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Abstract 
This thesis aims to examine a selection of the standards identifiable in the 
published work of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("the CPT"). Part I commences 
with an examination of the mandate and modus operandi of the Committee, 
followed by an exposition of the two fundamental principles 
- 
of confidentiality 
and co-operation 
- 
which inform its work. The CPT's standard-setting work is 
introduced by means of an examination of its evolution and rationale, the purport of 
standards set and the ways in which such standards find expression. 
Part II concerns CPT precepts on police custody. It begins with an examination of 
the CPT's "three fundamental safeguards against ill-treatment": the rights to notify 
a third party of the fact of one's detention, of access to legal advice and to a 
medical examination by a doctor of one's own choosing. It then considers, in turn, 
the duty to inform a detainee of all his rights; the conduct of police interrogations; 
the electronic recording of interviews; the maintenance of custody records; and 
police complaints and inspection procedures. 
Part III is devoted to a number of matters considered under the umbrella term 
"imprisonment". It begins with a detailed examination of the phenomenon of prison 
overcrowding, its effects on detainees and the prison environment, and policies 
designed to eradicate it or at least mitigate its effects. There then follow two 
sections on recourse to and safeguards attending, the use of force and/or 
instruments of restraint and solitary confinement in places of detention (which 
places include, for the sake of completeness, police establishments, immigration 
detention centres, psychiatric establishments, etc. ). 
Part IV attempts to draw everything together, to assess the impact of CPT standards 
on national criminal justice and penal policy and to consider ways in which that 
impact might be enhanced. 
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The Citation of CPT Documents in this Thesis 
It may be of some assistance to the reader if the manner in which CPT documents are 
cited in this work is explained. Visit reports are identified by reference to the State 
party visited, followed by a number representing the visit undertaken (the numeral "I" 
signifying the first visit to the Party 
- 
whether periodic or ad hoc in nature' 
- 
"II", the 
second visit, and so on) and a paragraph reference. Thus, the citation "Finland I, para 
56" is a reference to paragraph 56 of the report on the CPT's first visit to Finland. The 
CPT Document Reference Number ("CPT/Inf') is not indicated in the text. This may 
be found at Table A in the Appendix to this thesis. 
A similar approach has been adopted in respect of other CPT publications. General 
Reports are identified by the abbreviation "GR", preceded by an indication of its 
position in the sequence of annual reports. Thus, "2nd GR, pars 74" refers to 
paragraph 74 of the Committee's second General Report. The CPT Document 
Reference Number of such reports may be found at Table B of the Appendix. 
In the same way, "Finland Response I" refers to the Response of the Finnish 
Government to the CPT's first visit to the country and "Finland Response II", to the 
Response formulated to the Committee's second visit. Where a Party's response has 
taken the form of an "Interim" or "Follow-up" report, the citation is altered 
accordingly. It should be noted that the Appendix does not contain a Table of 
Government responses. It was decided that in the light of the infrequent reference in 
this text to such responses, the creation of such a Table could not readily be justified. 
Accordingly, the CPT Document Reference Numbers of Party responses are indicated 
in the text, at the relevant footnote. 
In adopting the approach just elaborated, it is intended to convey as much information 
to the reader as possible while seeking to avoid the creation of large and unwieldy 
footnotes. 
Bibliographical references 
A similar shorthand has been adopted in respect of bibliographical references. Books 
and academic articles are identified in the text by reference to their author(s) and the 
year of their publication (e. g. "Evans and Morgan (1998)"). Full references for the 
publications cited may be found in the Bibliography (followed by a parenthetical 
indication of how they appear in the text). 
' These terms are explained below, at pp 11-12. 
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PART I 
Introduction 
1 
An Introduction to the CPT 
Introduction 
The object of this thesis is to examine in a critical sense the standard-setting work of 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment ("the CPT"). More specifically, it is to examine a range of 
standards developed by the CPT in the first ten years of its operation. Because of the 
nature and requirements of the Ph. D. process, it is not possible to examine the work of 
the CPT exhaustively. Word and time constraints preclude anything other than a 
general overview, inter alia, of the evolution, mandate and modus operandi of the 
Committee. Fortunately, such matters have been studied in some detail by a number 
of commentators, who, it would not be an overstatement to say, may be considered 
"specialists" on the CPT. ' 
Those same constraints also preclude an exhaustive study of CPT standards. 
To examine in detail every standard or potential standard identifiable in the 
Committee's published work would be a huge undertaking. Consequently, a number 
have been selected which, it is hoped, adequately represent the range of standards to 
`A far from exhaustive list of the principal publications on the CPT includes Evans, Malcolm and 
Morgan, Rod, The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture: Operational Practice 41 ICLQ 
1992, pp 590-614; Morgan, Rod and Evans, Malcolm, Inspecting Prisons: the View from Strasbourg, 
34 BJC (Special Issue), Spring 1994, pp 141-159 (also published in King, R and Maguire, M. (eds. ), 
Prisons to Context, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) ("Morgan and Evans (1994)"); Evans, Malcolm D. 
and Morgan, Rod, Preventing Torture. A Study of the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998 ("Evans and Morgan (1998)"); Morgan, Rod and Evans, Malcolm D. (eds. ), Protecting Prisoners. The 
Standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture in Context, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1999 ("Morgan and Evans (1999)"); Murdoch, Jim, The Work of the Council of 
Europe's Torture Committee 5 EJIL 1994, pp 220-248 ("Murdoch (1994)"); and Cassese, Antonio, A 
New Approach to Human Rights: The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture 83 AJIL 
1989, pp 128-153 ("Cassese (1989)") and Inhuman States. Imprisonment, Detention and Torture in 
Europe Today, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, first published in Italian as Umano-Disumano: Commissariati e prigioni nell Europa di oggi, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1994 ("Cassese (1996)'). 
have emerged to date and whose study accurately reflects the way in which the CPT's 
standard-setting work has evolved and finds expression. 
Studies of CPT standards have been undertaken before. 2 However, such 
studies have invariably comprised just one part of a broader examination of the 
Committee's work; they have not set out specifically and comprehensively to consider 
the content of its evolving corpus of standards. By contrast, it is the express intention 
of this thesis to examine CPT standards as they find expression in its published work. 
Accordingly, while there may be some margin for debate as to the exact content of 
such standards 
- 
for, although many speak for themselves, a sufficiently large 
penumbral area exists round some, it is submitted, to permit a certain creativity in 
interpretation 
- 
it is hoped that the present work represents as thorough an analysis of 
the various standards considered as time and space permit. 
Axiomatically, in seeking to identify CPT precepts on the protection of 
detainees against ill-treatment, the most fruitful source of information is the 
Committee's published work, principally its reports on visits to States parties and its 
annual General Reports, supplemented, where appropriate (for example, when 
clarification on a particular point of domestic law is necessary), by the published 
responses of States parties visited. At various points in this text reference will also be 
made to the European Prison Rules ("the EPR"). The Rules are cited merely as a 
point of reference. It is not the purpose of this thesis to attempt a comparative study 
of the principles identifiable in the work of the CPT and those elaborated in the Rules. 
In the first place, the Rules, as their name suggests, relate principally to the detention 
of persons in prison establishments; whereas the present work devotes a not 
2 See, e. g., Evans, Malcolm D. and Morgan, Rod, The European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture: 1992-1997,46 ICLQ 1997, pp 663-675 ("Evans and Morgan (1997)") at 668 et seq.; Evans 
and Morgan (1998), pp 247-315; Morgan and Evans (1999), pp 31-82; Kaiser, Gunther, Detention in 
2 
inconsiderable amount of space, in addition, to standards on detention in police (and, 
indeed, other) establishments, which detention falls outside the Rules' purview 
- 
except, it might be argued, insofar as they relate to unconvicted prisoners. In the 
second place, any effort to study the compatibility of standards developed by the CPT 
with those elaborated under the EPR 
- 
or even with those elaborated under other 
international instruments which inhabit the same field 
- 
would be covering ground 
previously trodden in exemplary fashion by other commentators. 3 Consequently, 
brief references to the EPR in this work are made simply to place the precepts of the 
Committee in a broader historical and international context. 
In the identification and examination of CPT standards 
- 
and, where possible, 
potential standards 
- 
in this work, reference will be made to the experience of visiting 
delegations as well as to the Committee's interpretation of domestic law and practice. 
In some instances, it is worth noting, such law and practice may be said to offer 
greater protection for detainees than that sought by the CPT and this will be 
highlighted in the text. Obversely, where domestic provision falls short of CPT 
standards, the deficiency will be indicated and commented on. Further, reference will 
be made throughout, where appropriate, to detention in establishments other than 
prisons and police stations. However, it is not the author's intention to examine such 
detention in any depth. CPT standards on the detention, inter alia, of foreign 
nationals under domestic aliens legislation, the mentally ill and juveniles are not the 
subject of this work. They are deserving of quite separate treatment and the reader 
should look elsewhere for more comprehensive elaboration in this regard. 4 
Europe and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, I European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1995, pp 2-17 at 8 et seq; and Murdoch (1994), p 233 et seq. 
3 See, e. g., Murdoch (1994), pp 231-238 and CPT Standards within the Context of the Council of 
Europe, in Morgan and Evans (1999), pp 103-136; and Suntinger, Walter, CPT and Other 
International Standards for the Prevention of Torture, also in Morgan and Evans (1999), pp 137-166. 
" The CPT has used the medium of its annual General Reports to adumbrate standards on detention in 
places other than (adult) prisons and police establishments: see further below, p 50. 
3 
The reader should also be aware that to a very large extent, this work avoids 
examining material conditions of detention and the provision of regime activities in 
custodial establishments. Again, pressures of space have meant that detailed perusal 
of such features of detention is not feasible. However, where it is clear that the 
physical environment and the provision of activities are integral to the precept under 
discussion (for example, in the solitary confinement of detainees), appropriate 
reference and explanation will be offered in the text. 
The essential role of the CPT 
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment ("the ECPT")5 was opened for signature on 26th November 
1987 6 As at 18th August 2000, it had been ratified by all forty-one member States of 
the Council of Europe, 7 a number unlikely to have been anticipated twelve years 
earlier and which may be accounted for by the swelling of the Council of Europe 
following the accession of many central and eastern European States. 8 The ECPT 
establishes the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
s Council of Europe Doc. H (87) 4, reprinted in 27 ILM 1152 (1988); ETS 126; UKTS 54 (1991); 
Cmnd 1634. 
6 The origins and drafting history of the ECPT have been covered in extenso by a number of academic 
commentators. See, e. g., Cassese (1989), p 130 et seq; and Evans and Morgan (1998), p 106 et seq. 
See also paras 1-11 of the Explanatory Report, which accompanies the text of the ECPT. (On the status 
of the ExJlanatory Report as a means of interpreting the Convention text, see below, n 13. ) 
7 See 10 GR, para 14. Georgia ratified the Convention on 20th June 2000. It will enter into force in 
respect of the State on 1'` October 2000. 
8 It was a sine qua non of their membership of the Council of Europe that such States sign and ratify 
the ECPT. It should be noted that their accession to the Convention may have rendered redundant in 
practice the Convention's First Protocol (opened for signature in 1993; ETS 151; UK Misc. Series No. 
3 (1994); Cmnd 2454), which authorises the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to invite 
non-member States to accede to the ECPT. The Protocol has not yet entered into force and will only do 
so when ratified by all States parties. As at 18th August 2000, it had been ratified by all Parties except 
Croatia and Ukraine (see 10`s GR, para 15). If it ever does enter into force it might be used to extend 
the geographical scope of the Convention further still (by, for example, embracing Applicant States for 
membership of the Council of Europe or certain non-European States which enjoy close links with 
Europe). 
4 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("the CPT" or "the Committee"). 9 This 
Committee is mandated: 
"... by means of visits, [to] examine the treatment of persons deprived of their 
liberty with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection of such 
persons from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment" lo 
In order to facilitate the CPT's work: 
"Each party shall permit visits... to any place within its jurisdiction where 
persons are deprived of their liberty by a public authority". 11 
Following each such visit, the CPT is required to draw up a report setting out its 
findings. This report, which also contains, inter alia, the Committee's 
recommendations for strengthening the protection of detainees against ill-treatment, is 
transmitted to the Party concerned. 12 It marks the commencement of a post-visit 
dialogue between the CPT and the Party addressed. 
A non judicial organ 
In addressing States parties, the CPT acts in neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial 
capacity. "It is not its task to adjudge that violations of the relevant international 
instruments [e. g. Article 3, ECHR] have been committed" or to interpret the 
provisions of such instruments. 13 Its function, rather, is "purely preventive": to 
9 Article 1, ECPT. 
lo Ibid. 
11 Article 2, ECPT. 
12 Article 10(1), ECPT. 
13 See Explanatory Report, pars 17. The purpose of the Explanatory Report is to set out in detail the 
manner in which the provisions of the ECPT are to be interpreted and applied. It has been described as 
"an indispensable element of the proper interpretation and application of the Convention", particularly 
in light of the fact that the Convention provisions and the relevant parts of the Explanatory Report 
were always conceived as two parts of a whole". Accordingly, the Report does more than merely 
supplement the ECPT; it should be "considered as an agreement or instrument made in connection with 
the conclusion of the Convention": see letter of 9`" November 1990 from the President of the CPT to 
5 
conduct fact-finding visits and, if necessary, on the basis of its findings, to offer non- 
binding recommendations with a view to improving detainees' protection against ill- 
treatment. 14 Accordingly, the CPT has no legal or quasi-legal sanctions at its 
disposal. In the event that a Party refuses to improve matters in the light of the 
Committee's recommendations, particularly if that refusal is repeated, or refuses to 
co-operate with the CPT in other ways, the latter may, "after the Party has had an 
opportunity to make known its views", issue nothing more censorious than a "public 
statement"15 
- 
although it does have a "wide discretion" in deciding what information 
to make public (subject to certain considerations of confidentiality and due process). 16 
Thus, unlike the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, whose activities 
"aim at `conflict solution' on the legal level, the CPT's activities aim at `conflict 
avoidance' on the practical level". 17 Its task is "not to publicly criticise States, but 
rather to assist them in finding ways to strengthen the `cordon sanitaire' that separates 
acceptable and unacceptable treatment or behaviour". 18 
The ICRC model 
The work of the CPT has emerged from 
- 
in fact, was inspired by - that of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross ("the ICRC"), which carries out visits to 
places where prisoners of war are detained and, if appropriate, makes 
recommendations for the improvement of conditions therein. All such visits are 
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, in CPT/Inf (93) 10, pp 5-8 at 6-7. At the same time, 
however, the Report "does not have the same value as the text of the Convention": see letter of 10`s 
July 1991 from the President of the CPT to the Chairman of the Ministers' Deputies, CPT/Inf (93) 10, 
F4 13. 
Idem, para 25. 
15 Article 10(2), ECPT. The issuing of a public statement requires a majority of two-thirds among 
Committee members. 
16 See Explanatory Report, para 75. To date, two such statements have been issued, both concerning 
Turkey, the first in 1992 and the second in 1996: see Table A in the Appendix to this work. 
'7 See1'`GR, pars2. 
18 Ideen, para 3. Paragraphs 2 and 3, together with others contained in the CPT's 1d General Report, are 
reproduced in the first visit reports transmitted to Parties. 
6 
conducted in confidence, 19 which precept, together with that of co-operation between 
the ICRC and the local authorities (and the ICRC's scrupulously neutral approach to 
its work), provides the bedrock on which it operates. The ICRC may only visit places 
of detention when there exists a state of international armed conflict between States 
parties to the Geneva Conventions of 12th August 1949.20 In all other cases, it may do 
so only by negotiating special agreements with the State concerned or, in 
circumstances in which a state of internal armed conflict exists, with each of the 
parties to the conflict, 21 which agreements may generally be terminated at any 
moment. However, the Committee will only undertake visits if certain non-negotiable 
conditions are agreed to: it must be granted access to all detainees in all locations 
which fall within the scope of its mandate; it must be able to interview detainees 
freely in the absence of witnesses; it must be free to draw up lists of prisoners; and it 
must be able to make repeat visits and to distribute aid if necessary. 
The parallels between the work of the ICRC and that of the CPT are clear to 
see. The mandate of the CPT has simply been broadened to encompass peacetime 
visits to a wider range of places of detention. Interestingly, it is a mandate the 
realisation of which was first attempted at the global, rather than regional, level. In 
1980, the Government of Costa Rica submitted a draft Optional Protocol to the - then 
- 
draft International Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("UNCAT"), 22 which Protocol sought to create 
at the universal level a system of visits like that which eventually took shape in 
Europe. The proposal, while much debated, has yet to proceed beyond the draft 
19 In practice, this means that while reporting publicly on the locations of its visits, the ICRC does not 
report publicly on its findings, which are transmitted only to the local authorities. 
20 See common Article 10/10/10/11, Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, 1e 
August 1949; UNTS 75 31; UKTS 39 (1958); Cmnd 550. 
Z' See common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, op cit, n 20. 
The Convention entered into force on 26th June 1987 (23 ILM 1027; 24 ILM 535; UKTS 107 (1991); 
Cmnd 1775). 
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stage23 and may be regarded as, to all intents and purposes, indefinitely stalled. This 
means that the ECPT is unique in international law. It is the first and, for the time 
being, only treaty-based mechanism which facilitates the regular and, if necessary, ad 
hoc, inspection of a variety of places of detention and the making of recommendations 
by the organ mandated to carry out such inspections 24 The CPT's work and, it 
follows, the standards which it sets, are accordingly of great significance. 
Membership 
The ECPT provides that the Committee shall consist of a number of members equal to 
the number of Parties. 25 Members are elected by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe from a list of three candidates provided by each Party. 26 They are 
elected for a period of four years and are eligible for re-election only once. 27 If it 
enters into force, the Second Protocol to the ECPT will, inter alia, permit members to 
stand for re-election for a second time. The Protocol was opened for signature in 
1993 and as at 18th August 2000, had been signed and ratified by thirty-nine of the 
forty-one States parties. 28 
23 For a number of years now, a working group has been engaged in an effort to settle a text to be put 
forward for adoption: see, inter a/ia, Association for the Prevention of Torture ("APT"), Working 
Group on the Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Analytical Report of the Association for the Prevention of 
Torture, APT, Geneva, 1996, which covers the history of such efforts to the end of 1995; and, for 
recent evidence of the on-going work of the group, GAOR A/54/44, at p2 (1999). 
24 The Committee Against Torture, established by UNCAT, is mandated to receive and examine reports 
from States parties and, under two optional procedures, communications from either States or 
individuals. Further, it is authorised to instigate (confidential) investigations if it receives "reliable 
information" which appears to it to show "well founded indications" that torture is being 
"systematically practised" in a State party. Clearly, the UN Committee's mandate is narrower than that 
of the CPT. Further, like the Council of Europe, the Organisation of American States has formulated a 
regional torture convention. However, it is principally concerned with acts of torture and does not 
possess the broad-ranging sphere of concern of its European sibling. Further, it does not establish an 
organ possessed of a mandate like that of the CPT. 
0 Article 4(1), ECPT. As at 18'" August 2000, the CPT comprised 36 members, the seats of Greece, 
Hungary, Italy and Latvia being vacant and that of Georgia requiring to be filled as from 1° October 
2000: see 10 GR, para 17. 
26 Article 5(1), ECPT. 
21 Article 5(3), ECPT. 
28 See 10t` GR, para 15. Like the First Protocol, the Second Protocol (ETS 152; UK Misc. Series No. 4 
(1994); Cmnd 2459) will only enter into force once ratified by every State party. 
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Members serve "in their individual capacity". 29 They do not represent the 
Party that nominated them or, for that matter, any other interest or cause. Thus, they 
are to be "independent and impartial, and shall be available to serve the Committee 
effectively". 30 They shall be: 
"... chosen from among persons of high moral character, known for their 
competence in the field of human rights or having professional experience in 
the areas covered by this Convention". 31 
In this connection, the Explanatory Report suggests, inter alia, that: 
"[i]t is not thought desirable to specify in detail the professional fields from 
which members of the Committee might be drawn... It would be desirable that 
the Committee should include members who have experience in matters such 
as prison administration and the various medical fields relevant to the 
treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. This will make the dialogue 
between the Committee and the States more effective and facilitate concrete 
suggestions from the Committee". 32 
In order to ensure that in carrying out its work, the CPT is able to avail itself of as 
much expertise on matters falling within the scope of its mandate as possible, it may, 
"if it considers it necessary, be assisted by experts... "33 This provision is important, 
it is submitted, because even the most balanced of Committees will lack expertise in 
29 Article 4(4), ECPT. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Article 5(2), ECPT. 
32 See Explanatory Report, para 36. It has been said recently that the composition of the Committee 
comprises a good balance of gender and expertise: see Morgan and Evans (1999), pp 12-13 (reflecting 
the situation as it stood in December 1998). However, recent elections, it is clear, have left it a little 
short of medical practitioners, notably forensic doctors 
- 
especially when compared with the number of 
legally trained members 
- 
as well as persons with experience of police matters and women (who 
currently comprise only 9 out of 36 members): see 10`s GR, para 18. 
33 Article 7(2), ECPT. 
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some areas. The "underlying idea" of the ad hoc use of experts, the Explanatory 
Report makes clear, is: 
"... to supplement the experience of the Committee by the assistance, for 
example, of persons who have special training or experience of humanitarian 
missions, who have a medical background or possess a special competence in 
the treatment of detainees or in prison regimes and, when appropriate, as 
regards young persons". 34 
It is clear from a perusal of visit reports that the use of outside expertise in the 
conduct of visits is a practice which may be considered, to all intents and purposes, as 
routine, a state of affairs which was perhaps not anticipated when the CPT 
commenced its work. 35 
VLcitc 
Visits to States parties, as we have seen, represent the means by which the CPT fulfils 
its Convention mandate. The effectiveness with which they are carried out, therefore, 
is crucial to the success or failure of the entire Convention system. Accordingly, they 
are worth examining in some detail. 
The scope of the CPT's visiting role 
The CPT is entitled to make visits to "all kinds of places where persons are deprived 
of their liberty, whatever the reasons may be". 36 Thus, it may visit and enjoys 
34 See Explanatory Report, pars 51. 
33 See Morgan and Evans (1999) p 14. Unlike members of the Committee, experts may "exceptionally" 
be excluded from delegations that visit a Party by the national authorities: Article 14(3), ECPT. 36 See Explanatory Report, para 30. 
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complete freedom of movement37 in, inter alia, police stations, prisons, immigration 
detention centres, psychiatric hospitals, juvenile detention centres and military 
barracks: in short, "any place within [a Parties'] jurisdiction where one or more 
persons are deprived of their liberty by a public authority... whether the deprivation is 
based on a formal decision or not". 38 Visits may be made to both private and public 
institutions. However, because the crucial element is whether the deprivation of 
liberty is the result of action taken by a public authority, the CPT may not visit 
persons who are detained voluntarily, like certain psychiatric patients (although, in 
such circumstances, it should be permitted to satisfy itself that the requisite 
voluntariness is present). 39 
Types of visit 
Article 7(1), ECPT provides that the CPT shall undertake two types of visit. Visits of 
the first type, periodic in nature, are made to each State party putatively on a regular 
basis. 0 In formulating its programme of periodic visits, the Explanatory Report 
suggests, the CPT should "ensure, as far as possible, that the different States are 
visited on an equitable basis" 41 Periodic visits vary in length, depending, inter alia, 
on the size of the Party being visited. At their longest, they may last between two and 
three weeks. During each such visit, the CPT may visit a number of different kinds of 
establishment in a variety of locations. However, "its programme of periodic visits 
37 The right of free movement in places of detention is conferred on the Committee by Article 8(2), 
sub-paras (a) and (c), ECPT (see further below, pp 35-36). The right is circumscribed, however, by 
Article 9, ECPT (see below, pp 15-16). 
38 See Explanatory Report, para 28. 
39 Idem, para 32. 
40 The Committee originally expressed the intention to visit each Party on a two-year cycle. With the 
accession to the ECPT of a number of central and eastern European States and the decision to visit each 
such State within a year of their accession, however, that cycle has now stretched to one of four years: 
see inter alia Morgan and Evans (1999), p 15. 
"'See Explanatory Report, pars 48. See also Rule 31.2 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure. 
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should not imply, for practical reasons", the Explanatory Report asserts, "systematic 
visits in all places where persons are deprived of their liberty". 42 
The immanent rigidity of periodic visits and the increased length of the 
periodic visit cycle has imbued the second type of visit authorised by Article 7(1), 
namely, "such other visits as appear to [the Committee] to be required in the 
circumstances" 
- 
more commonly and conveniently referred to as ad hoc visits 
- 
with 
a greater significance. Over the course of its working life, ad hoc visits have become 
an increasing feature of the Committee's activities, a trend which finds justification in 
the Explanatory Report, which states unequivocally that the CPT "should even accord 
a certain priority to ad hoc visits... s43 
Typically, ad hoc visits are precipitated by a concern on the part of the CPT 
that the situation in a particular establishment or type of establishment or locality or 
Party generally demands urgent attention. Accordingly, it is invested with a certain 
discretion in determining the necessity of a visit, as well as the criteria on which such 
determination is based. Thus, whilst visits may not be triggered by the receipt of 
individual complaints 
- 
the ECHR organs, after all, offer more appropriate fora for 
the investigation of such matters 
- 
the CPT should be "free to assess communications 
from individuals or groups of individuals and to decide whether to exercise its 
functions upon such communications". 44 
As the Committee's experience has grown, a third type of visit has emerged, 
which may be considered an offshoot of the ad hoc visit procedure. Follow-up visits 
are swift, targeted visits to an establishment or establishments visited previously in 
'2 Ibid. 
`3 Ibid. 
44 Idem, para 49 (which also states that the CPT should enjoy a "similar" discretion when invited by a 
Party to visit places within its jurisdiction in order to `Investigate certain allegations and to clarify the 
situation'). 
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the course of periodic or ad hoc visits. Today, therefore, the distinctions between the 
various categories of visit are increasingly blurred, particularly now that Parties are 
being visited for a third, fourth and even fifth45 and sixth46 time, with the consequence 
that even periodic visits may focus on establishments visited previously 47 
Visits are not carried out by the full Committee. "As a general rule", Article 
7(l), ECPT stipulates, "visits shall be carried out by at least two members of the 
Committee" 48 These members 
- 
who shall not include the member elected in respect 
of the State to be visited49 
- 
form part of a delegation, comprising also ad hoc 
experts, 50 interpreters and members of the Secretariat. The composition of such 
delegations varies depending on the length and nature of the visit and the size of the 
Party. Periodic visits may involve as many as five Committee members, two experts, 
a number of interpreters and two members of the Secretariat. 
Notification of visits 
The CPT is duty-bound to "notify the Government of the Party concerned of its 
intention to carry out a visit", following which notification it may visit those places of 
45 At the time of writing, the UK had received five visits. 
I Spain, for example, has been visited on six occasions. Turkey, it should be noted, has received nine 
visits to date. 47 Although not strictly falling within the scope of the term visit, the recently developed practice 
whereby members of the CPT Bureau 
- 
which comprises three Committee members, the President and 
First and Second Vice-Presidents 
- 
and Secretariat visit Parties in advance of first periodic visits in 
order to address officials and activists on the work of the CPT is worth noting in the present 
connection. It has proved particularly useful in acquainting central and eastern European Parties with 
the Committee's purpose and modus operandi: see inter alia 10d' GR, para 8 and also Morgan and 
Evans (1999), p 22. The CPT has also engaged State authorities in direct, "face-to-face" discussions to 
coincide with the transmission of visit reports, the aim of which is to highlight certain key issues raised 
in the reports and to transmit information to relevant government departments: see inter alia 1O' GR, 
ara 9. $ Exceptionally, however, one member may conduct a visit, "e. g. in ad hoc visits of an urgent nature 
when only one member is available": see Explanatory Report, para 50 (and Rule 34.1 of the CPT's 
Rules of Procedure). 
49 See Rule 37.2 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure. 
50 Rather like the Committee members who may participate in a visit, "as a rule", a visiting delegation 
shall not be assisted by an expert who is a national of the State to be visited: Rule 38.2 of the CPT's 
Rules of Procedure. 
13 
detention which it is authorised to visit "at any time". 51 It is notable that no specific 
provision is made as to the period of notice, which means that, in principle, a visit 
could take place immediately after notification has been given. 52 However, in order 
that a visit may be rendered "as effective as possible", the Explanatory Report 
provides that, "as a general rule and taking into consideration the principle of co- 
operation set out in Article 3, [ECPT]", 53 the Committee should give the Party 
concerned "reasonable time to take the necessary measures... "54 
In practice, the CPT has adopted a three-stage notification procedure. In the 
calendar year before they are due to take place, it announces its programme of 
periodic visits, without indicating the timing of such visits. 55 Approximately two 
weeks before the visit to a particular Party is due to commence, the CPT sends notice 
of its intention to visit to the national authorities. It is expected that this notification 
will indicate the timing and anticipated length of the visit and the composition of the 
visiting delegation, including Committee members, ad hoc experts, members of the 
Secretariat and interpreters. Lastly, the Party is furnished with a list of establishments 
to be visited a few days before the Committee's arrival. This list is provisional and 
"should not preclude the Committee from announcing that it also wishes to visit other 
establishments in the course of the visit". 56 The identification of places of detention 
s' Article 8(1), ECPT. 
52 Recently, the CPT undertook an ad hoc visit to Spain a mere three days after learning of the incident 
which precipitated it and just two days after first contacting the Spanish authorities in connection with 
it (see the CPT's sixth report to the Spanish Government relating to the apprehension, detention and 
interrogation of Mr Jesus Arcauz Arena, a suspected terrorist, in early January 1997). 
 On the principle of co-operation generally, see below, p 31 et seq. 54 See Explanatory Report, para 56. At the same time, the Report continues, "the Committee should 
carry out the visit within a reasonable time after notification". 55 See Rule 31.2 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure. Ten periodic visits were scheduled for 2000: see 
Council of Europe Press Release dated Yd December 1999. The Committee aspires to carry out visits 
on 200 days each year (see, e. g., 9`h GR, pares 18-19). However, insufficient resources have meant that 
the number of "visit days" for which a budget is available currently stands at 150: see 1& OR, para 
20. 
56 See Explanatory Report, pars 58. 
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to be visited rests, as might be expected, with the CPT itself. However, it is reliant, 
to a certain extent, on information furnished by others, such as States parties, non- 
governmental organisations ("NGOs"), the media and, with its own developing 
experience, information gathered by its Members and the Secretariat in researching 
and conducting visits. 
Restricting the right of visit 
Article 9(1), ECPT provides that: 
"In exceptional circumstances, the competent authorities of the Party 
concerned may make representations to the Committee against a visit at the 
time or to the particular place proposed by the Committee. Such 
representations may only be made on grounds of defence, public safety, 57 
serious disorder in places where persons are deprived of their liberty, the 
medical condition of a person58 or that an urgent interrogation relating to a 
serious crime is in progress". 
This provision recognises that, "notwithstanding the obligations of a Party to permit 
visits by the Committee, certain exceptional circumstances may justify a 
postponement of a visit or some limitation of the right of access of the Committee as 
regards a particular place". 59 In order to avoid compromising the CPT's right of visit, 
however, Article 9(2) provides that: 
"Following... representations [made under Article 9(1)], the Committee and 
the Party shall immediately enter into consultations in order to clarify the 
situation and seek agreement on arrangements to enable the Committee to 
57 Which ground includes "an urgent and compelling need to prevent serious crime": see Explanatory 
Report, para 71 (2d indent). 
S8 I. e. "where, having regard to the medical (including mental) condition of a person proposed to be 
visited, a visit at a particular time could prove detrimental to health": ibid (4th indent). 
39 Ibid. 
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exercise its functions expeditiously. Such arrangements may include the 
transfer to another place of any person whom the Committee proposed to visit. 
Until the visit takes place, the Party shall provide information to the 
Committee about any person concerned". 
The publication of reports 
Visit reports 
After each visit, the Committee is required to draw up a report on the facts found by 
its delegation60 and transmit it to the Party concerned, together with any number of 
"recommendations" for improving detainees' protection against ill-treatment, 
"comments" and "requests for information". The Convention text only refers to 
recommendations and it is these to which Parties must respond; they are under no 
obligation to respond to comments and requests for information. Nevertheless, these 
latter expedients afford the CPT useful opportunities to make known its views on 
particular matters or to indicate areas of concern without having to resort to the more 
demanding and arguably more antagonistic formula of a recommendation. 61 
Visit reports are prepared by the delegations that carried out the visits to which 
they relate. They are subsequently adopted at one of the CPT's tri-annual plenary 
meetings. Originally, it was the Committee's intention to adopt reports within six 
months of a visit. However, pressures on resources, both financial and administrative, 
particularly following the accession to the ECPT of various central and eastern 
60 Visit reports characteristically describe establishments visited in some detail, including the amount of 
available accommodation, size of the inmate population, cell size and furnishings, sanitary facilities 
and all aspects of the custodial regime. Consequently, it is possible for the CPT - and the reader - to 
formulate a "cumulative view" of the effect of the custodial environment on persons detained therein: 
see Morgan and Evans (1994) at 154. 
61 It is worth noting in the present connection that, notwithstanding the formal constraints of the 
reporting procedure, the ECPT makes provision, at Article 8(5), for the CPT to make immediate 
observations to a Party in the course of a visit, typically when its findings give cause for serious 
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European States, have made meeting this objective difficult. More commonly, the 
post-visit interregnum lasts up to nine months. Having been adopted, visit reports are 
transmitted under a cloak of confidentiality to the State party concerned, together with 
a request that the latter furnish the Committee, within six months, with an interim 
report on measures taken or proposed to be taken to implement CPT 
recommendations and, within twelve months, with a follow-up report containing fuller 
details of such measures. 62 Upon receipt and perusal of a response, the CPT engages 
in further dialogue by way of an exchange of letters. Ultimately, of course, this 
dialogue elides into the preparations being made for the next visit to the Party 
concerned. 3 
The visit report (as well as all other material gathered in connection with a 
visit and the responses of State parties) remains confidential unless and until the Party 
concerned authorises its publication. TM It is a mark of the success of the Convention 
system that the overwhelming majority of visit reports have been published. 65 
General Reports 
In addition to visit reports, the CPT is required on an annual basis to draw up a 
"general report on its activities". This report is submitted to the Committee of 
Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and, subject to the 
concern. The use made of this expedient by the CPT will be dealt with in greater detail below, at pp 
51-3. 
62 Following an ad hoc visit, the CPT more commonly requests a single response. 
63 interestingly, at least in the context of the present work, Morgan and Evans have suggested that "the 
nature of the dialogue tends to reinforce the value of fairly formal standards which can be readily 
articulated and can form a fixed point in a process that may span several years": see Morgan and Evans 
(1999), P18. 
' Article 11(1) and (2), ECPT. On the principle of confidentiality as it applies inter alia to the 
reporting procedure, see below, p 19 et seq. 65 As at 18'h August 2000, the publication of 65 of the 98 visit reports so far drawn up had been 
authorised: see 10'" GR, pars 11. Even the most recalcitrant Party, Turkey, has authorised the 
publication of the report on the CPT's 1997 periodic visit (although seven other Turkish reports, dating 
back to 1990, remain unpublished). 
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Convention requirement of confidentiality, 6 made public. 67 General Reports should 
contain, inter alia, "information on the organisation and internal workings of the 
Committee and on its activities proper, with particular mention of the States 
visited". 68 In the context of this thesis, the CPT's annual reporting responsibilities are 
of great significance, for, as we shall see, they provide much of the foundation for the 
Committee's standard-setting work. It has used them as the medium through which to 
set down a number of precepts on various aspects and categories of detention with a 
view to stimulating discussion as well as to giving some indication, in advance of 
visits, of its views on certain matters. 69 
Conclusion 
It is hoped that the foregoing analysis offers sufficient insight into the mandate and 
working methods of the CPT and the legal framework within which it operates to 
enable the reader to place its standard-setting work in some kind of institutional 
context. It is not intended to be an exhaustive account of the CPT as an organ of 
inspection. Rather, it is an attempt to adumbrate the most salient features of its work, 
before we consider the formulation and evolution of its standards. Two features of 
the ECPT system are deserving of particular examination, however, for they strongly 
shape and inform the nature of the Committee's work. They are the principles that 
underlie its visit and reporting responsibilities and it is these to which we now turn. 
" As provided for in Article 11, ECPT. 
67 Article 12, ECPT. 
6S See Explanatory Report, pare 79. 
69 See fur her below, p 50. 
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2 
Principles which Underpin the Work of the CPT 
Introduction 
Because of the intrusive nature of its work and the sensibilities of States parties in the 
formulation and implementation of policy on detention (regardless of type), the CPT 
must adopt a modus operandi which is at once effective, permitting it to operate in 
accordance with its preventive mandate without undue hindrance or obstruction, and 
sensitive to the difficulties of States, inter alia, in tackling crime, punishing offenders, 
protecting society at large, safeguarding the welfare of vulnerable and disturbed 
individuals and operating an effective and humane immigration policy. 
Consequently, the Committee has developed a working method constructed on the 
twin pillars of confidentiality and co-operation. Respect for these two principles, both 
on the part of the CPT and its interlocutors, it follows, facilitates efforts to strengthen 
the protection of detainees against ill-treatment without the Committee's being or 
appearing to be didactic and abrasive. It is proposed to examine each principle in turn 
before considering in detail the CPT's standard-setting work. 
The principle of confidentiality 
The Convention text 
All aspects of the CPT's work, whether concerned with the preparation for and 
conduct of visits, the formulation of visit reports or the subsequent and on-going 
dialogue with States parties, are subject to a strict regime of confidentiality. 
Adherence to this regime, it is clear, is crucial to the proper functioning of the 
Committee and to State party confidence therein. Accordingly, the CPT has 
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characterised the principle of confidentiality as "one of the cornerstones of its conduct 
of business". ' The principle itself finds expression, inter alia, in Article 11, ECPT, 
which provides that: 
"1. The information gathered by the Committee in relation to a visit, its report 
and its consultations with the Party concerned shall be confidential. 2 
"2. The Committee shall publish its report, together with any comments of the 
Party concerned, whenever requested to do so by that Party. 3 
"3. However, no personal data shall be published without the express consent 
of the person concerned". 
What information is confidential? 
The Explanatory Report to the ECPT develops each of the Article 11 provisions. 
Article 11(1), ECPT, the Report states, "establishes the principle of the confidential 
nature of the Committee's activities". Its reference to "information gathered by the 
Committee", it suggests, is a reference, inter alia, to: 
"... facts it has itself observed, information which it has obtained from external 
sources and information which it has itself collected". 5 
In addition, the Rules of Procedure provide that confidentiality shall extend to "all 
Committee meeting reports and working documents". 6 Clearly, therefore, all 
observations made and information received and collected and all meetings and 
consultations held and all minutes of meetings and consultations made, by the CPT in 
the course of its work are considered subject to the principle of strict confidentiality. 
Further, the Committee respects the principle of legal professional privilege in the 
i See 1" GR, pars 78. 
2 See, similarly, Rule 45.1 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure. 
See also Rule 42.1 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure. 
4See also Rule 45.2 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure. 
s See Explanatory Report, para 76. 
6 See Rule 45.1of the CPT's Rules of Procedure. 
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performance of its Convention responsibilities, for example, acceding to the requests 
of national authorities to omit from published visit reports passages relating to 
professional legal advice given to those authorities in connection with certain matters 
raised by visiting delegations. 
Authorising publication of the visit report: a duty to publish the entire report 
To Article 11(2), ECPT, the Explanatory Report adds the following rider: 
"[i]f the State concerned itself makes the report public, it should do so in its 
entirety". 8 
The Committee's Rules of Procedure develop this point further, stipulating that: 
"... [i]f the Party itself makes the report public, but does not do so in its 
entirety, the Committee may decide to publish the whole report... 
... 
Similarly, the Committee may decide to publish the whole report if the 
Party concerned makes a public statement summarising the report or 
commenting upon its contents" 9 
The publication ofpersonal data: a qualified prohibition 
Paragraph 78 of the Explanatory Report qualifies the Article 11(3) prohibition against 
the publication of personal data without the express consent of the person concerned. 
It provides that the prohibition: 
"... might not exclude the publication of such data if the identity of the person 
concerned is not revealed or could not be discovered from the context". 
See, e. g., UK IV, paras 40,42,44 and 45 (relating to legal advice given by the Metropolitan Police 
Solicitors Department to senior officers from the Metropolitan Police Force and the Director of the 
Complaints and Investigation Branch of the Metropolitan Police in connection with a number of civil 
actions brought by persons alleging ill-treatment at the hands of officers employed by the Force). 
= See Explanatory Report, pars 77 (emphasis added). 
9 See Rule 42.2 and 42.3 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure. 
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This qualification would, seemingly, facilitate the making of references in visit 
reports to specific individual cases, while safeguarding the identity of the person 
concerned. 10 
A continuing duty 
The confidential character of the CPT's work is further circumscribed 
- 
and, indeed, 
strengthened 
- 
by Article 13, ECPT, which provides that: 
"The members of the Committee, experts and other persons assisting the 
Committee are required, during and after their terms of office, to maintain the 
confidentiality of the facts or information of which they have become aware 
during the discharge of their functions". 
Rule 46.1 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure merely replicates the terms of Article 13, 
while paragraph 80 of the Explanatory Report emphasises its key points, stating that: 
"[i]n accordance with [Article 13], members of the Committee, experts and 
other persons assisting the Committee are required to observe confidentiality, 
even after their term of office has come to an end. It relates to all facts or 
information which may have come to the notice of the Committee members or 
such other persons during the discharge of their functions when visits are 
being effected, or at any other moment". 
10 In only one instance, to date, has a detainee expressly consented to the publication of personal data 
from which his identification could be ascertained. It concerned a person interviewed by the CPT in 
Spain in the course of an ad hoc visit in 1997. His alleged ill-treatment at the hands of police officers 
formed the basis of an entire report. He consented to the revelation of his identification, both when the 
report was transmitted to the Spanish authorities and in the event of its publication: see Spain VI, p 8, n 
1. The Convention prohibition against the publication of personal data 
- 
or at least the passing on of 
such data to other interested bodies 
- 
has been criticised in some parts because, it is argued, it may 
serve to mask ill-treatment: see Evans and Morgan (1998), p 374. 
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Sanctions against errant members of the CPT 
Following a number of leaks of "purportedly... confidential material" to the media 
during its early working life, as well as the latter's misrepresentation of "matters that 
should have remained confidential", the Committee determined, in 1990, inter alia, to 
"reinforce its practices and procedural rules on the subject of confidentiality". " 
Accordingly, it formulated two new Rules of Procedure, Rules 47 and 48.12 Rule 47 
provides that: 
"[i]f there are serious grounds for believing that a Committee member has 
violated the obligation of confidentiality, the Committee may, after the 
member concerned has had an opportunity to state his views, decide by a 
majority of two-thirds of its members to inform the Committee of Ministers of 
the matter". 
However, in its 1" General Report, the CPT adumbrated a more measured, two-stage 
reference procedure, which provides that: 
"... if there are serious grounds for believing that a Committee member has 
violated the rule of confidentiality, the Committee may, after the member 
concerned has had an opportunity to state his views, decide by a majority of 
two-thirds of its members to issue an admonition to that member; in case of a 
new breach of confidentiality by the same Committee member, the CPT may 
inform the Committee of Ministers of the matter, under Rule 47 of its Rules of 
Procedure 
... 
s13 
In the absence of any indication from the CPT as to which of these two approaches is 
il See 1° GR, paras 79-80. On the Committee's relationship with the media generally, see below, p 27- 
31. 
12 Both new Rules were formally introduced on 9th November 1990. 
13 See 1" GR, para 82, sub-pars (iii). 
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to be preferred, it would be sensible to consider the more flexible and elaborate one 
suggested in its 1" General Report as most accurately representing its thinking on the 
subject. However, the Committee's elaboration of this embryonic internal 
disciplinary procedure has not ended there. To the process just highlighted, it has 
added, peremptorily, that: 
"... if a Committee member to whom an admonition has been addressed is a 
member of the Bureau, he shall resign from his position as President or Vice- 
President". 14 
It should be noted that this provision is not reflected in Rule 47 of the CPT's Rules of 
Procedure. 
A duty which binds members of the Secretariat, experts and interpreters 
Rule 46.2 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure stipulates that: 
"A provision [replicating Article 13, ECPT and Rule 46.1 of the Rules of 
Procedure] shall be inserted in the contracts of experts and interpreters 
recruited to assist the Committee". 
In addition, the new Rule 48 provides that: 
"1. If there are serious grounds for believing that a member of the 
Committee's Secretariat or an interpreter has violated the obligation of 
confidentiality, the Committee may, after the person concerned has had an 
opportunity to state his views, decide by a majority of its members to inform 
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of the matter and request that 
appropriate measures be taken. 
14 Ibid. 
24 
2. If there are serious grounds for believing that an expert has violated the 
obligation of confidentiality, the Committee shall, after the person concerned 
has had an opportunity to state his views, decide by a majority of its members 
on the measures to be taken". 15 
Confidentiality in the conduct of relations with other organisations working in the 
same field 
Insofar as the CPT enjoys relations with agencies like the European Commission and 
Court of Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN 
Committee against Torture, the UN Special Rapporteur on questions relevant to 
torture and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as any number of non- 
governmental organisations, 16 it is, it has insisted, "of course, bound by its obligation 
of confidentiality". Accordingly: 
"... it cannot disclose [to such organisations] anything about its findings or its 
deliberations (though it can of course provide information on its working 
methods in general)". 17 
As a result, it maintains, "the flow of information between [it] and the bodies 
concerned is very much a one-way process". 18 
States parties and the duty of confidentiality 
The Committee has been at pains to point out that the principle of confidentiality, as it 
applies to its own work and relations, should apply equally to States parties. For 
instance, in its 1" General Report, regarding "allegations in the media that the national 
15 See also 1d GR, Para 82, sub-para (iv). 
16 On such relations generally, see 1" GR, paras 42-44. 
'7 Idem, Para 43. 
11 Ibid However, cf below, p 487. The CPT's adherence to the principle of confidentiality, particularly 
as it applies in its relations with NGOs, has been criticised by both NGOs and some commentators: see, 
e. g., Evans and Morgan (1998), pp 359-62 and 375-9. 
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authorities of a State party ha[d] disclosed confidential material", it declared that "the 
Bureau should immediately draw the attention of those authorities to such allegations 
and insist that the rule of confidentiality also applies to States". 19 
Confidentiality in the preparation of annual General Reports 
By virtue of Article 12, ECPT, the CPT's obligation to produce an annual report on its 
activities is, like other areas of its work, "[s]ubject to the rules of confidentiality in 
Article 11". This constraint is given further emphasis in the accompanying 
Explanatory Report, which provides that "[w]hen preparing its report, the Committee 
must naturally comply with the provisions of Article 11 concerning the confidential 
character of certain types of information and data". 20 Further, as might be expected, 
reference is made to the duty in the CPT's Rules of Procedure. 21 
Confidentiality and the issuing of public statements 
We have already touched on the public statement procedure in the context of the 
sanctions available to the CPT in the event of a failure to co-operate on the part of 
States parties. u However, what has not so far been examined in any detail is the 
extent to which the rule of confidentiality affects the contents of such statements and 
the manner in which they are issued. In this regard, the Committee's Rules of 
Procedure make it clear that: 
"Subject to the provisions of Rule 45, paragraph 2, the Committee shall be 23 
released from the obligation of confidentiality when making a public 
statement" 24 
19 Idem, para 82, sub-para (v) (emphasis added). 
20 See Explanatory Report, para 79. 
21 At Rule 49.1. 
I See above, p 6. 
p Rule 45.2 concerns the confidentiality of personal data: see further above, p 20, n 4. 24 See Rule 44.3 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure. 
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Clearly, the CPT's latitude in this area is considerable, a fact given emphasis by the 
Explanatory Report to the ECPT, which provides that "[t]he Committee will have a 
wide discretion in deciding what information to make public... "25 However, it adds 
the 
- 
not unexpected 
- 
caveat that in exercising such discretion: 
"... [it] will have to take due account of the need to secure that information 
passed over in confidence is not revealed. It should also take into 
consideration the desirability of not revealing information in connection with 
pending investigations". 6 
The CPT and the media 
In its 1" General Report, the CPT considered in extenso the potentially contentious 
subject of its relationship with the media. 27 Conveniently, it sought to explain the 
progressive shift in its attitude towards the role of the media in its work which took 
place early in its working life. At its inception, it admitted, it "refrain[ed] from 
having any contact whatsoever with the media, in order to ensure respect for the basic 
obligation of confidentiality". 8 Over time, however, it grew to realise that it had 
"underestimated the interest of the media as well as of non-governmental 
organisations and individuals in being fully informed about the CPT's activities". 29 
Unfortunately, this interest did not always manifest itself in accurate reporting of the 
Committee's work, with the result that within the first year of its operation, it was 
forced to reassess its approach to relations with the media. "[A] few months after [it] 
became operational", it reflected, "some newspapers began carrying articles 
purportedly disclosing confidential material". Indeed, "on occasion", it seems, they 
25 See Explanatory Report, Para 75. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See generally 1" GR, paras 78-84. 
2s Ideen Para 78. 
29 Idem, Para 79. 
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set out 
- 
"sometimes in a distorted way" 
- 
matters "that should have remained 
confidential". On one such occasion, following a CPT visit, a newspaper had "clearly 
pieced together information received from persons and organisations with which the 
visiting delegation had been in contact and [had] purported to disclose the 
delegation's findings". On another, a newspaper had "published erroneous statements 
about what the delegation was supposed to have seen in a particular prison". Further, 
on more than one occasion, it is clear, newspapers had "alleged that the national 
authorities of a particular country had publicised confidential statements made within 
the CPT'. 30 "Highly concerned by this trend", the CPT resolved to systematise its 
relations with the media. Accordingly, it adopted: 
"a three-pronged policy: to officially channel to the media all information not 
covered by the rule of confidentiality; to reinforce its practices and procedural 
rules on the subject of confidentiality; [and] to react immediately to statements 
in the media distorting the CPT's activities". 31 
It is worth examining each feature of this policy in turn. 
Furnishing the media with all non-confidential information 
The Committee determined in late 1990, that if it is to reduce the risk of media 
misrepresentation of its work, it should actively furnish media organisations with all 
material not covered by the rule of confidentiality. This approach, it resolved, would 
manifest itself, essentially, in two ways: 
"i) a press release [would] be issued at the end of each visit 
- 
be it periodic or 
ad hoc 
- 
indicating the name of the country visited, the dates of the visit, the 
composition of the delegation and the places visited; 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ideen, para 80. 
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ü) the CPT's Bureau [would] maintain appropriate informal contacts with 
representatives of the media on a regular basis, while strictly respecting the 
rule of confidentiality". 32 
As to point (ii), unfortunately, the Committee has, to date, offered no indication as to 
what it means by the terms "appropriate" and "regular" when describing the contact to 
be made by the Bureau with media organisations. It is very likely, however, that a 
modus vivendi has emerged as a result of its experiences in the field. 
- 
Reinforcing practice and procedure under the rule of confidentiality 
The second strand of the CPT's revised policy on media relations is, unlike the first, 
negative in its circumscription of members' activities. Under it, the Committee 
identifies that conduct which is to be avoided in encounters with the media. 
Moreover, as we have seen, it lays down the consequences of breaching the principle 
of confidentiality. 33 The revised approach commences with the broad principle that 
"visiting delegations should avoid contact with the media during the course of a 
visit... "34 Beyond this self-imposed silence of the visit, the media's access to 
members is circumscribed in the following way: 
"... individual Committee members may give interviews to representatives of 
the media, but a) the interviews should not disclose any confidential 
information, b) they should be given on an `on the record', attributable basis, 
and c) a copy of each interview should be forwarded to the CPT's 
"3s Secretariat... 
32 Idem, para 81. 
33 See above, pp 23-4. 
34 See I" GR, para 82, sub-para (i). 
35 Ibid, at sub-para (ii). 
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- 
CPT reaction to media distortions of its activities 
Regarding the third head of the Committee's revised media relations policy, it 
resolved, simply and logically, that when confronted with inaccurate or misleading 
representations of its activities "the Bureau should immediately issue a 
s36 correction... 
The Committee's hopes for its revised media relations policy 
It is important for an organ like the CPT, which is, designedly, a facilitator of change, 
not to deny the constructive role capable of being played by the media in achieving its 
objectives. Media organisations represent indispensable vehicles for galvanising 
public and political opinion. Accordingly, rigid adherence to the rule of 
confidentiality, commendable though that may be, may prove counter-productive. 37 
At the same time, however, it must take cognisance of the fact that all States, 
particularly in the criminal justice arena, are especially sensitive and susceptible to 
expressions of public whim. Consequently, to be perceived as exploiting or being 
careless in conducting relations with the media, may be regarded with little 
indulgence by States parties. Such conduct may be construed as an abuse of the trust 
placed in the Committee when Parties accede to its intrusive inspection regime. The 
Committee, it is safe to assume, was aware of the need to balance these two 
potentially antithetical interests when conceiving its revised policy on media relations. 
Indeed, it was presumably in this spirit that, having laid down this policy, it 
expressed: 
36 Ides para 83. 
37 Evans and Morgan are of the opinion that in its development of the principle of confidentiality 
generally, the CPT "should be seeking to restrict the principle... to the narrowest of bounds, whilst 
remaining faithful to the letter of the Convention text": see Evans and Morgan (1998), p 380. 
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"[a] trust... that the media will gradually become aware that they should 
respect the restraints under which the CPT operates in its efforts to engage in a 
fruitful dialogue with sovereign States". 38 
At the same time, however, cognisant of the expediency of maintaining good relations 
with the media in the development of its work, it suggested that: 
"... although [it] cannot put the bulk of its work in the public domain, it will 
strive to make public as much information about its activities as is compatible 
with the obligation of confidentiality", 39 
As a result of such scrupulous efforts at balance, the CPT has described itself as 
"confident that its new policy in the area of relations with the media will prove 
helpful"'. 40 
The principle of co-operation 
Like that of confidentiality, the principle of co-operation accompanies and informs 
much of the work done by the CPT. It finds expression in a number of Convention 
provisions41 and its published work contains many references to the reciprocal 
obligation of assistance binding on the Committee and States parties in the fulfilment 
of the Convention's objectives (relating in particular to the manner in which visiting 
delegations are received by the authorities, both in a general sense and at individual 
establishments, and the assistance afforded them in the course of visits). The 
fundamental duty to co-operate finds expression in Article 3, ECPT, which provides, 
simply, that: 
38 See 1` GR, pars 84. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Namely Articles 3,8,9,10,16 (plus the related Annex to the Convention) and 17(1). 
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"[i]n the application of this Convention, the Committee and the competent 
national authorities of the Party concerned shall co-operate with each other". 
The Explanatory Report reiterates the Article 3 duty, referring expressly to a mutual 
`oblig[ation]" and "spirit" of co-operation in the application of the Convention. 42 
Thus, the Report maintains, "[i]n order to indicate the spirit of the relationship 
between the Committee and the Parties, Article 3 contains a general provision on co- 
operation". 43 Given the absence of any judicial or quasi-judicial powers available to 
it, in order effectively to function and to bring about improvements in the treatment of 
detainees, the CPT, it is clear, is reliant to a great extent on States parties' upholding 
this principle, which, the Explanatory Report asserts, "applies to all stages of the 
Committee's activities"; for, as well as Article 3, ECPT, "[i]t is of direct relevance to 
several other provisions of the Convention, such as Articles 2,8,9 and 10". 44 
Co-operation in the course of a visit s 
The Convention's much heralded principle of co-operation arguably manifests itself 
most clearly in the modalities of the visit process. 
- 
The obligations of the Committee 
Article 8(1), ECPT provides that the Committee shall "notify the Government of the 
Party concerned of its intention to carry out a visit" 46 This duty of advance notice, as 
we have seen, would appear to mark the extent of the Committee's obligations in this 
regard. For, thereafter, it may "at any time" visit any place of detention in the Party 
42 See Explanatory Report, para 20. 
43 Idem, Para 33. 
µ Idem, Para 34. 
4s On the visit procedure generally, see above, p 10 et seq. 
46 Such notice ought to be received by an authority competent to handle such affairs, the existence of 
%hich should be communicated to the CPT in advance: Article 15, ECPT. 
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addressed. 47 There is, therefore, no specified time-frame for the conduct of a visit; it 
has been left to the Committee to determine just when to carry out a visit of which 
notice has been given. Paragraph 56 of the Explanatory Report refers to a process 
which, "as a general rule", gives the Party concerned a "reasonable time" in which to 
take the steps necessary to facilitate the most effective visit possible, while stipulating 
that "the Committee should carry out the visit within a reasonable time after the 
notification". 48 
With its creation of a duty to provide advance notice of a visit, the Convention 
clearly establishes the principle that there shall be nothing arbitrary and didactic about 
the Committee's relationship with States parties. Its duty to observe what is, after all, 
a common courtesy, lends to the relationship an element of equality. Further, it 
makes Parties' reciprocal duty of co-operation appear less onerous. Paragraphs 57,58 
and 59 of the Explanatory Report further elaborate the basic Article 8(1) duty. 
Emphasising the "spirit of co-operation" which is to inform all communication 
between the Committee and the State party visited, the Report provides that where the 
advance notice fails to state the date and place of the Committee's arrival, it is 
"expected" that they will be provided "subsequently, before the visit takes place". 9 
As for the content of such advance notice, the Report suggests that in addition to 
announcing the visit, it should state the names of the Committee members and 
identify the experts, interpreters and other staff taking part in the visit, as well as the 
institutions which the delegation intends to visit. 50 However, announcing in advance 
the names of places to be visited does not "preclude" further announcements "in the 
47 Paragraph 55 of the Explanatory Report reiterates the Article 8 arrangements. 
"$ On the notification procedure adopted, see above, p 14. 
49 See Explanatory Report, pars 57. 
90 Idem, pars 58. 
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course of [a] visit". 51 To deny the Committee this right would be to inhibit the 
seminal role conferred on it by Article 2 of the Convention. 
- 
The reciprocal obligations of States parties 
Article 8(2), ECPT sets out the "facilities" with which States parties shall furnish the 
Committee in order to enable it to carry out its mandate effectively. They comprise: 
"a. access to [a State party's] territory and the right to travel without 
restriction; 
"b. full information on the places where persons deprived of their liberty are 
being held; 
"c. unlimited access to any place where persons are deprived of their liberty, 
including the right to move inside such places without restriction; 
"d. other information available to the Party which is necessary for the 
Committee to carry out its task. [However, ] in seeking such information, 
the Committee shall have regard to applicable rules of national law and 
professional ethics". 
The accompanying Explanatory Report emphasises that "in view of the particular 
nature of the visits which the Committee is required to make", Article 8, paragraph 2 
applies "equally before, during and after" visits. 52 Further, the list of facilities with 
which the Committee shall be furnished by the visited Party is "exhaustive"53 - 
although the Report adds, justifiably, that "other necessary assistance" should be 
afforded where appropriate. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Idem, pars 60. 
33 Ibid. 
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It is understood that the Article 8(2) sub-paragraph (a) reference to the CPT's 
unrestricted rights of access and travel relates to the issue of immigration. 54 Thus, it 
must be read "in conjunction with" Articles 2'55 14(3)56 and 16.57 Accordingly, 
insofar as the provisions of Article 14(3) do not apply, "conditions prescribed by 
Parties with respect to immigration (eg visas) may not be invoked against members of 
the visiting team... ,, ss 
The reference to "full information" on places of detention at Article 8(2), sub- 
paragraph (b) has been interpreted as requiring that each State party: 
"... supply the Committee on request with a list of the places under its 
jurisdiction where persons deprived of their liberty are being held, stating the 
nature of the establishment (prison, police station, hospital etc)... It is 
envisaged that the Committee will eventually request a comprehensive list of 
places within a particular area which it intends to visit within the jurisdiction 
of the State... s59 
States parties are not obliged to furnish the CPT with a list of all detainees within their 
jurisdiction. 60 Rather, if the Committee requires information about a specific 
detainee, "including his or her place of detention", it may ask for it under the `catch- 
all' provisions of Article 8(2), sub-paragraph (d) 61 
Sub-paragraph (c) of Article 8(2) is an understandable adjunct to the sub- 
paragraph (a) right of unrestricted access and travel. It serves to reinforce the 
54 Idem, Para 61. 
ss Concerning the Committee's general right of access to "any place... where persons are deprived of 
their liberty by a public authority". 
% Concerning the right of States parties "exceptionally" to preclude an expert or other person assisting 
the Committee from taking part in a visit. 
 Concerning the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Committee, its members and experts 
assisting it. 
s$ See Explanatory Report, Para 61. 
59 Idem, Para 62. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. See further below, p 36. 
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Committee's freedom of movement, "particularly inside places referred to in Article 
212.62 However, the freedom to move from institution to institution and within 
institutions in a State party is one thing; to do so without being monitored is quite 
another. And, it is in this regard that States parties have chipped away at the 
Committee's powers. For, the right of "unlimited access" to places of detention 
enshrined in sub-paragraph (c) must be understood in the context of the Convention as 
a whole. This means that insofar as the Committee enjoys a freedom of movement, it 
can only be exercised in accordance with Articles 963 and 15,64 ECPT. 65 Thus, 
visiting delegations must be prepared for the accompaniment of a State official during 
visits, ostensibly to provide them with assistance (a reference to the Article 15 
"liaison officer"). Further, a Party may require a delegation to be accompanied by a 
"senior officer in places which are secret for reasons of national defence or which 
enjoy special protection for reasons of national security"A6 (a reference, presumably, 
to some of the Article 9 `claw-back' provisions). However, notwithstanding such 
constraints, by virtue of Article 8(3), ECPT, it remains the case that when the 
Committee interviews persons deprived of their liberty, it may do so "in private". 
This means, in practice, that "an accompanying person must not be present at [such] 
interviews" if this is the wish of the Committee 67 
Sub-paragraph (d) of Article 8(2) is an instructive example of the extent to 
which the Committee and States parties are expected to co-operate in facilitating the 
Committee's task (as well as in respecting each other's often difficult positions). The 
62 Idem, para 63. 
63 See generally above, p 15. 
64 Article 15, ECPT provides that "[e]ach Party shall inform the Committee of the name and address of 
the authority competent to receive notifications to its Government, and of any liaison officer it may 
appoint". 
6 Explanatory Report, para 63. 
66Ibid. 
67 See Explanatory Report, pars 63. 
36 
first sentence reference to a State party's duty to provide "other information... which 
is necessary for the Committee to carry out its task"68 is, for all practical purposes, a 
requirement to provide all such information which is not expressly dealt with in the 
preceding sub-paragraphs and elsewhere in the Convention. It is, in other words, a 
mopping up provision and may be considered, accordingly, "of great importance to 
the Committee". 69 However, equally significant is the second sentence of sub- 
paragraph (d), which reads: 
"[i]n seeking [other information available to the Party necessary for the 
Committee to carry out its task], the Committee shall have regard to applicable 
rules of national law and professional ethics". 
This is the CPT's reciprocal obligation in this area. It is a clear expression of respect 
for the internal laws and practices of States parties on the disclosure of information, 
"in particular, rules regarding data protection and... medical secrecy... "70 Moreover, 
as if to emphasise the duties of both the Committee and States parties in this regard, 
the Explanatory Report concludes, grandiloquently, that: 
"[i]t is envisaged that possible difficulties in this field will be resolved in the 
spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation upon which the Convention is 
founded" 71 
Lastly, the form 
- 
as opposed to the substance 
- 
of the information requested, the 
Explanatory Report stipulates, should be left to States parties: "it is for the Parties to 
decide the form (eg originals or copies of documents) in which the information 
requested by the Committee shall be communicated". 72 
611 See also idem, Para 64. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid 
71 Ibid. 
72 Idecn, paragraph 65. 
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Conclusion 
The two overarching principles of confidentiality and co-operation have clearly 
seeped into every comer of the CPT's work. The former, in particular, is a jealously 
guarded precept and the consistency with which it is upheld by Committee members, 
accompanying experts and members of the Secretariat alike is a source of much pride. 
As we have seen, however, the rigour with which it is adhered to has invited criticism 
from a number of commentators and, perhaps more significantly, the Committee's 
NGO interlocutors. There is a danger, therefore, that in seeking to maintain such high 
standards of integrity, the CPT may stifle its effectiveness as an instrument of change. 
It risks isolating itself from that network of institutions, organisations and individuals 
whose contribution to its work may do much to advance the protection of detainees 
against ill-treatment in Europe. It must be recalled, however, that the Committee is 
possessed of a unique and intrusive mandate. Further, its members and Secretariat are 
undoubtedly acutely aware of their privileged position in international law and the 
responsibilities entailed thereby. Their caution in developing the scope and manner of 
the CPT's work is, therefore, understandable. In the years ahead, it will be most 
interesting to see how the CPT seeks to alter the regime of confidentiality which 
currently embraces its work, particularly if its undoubted effectiveness as an organ of 
inspection begins to falter. 
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3 
The CPT's Standard-Setting Initiative 
Introduction 
No organ of inspection or examination can expect to operate properly without a 
certain circumscription of its remit. In the interests of expedition and consistency, it 
must work in accordance with determined 
- 
though not inflexible 
- 
guidelines or rules 
of operation. The CPT is no exception; in pursuing its inspectoral mandate, it is, it 
has stated: 
"... feeling its way towards developing its own `measuring rods', in the light of 
the experience of its members and of a careful and well-balanced comparison 
of various systems of detention". ' 
As a consequence of this approach, the Committee, it is fair to say, has augmented 
that "array" of standards on detention which already exist in the international arena 
and of which it makes use in carrying out its work. 2 Endeavouring to build on the 
guidance offered by these various standards, and, unlike the European Commission 
and Court of Human Rights, not obliged to apply and interpret substantive treaty 
3 provisions, the CPT, early in its working life, sought to gauge: 
"... the feasibility of... the gradual building up of a set of general criteria for the 
treatment of persons deprived of their liberty" 4 
. 
1 See I" GR, Para 95. 
2 Ibid. See also paras 5 and 6 (ii) of the Report, as well as Explanatory Report, paras 22,26 and 27. 
3 Ideen, Para 6 (ii). 
4 Ideen, Para 96. 
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Almost a decade later, this tentative suggestion, it may be safely conjectured, is 
steadily being realised. In subsequent General Reports, the CPT has adumbrated a 
number of "general standards" pertaining to various aspects of custody in police 
establishments, prisons, immigration detention centres, mental health institutions and 
juvenile detention centres. In addition, each published visit report, in highlighting 
delegation findings in the Party concerned, may be seen to apply and expound the 
established criteria. 
Publication and prescription 
It seems also that this gradual compilation of criteria against which to measure 
situations encountered during visits is not intended merely for the use of the 
Committee and the States parties addressed. With a view to influencing penal policy 
in States parties throughout Convention territory, the CPT has announced boldly that 
it might: 
"... at some future date decide to make [its standards] public, so as to offer 
national authorities some general guidelines in relation to the treatment of 
persons deprived of their liberty". 5 
Significantly, in elaborating such guidelines in its General Reports, the CPT actually 
guarantees their publication. For, by virtue of Article 12, ECPT, the Committee is 
duty-bound to publish its general reports annually. 6 It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the Committee will, in addition, publish a separate document, codifying its 
myriad standards on detention. 7 
s Ibid. 
6 See also in this connection Rule 49 of the CPT's Rules of Procedure. 7 The Geneva-based NGO, the Association for the Prevention of Torture, has, to a certain extent, 
undertaken this task itself with the publication of a number of brochures on standards elaborated by the 
CPT. 
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The Committee's description of its standards as "guidelines" is not without 
significance. It is, it will be recalled, neither a judicial nor quasi-judicial organ; it 
cannot issue normative pronouncements. Accordingly, its developing corpus of 
standards enjoys no binding authority. Cognisant of this limitation on its powers, the 
CPT, from its inception, has sought to anticipate concerns about the boldness of its 
standard-setting work, insisting that were it to publish its "general criteria" for the 
benefit of States parties, "[i]t goes without saying that... it would in no way be trying 
to play a legislative role, for which it was not created". Accordingly, in setting 
standards, it is seeking to offer Parties nothing more peremptory than: 
"... some non-binding guidelines that might be of assistance in the context of 
the improvement of the treatment and conditions of detention of persons 
deprived of their liberty". 8 
In this way, the CPT hopes to give national authorities "a clear advance indication" of 
its views on matters falling within its sphere of interest "and, more generally, to 
stimulate discussion". 9 
Justifying the creation of a corpus of standards 
Notwithstanding the prescriptive limitations just outlined, the Committee, it is 
submitted, has nothing to fear in formulating and promulgating a set of standards that 
may ultimately be of use in the development of criminal justice and penal policy in all 
States parties to the Convention. For, not only does the investigative nature of its 
S 1" GR, para 96. Given the Committee's disavowal of anything more normative than "guidelines", it 
is a little surprising to read in the final paragraph of every published visit report that in their responses 
to visit reports, States parties are expected to provide inter alia "details of how it is intended to 
implement the CPT's recommendations and, as the case may be... an account of action already taken". 
For an organ which professes to offer nothing more peremptory than non-binding recommendations, 
these are rather exacting expectations, it is submitted. 
9See70sGR, pars24. 
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work lend itself to the use and dissemination of such formulae, but the Committee's 
need to treat States parties in an equitable, non-discriminatory way (or risk losing 
credibility) positively demands the creation of objective 
- 
though, as we shall see, not 
immutable 
- 
methods of measurement. They represent a logical and unavoidable 
consequence of its preventive mandate. 
The genesis of the CPT's standard-setting work 
Crucial to the effective execution of its fact-finding and reporting responsibilities, the 
CPT has insisted, is its power to issue recommendations. Such recommendations, it 
maintains, are: 
"... designed to prevent the possible occurrence of treatment that is contrary to 
what reasonably could be considered as acceptable standards for dealing with 
persons deprived of their liberty". 10 
Issued in 1991, this statement introduced the notion of "standards" into the 
Committee's public discourse. Such "standards", it is clear, lend substance and 
meaning both to the CPT's methods of assessing custodial situations and to the 
recommendations arrived at through such assessment. Evidently, the nature of the 
CPTs mandate determines the tools with which it works. Because it operates in the 
field by way of periodic and ad hoc visits (unlike, for example, the European 
Commission and Court of Human Rights, which intervene only upon being petitioned 
by individual or State applicants"), it works, to all intents and purposes, with a tabula 
rasa; it requires no particular reason to visit a Party 
- 
though, axiomatically, it 
apprises itself fully of the general state of affairs obtaining therein in advance. 
10 See 1°` GR, pars 4. 
11 Idem, para 6 (iv). 
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Accordingly, the discerning use of objective "measuring rods" may be 
regarded as crucial to its effective operation. In order properly to assess situations 
likely to be encountered in the course of visits and, of course, to fulfill its preventive 
mandate, the possibility of invoking a broad range of pre-determined precepts is 
useful. Unlike the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, the CPT is 
unable to develop such precepts, as needed, on a case-by-case basis, arriving at 
judgments based on a particular set of facts. Rather, it must visit each place of 
detention equipped with a consistent set of measuring criteria. This set must be 
comprehensive; it must possess no lacunae, otherwise, its practical value and, with it, 
the Committee's credibility, may be fatally undermined. 
The substance of CPT standards 
The first suggestion of the existence and content of a corpus of standards appeared in 
the CPT's 1't General Report. Therein, adumbrating its working methods and seeking 
to emphasise the broad reach of its interests and concerns, it stressed that: 
"... the CPT must always look into the general conditions of detention existing 
in the countries visited... it must examine not only whether abuses are actually 
occurring but also be attentive to those ` indicators' or `early signs' pointing to 
possible future abuses". 12 
It is in the fulfillment of this pre-emptive role that the Committee has sought to 
develop and deploy a detailed body of examining criteria. In this regard, in that first 
annual report, regarding the focus of its attention in the course of visits, it reduced the 
rather imprecise notion "general conditions of detention" to the following tripartite 
formula: 
'2 See 1" GR, para 48. See, in the same connection, 2" GR, para 35. 
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(i) the physical environment in which detainees are obliged to live (comprising, inter 
alia, the space available to detainees; arrangements for the lighting and ventilation of 
cells and communal areas; washing and toilet facilities; and eating and sleeping 
arrangements); 
(ii) the social needs of and pressures on detainees (regarded by the Committee as 
comprising, inter alia, relationships with other detainees and law-enforcement 
personnel; links with families, social workers and the outside world in general; and 
the medical care provided by the authorities); and 
(iii) the extent to which certain basic safeguards against ill-treatment exist in Parties 
visited (including, in respect of detention by the police, the right to have someone 
notified of the fact of one's detention; the right of access to a lawyer; the right to a 
medical examination; and the possibility of lodging a complaint about ill-treatment or 
conditions of detention). 13 
Taking up this theme in its 2"d General Report, the CPT defined more broadly 
the "wide range of issues" which it must "explore" in the fulfillment of its preventive 
mandate. Matters of particular concern in the conduct of visits, it suggested, include 
the rights possessed by detainees; custody, interrogation and disciplinary procedures; 
available avenues of complaint; physical conditions of detention; the nature and 
extent of regime activities; and the standard of health and hygiene in places of 
detention. 14 Some of these issues, clearly, the Committee had highlighted in its 1d 
General Report; others, like custody, interrogation and disciplinary procedures and 
regime activities, it introduced here for the first time. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See 2°d GR, pars 35. 
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Interestingly, the Committee also introduced at this juncture the notion that in 
examining places of detention, matters of concern must be viewed "both individually 
and cumulatively", thus demonstrating its determination to address not only the 
minutiae of life in custody, but also broader, systemic issues. Such an approach, it is 
fair to say, more accurately reflects the nature of detention, wherein the accumulation 
of individual problems and shortcomings in a particular environment can, to an extent 
less possible in the outside world, occasion serious institutional difficulties. At the 
very outset of its working life, therefore, the CPT merely set down the broad 
parameters of its standard-setting work. Subsequently, as its body of reports has 
grown, it has, as we shall see, given flesh to these skeletal provisions. 
It is, perhaps, worth noting here that the CPT is not content to address only 
problems of direct concern to detainees. Rather, it considers that: 
"... often one cannot understand and assess the conditions under which persons 
are deprived of their liberty in a given country without considering those 
conditions in their general (historical, social, economic) context. Although 
human dignity must be effectively respected in all Parties to the Convention, 
the background of each of these countries varies, and can account for 
differences in their response to human rights issues. It follows that, to fulfill its 
task of preventing abuses, the CPT must often look into the underlying causes 
ls of general or specific conditions conducive to mistreatment". 
Accordingly, having examined conditions of detention obtaining in a particular Party: 
"... [it] may not find it appropriate to confine itself to merely suggesting 
immediate or short-term measures (such as, for example, administrative 
action) or even such measures as legislative improvements. It may find it 
15 See l GR, para 49, 
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necessary to recommend long-term measures, at least whenever it has become 
apparent that unacceptable conditions exist in a country as a result of deep- 
rooted factors that cannot be alleviated simply by judicial or legislative fiat or 
by resort to other legal techniques. In such cases, educational and similar long- 
term strategies may prove essential". 16 
Potentially, therefore, the CPI's developing body of standards may comprise a much 
broader range of matters than is ordinarily associated with an agent of inspection. 
"Quantifying" CPT standards 
One of the consequences to flow from its preventive mandate, the CPT has postulated, 
is the fact that in order to fulfill that mandate effectively, it must seek to engender 
among States parties a degree of protection of detainees that is: 
"greater than that upheld by the European Commission and Court of Human 
Rights when adjudging cases concerning the ill-treatment of persons deprived 
of their liberty and their conditions of detention". 17 
Unfortunately, the Committee has not expounded this hortatory gesture. We may 
speculate, however, that in order to protect detainees satisfactorily, it considers that it 
must seek to forestall treatment and behaviour which, under existing ECHR 
jurisprudence, could not readily be held to violate, inter alfa, Article 3, ECHR. In 
other words, its object is to prevent a situation from degenerating to an extent which 
would justify an application to the ECHR organs for breach of Article 3. In 
appropriating for itself this particular responsibility, the CPT prepared the ground for 
the development of its own measuring rods. For, if, as we may infer from its remarks, 
16 Idem, para 50. 
17 Idem, para 51 (emphasis added). 
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the standards developed under the Article 3, ECHR jurisprudence are deficient 
- 
or, at 
least, not entirely appropriate 
- 
for an organ working to a preventive mandate, it must, 
of necessity, fashion supplementary provisions. Otherwise, there would exist a 
practical lacuna in the protection against ill-treatment afforded detainees in States 
parties to the ECPT. 
Broadening the application of CPT standards 
With the opening for signature of Protocol Number 1 to the ECPT, 18 the CPT's earnest 
commitment to greater protection for detainees than is presently afforded by the 
ECHR organs may, in principle, extend beyond the boundaries of the Council of 
Europe. It was in this context that the CPT, in its 1" General Report, intimated its 
vision of the kind of European penal culture that might be established under its 
guidance. For, in welcoming the opening-up of the Convention and the potential 
expansion of the Committee's monitoring activities occasioned thereby, it sought to 
acclaim the benefits which might accrue to the cause of human rights in Europe. As a 
result of the CPT's enhanced role, it insisted: 
"common standards of protection for persons deprived of their liberty would 
be applied to a broader circle of countries". 19 
In this single phrase, it is submitted, the CPT revealed its true raison d'etre: to fashion 
and invite States to bring their penal systems into line with a uniform European 
standard; not with an ideal or lofty desideratum; but with a fundamental, realistic 
standard, attainable by all 20 Logically, this object requires the prior determination of 
18 See generally above, p 4, n 8. 
19 See 1° GR, para 86 (emphasis added). 
20 Professor Antonio Cassese, who was the very first President of the CPT, has stated that, subject to 
certain national and cultural differences between Parties, members of the CPT "have always agreed that 
our aim [is) to achieve the same level of civilized standards in the field of detention, throughout 
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the standard sought to be achieved and, therefore, it may be suggested, of a CPT 
model. 
The source of CPT standard-setting work 
Inevitably, the mature standards inherent in and developed under, inter alia, Article 3, 
ECHR provide the basis of the CPrs standard-setting work. Indeed, during the first 
few months of its existence, in preparing for its inspectoral role, the Committee 
devised a collection of "common working tools" designed to meet the needs of its 
diverse membership, among which was a set of "general documents" on the 
jurisprudence of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights germane to 
its activities. Further, it has stated subsequently that: 
"[i]n carrying out its functions [it] has the right to avail itself of legal standards 
contained in not only the European Convention on Human Rights but also in a 
number of other relevant human rights instruments (and the interpretation of 
them by the human rights organs concerned)". 21 
Moreover, unlike the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, the CPT "is 
not bound by substantive treaty provisions". Rather, it is free simply to "refer to a 
number of treaties", as well as to other international instruments - including "non- 
binding criteria", like the various sets of standards approved by the Council of 
Europe": see Cassese (1996), p 28. Given that, as we shall shortly see, the CPT invokes as sources of 
its standard-setting work, standards derived from international instruments which originate from 
beyond Europe, it is worth speculating whether what the CPT is really attempting to do is to set a 
common European standard 
- 
based, inter alia, on practice among European States - which standard 
may or may not have the potential to be applied beyond Europe, or whether, rather, it is seeking to 
apply to Europe established universal standards. It is a question to which we shall return in the 
Conclusion to this work 
21 1" GR, paras 5 and 95. 
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Europe22 and the United Nations, 23 "and the case-law formulated thereunder". 24 
Justifiably, therefore, the CPT has chosen to build its practice around the 
considerable international framework of binding and non-binding standards that exist 
today in the area of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. At the same time, 
however, it has shown the enterprise and intrepidity of an organ bound neither by 
substantive treaty definitions of these phenomena nor by the jurisprudence of judicial 
and quasi-judicial organs acting in the same field. Consequently, to the CPT, the 
extant international framework represents merely a "point of departure or reference" 
in its assessment of the treatment of detainees on Convention territory; 25 it is free, it 
has made clear, to supplement this framework with its own corpus of standards, 
because, it has stated, "often... no clear guidance can be drawn from [existing 
standards]... or at least... more detailed standards are needed it 
. 
26 
Actuated by such motives, therefore, the CPT has set about steadily compiling 
its own set of "measuring rods" on the strength of the experience of its members and 
associated experts and a comparative study of the systems of detention encountered 
by it. 27 Thus, although the CPT is content, when it suits it, to work within existing 
international parameters on the treatment of detainees, when it deems it necessary, it 
is quite prepared to go further and formulate and apply its own precepts. In this way, 
it is submitted, it may serve to create new parameters, albeit ones constrained by its 
inherent legislative powerlessness. 
22 Such standards include, most obviously, the European Prison Rules, Recommendation R (87) 3 of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, adopted 12th February 1987, replacing 
Resolution (73) 5 on the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. 
" Which standards include the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Ecosoc Res. 
663C (XXIV), 31d July 1957 and Res 2076 (LXII), 130' May 1977), the Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials (GA Res. 34/169,19th December 1979) and the Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (GA Res. 43/173,1988). 
24 1R GR, paras 6 (ii) and 95. 
Idem, para 5. See similarly Explanatory Report, paras 22 and 27. 
26 Idem, para 95. 
27Ibid. 
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Annual General Reports 
Thus far, the medium through which the CPT has most consistently pursued its 
standard-setting objective has been its annual General Reports, the purpose of which, 
it has stated, is, inter alia, to elaborate "certain substantive matters to which it pays 
attention when carrying out visits" 
- 
all the while, of course, "fully respecting" the 
rule of confidentiality laid down in Article 11, ECPT. 29 Therein, it endeavours to: 
"explore [in detail] matters of interest concerning... deprivation of liberty 
... 
[in 
order] to give a clear advance indication to national authorities of its views on 
different matters falling within its mandate and more generally to stimulate 
discussion on issues concerning the treatment of [detainees]". 29 
These comments have prefigured annual CPT pronouncements on detention in police 
establishments; 30 prison conditions and regime; 31 health care services in prisons; 32 the 
detention of foreign nationals under aliens legislation; 33 the involuntary placement of 
persons in psychiatric establishments; TM the detention of juveniles; 35 and women 
deprived of their liberty. 36 Clearly, therefore, the Committee's General Reports are of 
potentially great significance in its standard-setting work, all the more because, as we 
have seen, they offer the only means available to it of regularly placing its views in 
the public domain. As such, they may provide the most effective tool available to the 
CPT in its efforts to effect improvements in the treatment of detainees. 
28 See 2d GR, para 4. On the regime of confidentiality established, inter alia, under Article 11, ECPT, 
see above, p 19 et seq. 
2' Ibid. 
30 Idem, paras 36-43. 
31 Ideen paras 44-60. 
32 See 3 GR, paras 30-77. 
33 See 7th GR, paras 24-36. 
34 See 8th GR, paras 25-58. 
35 See 9th GR, paras 20-41. 
36 See 10th GR, paras 21-33. 
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Setting standards in the course of visits 
In the conduct of visits, one stage is of particular significance in the present 
connection. It concerns the moment, at the end of a visit, when the Head of the 
visiting delegation, "if possible, with the rest of the delegation", meets the relevant 
national authorities one final time. These meetings, the CPT has stated, enable the 
delegation, first, to comment on the circumstances surrounding the visit and the 
manner of its conduct and, second, to offer some "tentative first impressions" of the 
places of detention visited, especially following the discovery of matters of "particular 
concern". 
37 This notion of a final, reflective meeting with the national authorities of a 
Party, arranged, if necessary, with a view to inducing swift action on their part, has 
not simply grown pragmatically out of the manner in which visits are conducted. 
Textual authority for their convening exists, it might be argued, in the shape of Article 
8(5), ECPT which provides that: 
"if necessary [during a visit], the Committee may immediately communicate 
observations to the competent authorities of the Party concerned". 38 
In this way, the Committee is authorised formally to engage Parties in what is, we 
may presume, a forthright dialogue on matters of concern arising from its work. 
Thus, Article 8(5) is a very useful and flexible provision; the CPT would do well to 
exploit it at every possible turn. Already, it has been widely deployed in practice39 
and it should be encouraged, as a matter of convention, formally to invoke it during 
and after more visits in order to make particular observations to the Parties concerned. 
This would, to a certain extent, obviate the interregnum in communications inherent 
37 See inter alia 1g GR, para 67; 2°d GR, para 23; and 3'' GR, para 14. 
38 See also in this regard Rule 39.2, Rules of Procedure. 
39 See, e. g., 2id GR, para 23; and 5`s GR, para 9. Such practice has, it seems, borne fruit. A number of 
Parties, the CPT noted in its 2' General Report, have "reacted favourably" to Article 8(5) observations 
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in the Convention's existing reporting mechanism. 0 Indeed, Mr. Trevor Stevens, 
Secretary to the Committee, in a conference devoted to the implementation of the 
Convention convened in Strasbourg in December 1994, suggested that a greater 
readiness to make use of the Article 8(5) provisions might go some way towards 
addressing the difficulties which the Committee encounters in securing the swift 
- 
or, 
indeed, any 
- 
implementation of its recommendations. 
It is clear, however, that recourse to the Article 8(5) procedure should not have 
the practical effect of undermining or replacing the CPT's reporting duties, as 
provided for in Article 10(1) of the Convention. 41 Further, enthusiasm for the 
practical potential of Article 8(5) should be tempered by the knowledge that it has 
been identified as capable of being invoked principally during the visit and that such 
invocation should be limited to "exceptional" situations, like those in which there 
exists an "urgent need" to improve the treatment of detainees. 42 Thus, the Committee 
is not to avail itself lightly of the Article 8(5) expedient. The provision does not 
confer on a delegation the freedom to communicate its views on almost everything 
relevant to the CPT's mandate in the course of a visit 
- 
even if of fundamental 
importance to its evolving body of standards. To validate an intervention of this kind, 
it seems, there must first exist a compelling justification. Thus, the Committee 
cannot, it seems, promote any body of general standards which it may develop 
through the kind of politic arrangement Article 8(5) otherwise seems to encourage. 
The procedure is, in practice, only of use in drawing attention to situations of 
and "desirable steps" have been taken "rapidly, without awaiting the transmission of the CPT's report". 
See similarly 5t° GR, para 17. 
40 See, e. g., 1'` GR, para 71; 4th GR, paras 8 and 19; 5`s GR, para. 10; and above, pp 16-17. 
41 See, e. g., Explanatory Report, para 70. 
42 Ibid. 
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immediate and grave concern. It is principally an oral 
- 
or, at least, informal 
- 
mechanism, whereas the elaboration and promulgation of standards, in order to be 
effective, must be communicated in written form and, therefore, documented. The 
procedure may be invoked, in practice, only in the most particular of circumstances; 
there may be many breaches of penal standards which are not grave and, therefore, 
unlikely to precipitate recourse to it. 
Conclusion 
The standard-setting work of the CPT whether through the expedient offering of 
"tentative first impressions" at the end of each visit, the more formal invocation 
of Article 8(5), ECPT or the publication of visit and General reports, can only 
realistically achieve its avowed objective 
- 
the strengthening of the protection against 
ill-treatment afforded persons deprived of their liberty 
- 
it is submitted, if the 
Committee determinedly and consistently makes use of a broad range of standards in 
its work. For, without authority for positions adopted in the light of visits, it is clear, 
the CPT can neither form nor lend conviction to its observations. 
In the following chapters we shall examine in detail the contents of a number 
of CPT standards on detention identifiable in its published work. To a certain extent, 
the task of codifying precepts has already been set in train by the Committee itself, as 
evidenced by the substantive chapters in its second, third, seventh, eighth, ninth and 
tenth General Reports. However, it may be argued that the contents of such reports 
represent only inchoate 
- 
albeit very significant 
- 
guidance. A more comprehensive 
code, which builds on and applies this annual framework, may be apprehended in the 
more broad-ranging text of visit reports. 
In the following analysis it shall be presumed that a statement or observation 
of the CPT constitutes a `standard' or `guideline' or `precept' if it resembles 
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something which one might sensibly identify as such. Accordingly, comments and 
even requests for information and not just, as might be expected, more forceful 
recommendations, may plausibly be regarded as containing at least the kernel of a 
standard. 3 There is inevitably an element of miscellany about this examination. 
Space constraints preclude an exhaustive study of CPT precepts on detention. 
Accordingly, many of those standards which are deserving of thorough examination 
have been omitted in favour of others. It is hoped that arbitrariness and confusion 
have been avoided in making the selection and that the resultant mix of standards at 
least conveys a sense of the nature of the Committee's evolving corpus of standards 
as well as of the processes behind its formulation. 
The purpose of references in subsequent chapters to relevant provisions of the 
European Prison Rules has already been explained 44 In this connection, it should be 
noted that any analysis of CPT precepts cannot be undertaken without at least 
acknowledging that they exist merely as part of a growing international legal 
framework. Accordingly, if one is to attempt to assess the impact of such precepts on 
State party law and practice 
- 
as we shall ultimately attempt to do45 
- 
it is, as some 
commentators have stressed: 
"... important to bear in mind that, in so far as the standards set by the CPT are 
merely reflective of those already required of states by existing legally-binding 
international instruments, or clearly set out in the non-binding codes, 
compliance cannot be attributed solely to the work of the CPT' 46 
43 For an examination of the terms "recommendation", "comment" and "request for information" and 
the import which attaches to them under the terms of the ECPT, see above, p 16. 
" See above, pp 2-3. 
45 See below, p 481 et seq. 
46 See Evans and Morgan (1998), p 259 (emphasis added). 
54 
PART II 
Standards on Police Custody 
4 
The Development of CPT Standards on Police Custody: 
An Introduction 
Much of the present examination axiomatically concerns efforts to fight crime. For 
all States, this is an area of great sensitivity. The CPT, for its part, accepts that crime, 
particularly in its more abhorrent manifestations, like the "destructive phenomena" of 
terrorism and drug and arms dealing, "rightly meet[s] with a strong response from 
state institutions". At the same time, however, and as might be expected, it considers 
that "under no circumstances must that response be allowed to degenerate into acts of 
torture or other forms of ill-treatment". For, "[s]uch acts", it holds, "are both 
outrageous violations of human rights and fundamentally flawed methods of obtaining 
reliable evidence for combatting crime". Further, it considers, "[t]hey are degrading 
to the officials who inflict or authorise them" and, "[w]orse still 
... 
can ultimately 
undermine the very structure of a democratic State". ' 
The Committee has been equally forthright in its condemnation of more 
insidious forms of ill-treatment. Where material conditions of detention in police 
establishments may be characterised as "poor", where "important qualifications are, 
or at least can be, placed upon certain fundamental rights of persons detained 
[therein]" and where interrogations are "intensive and potentially prolonged", the 
"cumulative effect", it has suggested 
- 
somewhat understatedly 
- 
is to place detainees 
"under a considerable degree of psychological pressure". 2 Further, if the effect of 
1 See Turkey PS I, para 28. 
2 See UK II, para 109. 
55 
such pressure is "to "break [a detainee's] will", then, it believes, he may be 
considered to have been treated inhumanly. 3 
Focus of attention 
Those features of detention which the Committee regards as being of particular 
importance in determining the likelihood of ill-treatment in police establishments 
comprise, principally: 
(i) allegations of ill-treatment received prior to and during a visit; 
(ü) related medical findings; 
(iii) material conditions of detention observed in the course of the visit; and 
(iv) the content and operation in practice of the putative safeguards against ill- 
treatment which operate in the Party concerned. 
Aims of the CPT's standard-setting work in the context of police 
custody 
From its observations on its delegation's visit to Northern Ireland in 1993, it is 
possible to determine just what the Committee hopes to achieve in developing a set of 
guidelines on the treatment of persons detained by the police. While its observations 
were clearly directed at the situation encountered in the course of the visit itself, they 
may be applied with equal force, it is submitted, in other instances. Indeed, the CPT 
has offered very similar formulations in numerous other visit reports. By following 
its recommendations and by "consolidating safeguards" against abuse, the Committee 
3 Ibid. 
4 See, e. g., idem, para 36. It need hardly be stated that such features strongly influence the structure of 
visit reports. 
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averred to the UK authorities, public confidence in the fairness of treatment accorded 
persons detained by the police in Northern Ireland would be reinforced. For, the 
effectiveness of any police force, it continued, depends "in large measure" on the 
degree of support which it enjoys among the community at large. 5 Further, it claimed, 
by implementing the measures suggested, officers would be better placed to challenge 
unjustified allegations of ill-treatment. Emolliently, it added, parenthetically, that the 
police and security forces' capacity to combat crime 
- 
more specifically, terrorism 
- 
would not be undermined by the making of the recommended changes 6 Indeed, it 
suggested, adherence thereto might render their work more effective. 
s Ideen, pars 111. 
6 Ibid. 
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5 
The Creation of Fundamental Safeguards Against Ill- 
treatment in Police Custody 
Introduction: a range of safeguards 
The CPT devotes considerable space in its published work to elaborating those 
features of police custody on which, in its view, States parties ought to concentrate if 
the risk of ill-treatment of detainees, inherent in all systems of detention, is not be 
realised. For instance, having determined, in 1990, that in Austrian police 
establishments perceived "weaknesses" in the system of basic safeguards had given 
rise to a "serious risk of detainees being ill-treated while in police custody", ' the 
Committee adumbrated a series of measures "designed to address [the] problem". 
The ` most important" of these, it proclaimed, were: 
"- improved access to legal advice for persons in police custody; 
-a right for persons in police custody to be examined by a doctor of their 
own choice; 
- 
[the] drawing up of a code of practice concerning police interviews; [and] 
- 
[the maintenance of] full records of police custody (including 
transportation), providing for greater accountability". 2 
To this basic list it subsequently added the "essential ingredient of any strategy for the 
prevention of ill-treatment", namely, the provision of "adequate professional training" 
for police officers.; In other visit reports, the CPT has developed this basic formula, 
reinforcing it, where appropriate, with measures designed to assist Parties to 
' See Austria I, para 48 and p7 of the report, "Summary of the CPT's main findings". 2 Idem, para 49. 
3 Ibid. See also p7 of the report. 
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incorporate the safeguards adumbrated into their domestic criminal justice systems. 
As we shall see, it has also sought to augment the safeguards with other new and 
arguably equally fundamental principles, like the right of a newly-detained person to 
inform a third party of his choice of the fact of his detention and the duty of detaining 
authorities to inform a detainee, promptly and intelligibly, of the rights of which he 
may avail himself. The Committee's ultimate objective in all this is to conceive an 
exhaustive body of rights and responsibilities, which, if adhered to punctiliously by 
the police authorities, ought to minimise the risk of ill-treatment of persons detained 
by them. The aim of this and subsequent chapters, therefore, is to identify these rights 
and responsibilities. 
The three rights to which the CPT "attaches particular importance" 
Of the numerous rights and guarantees to which, in the view of the CPT, persons 
detained by the police are entitled, three, it has stated, are of "particular importance", 
being three "fundamental safeguards" against abuse. The three safeguards comprise: 
"the right of the person concerned to have the fact of his detention notified to a 
third party of his choice (family member, friend, Consulate), the right of 
access to a lawyer, and the right to request a medical examination by a doctor 
of his choice (in addition to any medical examination carried out by a doctor 
called by the police authorities) ". 4 
These safeguards, the Committee has stated, should apply: 
"as from the very outset of deprivation of liberty, regardless of how it may be 
described under the legal system concerned (apprehension, arrest, etc)". 5 
` See 2d GR para 36. Two of these safeguards, it is worth noting, also figure in the list of key 
guarantees adumbrated above. 
Ibid. 
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They should apply, in other words, "from the moment when those concerned are 
obliged to remain with the police". Further, it has suggested, the three rights should 
be "expressly guaranteed" in law, 7 which means not only making express legislative 
provision, but, in addition, it seems, giving "clear instructions" to police officers that 
the rights are to obtain as from the outset of detention and spelling out "the modalities 
for ensuring the [rights'] effective application in practice... "8 
Underpinning the three basic rights 
Reinforcing the three fundamental safeguards, it is clear, is a second, protective tier of 
measures comprising, inter alia: 
(i) a responsibility on the part of the authorities to inform persons detained by the 
police of all their rights 
- 
including the three fundamental ones 
- 
"expressly" and 
"without delay"; 9 and 
(ii) a responsibility on the part of national legislatures clearly to circumscribe the 
circumstances in which the exercise of "one or the other" of the three fundamental 
rights may be legitimately delayed in the interests of justice and to "limit... in time" 
such delays. 10 
It is proposed to examine the CPT's elaboration of each of these safeguards in 
turn. In addition, we shall examine a number of other guarantees which it considers 
are also important in forestalling ill-treatment in police custody. 
6 See, e. g., Finland I, para 26; and Poland I, para 45. It is worth noting that the CPT considers that the 
same range of precepts should apply mutatis mutandis in the detention of foreign nationals under 
domestic aliens legislation: see, e. g., 7th GR, paras 30-1; and Belgium II, para 76. 
7 See, e. g., Denmark I, paras 126,128 and 143. 
See Turkey I, pars 22. 
9 See, e. g., Germany I, pars 30; Iceland I, para 29; and Portugal I, para 37. 
10 See 2d GR, para 37. 
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6 
The Right to Notify a Third Party of the Fact of One's 
Detention 
Introduction: the basic precept 
The CPT holds that: 
"[t]he right to inform a next of kin or other third party of one's arrest is a 
fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment and as such should be guaranteed 
by the law"! 
The European Prison Rules, though not expressly concerned with the rights of 
persons detained by the police, do provide, in an analogous sense, that: 
"Untried prisoners shall be allowed to inform their families of their detention 
immediately and given all reasonable facilities for communication with family 
and friends and persons with whom it is in their legitimate interest to enter into 
contact". 
2 
This right, the right not to be held incommunicado, comprises a number of features. 
Some of these, as we shall see, require little analysis, being so essential to the right's 
meaningful exercise as to be axiomatic; others, by contrast, especially where the CPT 
itself is somewhat obscure, may require careful exegesis. The CPT's fundamental 
view of the right is, with one or two insignificant variations in expression, this: 
(i) that persons detained by the police have the right to inform without delay a close 
relative or third party of their choice3 of their situation; 
1 See Denmark I, para 126. 
2AtRule 91.1. 
3 See UK III, pars 288 (concerning the CPT's querying of the authorities' circumscription of the right 
in order to limit the party to whom notification may be made to a "reasonably named" third party). 
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(ii) that this right should be expressly guaranteed; it should not merely be implied 
into other legal or regulatory provisions; 4 
(iii) that the right should be available to all persons detained by the police, "for 
whatever reason" (i. e. whether formally arrested or merely apprehended in order to 
"give an explanation" or for identification purposes or as a potential witness or having 
been "taken into care"); 5 
(iv) that the exercise of this right may be made subject to certain exceptions 
"designed to protect the interests of justice"; 6 and, consequently, 
(v) that "any possibility exceptionally to delay the exercise of the right-should be 
clearly circumscribed, made subject to appropriate safeguards (e. g. any such delay to 
be recorded in writing together with the reasons therefor and to require the approval 
of a senior officer or public prosecutor [i. e. a higher authority7]) and [be] strictly [and 
expressly8] limited in time". 9 
Developing the basic precept 
Identifying the third party: the problem for foreign national detainees 
One particular problem encountered by police authorities in giving practical effect to 
the right of notification concerns foreign national detainees. In this connection, to the 
Greek authorities, regarding the possible identity of the third party to whom a person's 
See, e. g., Belgium II, para 35. Some analysts contend that the CPT's response to State party practice 
in this regard suggests that it is of the opinion that "in the final analysis it is the binding nature of the 
provision rather than its exact form that matters": see Evans and Morgan (1998), p 262. 
See Czech Republic I, para 27; and Sweden III, para 18. 6 See, e. g., Greece I, para 37. 
See Germany I, para 35. 
= See, e. g., Finland I, para 30; and Sweden I, paras 24 and 156. 
9 See Greece I, paras 37-8 and 267; and, similarly, Malta I, paras 84 and 112; and Belgium II, para 35. 62 
detention may be notified, the CPT suggested, in the light of its 1993 visit to the 
country, that when foreign nationals are detained by the police: 
"[they] should be provided with the address and telephone number of the 
consular authorities of their country". lo 
This, in fact, represents a logical development of the Committee's belief that foreign 
nationals apprehended by the police should be entitled, as from the outset of their 
custody, "to inform... for example, the consul of their country" of their detention. " 
Of course, foreign national detainees should not be told that they may only contact 
their national consular authorities; like all other persons detained by the police, the 
third party to whom such persons may wish their detention to be notified should not, 
the Committee believes, be circumscribed so restrictively. This may account for its 
implied disapproval of the forms used by Austrian police officers in May 1990 to 
inform detainees of the possibility of their contacting a third party: "interestingly", the 
CPT noted in its first Austrian visit report, the forms given to foreign nationals "only 
refer[red] to the possibility of contacting the consul of the detainee's country" 
. 
12 
The CPT also considers that notification should be given to the consular 
authorities only with the consent of a detainee. If, as a matter of policy, the consulate 
is always informed of the detention of one of its nationals, "even if the detainee 
object[s]", it has stated, there may be "very unfavourable consequences". 13 
Acting in contravention of the detainee's wishes 
Following on from this last point, and in a more general sense, in its first Swedish 
visit report the CPT suggested, peremptorily, that: 
lo Ideen, para 37. 
" See Germany I, para 35. 
12 See Austria I, para 58 (emphasis added). 
13 See Spain I, para 54. 
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"[i]t is indisputable that notification of a person's custody to a third party 
should never be made against his wishes". 14 
It did, however, offer the caveat that unwanted notification should be possible in 
"exceptional circumstances": where, for example, a detainee is mentally il1.15 The 
detention of minors, too, is probably an exception to the general rule. 16 The CPT's 
position is consistent with Rule 92.3, EPR which stipulates that: 
"If an untried prisoner does not wish to inform [members of his family of his 
detention], the prison administration should not do so on its own initiative 
unless there are good overriding reasons as, for instance, the age, state of mind 
or any other incapacity of the prisoner". 
Pressurising the detainee 
It is also the CPTs view, as one would expect, that there should be a "strict obligation 
placed upon the police... to refrain from placing any pressure of whatever kind" on 
detainees in the exercise of their right of notification. " In this regard, it was alleged 
by one prisoner met in Austria in 1990, for example, that he had been "coerced into 
signing a form renouncing his right to inform someone of his arrest". '8 
Keeping the detainee informed 
Without ever stating so expressly, the CPT is understandably keen to see that, as a 
matter of routine, detainees who have in fact exercised their right of notification are 
informed of its outcome. 19 
14 See Sweden I, Para 22. Cf Swedish law in this area: idem, App III, Para 10. 
is Ibid. 
16 See further below, p 72. 
'7 See Austria I, Para 60. 
'= Idem, Para 57. 
19 See Norway I, Para 31. 
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A right exercisable "without delay" 
The right to inform a third party of the fact of detention is described by the CPT in its 
basic formulation as one which should be exercisable "without delay" or 
"immediatelyi20 In other words, a detainee should be entitled to exercise the right 
from the moment he is first detained by the police. Accordingly, it is important to 
establish, definitively, at what point detention may be said actually to commence. 
Does it commence the moment a person is apprehended by the police or later, when 
he is formally "arrested", following, for example, the issuing of a judicial warrant 
authorising his detention? Does it begin only once a detainee has been placed in a 
police cell or, presumably later still, when his formal interrogation begins? The CPTs 
basic position, though laudably concise, is too simply expressed to accommodate 
subtleties such as these. In a number of visit reports, however, the Committee has 
been patently more forthcoming. Following its visit to Germany in December 1991, 
for example, in its measured way, it "stressed" that: 
"... the period immediately following deprivation of liberty by law 
enforcement officers is the one during which the risk of intimidation and ill- 
treatment is at its greatest". ' 
Consequently, it stated, it is "essential" that the right to contact a third party: 
"... be guaranteed as from the very outset of police custody (and not only from 
the moment when the detained person is formally `arrested' by a judge or 
officially interrogated by the police/public prosecutor)". 22 
20 See, e. g., Iceland I, para 30; and Denmark I, para 126. 
21 See Germany I, Para 34. 
22 Ibid. See also 
- 
though less comprehensively 
- 
Portugal I, para 41 (1° sub-para); and Sweden I, 
paras 24 (1" sub-para) and 156. 
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In other words, the right should be guaranteed "from the moment... [a person is] 
obliged to stay with the police". 23 (We have already seen, of course, how the CPT has 
sought to emphasise that the three principal safeguards against ill-treatment in police 
custody 
- 
which safeguards include the right not to be held incommunicado 
- 
should 
apply as from the very outset of detention "regardless of how it may be described 
under the legal system concerned (apprehension, arrest, etc) 44). 
The CPT was prompted to offer these views to the German authorities 
because, under federal law as it stood in 1991, it appears, "very rarely" was a person 
apprehended by the police on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence (a so- 
called "Verdachtiger") permitted to inform a third party of the fact of his 
apprehension. However, if he was also the "subject of a criminal inquiry" (a 
`Beschuldigter"), he might "sometimes" be granted such an opportunity "if this [was] 
considered to be compatible with the needs of the inquiryi25 If he was not the subject 
of a criminal inquiry, then he might inform someone of the fact of his detention at the 
point when a judge issued a warrant of arrest ordering his detention, which could be 
as many as 48 hours after his apprehension. 26 This left him, theoretically at least, 
incommunicado during his 
- 
potentially quite lengthy 
- 
most vulnerable period. 
In other visit reports, too, the CPT has betrayed a certain anxiety about 
circumstances in which it is alleged or it is provided by law that a person detained by 
the police may notify a third party of his detention only "after questioning by a 
detective, or even... after their appearance before the prosecutor"27 or "as soon as this 
I Ideen, pars 208. See, similarly, Sweden I, pars 22 (though cf unpredictable Swedish practice: 
Sweden III4 Para 17). 
u See above, p 59. 
" See Germany I, para 32. German law in this respect is set out at para 31 and Appendix III, para 6 of 
the report. 
26 Idem, Para 15. 
27 See Norway I, pars 31. 
66 
can be done without detriment to the investigations28 or only after he has been 
charged with an offence and brought before a public prosecutor29 or only "from the 
moment when a court order involving deprivation of liberty becomes effective". 30 
Rather strikingly in this connection, in May 1991, officials of the National 
Police Board informed a visiting delegation to Sweden that "during the pre-arrest 
stage of custody [which could last for six or even, exceptionally, twelve hours], the 
general practice was not to notify the detained person's relatives or other third party of 
his situation". 31 This was so, they advanced 
-a little artlessly and, seemingly, without 
further explanation 
- 
because such notification "could be prejudicial to the detainee". 32 
The CPT, in its subsequent visit report, memorably described the situation of such 
persons as "something of a twilight zone". 33 
Delaying the exercise of the right: exceptions "designed to protect the interests of 
justice" 
As we have seen, the CPT is prepared to qualify its basic position on the right to 
contact a third party in order to permit the police, in "exceptional" circumstances, to 
delay notification, provided that the interests of justice will be served thereby. 
However, such "possibilities", it considers, should be "clearly circumscribed". TM As to 
the circumscription sought, the Committee has averred that domestic legal provisions 
which render the exercise of the right contingent on there being "[no] specific reason 
to believe that this could prejudice the [criminal] inquiry"35 or possible "as soon as 
28 See Sweden I, para 21. Seven years after its first periodic visit to Sweden, "the formal legal 
situation", the CPT observed, "was unchanged": see Sweden III, para 16. 
29 See Greece I, paras 36 and 14 (a juncture that might be reached as many as 24 or more hours after 
initial apprehension). 
30 See Portugal I, para 38 and App III, para 6. 
31 See Sweden I, para 22. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ideen, pare 156. 
34 See above, p 62. 
35 See Iceland I, pars 31. 
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this no longer causes any special hindrance to the investigation of the crime"36 are 
"too vague". 37 Any discretion vested in the authorities to delay exercise of the right, 
it considers, should be "more closely circumscribedi38 or "spelt out more clearly". 39 
Accordingly, it has found much more agreeable legislation which confers on police 
officers a power to delay only if they can establish "[a] reasonable fear of destruction 
of evidence, hiding of objects or profits [and] warning of other suspects" 40 
- 
Acceptable duration of delay 
In the course of its second periodic visit to Finland, in June 1998, the CPT learned 
that, as had been the case during its first such visit, some six years previously, 
domestic law conferred on the police "a broad discretionary power to hold a person 
for up to 96 hours (i. e. until the first remand hearing) without any notification of his 
apprehension/arrest being given to his family or other persons with whom he has a 
close relationship"41 In its subsequent visit report, while acknowledging that the 
denial of the right of notification "for a brief period" may exceptionally be necessary 
in order to protect the interests of justice, the Committee felt compelled to remark that 
"the possibility to delay for up to four days... is not justifiable". Consequently, it 
recommended that: 
"... the period during which an apprehended/arrested person can be denied the 
right to notify his next-of-kin or another appropriate person of his situation be 
shortened substantially; in the Committee's opinion, a maximum period of 48 
36 See Finland II, para 28. 
31 Idem, para 29. 
38 Iceland I, pars 31. 
39 Finland II, para 29. Cf Finland I, pare 28 (domestic legal provision permitting exercise of the right 
of notification "provided that this will not jeopardise the `clarification' of the case" allowed to pass 
without comment). 
40 See Iceland II, pars 23. 
41 See Finland II, pars 29. 
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hours would strike a better balance between the requirements of the 
investigation and the interests of detained persons". 4Z 
This statement, it is submitted, represents the CPT's fundamental position on the issue 
of delay. 
- 
Authorising the delay: the need for the approval of a senior police officer or 
public prosecutor 
While the content of this precept largely speaks for itself, it is nevertheless worth 
noting that the Committee considers that "it would be highly desirable for any delay 
in the exercise of a person's right to notify someone of his situation to be always 
subject to the approval of a senior police officer with the right to arrest". 43 It is also 
the Committee's view, as might be expected, that the courts have a role to play in 
authorising delay. 44 
Refusing permission to exercise the right 
In suggesting that the exercise of the right of notification might legitimately be made 
subject to certain exceptions in the interests of justice, the CPT has, on occasion, 
referred to "the possibility for the police exceptionally to delay or refuse" contact 
with a third party. 45 This is a suggestion of rather questionable merit, it is submitted. 
For, why should the CPT countenance the vesting of a discretion in the police not 
merely to delay exercise of the right, but to prevent its exercise entirely? It would 
appear to vitiate the spirit of its belief that the risk of ill-treatment of detainees is at its 
42 Ibid. See, in the same connection, Spain II, para 60; and Spain VI, para 23 (regarding the 
"unsatisfactory" possibility under Spanish law of withholding notification of the fact of detention for 
up to five days). 
4 See Finland II, para 30 (emphasis added). Cf Finnish procedure in this area 44 See, e. g., San Marino I, para 22 (approval of `Judicial authority" required); Netherlands (NA) 1, para 
46,2' indent (approval of "court or a public prosecutor" necessary); and Belgium I, para 40,2d indent (approval of "judge or magistrate" required). 
`s See, e. g., Austria 1, para 60 (3" sub-para); and Denmark I, para 126 (emphasis added). 
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greatest in the first hours and days of police custody. As yet, however, it has not 
sought to justify this view. For instance, visiting Austria in 1990, while apparently 
taken aback by the possibility that the Austrian police "may... refuse to allow a person 
to exercise the right [of notification] if it is believed that there may be a risk of 
collusion"46 
- 
which possibility was seemingly realised, if the claims of detainees 
interviewed at the time are to be believed 
- 
the Committee did nothing more than to 
re-state its basic position on delay/refusal, without ever offering a view on the 
propriety or otherwise of refusing exercise. 47 
On the evidence of its visit reports, therefore, and notwithstanding the frequent 
invocation of its dicta exhorting national authorities, inter alia, clearly to 
circumscribe the circumstances in which police officers may legitimately qualify the 
right not to be held incommunicado and to render it subject to appropriate safeguards, 
the CPT has been surprisingly discreet in the face of State party practice which 
appears prima facie to fail to match its basic precept. It may be, however, that it takes 
a pragmatic approach, accepting that in the course of a criminal investigation, the 
interests of justice may possibly be served by denying a suspect contact with a third 
party. This is something considered below in an examination of CPT precepts on the 
solitary confinement of detainees at the request of the police in order to advance a 
criminal investigation. 48 It is difficult to see, however, how one could justify such a 
denial in respect of other categories of detainee. 
A right to inform a third party in person? 
Whether a detainee should be permitted to contact a relative or other third party of his 
46 See Austria I, para 13. 
47 Ideen, para 60 (3d sub-para). See similarly Portugal I, paras 39 and 41 (mere re-statement of basic 
position notwithstanding the discovery in 1992 that court orders authorising a person's arrest may also 
contain provisions which "expressly prohibit" his contacting his family or other third party). 
" See below, pp 464-5. 
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choice personally is a practical question on which opinions may understandably 
differ. In a criminal investigation, to permit such personal contact creates the risk, 
however remote, of collusion or the destruction of vital evidence. Yet, it might 
equally be argued that a person merely suspected of a crime, being innocent in the 
eyes of the law, should be permitted to exercise those rights to which he is entitled 
freely. Even more forcefully, a suspected illegal immigrant, detained in connection 
with deportation proceedings and wishing to contact his national consulate, may be 
said to pose no immediate threat to public order. 
Under Norwegian law, it would appear, the act of notification may be 
performed only by the "prosecuting authorities", 49 a state of affairs on which the CPT 
has offered no opinion and therefore, we may assume, one which it is prepared to 
accept. S° Similarly quiescently, the situation encountered in Denmark in 1990, 
wherein, "[a]s a rule", an arrested person was not permitted to telephone a third party 
in person, it being done rather, "on his behalf' by the police, was also allowed to pass 
without comment. 51 The matter appears, however, to have been resolved in recent 
reports. To the Romanian authorities, for example, the Committee has gone so far as 
to suggest that the requisite notification may be given "either directly or through the 
intermediary of a police officer", 52 from which suggestion it is possible to infer that 
the CPT is prepared, in principle, to accept a situation in which the police authorities 
may deny detainees the opportunity to contact a third party in person, rather, 
undertaking the responsibility themselves. 
49 See Norway I, paras 11 and 31. 
50 It is worth noting, however, that the act of notification would appear to be a duty of such authorities 
rather than a discretion. 
s1 See Denmark I, pare 125. 
52 See Romania I, para 32 (1" indent). See, in the same connection, Bulgaria 1, para 83; Netherlands (NA) I, pars 46; and Belgium I, para 40 (1" indent). 
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Juvenile detainees: the provision of enhanced protection 
The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure appears, sensitively, to afford the parents or 
guardians of a detained minor "unrestricted access" to their child, 53 a gesture which 
demonstrates, it is submitted, that the right to inform a third party of one's detention 
may be capable of spawning further, related rights. The Austrian authorities, too, 
would appear to have taken cognisance of the unique vulnerability of "young people" 
in the present connection. For, since 1989, the CPT noted in its first visit report, the 
detention of juveniles by the Austrian police has been "subject to special rules, 
whatever the type of offence". M This "judicial protection", it continued, has been 
achieved by conferring on young detainees: 
(i) "a right to contact... a friend or relative and a legal adviser or probation officer"; 55 
(ii) a right to be "assisted by [such persons] from the time of their arrest and 
throughout the period of police custody' ; 56 and 
(iii) an entitlement to "psychological assistance by a person of their choice during 
[police] questioning". 57 
Gestures like these have, clearly, profoundly influenced the CPT. It has observed 
recently, with evident approval, for example, that: 
"[o]ver and above [guaranteeing the three fundamental] safeguards, certain 
jurisdictions recognise that the inherent vulnerability of juveniles requires that 
additional precautions be taken. These include placing police officers under a 
formal obligation themselves to ensure that an appropriate person is notified of 
53 See Netherlands I, para 36, note 3 (citing Section 490 of the Code). 54 See Austria I, para 15 (referring to the 
- 
amended 
- 
law known as "Jugendgerichtsgesetz"). 
55 Emphasis added. 
56 This provision would appear to reflect, in principle, that of Dutch law in this area, as examined 
above. 
s' Austria I, para 15. 
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the fact that a juvenile has been detained (regardless of whether the juvenile 
requests that this be done). It may also be the case that police officers are not 
entitled to interview a juvenile unless such an appropriate person and/or 
lawyer is present". 58 
A general failure on the part of States to conform to CPT guidelines? 
As the tenor of much of this examination suggests, in some instances, State party law 
and practice on so many aspects of the right to notify a third party may be said to fall 
some way short of the standards adumbrated by the CPT. For instance, in Maltese 
law, the right of an arrested person inter alia to inform someone of the fact of his 
arrest is simply not guaranteed. 59 However, it is "[a]pparently... usual practice" for the 
country's police to ask an arrestee whether he wishes someone to be notified and, if 
he does, to contact the person named on his behalf. 60 According to inspectors 
interviewed at the Police General Headquarters, Floriana, in 1990, however, an 
inquiry would be made of the detainee "[only] after the first period of questioning" 61 
Justifying this arrangement, officers rather disingenuously argued that "on an island 
the size of Malta, it would in any event be common knowledge within a very short 
time if someone was detained by the police; consequently, the latter had no interest in 
not giving notification of custody". 62 The CPT, for its part, "[did] not find this 
argument reassuring". It was "particular[ly]" troubled by the possible consequences 
ss See 9`h GR, para 23. 
s9 See Malta I, para 15. See, similarly, Greece I, para 36; Netherlands I, paras 36 and 159; and 
Denmark I, pars 125. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ideen, pars 82. 
62 Ideen, Para 83. 
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for "non-Maltese" detainees who might have no relatives or friends on the island privy 
to the local network. 63 
State party exemplars of the CPT's fundamental precept 
Lastly in the present connection, it may be instructive to consider some of those 
criminal justice systems which, in the light of the experience of visiting delegations, 
may be said to reflect the standards and objects on the right of notification which have 
been developed by the CPT. Rather strikingly, the United Kingdom has been 
described as offering an "impressive level of legal protection against the ill-treatment 
of detainees [in police custody]". TM In particular, the Codes of Practice developed 
under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE 1984") have found CPT 
favour, being described, inter alia, as "extremely good". 65 In England and Wales, the 
CPT remarked, following its visit in 1990, the right not to be held incommunicado is, 
together with other rights, "formally guaranteed by law". 66 Accordingly, it applies: 
"as from the outset of a person's custody by the police; exercise of the [right] 
may be delayed only in certain closely defined circumstances, and any such 
delay is subject to clear time limits (a maximum of 36 hours or, in the case of 
persons detained under the prevention of terrorism legislation, 48 hours)". 67 
63 Ibid. By the time of the CPT's second periodic visit to the Party in 1995, although instructions 
providing for a right of notification had been issued to police officers, significantly, they did not have 
the force of law: see Malta II, Para 27. 
"See UK 1, Para 216. 
as Idem, Para 238. 
Ideen, Para 217. 
67 Ibid. For a more detailed account of English legislation and relevant Codes of Practice in this area, 
see paras 17-18 of the report; and, for an insight into the similar provisions which obtain in Northern 
Ireland, see UK I1, paras 19 and 54. 
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More impressive still, in some States parties, it is clear, certain legal provisions afford 
greater protection than that sought by the CPT. They deserve briefly to be considered 
here, it is submitted, as exemplars of good practice. 
Foreign national detainees: entitlement to notify more than one third party 
In the Netherlands, when a person is subject to "administrative detention" 
- 
that is, 
detention for a "period... of no more than one month... imposed in respect of a foreigner 
in the interests of public peace, public safety or national securityi68 
- 
he appears to be 
entitled to have more than one third party immediately informed of the fact of his 
detention, namely, his relatives and his diplomatic or consular representative. 69 This 
is so notwithstanding the general absence in Dutch law of an express right of 
notification in respect of persons detained for interrogation purposes or, indeed, in 
police custody generally. 7° 
Means of communication 
The nature of the communication between detainees and third parties is not something 
on which the CPT has so far expressed an opinion. This is understandable, for it is 
unlikely that a police establishment in any State party will not possess that most 
immediate method of communication, the telephone. In Northern Ireland, however, 
the exercise of the right of notification is the subject of more elaborate arrangements. 
Under Codes of Practice developed in conjunction with the Police and Criminal 
Evidence (NI) Order 1989, ("PACE (NI) 1989") persons detained under the Order 
may "send a letter or message" to a third party and make a telephone call - all of 
68 See Netherlands I, Para IS. 
69 Idem, Para 36, note 3 (citing Section 84, Para 2 of the Decree on Aliens). Cf Denmark I, Para 125 (referring to an instance in which two foreign nationals detained at Kastrup airport in 1990 were denied 
contact with family members already in the country). 70 Idem, Para 36, main text. 
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which may be read or listened to. 71 Thus, detainees have not one, but two 
opportunities to exercise their right of notification, each different in character. This 
situation, the CPT acknowledged in its second UK visit report, develops the basic 
right "over and above [mere] notification of custody". 72 
Visit entitlement 
Further positive provisions in the Codes of Practice which elaborate the terms of 
PACE (NI) 1989 permit detainees to enjoy "supervised visits. 
.. 
at the custody officer's 
discretion". 73 Inconsistently, however 
- 
and the object of evident CPT concern in 
1993 
- 
those persons detained by the police in Northern Ireland on suspicion of having 
committed certain offences related to terrorism (under the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 ("PTA 1989")) do not appear to benefit from the 
same largesse. The Code of Practice to which their detention is subject "makes no 
reference to facilities of this kind", an omission which the CPT characterised as a 
"lacuna"74 given that the Act authorises the detention of persons without charge for up 
to seven days. 75 The Committee's unease at the absence of any reference in the Code 
to the kinds of facility apparently available to ordinary criminal suspects in Northern 
Ireland (i. e. monitored letters, telephone calls and supervised visits, at the custody 
officer's discretion) was undisguised: "it would be highly undesirable", it stated, "for 
such facilities to be routinely denied throughout custody periods lasting up to seven 
"'6 days. 
71 See UK II, para 55. 
n Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Idem, para 18. 
76 Idem, pars 55. It is worth noting in this connection that Rule 92.2, EPR provides that "[untried 
prisoners] shall 
... 
be allowed to receive visits from [family and friends] under humane conditions 
subject only to such restrictions and supervision as are necessary in the interests of the administration 
of justice and of the security and good order of the institution". 
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Conclusion 
Clearly, among States parties to the ECPT, law and practice on the right of 
notification is, to say the least, varied. Some Parties, like Malta, in 1990, offer no 
express legal guarantee at all. Others, like the Netherlands, while providing no 
guarantee in law, do provide for the right by way of circular or other sub-legislative 
guidance, such as a code of conduce 77 Lastly, some, like the UK, make very 
comprehensive legal provision. Further, it is evident that not all persons apprehended 
by the police on Convention territory are entitled to exercise the right. In some 
Parties, distinctions are drawn between those categories of detainee who may exercise 
it as from the outset of custody and those who may only do so subsequently, once 
their legal status has altered in the course of a criminal investigation (e. g. German 
law). In other Parties, while no distinction is drawn between categories of detainee, 
the right may be guaranteed only at a particular juncture in the criminal justice 
process (e. g. Swedish law), leaving all detainees incommunicado during the initial 
period of their detention. In addition, the grounds on which the police authorities may 
exceptionally exercise their residual right to delay notification may be obscure or 
undeveloped (e. g. Icelandic and Finnish law) and the period of time during which 
such notification may be withheld inordinately long (e. g. Finnish and Spanish law). 
There remains much work to be done, therefore, before State party law and practice 
may be said truly to reflect the CPT desiderata in this area adumbrated at the outset of 
this chapter. 78 
n See, e. g., Netherlands Response I, CPT/Inf (93) 20, p 21. 
79 See above, pp 61-2. 
77 
7 
Access to Legal Advice for Persons in Police Custody 
Introduction 
The CPT considers that: 
"[l]ike the right not to be held incommunicado, the right of access to legal 
advice [for persons detained by the police] is a fundamental safeguard against 
ill-treatment". 1 
Consequently, as with the former right, the creation of an express legal guarantee of a 
right of access to legal advice is, it believes, "an absolute necessity". 2 Merely 
respecting the right in practice, in the absence of a guarantee in law, would appear, 
therefore, to be insufficient. 3 Further, that guarantee, the Committee considers, 
should specify clearly that the right shall apply "as from the very outset of custody" 4 
Content of the right 
On the evidence of its published work, the guarantee sought by the CPT in this area 
comprises, in essence, the following: 
11 
... 
the right to contact and to be visited by [an independent] lawyer (in both 
cases under conditions guaranteeing the confidentiality of... discussions) as 
' See Malta I, para 86. The right of access to lawyer, of course, exists in addition to the right to notify 
a third party. It does not exist in the alternative. 
2 Idem, para 112. 
3 See, e. g., Netherlands I, para 41 (wherein the CPT expressed disappointment at its discovery, in 1992, 
of a situation in which, during the first six hours of a person's detention, "access to a lawyer may be 
granted, but is not a right"). 
See, e. g., Sweden I, para 25 and, similarly, para 156. (Cf Swedish law and practice in this area: right 
to legal advice seemingly unavailable in the pre-arrest/suspicion stage of a police investigation: 
Sweden III, paras 18-21). See also Turkey I, paras 17,19 and 24-5 (persons suspected of State Security 
Court offences granted access to a lawyer only after an elapse of four days; ordinary criminal suspects 
granted access only when making a formal statement, notwithstanding the terms of domestic law). 
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well as, in principle, the right.. 
. 
to have the lawyer present during 
interrogation". s 
As with the right to notify a third party of the fact of one's detention, however, the 
right of access to legal advice may be made subject to a power vested in the police 
exceptionally to delay or restrict access, which power, the CPT believes, should be 
"clearly circumscribed" and, like the right of notification, made "subject to 
appropriate safeguards (e. g. such delay or refusal to be recorded in writing together 
with the reasons and to require confirmation by a senior officer)" 6 
Justifying the right 
Guaranteeing a right of access to a lawyer as from the very outset of police custody, 
like the right not to be held incommunicado, is, the CPT holds, "essential" to the 
struggle to eliminate torture and ill-treatment, since: 
"[t]he period immediately following a person's loss of liberty is the one during 
which the risk of intimidation and ill-treatment is the greatest". 7 
The possibility for persons to have access to a lawyer during that period, it considers: 
"... will have a dissuasive effect on those minded to ill treat detained persons; 
moreover, a lawyer is well placed to take appropriate action if ill-treatment 
actually occurs". 8 
The Committee might contend, further, that if a detainee is denied access to a lawyer 
during the initial stages of his custody, his defence against any action taken against 
I See, e. g., 2°d GR, para 38; and Germany I, para 35. 
6 See, e. g., Malta II, para 28, sub-para (i). 
7 See, e. g., Norway I, para 33; Netherlands I, pares 41 (2°1 indent) and 159; and Belgium II, para 36. 
1 See, e. g., Czech Republic I, para 30; Turkey I, para 19; and France III, para 39. 
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him subsequently, such as the preferment of a criminal charge or, in the case of 
foreign nationals, the commencement of deportation proceedings, may be prejudiced. 
For, ready access to a lawyer may, ipso facto, increase the likelihood of better 
representation at subsequent hearings. In Sweden in 1991, for example, "a large 
number" of prisoners complained to a visiting CPT delegation about the legal 
assistance which they had received when arrested and placed on remand. "Many" 
persons alleged that they had seen their defence lawyer "for the first time only 
minutes before or even at the initial remand hearing". As a result, they claimed, "their 
interests had not been defended properly". 9 
Circumscribing the basic right 
The right-holder 
It is the axiomatic view of the CPT that every person detained by the police should, 
without exception, be entitled to seek and receive legal advice. Accordingly, 
provisions which guarantee access are flawed, it believes, if they limit the right 
merely to certain categories of detainee. To the Austrian authorities, for example, it 
has postulated that the "extreme... rar[ity]" with which, in 1990, persons detained by 
the police seemed to obtain access to lawyers during the initial period of their 
custody1° may have been due to the fact that under contemporary Austrian law, only 
persons suspected of having committed administrative offences" were entitled to be 
"visit[ed] and assist[ed]" by a legal adviser as from the outset of their custody. 12 
Persons suspected of having committed criminal offences did not enjoy such a right, 
9 See Sweden I, pars 28. 
lo See further below, p 90. 
" Which offences include breaches of the highway code and disturbances of the peace: see Austria I, 
Para 11. 
2 By virtue of Article 36, para 4 of the country's Verwaltungsstrafgesetz. 
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limited, as they were, merely to "telephone contact" with their lawyers. 13 In its 
subsequent visit report, the CPT recommended that the Austrian authorities "extend" 
the right of visit and assistance "to persons suspected of having committed a criminal 
offence". 14 As it does in respect of the right to notify a third party, therefore, the CPT 
believes that all persons detained by the police, "for whatever reason", should be 
granted a right of access to a lawyer as from the outset of their custody. 15 
When may custody be said to begin? 
We have already seen, in determining the moment at which the right not to be held 
incommunicado becomes exercisable, how difficult it is accurately to interpret when, 
in the view of the CPT, a person's detention may be said actually to commence. The 
same problem, of course, arises in respect of the right of access to a lawyer. 
Notwithstanding such difficulties, for present purposes, it is submitted, we should 
regard the CPTs request of the Danish authorities, following its visit in 1990, whether 
a person taken into police custody is entitled to obtain legal advice "as from the 
moment he is apprehended (as distinct from the moment when the first interrogation 
takes place)s16 as a most apposite expression of its view on the matter. Under 
contemporary Danish law, it appears, access to a lawyer and his presence during 
interrogations were guaranteed "[only] from the moment [detainees were] questioned 
for the first time by the police". 17 
13 See Austria I, paras 14 and 59. 
'4 Idem, Para 60 (4s' indent). 
is See further Czech Republic I, Para 30 (under Czech law as it stood in 1997, a detainee was entitled to 
contact a lawyer at the moment of charge (Para 29), but not before or at any other stage of police 
custody); Poland I, Para 49 (denial of access to a lawyer during the first 48 hours of police custody 
authorised because detainee not legally an "accused"); and Sweden III, Para 21. 
16 See Denmark I, Para 127. 
17 Idem, App 2, Para 7. See, similarly, Finland II, Para 31 (regarding the operation in practice of 
Section 10 of the country's Pre-Trial Investigation Act). 
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What kind of contact should a lawyer and his client enjoy? 
Simply guaranteeing a right of access to legal advice should not, the CPT considers, 
mark the extent of authorities' responsibilities in this area. As might be expected, it 
seeks, in addition, precision in determining the nature of the contact between a lawyer 
and his client. For instance, it has sought to know of the Danish authorities whether 
the "precise content" of a domestic guarantee includes, inter alia, a right of visit. 18 
Finnish law would appear to be quite developed in this regard. It provides that a 
person "suspected of an offence and apprehended, arrested or remanded for 
trial... [has, in principle, ] the right to be in contact with his counsel through visits, by 
letter or by telephone". '9 The CPT, it is no surprise, "welcome[d]" such provision. 20 
Guaranteeing the confidentiality of discussions 
We have already seen that the CPT considers that detainees should be able to contact 
and be visited by a lawyer "in conditions guaranteeing the confidentiality of [their] 
discussions". 1 So fundamental to the effective exercise of the right is this guarantee, 
it seems, that the Committee has sought to commend it as "the key element in the 
concept of access to a lawyer for persons in police custody". 2 Accordingly, it has 
insisted that: 
is Ideen, pars 127 (2"d indent). 
19 See Finland I, para 31 (citing Section 10 of the country's Pre-Trial Investigation Act). 20 Idem, para 32. 
21 See above, p 78. 
22 See UK II, para 63. See, similarly, Spain I, para 50 (regarding the CPT's view that the possibility of 
a private consultation, particularly during the period immediately after loss of liberty, represents "the 
core of the notion of access to legal assistance". However, cf Spain V, para 47, wherein, 
notwithstanding the CPT's views, the complete denial of access to a lawyer for a suspected terrorist of 
two and a half days in January 1997, during which time, he alleged, he was subjected to particularly 
intense ill-treatment by the Civil Guard, was highlighted). 
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"[f]or the right of access to a lawyer to be fully effective as a means of 
preventing ill-treatment, it must include the right. 
.. 
to consult in private with a 
lawyer in all cases". 23 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, in Finland, in 1992, the CPT was "concern[ed]" to learn 
that in Finnish law, "in exceptional cases, discussions with a lawyer may be listened 
to, and correspondence inspected" by the detaining authorities, 24 and in Italy, in 1995, 
that the privacy of lawyer-client consultations in establishments operated by the 
carabinieri is guaranteed only "when that is possible, having regard to the existing 
infrastructures". 25 In other States parties, too, domestic law authorises breaches of the 
confidentiality of lawyer-client discussions. In Northern Ireland, for instance, 
although both PACE (NI) 1989 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
1991 ("the EPA 1991") provide that persons detained by the police may consult with 
a solicitor in private, by virtue of Section 45, EPA 1991, a police officer of the rank of 
Assistant Chief Constable or above may direct that a detainee "may only consult a 
solicitor in the sight and hearing of a uniformed officer of the rank of Inspector or 
above". 6 Visiting in July 1993, a delegation learned that this power was "apparently 
used rarely" 27 Nevertheless, the CPT subsequently felt compelled to "express strong 
reservations" about the possibility of vitiating the confidentiality of detainee/lawyer 
discussions in this way. 28 
p Idem, para 60. See similarly Finland I, paras 32 and 148; and Romania I, para 35 (cf Romanian 
police practice in 1995: presence of police officers during lawyer-client consultations possible during 
period of "arrestation preventive", which, it seems, could last for some time (para 12)). 
See Finland I, paras 31-2 (regarding Section 12 of the country's Remand Imprisonment Act); and 
now Finland II, para 32. 
25 See Italy II, para 52. 
26 See UK II, para 60. 
27 In some 2% of cases, according to a Home Office study. 
28 UK II, pars 60. 
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As for police practice in Northern Ireland, at the Castlereagh Holding Centre, 
where, at the time of the visit, two rooms had been set aside for detainee-lawyer 
consultations, "[t]he normal practice", apparently, "was for a police officer to observe 
the interview from outside the room, through a window in the door". 29 It was noted 
by the visiting delegation that "unless the detainee and his lawyer spoke loudly, they 
could not be heard from the outside". However, "several detainees spoken to 
expressed the firm conviction that their discussions with lawyers had been overheard 
by police officers", some alleging, even, that "detectives had taunted them by 
repeating details of [the] discussions". Further, a number of lawyers "also expressed 
doubts as to the de facto privacy of their discussions... "30 
Breaches of lawyer-client confidentiality also appear to be authorised by 
Sweden's Code ofJudicial Procedure. Section 9 of Chapter 21 of the Code provides 
that a person arrested by the police (or remanded in custody) shall have a public 
defence counsel appointed if he so requests and that such defence counsel may speak 
in private with his client. A counsel other than a public defence counsel, however, 
may do so "only upon the consent of the investigating authority or the public 
prosecutor". 31 Visiting the country in May 1991, the CPT had clearly been troubled 
by this distinction, for in its subsequent visit report it sought to ascertain the grounds 
on which the police or a public prosecutor might withhold their consent to a 
confidential meeting between a private defence counsel and his client and whether 
there exist any circumstances in which a public defence counsel may be denied such a 
meeting. 32 
29Idem, Para 61. A "similar arrangement", it seems, obtained at Gough Barracks Holding Centre. 30 Ibid. In the same connection 
, 
in France, in 1996, a visiting CPT delegation observed in a number of 
police establishments visited how the acoustics of rooms set aside for lawyer-client consultations 
permitted conversations to be heard outside: see France III, para 39. 
' See Sweden I, para 21 and App III, pars 10. 
32 Idem, para 27. See, similarly, Netherlands I, para 42 (regarding the operation in practice of Section 
50 of the country's Code of Criminal Procedure). 
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Providing exceptions to the right 
Like the right to notify a third party of the fact of one's detention, the right of access 
to legal assistance, the CPT considers, may be subject to a power of delay on the part 
of the authorities "in order to protect the interests of justice". However, such power, 
it has asserted, should be "clearly defined" and its application "strictly limited in 
time". 33 Thus, while the of access to a lawyer granting as from the outset of police 
custody is, the Committee believes, crucial to the prevention of ill-treatment, it is 
prepared to "acknowledg[e]" that: 
". An order to protect the interests of justice, it may exceptionally be 
appropriate 
- 
for a certain period 
- 
to delay (or restrict) access by a [detainee] 
to a lawyer of his-choice". 34 
The Committee's choice of wording here is significant, it is submitted, for, in a 
reference to the words underlined, it has stated that: 
"... it finds it hard to understand why an exception of this kind should apply to 
access to any lawyer (and also. therefore. to an officially appointed lawyer)". 3s 
To apply the exception to any lawyer, whether chosen by the detainee or appointed by 
the State, is, it considers, "difficult to justify". 36 Clearly, therefore, any power to 
delay or restrict access to legal advice 
- 
which power, the CPT concedes, may 
legitimately vest in the police 
- 
should not be an absolute one; a detainee should not 
be "totally denied [access] during the period in question". 3' Rather, every person 
detained by the police, it has declared, in a gesture reminiscent of its fundamental 
33 See 2"d GR, para 37. 
34 See Netherlands I, paras 42 and 159 (original emphasis) and now Netherlands II, para 34; and Poland 
I, para 50. 33 Ibid (original emphasis). 
36 Idem, para 159. 
37 See Greece I, para 40; UK II, para 58; and Belgium II, para 36. 
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position on this issue, "has the right to consult in private with a lawyer (where 
necessary, an officially appointed lawyer), without delay". 38 This right, it has 
insisted, should be both "unrestrictedn39 and the subject of a "legally binding 
provision". 40 
What this means practice, it appears, is a guarantee 
- 
"as far as possible 01 
- 
of 
access to (including the right to consult in private with42) "another independent lawyer 
who can be trusted not to jeopardise the legitimate interests of the police 
investigation... i43 It is in this area that the right of access to a lawyer may be said to 
differ fundamentally from that to notify a third party, the complete denial of which, it 
seems and as some commentators have suggested, the CPT is prepared to countenance 
in certain, closely defined circumstances. ' 
State-sanctioned lawyers 
Seemingly actuated by the need to balance the interests of justice and those of the 
individual detainee, in its 2nd General Report, the CPT suggested that: 
"... [the development of] systems whereby, exceptionally, lawyers... can be 
chosen from pre-established lists drawn up in agreement with the relevant 
professional organisations should remove any need to delay the exercise of 
[the right] of access to legal advice" 45 
38 See Netherlands I, paras 42 and 159 (emphasis added). 
39 See Finland I, para 32. This is doubtless what the CPT meant when, in its 2"d General Report, it 
suggested that the power to delay, like that which, it considers, may vest in the authorities in respect of 
the right to notify a third party, should be "clearly defined" and its application "strictly limited in time": 
see 2°' GR, pars 37. 
40 See UK IV, paras 61 and 163. Accordingly, provision merely in a Note for Guidance rather than in a 
binding Code of Practice is insufficient 
41 See UK 11, para58. 
42 See Finland II, para 32. 
43 See, inter alia, Greece I, pars 40; Poland I, para 50; Netherlands II, para 34; and France III, para 39. 
4° See above, pp 69-70 and also Morgan and Evans (1998), p 272. 
45 See 2"d GR, para 37. A similar suggestion in respect of the right of access to a medical doctor for 
persons detained incommunicado by the police is examined below, at p 114-15. 
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Such lawyers, it follows, could operate as officially-appointed legal counsel whenever 
a detainee is denied access to his own, nominated lawyer, thereby obviating the 
possibility that he is "totally denied" access to legal advice in police custody. In 
addition, of course, they may be of use to persons detained by the police who either 
do not have their own lawyer or do not know the name of a lawyer who may be 
contacted. 46 
In sum, therefore, it seems that the CPT is prepared to countenance the placing 
of restrictions on a detainee's right of access to a lawyer of his own choosing where 
the interests of justice so require. However, it is disinclined to see access denied 
absolutely: a detainee, it considers, should always be entitled to contact and be visited 
by an independent lawyer, in confidence, as from the very outset of his custody, even 
if the latter must be "officially appointed". In this way, it may be suggested, a 
detainee's inalienable right of access may remain fundamentally unaltered; the CPTs 
apparent concession of a certain State discretion ought not to dilute the essence of the 
right in practice. 47 Self-evidently, such officially appointed lawyers must be 
competent. They must be sufficiently familiar with the domestic criminal justice 
process to be able effectively to represent their client. They should not, therefore, act 
as little more than "silent observers" during proceedings and should endeavour to 
make appropriate contact with their client before the commencement of such 
proceedings. 8 
I See, e. g., Ireland II, para 23. In Ireland, it appears, "informal arrangements" exist whereby officers 
will furnish suspects who know of no lawyer with the names of solicitors willing to attend at the 
station. However, no panel of duty solicitors has yet been drawn up and officers are not obliged to 
provide detainees who know of no lawyer with a list of names. Such matters, the CPT stated, should 
be the subject of "more formal arrangements". 
47 Of course, any putative right of access is rendered nugatory if the State is not prepared, even, to 
permit access to an independently appointed lawyer: see, e. g., Turkey I, pars 18. 
8 See Romania I, paras 37 and 79. 
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Defining the exception 
Unfortunately, the Committee has not yet fully explained various terms used by it to 
circumscribe the power of the State to delay or restrict access. For instance, while a 
term like "[protecting] the interests of justice", although imprecise, is difficult to 
interpret other than conventionally (i. e. as connoting the need to avoid prejudicing a 
police investigation through, for example, collusion 
- 
deliberate or otherwise, on the 
part of the detainee or his lawyer 
- 
with others or the destruction of evidence), it is 
much less clear what the CPT means by "a certain period", being the period during 
which to delay or restrict access may "exceptionally" be "appropriate". Is a delay or 
restriction "appropriate" if it obtains only for a few hours? Is it still "appropriate" 
after a day or even 48 hours? The CPT has yet to say 
- 
although, it has, 
understandably, expressed "reservations" about the possibility of denying or 
restricting contact between a detainee and his lawyer for periods of up to six days. 49 
It is, similarly, difficult to determine with precision the meaning of the CPT's 
parenthetical reference to "restrict[ed]" 
- 
not merely delayed 
- 
access to a detainee's 
chosen lawyer, restricted access, like delayed access, being, in the view of the 
Committee, "exceptionally... appropriate". Interpreted narrowly, a restriction may 
connote nothing more proximate than correspondence by letter or, at best, telephone. 5° 
We have seen, however, how disinclined the CPT is to countenance anything less than 
personal contact between a lawyer and his client. 51 Arguably just as damaging to the 
preparation of a detainee's case would be the imposition of restrictions which, say, 
49 See Netherlands I, paras 42 and 159. It will be recalled that in the context of the right not to be held 
incommunicado, the CPT is of the view that a power to delay notifying a third party of the fact of one's 
detention for up to 48 hours is acceptable: see above, pp 68-9. 
so See, e. g., pre-1991 Austrian law on the detention of criminal suspects: above, pp 80-1. 
51 It is interesting to see, however, that in recommending to the Maltese authorities the introduction of a 
right of access to a lawyer for persons detained by the police, the CPT has suggested that only 
telephone contact is of immediate necessity; a right to personal contact need only be envisaged "in the 
short term" (in other words, it may be inferred, the CPT is prepared to countenance contact by indirect 
means as a short-term expedient and as a prelude to personal contact): see, e. g., Malta II, para 28. 
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limit the number of visits that a legal representative may make to his client or the 
amount of time that he may spend with him during each encounter. It is submitted 
that the CPrs formula as to acceptable restrictions is so vaguely expressed 
- 
or, at 
least, so undeveloped 
- 
as to permit, conceivably, all of these possibilities. 
The potential harm that is occasioned by a failure adequately to circumscribe 
the power of the police to impose restrictions on the right may be illustrated by the 
following example. Under prevention of terrorism legislation as it operated in 
Northern Ireland in 1993, it was possible for the police to deny a detainee access to a 
lawyer for a period of 48 hours following a previous consultation. As a consequence, 
the number of consultations between a detainee and a lawyer might be limited to a 
maximum of three in any seven day period of detention. 52 "More significant[ly]", it 
meant that access to a lawyer might be granted "immediately following arrest, but 
before the interview process beg[an], and then subsequently denied throughout the 
whole period during which the person [was] detained". 53 This, the CPT clearly felt, 
effectively vitiated the right of access to legal advice conferred on persons detained 
under the legislation, particularly in light of the fact that the "majority" of such 
persons were either released or charged within two days. 
The provision, free of charge, of independent legal advice 
The notion of furnishing persons detained by the police with access to an independent 
- 
albeit State-financed 
- 
system of legal advice-giving has been advocated by the CPT 
ever since its inception. The right to such independent legal advice and to the cost of 
its provision flow naturally from the Committee's belief that the restrictions which, as 
we have seen, it considers may legitimately be placed on the right of access to a 
52 Seven days, it will be recalled, is the maximum period of time that a person detained on suspicion of 
having committed aterrorist-related offence may be held without charge in the jurisdiction. 53 See UK II, para 59. 
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detainee's chosen lawyer should not amount to a complete abnegation of his right to 
legal advice. That securing access to free and independent legal advice for persons 
detained by the police is a priority of the CPT was evident in its first Austrian visit 
report. Therein, in the light of some quite startling evidence to emerge from its 
delegation's visit in 1990, it recommended that: 
"... urgent consideration be given to the possibility of devising a scheme for 
the provision, free of charge, of independent legal advice to persons in police 
custody". 54 
In this regard, although contemporary Austrian police practice was the subject of a 
ministerial circular which provided that a person detained by the police was entitled to 
inform both a third party of his choice and a lawyer of the fact of his detention, police 
officers interviewed in the course of the visit intimated that it was "extremely rare for 
persons to have access to legal advice during the initial period of police custody". ss 
One station officer interviewed "could not recall any instance of [legal] advice being 
provided in five years experience"; while another suggested that "possibly [just] one 
out of 700 detainees so far handled by his station in 1990 had [had] the benefit of 
advice from a lawyer while in police custody". 56 Speculating as to why this should 
have been so, the CPT suggested that what Austrian criminal procedure lacked "most 
fundamentally" was a "developed infrastructure... permitting the provision of legal 
advice free of charge and at short notice to persons in police custody". 57 As a result of 
this and other deficiencies in the same area 
- 
such as the general failure of the 
Austrian police to respect in practice the right of detainees to contact both a third 
54 See Austria I, para 60 (6`h indent). 
ss Idem, pars 59. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid (4th indent). 
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party and a lawyer following their detention and the right of visitation by a lawyer 
during the initial period of a police investigation 58 
- 
the Committee could only 
conclude that, "save for someone who knows the name of a lawyer in advance, and 
who has the means to pay for his services, there is in practice an absence of any form 
of independent legal advice for detainees in police stations". 59 
Clearly, it is the view of the Committee that appropriate legal representation 
should be made available to every person taken into police custody even if this means 
providing it at the expense of the State. It was in this spirit, it may be inferred, that to 
the Danish authorities, regarding the statutory guarantees offered in this area under 
domestic law at the time of its visit in 1990, it posed the question: 
"... what happens if a person in police custody states that he wishes to have 
legal advice but that he does not know of a lawyer and/or is not in a position to 
pay for a lawyer's services? "60 
Presence of a lawyer during interrogations 
It will be recalled that the CPT's view on the entitlement of persons in police custody 
to the presence of a lawyer during questioning is the rather elliptical notion that the 
right should obtain "in principle". 1 Such a notion would seem to permit the creation 
of exceptions to the right, with the result that, in certain circumstances, the police 
authorities could prevent a detainee's lawyer from attending his client's interrogation. 
The CPT was curiously quiescent on the matter in its early published work. More 
ss Ibid (1` and 3'd indents). 
59 Ibid. 
60 See Denmark I, para 127 (31' indent). For further evidence of CPT concern about the provision of 
legal services to persons held in police custody but unable to pay for a lawyer, see Germany I, para 35; 
Ireland I, pars 45 (and now Ireland II, pars 24 
- 
no provision of legal aid to persons detained in Garda 
establishments, but the situation is under review); and Bulgaria I, para 87 (wherein the Committee 
averred that "[i]t goes without saying that if the right of access to a lawyer is to be exercised effectively 
there must be a system of legal aid for detained persons'). 
61 See above, p 79. 
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recently, however, it has developed a formula which, given the consistency with 
which it appears in published visit reports, may now be regarded as its fundamental 
position on the question. This formula develops its comparatively skeletal initial 
position in a number of interesting ways. Today, therefore, the right of access to legal 
advice for persons in police custody, the Committee considers, connotes an 
entitlement: 
"... to have a lawyer present during any interrogation conducted by the police 
(whether this be during or after the initial period of police custody). Naturally, 
the fact that a detained person has stated that he wishes to have access to a 
lawyer should not prevent the police from beginning to question him on urgent 
matters62 before the lawyer arrives. Provision might also be made for the 
replacement of a lawyer who impedes the proper conduct of an interrogation, 
though any such possibility should be closely circumscribed and made subject 
to appropriate guarantees". 63 
The importance of a legal presence during interrogation was emphasised to the 
Spanish authorities in the light of the Committee's first visit, in 1991. Learning that 
in Spanish police practice, access to a lawyer could be denied until a detainee was 
ready to make a formal statement after his interrogation, it remarked that: 
"[a] right of access to legal assistance loses much of its effectiveness if it 
consists only of the presence of a lawyer when a statement is made and 
recorded... It provides little protection against the possible intimidation or 
62 Le. more than merely "informal conversations": see Romania I, para 36. 63 See, e. g., Poland I, para 50; Belgium II, para 36; France III, para 39; Spain V, para 53; and Spain VI, 
para 19. The CPT has yet to indicate what matters it regards as sufficiently "urgent" to warrant 
questioning in the absence of a lawyer and what circumscription and guarantees it considers are 
appropriate in respect of the replacement of obstructive lawyers. 
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physical ill-treatment of the detainee during the period prior to the interview at 
which his statement is given". TM 
Interestingly, the Spanish authorities sought to justify the practice adhered to by 
reference to criminal procedure. The importance of access to a lawyer for persons 
detained by the police, they insisted, derives not from the protection against ill- 
treatment afforded thereby, but from that lawyer's ability to render any defence to a 
criminal charge more effective. Consequently, they claimed, detainees have no need 
to consult a lawyer until in a position to make a formal statement 65 The CPT, it is no 
surprise, disagreed, believing that the right's very "raison d'etre" is to enhance 
detainees' protection against ill-treatment as from the very moment they are obliged 
to remain with the police. Accordingly, its concerns are "quite distinct from the 
issues of criminal procedure (including the right to a defence and the evidential value 
of statements given by detained persons)... raised by the Spanish authorities" 66 
Conclusion 
Looked at as a whole, CPT precepts on the right of access to a lawyer in police 
custody may, with one or two exceptions, be considered analogous to the provisions 
of the European Prison Rules on the right of "untried prisoners" to legal 
representation. In this regard, Rule 93, EPR provides that: 
"Untried prisoners shall be entitled, as soon as imprisoned, to choose a legal 
representative, or shall be allowed to apply for free legal aid where such aid is 
" See Spain I, para 50. See also Spain V, para 47 (wherein the CPT remarked that, where a lawyer is 
denied access to his client until the latter is required to make a formal statement and, once access has 
been granted, is denied the chance to speak with his client in private, he is rendered little more than an 
"observer"). 
65 See Spain VI, para 20. 
66 Idem, para 21. Following this exchange of views, the Spanish authorities, the CPT was "pleased to 
learn", indicated that they would adopt measures with a view to guaranteeing a right of access to a 
lawyer as from the outset of detention. 
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available and to receive visits from that legal adviser with a view to their 
defence and to prepare and hand to the legal adviser, and to receive, 
confidential instructions. On request, they shall be given all necessary 
facilities for this purpose. In particular, they shall be given the free assistance 
of an interpreter for all essential contacts with the administration and for their 
defence. Interviews between prisoners and their legal advisers may be within 
sight but not within hearing, either direct or indirect, of the police or 
institution staff... " 
The CPT, it should be noted, has yet to address the question of access to an 
interpreter. Nevertheless, the safeguard which it seeks in this area is a comprehensive 
one, connoting a legal guarantee of access from the moment a person is obliged to 
remain with the police, which guarantee is additional to the right to notify a third 
party of the fact of one's detention. This right of access comprises a right to contact 
and be visited by a lawyer, in both cases in conditions guaranteeing the confidentiality 
of discussions, as well as, in principle, the right to have a lawyer present during 
interrogations. In closely defined circumstances, access to a detainee's chosen lawyer 
may be legitimately delayed for a strictly defined 
- 
though, as yet, unspecified - 
period of time and other 
- 
again unspecified 
- 
restrictions may be placed on the 
access granted. However, access to legal advice should not be totally denied during 
that period. Accordingly, access to another independent, trustworthy lawyer, where 
necessary drawn from a pre-established list, should be facilitated. Further, it is 
desirable that a system of criminal legal aid be available for those unable to pay for 
the services of a lawyer. 
As with the right of notification, among Parties to the ECPT, both law and 
practice on the right to legal advice for persons held in police custody vary markedly. 
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Some States, like Malta (again), make no provision at all. 67 Others, like the 
Netherlands, offer a right (of sorts) in practice without having enshrined it in law. In 
some (e. g. Sweden and Turkey), access is not available as from the outset of custody; 
while, in others (e. g. Austria), a distinction is drawn between different categories of 
detainee. Elsewhere, the guarantee only operates as from a particular moment in the 
criminal justice process (e. g. Czech and Polish law) and the power vested in the 
authorities to delay access may be considerable (e. g. the Netherlands, where a delay 
of up to six days is possible). 
The confidentiality of lawyer-client consultations is not guaranteed in a 
number of States (e. g. Romania, Finland, Italy and Sweden), while a larger number 
still do not provide any form of free legal advice for the impecunious detainee. Like 
the right to notify a third party, therefore, there is some distance to travel before 
anything approximating uniform practice will obtain among Parties in the provision of 
a right of access to a lawyer for persons detained by the police. 
67 See Malta II, pare 28. 
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8 
The Right to a Medical Examination by a Doctor of One's 
Own Choosing (and Other Related Safeguards) 
Introduction: the basic precept 
The right to request and receive a medical examination by a doctor of their own 
choosing, in addition to any medical examination carried out by a doctor called by the 
police authorities, is the last of the three rights vested in persons detained by the 
police to which the CPT "attaches particular importance". Like the two others, this 
third "fundamental safeguard" should, the Committee considers, "apply as from the 
very outset of deprivation of liberty, regardless of how it may be described under the 
legal system concerned... "' For their part, in the related context of the detention of 
"untried prisoners", the European Prison Rules, it is worth noting, provide that: 
"... prisoners shall be given the opportunity of being visited and treated by 
their own doctor or dentist if there is reasonable ground for the application. 
Reasons should be given if the application is refused. Such costs as are 
incurred shall not be the responsibility of the prison administration"? 
As to the nature of medical examinations carried out on detainees 
- 
notably, but not 
exclusively, those conducted by doctors summoned by the police authorities - "all 
such examinations", the CPT has proclaimed: 
"should be conducted out of the hearing and preferably [unless the doctor 
concerned requests otherwise] out of the sight, of police officers. Further, the 
results of every examination as well as relevant statements by the detainee and 
1 See above, p 59. 
2 Rule 98, EPR 
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the doctor's conclusions should be formally recorded by the doctor and made 
available to the detainee and his lawyer". 3 
Thus, the precept embraces questions of privacy, recording practices and access to the 
information obtained during the examination. There is no reason, it is submitted, why 
the same precept ought not to apply mutatis mutandis to medical examinations carried 
out by doctors chosen by detainees. 
The salient features of the precept are, to a certain extent, self-explanatory and 
may be dealt with, if at all, very quickly. However, other features, particularly those 
with which the CPT has sought to supplement its fundamental position, may require 
more considered scrutiny. 
Developing the basic precept 
An express guarantee 
As it holds in respect of the two other fundamental safeguards against police ill- 
treatment, the CPT considers that the possibility that a detainee may be examined by a 
doctor of his choice, in addition to any doctor provided by the police authorities: 
"should be expressly provided for in respect of all stages of police custody". 5 
Again, like other safeguards, it seems that satisfactory provision requires legislative 
enactment; simple codification, in, for example, a subsidiary note of guidance, falls 
3 See 20d GR, Para 38. 
Evans and Morgan discuss in some depth the kind of protection which, the Committee considers, 
ought to be made available to a detainee's nominated doctor and conclude that in the light of 
suggestions made by States parties that the police are responsible for the safety of doctors, the risk of 
hostage-takings and attempted escape, "the CPT has indicated that privacy [of consultation] is 
preferable, unless the doctor concerned requests otherwise" (though a "significant" number of Parties 
find such a prospect `unacceptable"): see Evans and Morgan (1998), p 280. 
s See Denmark I, paras 128 and 143 (cf Danish law: idem, App II, Para 22); and, similarly, Finland I, 
paras 35 and 149 (and now Finland II, Para 34); and Sweden III, Para 24 (wherein the CPT made it 
clear that a failure to make specific provision gives the police too great a discretion to determine the 
necessity of an examination). 
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short of the suggested precept. For instance, visiting the Netherlands, in 1992, the 
Committee learned that Dutch legislation on police custody "does not regulate the 
matter of detainees' access to a doctor". Rather, the right is provided for by way of 
"ministerial instructions... issued jointly by the Ministers of Justice and the Interior, in 
co-ordination with the Minister of Health and the Dutch Medical Association". In its 
subsequent visit report, the Committee averred that "even though it may already be 
the effect of the instructions 
... 
the Dutch authorities [should] expressly provide for [an 
effective right of access]". 
A right as from the outset of custody 
Like the rights not to be held incommunicado and of access to a lawyer, the right to a 
medical examination (though, as we shall see, not necessarily one carried out by a 
doctor of a detainee's own choosing) is a right which, the CPT believes, ought to be 
exercisable as from the very outset of a person's custody. ' "In the interests of both the 
prevention of ill-treatment and health care in general", it has stated, "it is essential that 
a person taken into police custody is made the subject of a medical examination as 
soon as possible". 8 Accordingly, it considers that: 
"... toutes les personnes placees dans un lieu de detention de la police soient 
vues dans les 24h par un medecin (ou par un assistant medical/infirmier 
diplome faisant rapport a un medecin) et fassent, s'il ya lieu, l'objet d'un 
examen medical approfondi". 9 
6 See Netherlands I, paras 44 and 46. See in the same connection Greece I, para 43 (adoption of 
"specific legal provisions" recommended). 
7 See, e. g., Luxembourg I, paras 32 and 144; and France I, para 44 (cf contemporary French law: idem, 
Para 43). 
See Romania I, para 39. 
9 Ibid. In 1995, Romanian police practice in some establishments appears to have fallen short of this 
standard, with potentially serious consequences, it seems, for the control of the spread of infectious 
diseases: idem, para 81. 
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This, it seems, is what, in practice, the CPT now expects of the police authorities in 
facilitating access to a doctor "without delay". 
Access to a doctor of the detainee's own choosing 
The CPT has supplemented its basic understanding of the right to a medical 
examination in a variety of ways. To the Austrian authorities, for example, it has 
recommended that: 
"in addition to examination by a police doctor, 1° a person in police custody 
should have the right to be examined if he so the wishes by a doctor of his own 
choice". " 
This right, the Committee has sought to emphasise, is exercisable, not merely in the 
alternative 
- 
i. e. instead of any examination carried out by a doctor summoned by the 
police 
- 
but supplementary to any such examination: i. e. "si la personne concernee 
estime que l'intervention du medecin designe par 1'autorite competente devrait etre 
completee par un second examen". 12 In this regard, in what may be seen as a 
propitiating gesture towards the Austrian authorities following its visit in 1990,13 the 
CPT suggested, parenthetically, that "such a right exists in other countries and has not 
caused insuperable practical problems". 14 Unfortunately, the Committee offered no 
examples of such parties. However, it might have cited, it is submitted, Ireland, with 
the proviso that the Irish police do retain a residual discretion completely to deny a 
lo Or, at least, a doctor designated or called by the police for the purpose of examining a person in their 
charge. 
" See Austria I, para 64 (emphasis added). Cf Austrian law: idem, para 61(` no right to be examined by 
a private doctor"). See, similarly, Malta I, pars 88 (at the Sliema and Valletta District Police 
Headquarters in 1990, if a detainee requested or appeared to need medical attention, an - "independent" 
- 
doctor would be called from the nearest `polyclinic") and now Malta II, para 33. 12 See Belgium II4 para 37; and France III, para 40. 13 Austria was the first contracting Party to receive a CPT visit. Until sure of its position vis-i -vis 
States parties, therefore, the Committee may have wished to proceed particularly cautiously at this juncture. 
`See Austria I, para 64. 
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detainee access to a doctor of his choice (which possibility did concern the CPT in the 
wake of its visit in 1993); 15 and England and Wales, where the right is provided for in 
a Code of Practice developed under PACE 1984.16 Further, in another mollifying 
gesture, the CPT has suggested that "rien n'empecherait qu'un tel examen soit 
effectue aux frais de la personne detenue". 17 
The Committee sought further to justify the right of access to a doctor of 
choice in its first Hungarian visit report wherein it observed that despite having been 
"impressed by the professionalism" shown by the police doctors met during its visit in 
1994, it was clear that such doctors had had "the difficult task of combining aspects of 
the role of a treating doctor with the carrying out of certain duties18 requested by the 
police". 19 Having highlighted the potential conflict of interest inherent in this 
situation, the CPT averred that a further medical examination of the detainee by a 
doctor of his choice would represent "an essential additional safeguard", particularly 
since, "as far as the delegation could ascertain, such access was rarely, if ever, 
accorded [in Hungary]" 2° 
Delaying access 
The CPT appears prepared to countenance, in principle at least, the vesting in the law 
enforcement authorities of a power to delay access to a doctor of a detainee's 
choosing. At the same time, however, it considers that the right to a medical 
examination without delay ought not to be rendered nugatory in practice. 
is See Ireland I, para 46. 
16 See UK I, para 220. 
"See Belgium II, para 37; and, similarly, Spain VI, para 26. 1t Such as any number of 
- 
potentially intimate 
- 
forensic routines, like blood/alcohol tests: see, e. g., 
Hungary I, para 46. 
19 Ideen, paras 47 and 146. For details of the arrangements made for medical care in Hungarian police 
stations and holding facilities at the time of the visit, see para 46 (2°d indent) of the report. Regarding 
the CPTs views on the dual role of police doctors, see below, p 119 et seq. 20 Ibid. 
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Accordingly, in its third UK visit report, adverting to the UK authorities' previous 
indication that, "in exceptional cases, the police [in England and Wales] may decide 
to delay... access", 21 it "invited" them to: 
"explore the possibility of devising a scheme whereby any detainee whose 
access to a particular doctor requested by him [is] delayed by the police [can], 
if he so wishe[s], have access to another doctor (apart from a police surgeon) 
who [can] be trusted not to jeopardise the legitimate interests of the police 
investigation". 2 
This formula, it will be noted, resembles that invoked by the CPT in circumstances in 
which domestic law authorises the delay or denial of access to a lawyer nominated by 
a detainee, from which emerged its proposed accredited lawyer scheme. 23 The CPT is 
very eager, therefore, to find ways to avoid completely denying a detainee access to a 
doctor working entirely independently of the law enforcement authorities. Indeed, so 
concerned is it in this regard, that, as an alternative to the kind of scheme adumbrated 
above, the authorities, it has stated, might consider: 
"allow[ing] in all cases the detainee to be examined by the doctor initially 
chosen by him, but subject to the presence of a police surgeon at such 
examinations". 24 
Just such a scheme would appear to have operated in Northern Ireland, when visited 
in 1993. There, although persons detained under the PTA 1989 are entitled to be 
examined by a medical practitioner from the practice at which they are registered ("at 
their own expense") in addition to an examination by a State-appointed Medical 
21 See UK Response I, CPTMf (91) 16, p 52. 
'2 See UK III, pars 42. In Northern Ireland, prevention of terrorism legislation vests a similar power to 
delay in the police: see UK II, para 67. 
23 See above, p 86. 
24 See UK III, para 42 (emphasis added). See, similarly, France III, para 40.101 
Officer, access to the former may be legitimately delayed for up to 48 hours, "if it is 
believed that the examination would prejudice the investigation". 25 It was noted in 
the course of the visit, however, that examinations carried out by detainees' own 
doctors are invariably attended by Medical Officers, a gesture rationalised by the 
authorities as a "precautionary measure designed to ensure that only medical matters 
are discussed during such an examination". 6 In the circumstances, given the 
existence of such a precaution, the CPT understandably sought to know why, in 
addition, a detainee's access to his own doctor might be delayed for as many as 48 
27 hours. 
In summing up this particular aspect of the safeguard, it is difficult to dispute 
the assertion that its "underlying point... is not of course that a particular doctor 
should be present, but that an independent doctor should be available". 28 It is this, it 
is submitted, which is central to the effective operation of the safeguard in practice. 
Purpose of the medical examination 
Although the point is rather axiomatic, it is nevertheless worth noting that the CPT 
has described the right to a medical examination as a right to be examined by a doctor 
"either for treatment or the drawing up of a forensic medical reporti29 Thus, in the 
Committee's view, we may infer, access to a doctor should be provided not only when 
a detainee needs or requests an examination and/or medical treatment, but, also when, 
for a particular reason, he must or requests to be examined in order that a forensic 
medical report may be compiled. 
25 See UK II, pars 67. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See Evans and Morgan (1998), p 279. 
29 See Greece I, para 43. 
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The provision of a corps of medical staff permanently on call 
The CPT, as we have seen, has emphasised repeatedly the need to guarantee at a 
legislative level a detainee's right of access to a doctor. As might be expected, it has 
also been prepared to contemplate precisely how that guarantee might operate in 
practice. In other words, how it is possible to fashion a system that guarantees the 
availability of a doctor at all times for examination and treatment purposes. In its first 
Portuguese visit report, for example, it welcomed as "a most appropriate 
development" the "consideration" being given by the Ministry of Justice in 1992 to 
the provision of a doctor "permanently on call" at the Judicial Police Headquarters in 
Lisbon. "Such doctors", it considered, "would be able, when necessary, to examine 
persons brought before a judge by the police with a view to their remand in 
custody". 30 Similarly, without actually expressing outright approval, the Committee 
received favourably a proposal on the subject of police doctors made by the Chief of 
Police for the Canton of Geneva, Switzerland, in the course of a visit in 1991. He 
explained to the visiting delegation that no system of police doctors operated in the 
Canton and that, consequently, he had: 
`propose la creation, au sein de 1'Institut de Medecine Legale de 1'Universite 
de Geneve, d'une permanence de medecins qui seraient a disposition, sur 
s3 appel de la police... 1 
Clearly aware that without further circumscription of its role, a body like that 
described would lack the appearance of impartiality, the Chief of Police had 
developed his proposals, asserting that such a system would function: 
30 See Portugal I, para 46. 
31 See Switzerland 1, para 103. As for the situation in Switzerland generally, see pars 122 of the report. 
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"... sans toutefois que ces medecins aient un lien de dependance hierarchique 
avec le Chef de la Police". 32 
His simple proposal clearly attracted the CPT, for it found it "des plus importantes" 
and sought the views of the Swiss authorities. 33 A similar system was found to 
operate in some parts of France in late 1991 and was equally well received by the 
Committee. There: 
""[1]'approche consistant a donner a un seul service totalement independent la 
tache de mener a bien de tels examens medicaux apporte des garanties 
9234 d'objectivite, d'uniformite et de professionalisme... 
Although there is little other evidence to suggest that the creation of systems like 
those considered in Portugal, proposed in Switzerland and operating in France is a 
cause that the CPT is prepared expressly to promote, there is no doubt that it considers 
them to have merit, at least in principle, and that their further consideration may be 
appropriate. 35 
Provision for regular visits by qualified nurses 
Referring to circumstances in which, because of the size of an establishment, the right 
of access to a doctor may be somewhat attenuated in practice, the Committee has 
expressed the view that: 
"... it might be wise, in respect of high-capacity police detention centres... to 
make arrangements for regular visits by a qualified nurse. This nurse could 
32 Ibid. 
33 Idem, para 124. 
34 See France I, para 57. 
35 See also, in the same connection, the tenor of the CPT s observations in Sweden I, at para 30. 
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carry out a number of tasks which are currently carried out by ordinary police 
officers (distribution of medicines including psychotropic drugs, etc. )". 36 
Unannounced visits 
In its first Austrian visit report, the CPT cited an Austrian Ministry of the Interior 
press communique, issued four months before its delegation's visit in May 1990, in 
which the introduction of a "system of `spot checks' [to police 
establishments]... [a]pparently... by fully independent doctors... " was announced. 37 No 
further details were provided and, in any case, the scheme was "eventually discarded 
as being impractical". The concept, however, appealed to the Committee, which 
sought to receive, first, "full details of the system 
... 
e. g. rules of operation; number of 
visits carried out, when and where; findings, etc"; and, second, "the reasons why the 
idea... was considered impractical". 38 It may be argued that in responding thus, 
particularly in the light of the project's abandonment, the Committee inferred that in 
its view, a properly conceived system of unannounced visits to police establishments, 
carried out by fully independent doctors, with a view to interviewing and/or 
examining detainees, may be worth serious consideration. It is worth noting in this 
regard that the Committee cited the "spot check" initiative as one of a number of 
"impressive" measures taken or planned by the Austrian authorities in order to address 
the problems inherent in the country's contemporary criminal justice system. 39 
The physical conditions in which medical examinations take place 
The material environment in which the formal medical examination of persons 
detained by the police may be conducted is something on which the CPT has 
36 See Netherlands II, para 36. 
37 See Austria I, pars 63. 
38 Ideen, paras 64 and 102. 
39 Idem, para 101. 
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commented expressly 
- 
and not just in the most obvious sense that "very dilapidated" 
premises, it considers, should be "renovated" 40 For instance, it has proclaimed that: 
"[o]f course, if they are to perform their tasks effectively, forensic doctors 
must be provided with suitable premises and equipment. Above all, they must 
benefit from good lighting when carrying out examinations" 41 
This observation was made in the light of discoveries in Spain, in 1994, first, that 
medical examination rooms at the Civil Guard Headquarters, Madrid, "[did] not enjoy 
the required amount of light and, more generally, [were] poorly equipped for the 
purposes of medical examinations"; and, second, that persons previously held at the 
Headquarters were found to display injuries that either "had not been observed at all" 
by the forensic doctor or were "more extensive" than had been recorded by her. 
These phenomena, the CPT speculated in its visit report, may have been caused, "in 
part", by the "poor" facilities available to the doctor concerned42. Accordingly, it 
recommended that they be "substantially improved". 43 
More specifically, having visited the premises of the Service d'urgence 
medico-judiciaire at l'Hopital de Motel-Dieu, Paris, in 1991, the Committee made a 
number of observations about obtaining conditions, both expressly and impliedly 
critical. In particular, it noted, "il n'y avait qu'une seule salle d'attente pour toutes les 
personnes amenees au Service", with the result that "des personnes gardees a vue et 
menottes etaient souvent placees a cote de victimes de violence" - the latter also 
being treated at the hospital, it seems 44 This situation, the CPT proclaimed, was "des 
plus inappropriees". Accordingly, it recommended that "des mesures soient prises 
40 See Hungary I, paras 46 and 48 (0 indent) (regarding the infirmary at the Budapest Police Central 
holding facility, visited in 1994). 
41 See Spain III, para 38. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ideen, pars 39. 
'u See France I, para 58. 
106 
afin de remedier [de tels] manquements". 45 Clearly, what the CPT had in mind in this 
regard was the systematic separation of police detainees from victims of physical 
violence, all of whom might be waiting to be treated in hospital at the same time. The 
provision of separate waiting rooms, it is submitted, would be one obvious way of 
avoiding what is, at best, a problem of insensitivity. 
The CPT was also critical of the arrangements made for family visits in the 
hospital and hinted at ways in which they might be improved. The arrangements 
- 
described as "loin d'etre ideaux" 
- 
generally obliged family members to "rester debout 
dans 1'etroit couloir central et converser avec [un patient] a travers un petit guichet 
dans la porte de la chambre" 46 The CPT invited the French authorities to "improve" 
such provision, with a "comparable" unit at 1'hopital Ste. Marguerite in Marseilles 
offering something of a model, it seems. There, visits could take place "en general, 
dans la chambre du patient", although the door to the room would be left open "aver 
un policier a proximite". 47 Such facilities, the CPT observed, were "better" than those 
afforded in Paris 
- 
though, it might have commented on the constant close attendance 
of a police officer, which may be said to have vitiated the visit process. 
On physical conditions generally in establishments designated to treat police 
detainees, the CPT declared itself "favourably impressed" by the French authorities' 
identification of "[e]lements pour un schema d'amenagement d'unites specifiques 
d'hospitalisation des detenus", 48 an expression of approval for an apparent attempt to 
systematise and regulate the physical environment in all places where detainees may 
receive medical treatment. Further, in the light of its desire for confidentiality in the 
examination process, it is also no surprise to find the Committee, in its identification 
45 Ibid. See also para 209 of the report. 
46 Ideen. para 61. 
47 Idem, para 62. 
" Idem, para 64. 
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of appropriate material conditions in which to conduct examinations, calling 
specifically for an environment which "guarantee[s] notably the[ir] 
confidentiality... s49 Accordingly, it is "quite improper", it has declared, to conduct a 
medical examination in an interrogation room equipped with a two-way mirror 
- 
"thereby enabling the... examination to be observed by law enforcement officials" 
- 
rather than in a facility which has been "specifically set aside and equipped for that 
purpose" so 
Lastly, it need hardly be stated that forensic medical examinations should, in 
the view of the CPT, be conducted on an individual by individual basis, the collective 
examination of groups of detainees being, it believes, quite "undesirable". 51 
The provision of necessary medication to detainees 
The readiness with which persons detained by the police receive the medication which 
their physical condition requires was undoubtedly in the contemplation of the CPT in 
its first Austrian visit report, drawn up in the wake of its delegation's visit to the 
country in 1990. In Vienna, it had learned, persons detained in police establishments 
"sometimes did not receive the medication required by their medical condition (e. g. 
insulin for diabetics)". 52 Consequently, the Committee recommended that the 
Austrian authorities "review" the "existing procedures". 53 
The examination procedure 
" 
Identifying medical staff 
The formal procedures to which, the CPT believes, doctors ought to adhere when 
examining persons held in police custody were considered in its third Spanish visit 
49 See France III, pars 52. 
50 See Spain V, paras 48 and 54. 
51 See Turkey I, Para 36. 
52 See Austria I, para 62. 
53 Idem, para 64. 
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report. TM In the course of a visit to the country in June 1994, the Committee noted 
therein, a number of detainees had claimed that medical examinations carried out in 
the city of San Sebastian following arrest had been conducted "by someone 
purporting to be a doctor", the person concerned not having offered any formal 
identification or credentials. 55 Addressing the issue, the Committee recommended 
that: 
"... doctors who examine detained persons [should] formally identify 
themselves to the persons in question". 56 
- 
Distinguishing medical and custodial personnel 
In its first French visit report, the Committee observed that, in 1991, at one hospital 
designated for the formal examination and treatment of persons detained by the 
police, police officers and medical staff had been very similarly, if not identically, 
dressed. Questioned on the matter, one police officer had claimed that a lack of 
differentiation "facilitated contact". For its part, the CPT considered that: 
"il est tout aussi important pour les patients... d'etre capable de distinguer 
clairement les functions precises (soins ou securite) des differentes personnes 
auxelles ils doivent avoir affaire". 57 
Consequently, the French authorities, it stated, should take appropriate measures to 
ensure that: 
"les personnels soignant et de securite... soient clairement distinguables l'un 
de l'autre". 58 
sI While the CPTs observations in the report were confined to State-employed "forensic" doctors, they 
may be regarded as applying equally to any doctor called upon to examine persons in police detention, 
it is submitted. 
ss See Spain III, para 37. 
Ibid. 
57 See France I, para 61. 
sg Idem, para 63. 
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The Committee might have added that enabling a detainee to distinguish between 
medical and custodial personnel helps create that element of privacy which it regards 
as central to the effective exercise of the right. 
- 
Recording medical findings 
A guarantee of ready access to an independent doctor in respect of persons detained 
by the police is "important", the CPT considers, precisely because it expedites the 
"independent and objective recording, on a regular basis, of medical evidence of 
injuries sustained by detainees". 59 The recording of a doctor's forensic findings is 
something to which the CPT has given much thought. For instance, pursuant to its 
oft-repeated basic position on medical examinations, it has recommended that the 
form used to record details thereof. 
""... should be such as to ensure that the following information is systematically 
recorded: 
(i) statements made by the person concerned which are relevant to the medical 
examination (including the description by the person examined of his state of 
health and any allegations of ill-treatment); 
(ii) the doctor's objective medical findings based on a thorough examination; 
(iii) the doctor's conclusions in the light of (i) and (ii) [e. g. whether and to 
what extent, a person's allegations are consistent with the doctor's 
findings6°]" 61 
59 See UK II, Para 70. 
60 See Spain VI, Para 25 (2°d indent). 
61 See Spain III, Para 39 (and now Spain V, Para 54 and Spain VI, Para 24: standardised medical form 
recently introduced, but no provision for recording detainee's statements or doctor's conclusions); and 
similarly UK II, Para 70. In Turkey, in 1997, while the standard forensic medical form used to record 
findings corresponded with CPT precepts, the use of such forms was found to be very inconsistent: see 
Turkey I, pares 34-5. 
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- 
What doctors should lookfor in the course of a medical examination 
Following on from the last sub-section, the CPT, it should be noted, has supplemented 
its formal precepts on the right to a medical examination in police custody with 
practical advice to doctors concerning the kind of (non-physical) signs of distress 
which it considers they should look for during examinations. "[G]iven the pressures 
that can be brought to bear on a detained person", it has suggested, forensic doctors 
"should not necessarily accept at face value statements by such persons to the effect 
that they are being treated well". Accordingly, going beyond the investigations made 
during a routine medical examination, such doctors, it believes, should pay 
"[p]articular attention... to a detained person's psychological state 
- 
and more 
especially to changes in that state during the period of custody... s62 At the same time, 
however, in reaching his conclusions, the doctor, the Committee insists, "is not being 
asked to state whether or not the person examined has been ill-treated". This, after 
all, "is the task of the judicial authorities". Nevertheless, it maintains, "in order to 
assist public prosecutors and courts properly to assess the information set out in the 
medical form, the doctor should indicate the degree of consistency between any 
allegations made and the objective medical findings". 63 
- 
Confidentiality of medical findings 
As might be expected, the CPT is of the view that: 
"... the confidentiality of medical data [relating to the examination of persons 
in police custody should] be strictly observed" 64 
62 See Spain III, pars 39. 
63 See Turkey I, Para 37. 
64 See Czech Republic I, para 32 (4th indent). 
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Such confidentiality cannot be guaranteed, it considers, quite understandably, where 
detainees' medical certificates are simply attached to their custody records, rendering 
them "openly available to police officers", 65 or where open copies of forensic reports 
are handed to the officers who have accompanied detainees to their examinations 66 
- 
Examinations over and above those required or requested by the police and/or 
detainee 
When it is "appropriate", the CPT has suggested, forensic doctors should be able to 
carry out "specialist examinations" of detainees whom they have been asked to 
examine. Further, such doctors, it considers, should be able to "reserve their 
conclusions [on the health of the detainee(s) concerned] until such time as the results 
of those examinations are available". 67 Unfortunately, the CPT has not yet explained 
the kind of "specialist examinations" to which it adverts here 
- 
though, presumably, 
they include referrals to doctors with a particular expertise following the discovery of 
abnormalities during routine examinations. 
- 
Procedure in the event of the transfer of detainees 
To the Spanish authorities, following its ad hoc visit in June 1994, the CPT 
recommended, uncontroversially, that in the event of a detainee's transfer from one 
police establishment to another: 
"... copies of the reports drawn up in respect of that person by a doctor 
performing forensic duties [should] be systematically forwarded to the 
competent forensic doctor [at the new establishment]". 68 
65 Ideen, pars 31 (referring to the practice, inter alta, at the Prague Police Headquarters, when visited in 
1997). 
66 See Turkey I, para 39 (though cf 1995 Ministry of Health Circular: forensic reports to be forwarded 
to the relevant public prosecutor and police chief in sealed envelopes). 67 See Spain 111, pars 39. 
68 Ideen, pars 37. 
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- 
The weight to be given to a doctor's views in gauging a detainee 's frtness for 
detention or interview 
As might be expected, the CPT is troubled by the possibility that a doctor's views as 
to the fitness for detention and/or interview of an individual may be "overridden" by 
the police. 69 It is not clear, however, whether the Committee is absolutely opposed to 
the prospect or whether, rather, there are circumstances in which it might countenance 
the continued detention and/or interview of persons, notwithstanding the views of 
doctors. Nevertheless, clearly, the CPT would prefer the views of examining doctors 
to be heeded by the police. 
Suppressing evidence of ill-treatment at the request of the detainee 
A doctor may encounter "[p]articular difficulties" in faithfully recording his medical 
opinion, the CPT has stated, when a detainee alleges ill-treatment at the hands of the 
police, but requests that his allegations remain unrecorded or even that details of his 
injuries remain entirely secret. ' In the Committee's view, when faced with such a 
request, a doctor "must exercise his clinical judgment in a manner consistent with 
medical ethics". 71 Without at least a passing acquaintance with the notion and content 
of medical ethics, this expression of opinion raises as many questions as it answers. 
Fortunately, the Committee has also stated that if a doctor faced with this dilemma 
were to exercise his judgment in a way that results in no formal record being made of 
a detainee's allegations and injuries 
- 
as was the case, it seems, in respect of Medical 
Officers at the Castlereagh Holding Centre, Northern Ireland, in 199472 
- 
then the 
medical form placed in the detainee's custody record "would not contain a record of 
69 See, e. g., UK IT, para 68. In Northern Ireland, examining doctors are "requested to certify", inter 
alia, as to the fitness for detention and interview of persons whom they are called upon to examine. 70 Idem, pars 71. 
71 Ibid. 
n Ibid. 
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objective clinical findings". To act in this fashion, it holds, would be "potentially 
misleading". 3 
Consequently, it has proposed two ways in which injuries observed during a 
medical examination may be recorded by a doctor, notwithstanding a detainee's 
objections. First 
- 
and least sympathetic to the detainee 
- 
it considers that a doctor 
might, whatever the detainee's reservations, make an "appropriate entry" in the latter's 
medical record. Alternatively, he might refrain from completing the official medical 
record at all and simply transmit to the police all the information requested by it 
- 
"in 
particular" his opinion as to a detainee's fitness for detention or interview 
- 
"in another 
manner". 
74 A third approach that might prove useful is one that, in 1993, had clearly 
been used with some practical effect at the Castlereagh Holding Centre itself. It 
would require doctors to record the details of injuries observed "on the pre-printed 
medical report form [supplied] ", but to keep the form "separately [from the detainee's 
general prison file] (and privately)". As a result, some record, at least, of injuries 
observed would exist, "to which reference might be made when preparing a statement 
for use in any subsequent court proceedings". 5 
Protecting vulnerable detainees 
- 
Persons detained incommunicado 
Following visits to Spain in 1991 and April 1994, the CPT recommended to the 
authorities that a person being held in incommunicado detention in police custody - 
and, therefore, in an especially vulnerable position 
- 
should, if he so requests: 
73 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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"... be examined by the relevant forensic doctor and, if he so wishes, by a 
doctor chosen from a list of doctors drawn up in agreement with the 
appropriate professional body". 76 
Thus, like detainees who are not subject to such restrictions, those held 
incommunicado are, in the view of the CPT, entitled to seek and receive up to two 
medical examinations. At the same time, however, the Committee does not consider 
that the latter detainees should necessarily benefit from a right of access to a doctor of 
their own choice. For, in an otherwise unremarkable re-statement of one of its basic 
precepts in this area, it intimated in its first Spanish visit report that only persons 
detained by the police or Civil Guard "who [are] not being held incommunicado" 
should enjoy such a right. 77 Although it made no attempt to justify such a position, 
the CPT might have suggested that to facilitate access to an isolated detainee's chosen 
doctor would effectively render nugatory his secluded status. 
Subsequently, however, the Committee moderated its position, confessing to 
the Spanish authorities that it found the pragmatic approach to the medical 
examination of persons held incommunicado adopted by one judge interviewed in 
June 1994 "equally acceptable". The judge concerned had remarked to the visiting 
delegation that he was quite prepared to: 
"... accede to a request made by a detainee held incommunicado to be 
examined by his own doctor, provided that the forensic doctor was also 
present at the examination". 78 
76 See Spain I, pars 57 (2ad indent); and Spain II, para 68 (emphasis added). 
"See the combined effects of Spain I, para 57,2nd and 3`d indents. 
78 See Spain II, para 68 (emphasis added). See now Spain V, para 48 and Spain VI, para 26 (from the 
latter of which it is clear that the views expressed by the judge in 1994 are now incontrovertibly part of 
the CPT's body of standards in this area. These views reflect, it may be stated, those expressed by the 
Committee in respect of the right to an independent medical examination for detainees who are not 
subject to restrictions: see above, p 101). 
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- 
Intoxicated detainees 
In establishments obliged to handle large numbers of intoxicated detainees, we may 
infer from the CPTs first Finnish visit report, the provision of what it has termed an 
"ongoing healthcare service" may be desirable. This inference flows from its 
discovery in May 1992 at the Helsinki Police Detoxification Centre that, while a nurse 
was present five evenings a week, "apparently" there was no such provision at 
weekends, "when the Centre was busiest". 79 The Committee discovered, further, that 
although a doctor did visit the Centre once a day, he only examined those persons 
who wished to see him or whose condition was brought to his attention by the staff. 
Otherwise, he was summoned only if the staff thought it necessary or if a detainee 
requested it. 80 Although the CPT recommended that "improvements be made" to the 
Centre's medical service and, "in particular", that the presence of a nurse at weekends 
"be guaranteed", 81 precisely what, it considers, should constitute an "ongoing 
healthcare service" 
- 
other than the provision, daily, of nursing care of an unspecified 
duration 
- 
is not clear in the text of the report. 
The medical training ofpolice officers 
Although the need to expedite access to a medical doctor for detainees in police 
custody with a view to their examination and treatment necessarily comprises the bulk 
of CPT standard-setting work in the present connection, it has, occasionally, 
contemplated the broader role of doctors in domestic police procedures. In its first 
German visit report, for instance, it lauded as "particularly valuable" and as exemplars 
"which could be more widely followed", two instances 
- 
noted in the course of its visit 
79 See Finland I, paras 37 and 150. Cf much more appropriate provision at the Helsinki Police 
Headquarters (where daily nursing presence was guaranteed, a doctor was on duty three days a week 
and a doctor was permanently on call): idem, para 35. 80 Ibid. 
Idem, para 39 (1'd indent). 
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in December 1991- in which doctors were involved specifically in the training of 
police officers. First, consistent with its precept that "it is... essential for police 
officers to be able to detect when a detainee is in need of medical assistance, even 
when he does not request such assistance", in Bavaria, it noted, on the "initiative" of 
the Director of Police of Straubing, police officers were trained by a doctor in order to 
"familiarise them with different types of behaviour [requiring medical assistance] (for 
example, that of a diabetic)". 2 
Second, in Berlin, it learned, a Health Department brochure had been issued to 
officials, offering advice and information regarding, inter alga, "people with mental 
illnesses or other problems (elderly people, alcoholics, drug addicts, epileptics etc)". 83 
Given the encouraging language used by the CPT to describe both initiatives, it would 
not be presumptuous, it is submitted, to infer a belief on its part that the same kind of 
thought and sensitivity ought to be brought to bear by other Convention parties. 
On other occasions, the CPT has been more exact as to the requirements of the 
medical training of custodial staff. At the Helsinki Police Detoxification Centre, 
Finland, in 1992, for example, its delegation observed that officers received no 
"specialised training" in the treatment of intoxicated detainees. Rather, the authorities 
considered that, as a rule of thumb, if a new admission was "incapable of talking", 
they would be sent to a hospital; "otherwise, [they] would be placed in a cell". M In its 
subsequent visit report, the CPT suggested that in the absence of specialised training, 
"a range of serious medical conditions (e. g. internal bleeding, diabetes) may be 
masked by, or mistaken for, a state of intoxication"; and that, therefore, when 
82 Sae Germany I, para 38. 
83 Ibid. 
34 See Finland I, para 37. 
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"apparently intoxicated persons are taken into [police] custody, it is of critical 
importance that their health be appropriately monitored". 85 
Although the Committee offered no guidance as to the manner of such 
monitoring, we can be sure from its remarks on the practice at Helsinki that simply 
observing cells by means of a closed circuit television network, combined with a 
commitment on the part of custodial staff to "physically check... the condition of 
those detained from time to time" is insufficient; "such measures", the CPT averred, 
"cannot be considered to be a substitute for an adequate level of medical 
supervision". 86 Significantly in this regard, it noted, with approval, the terms of a 
recommendation of the Finnish Parliamentary Ombudsman to the Ministry of the 
Interior regarding the use of an Alcometer to test the alcohol levels of persons 
admitted to the Centre in order to make "an immediate and more reliable distinction 
between a person who has drunk alcohol... and a person who has taken an overdose of 
medicine or who has an attack of illness". 87 
Further, the level of medical supervision required of custodial authorities, it 
considered, should be premised on the need to provide, inter alia, "specialised 
training in the care of intoxicated detainees and in the recognition of conditions which 
could be mistaken for a state of intoxication"88 
- 
which conditions include "mental 
disorder. 
.. 
or handicap... or... the influence of drugs or... withdrawal symptoms", 
disorders whose identification, it remarked to the UK authorities following its visit in 
1990, should be encouraged among both police officers and police surgeons. 89 
Without "specific training" in the identification of such conditions, the CPT has 
85 Idem, para 38. 
Ibid. 
g' Ibid (note 8). 
88 Ideen, paras 39 and 150. 
89 See UK I, pars 222. 
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insisted, their detection in practice 
- 
and, therefore, the readiness with which the 
persons affected may be treated humanely and protected against abuse 
- 
is "not always 
a straightforward matter". 90 
The particular role of forensic doctors in preventing ill-treatment in police custody 
For the purposes of the present study, doctors who are employed by the police 
specifically to carry out forensic tasks may be distinguished from those general 
medical practitioners who may be called upon to examine and treat persons in police 
custody in the sense that, in addition to the carrying out of such examinations and the 
compilation of medical reports (both of a general nature and, more specifically, where 
police ill-treatment is suspected or alleged), the former perform "a range of other 
forensic tasks (e. g. performing blood/alcohol tests and taking intimate samples)". 91 
Although this distinction is a somewhat loose, unscientific one, it does at least permit 
the limited exploration here of a medical function which is acquiring a profound 
importance in contemporary criminal justice systems. In some jurisdictions, indeed, 
the routine provision of forensic examinations in respect of persons detained by the 
police may be considered a more significant safeguard against ill-treatment than any 
putative right of access to a doctor of a detainee's own choice. Turkey's regime of 
forensic examinations, for instance, has been broadly welcomed by the CPT, 
"provided the doctors concerned enjoy formal and de facto independence, have a 
mandate which is sufficiently broad in scope and have been provided with specialised 
training" s2 
90 Ibid. 
91 See Hungary I, para 46. 
92 See Turkey I, pars 31. 
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- 
Frequency of examinations 
Information gathered during its visit to Turkey in October 1997, the CPT has 
observed, indicated that all persons suspected of offences falling within the 
jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, 93 as well as most ordinary criminal suspects, 
are examined by a forensic doctor at the end of their period of police custody. 
Medical examinations at the outset of such custody, however, it seems, are "far less 
common" and when carried out, are "normally performed in a local public hospital 
rather than an accredited forensic service". 94 (A Prime Ministerial Circular issued 
after the visit, which establishes a duty to examine "both at the beginning and at the 
end of the custody period", was "welcome[d]" by the CPT. 95) Responding to these 
findings, the Committee recommended that: 
"... persons held for lengthy periods by the law enforcement agencies [should] 
be examined on a regular basis (at least every 48 hours) by a forensic 
doctor... [S]uch a procedure is followed in comparable situations in certain 
other countries and has proven an effective means of combating both ill- 
treatment and unfounded allegations of ill-treatment". 96 
It considered, further, that if, as the Turkish authorities claimed, it is thought 
impractical to transfer a detainee to a forensic medical service for examination every 
48 hours, then: 
"... [it would have] no objection to the examination... taking place on police 
premises, provided certain basic requirements were met (in particular, the 
93 Which offences comprise "crimes against the State; terrorist offences; drugs and arms-related 
offences, etc": see Turkey PS I, para 27. 
94 Turkey I, para 32. 
Ibid. 
Ideen, para 33 (reiterating a recommendation made in the, as yet unpublished, report on its 1994 visit 
to the country). 
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material environment should be such as to allow a thorough examination to be 
made and law enforcement officials should not be present at the 
examination)". 97 
Clearly, therefore, where, in the absence of any effective right of access to a doctor of 
a detainee's own choice, a Party makes provision for the medical examination of 
persons in police custody by a forensic doctor, such examination, the CPT considers, 
should take place at least every 48 hours for the duration of detention. 
Elsewhere, the CPT has "welcome[d]" seemingly informal arrangements 
under which police officers invariably request a medical examination following the 
use of force at the time of a person's arrest or subsequently, during his detention, and 
whenever a detainee is transferred to the custody of another agency or when it is 
necessary in order properly to attribute responsibility for injuries sustained by a 
detainee. 98 
- 
The protection of particular types of detainee 
The need to protect those categories of detainee "who might be considered to be at 
particular risk of ill-treatment, or who frequently allege such treatment"99 is a CPT 
concern which emerged from visits to Spain in 1991 and 1994. On both occasions, 
the Committee came away with the view that: 
"a closer involvement of forensic doctors in the medical examination of [such] 
detainees... would be desirable". 100 
91 Ibid. 
98 See Spain VI, para 28 (regarding the practice of the Catalan and, to a lesser extent, Basque police 
forces in 1998). 
" See Spain I, para 56. We may be sure that the categories of detainee that the CPT has in mind in this 
regard are vulnerable ones, like persons held incommunicado or who are intoxicated or young or 
mentally disordered or display signs of rough treatment 
10° Ibid and Spain II, pars 66. 
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The great care with which the CPT has, on more than one occasion, exhorted the 
Spanish authorities to develop the role of forensic doctors in the medical examination 
not only of certain, vulnerable categories of detainee, but, seemingly, of all persons 
detained by the police or Civil Guard, regardless of the motive behind their 
detention, '°' may very well have been precipitated by its findings, in both 1991 and 
1994, first, that "it would... be premature to conclude that the phenomena of torture 
and severe ill-treatment have been eradicated" in Spanish police establishments; '02 
and, second, that allegations received by it of "general rough treatment" were 
"len[t]... credibility" by their "sheer number", as well as by "certain... on-site 
observations" made by its visiting delegations. 103 
- 
The value of such protection 
As we have seen, the closer involvement of forensic doctors in the medical 
examination of detainees is important, the CPT insists, because "[t]he findings of 
[such] doctors will carry considerable weight in legal proceedings"'04 
- 
and such 
proceedings may very well flow from the ex officio examination of complaints of 
police ill-treatment. Further, the possibility that legal action may be taken against the 
State on the basis of such findings carries with it, in the view of the CPT, a 
considerable potential to forestall ill-treatment in police custody. '°5 
- 
The provision of appropriate support 
Given what we have learnt already about the role of forensic doctors in the 
101 See, for instance, the combined effects of Spain I, paras 45,57 (1° indent) and App Il, paras 9-13 
and Spain 11, pars 37. 
102 See Spain I, pars 25; Spain II, paras 20 and 206; and, reinforcing the first two instances, Spain III, 
ara 33. 
03 See Spain I, para 26; and Spain II, paras 21 and 207. For an insight into the kind of findings that, 
ultimately, led to such conclusions, see Spain I, paras 17-24; and Spain III, paras 11-33. t04 See Netherlands (NA) I, paras 26 and 158. 
tos See further below, p 345. 
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prevention of ill-treatment in police custody, at least as circumscribed by the CPT, it 
is no swprise to learn that it also considers that: 
"it is... essential that [forensic doctors] be provided with appropriate training, 
facilities and safeguards". 106 
Without ever having expounded this basic position, the CPT has nevertheless 
recommended that "due consideration" be given to the request of one clinical 
pathologist interviewed in the Netherlands Antilles in 1994, who sought: 
11 
... 
a protocol regularising her relationship with the Attorney General, for 
video recording facilities during autopsies and for expert advice to be 
available in appropriate cases". 107 
To accede to such a request, it is submitted, would provide a means, inter alia, of 
safeguarding the independent status of forensic doctors, 108 preventing abuse of their 
investigations and findings and facilitating their work in a most appropriate way. It is 
worth noting, too, that the involvement of and co-operation between central 
government and national medical associations in the provision of specialised training 
to forensic clinicians has also pleased the CPT. 109 
- 
Independence 
It should be noted that in examining the role of forensic doctors in the criminal justice 
system, the CPT has never lost sight of such practitioners' community function as 
medical doctors. For instance, to the Spanish authorities, following its two visits in 
1994, it sought to "stress" that: 
106 See Netherlands (NA) I, pars 26. 
107 Ibid. See also pars 158 of the report. 
101 See, further, next sub-section. 
109 See Turkey I, pare 40. 
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"although forensic doctors are employed by the State to carry out certain 
specific duties, as doctors they retain a basic duty of emergency care and 
advice to the persons they examine". ' 0 
Consequently, it considered that "[f]orensic doctors should be provided with all the 
means necessary to perform effectively this hybrid function". "' At first sight, such a 
hybrid existence may be said to compromise forensic doctors' vaunted position of 
independence, since the balance that must be struck between their roles as protectors 
of detainees and as forensic practitioners operating at the behest of the police may 
create actual or potential conflicts of interest. However, the CPT has never appeared 
unduly perturbed by the prospect of conflict, for instance, remarking following its 
1993 visit to Northern Ireland 
- 
where Medical Officers 112 working in the Holding 
Centres "ha[d] the difficult task of combining aspects of the role of a treating doctor 
with the carrying out of certain duties requested by the policei13 
- 
that such Officers 
had "successfully adapted to this hybrid function", displaying "impress[ive]" levels of 
independence and "quality of care" and prompting complaints neither from detainees 
nor police officers about the manner in which they performed their duties. ' 4 
Despite adducing no evidence as to how such a congenial accommodation had 
been achieved, it was nevertheless clear in its second UK visit report that the 
Committee is prepared to countenance, in principle at least, situations in which the 
doctors examining and/or treating detainees held in police custody do not, notionally, 
operate independently of the State. Such arrangements may be particularly important, 
110 See Spain II, para 66. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ie "General practitioners who ha[ve] entered into a contract to provide the medical services 
foreseen in the [relevant] Code of Practice": see UK II, pars 68. 113 Idem, pars 69. 
114 Ibid. 
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it is submitted, for detainees who, for a particular reason 
- 
such as their being held 
incommunicado 
- 
are unable to obtain access to a doctor of their choosing. 
Conclusion 
In seeking to urge greater respect among Parties for a right of access to a doctor for 
persons detained by the police, the CPT has made it clear that any right created should 
be the subject of an express legal guarantee. This guarantee should stipulate that a 
detainee is entitled to be examined, if he so wishes, by a doctor of his own choice, in 
addition to any examination carried out by a doctor called by the police; that all 
medical examinations are to be conducted out of the hearing and, unless the doctor 
concerned requests otherwise, out of the sight of police officers; and that the results of 
every such examination, together with relevant statements made by the detainee and 
the doctor's conclusions, are to be recorded in writing by the doctor and made 
available to the detainee and his lawyer. 
If access to a detainee's nominated doctor is legitimately delayed, access to 
another, independent doctor should be facilitated (although the CPT might accept a 
situation in which a detainee's nominated doctor is permitted to carry out an 
examination in the presence of a police surgeon). Further, persons detained 
incommunicado should be able to request an examination by a doctor summoned by 
the police and by a doctor chosen from an accredited list drawn up in conjunction 
with the relevant professional organisation. 
Among States parties, the level of protection afforded detainees in the present 
connection ranges from its complete absence to, in some respects, quite sophisticated 
provision. For instance, in 1990, Maltese law made no provision at all and access to a 
doctor in the country's police establishments was afforded very much on an ad hoc 
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basis. There is also no express guarantee in Danish, Finnish or Swedish law; while, in 
the Netherlands, provision is made merely by Ministerial circular. French law and 
Romanian practice do not facilitate access as from the outset of detention, while 
Austrian law provides no right to be examined by a doctor of a detainee's choosing. 
By contrast, Codes of Practice in England and Wales and legal provisions in 
Ireland offer somewhat greater protection. Further, some national 
- 
or, at least, 
regional 
- 
practices deserve to be highlighted, such as the practice in parts of France 
of providing a corps of doctors permanently on call and the use made of doctors in 
some German lander for training purposes. Such diverse provision demonstrates, it is 
submitted, the magnitude of the task confronting the CPT in its efforts to bring about 
improvements in the protection of detainees against ill-treatment in police custody 
across Convention territory. 
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9 
A Fourth Fundamental Safeguard: the Duty to Inform a 
Detainee of His Rights 
Introduction: the basic precept 
In order to be able effectively to exercise his three fundamental rights as from the 
very outset of his deprivation of liberty by the police, as the CPT desires, a detainee 
must, of course, first be aware of his entitlement to such rights. "It is axiomatic", the 
Committee considers, "that rights for persons deprived of their liberty will be of little 
value if the persons concerned are unaware of their existence"! It is for this reason 
that when promulgating its three fundamental safeguards against ill-treatment in 
police custody, the Committee invariably expresses the concomitant belief that: 
"[p]ersons taken into police custody should be expressly informed without 
delay of all their rights, including [the three fundamental ones]". 2 
This duty to inform, incumbent on police officers, the CPT believes, ought to be a 
"strict" one. 3 Further, it applies in respect of every person detained by the police, 
including those being held incommunicado. ' Indeed, so central is it to the 
Committee's evolving body of standards that it has described it on numerous 
occasions as "equally fundamental" as the three primary safeguards. 5 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, it has dismissed claims on the part of some authorities that by 
informing persons taken into police custody of their rights and thereby facilitating, 
I See Turkey I, para 26. Visiting the country in October 1997, very few detainees met in police 
establishments had received any information about their rights: idem, para 27. 
2 See, e. g., rd GR, para 37; and, similarly, Greece I, para 35; Spain II, para 58; and France I, pars 45. 3 See Austria I, para 60 (1" indent, at point ii). 
4 See Spain VI, pars 27. 
s See, e. g., Germany I, para 30; and Norway I, pars 30. 
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inter alia, access to a lawyer and doctor, police investigations may be slowed down or 
disrupted. 
Justifying the basic precept 
The putative duty to inform a detainee of his rights without delay self-evidently flows 
from the CPT's belief that the three fundamental rights should be guaranteed as from 
the very outset of custody. 
Giving practical effect to the basic precept 
In the course of its periodic visit to Sweden in May 1991, the CPT has stated, 
"[m]any" prisoners interviewed claimed that the police had not informed them of 
their rights, "in particular", their right of access to legal advice. 7 "In order to ensure 
that persons in police custody are duly informed of [all]8 their rights, " the CPT 
averred subsequently: 
"a form9 setting out these rights [should] be given systematically to detainees 
at the outset of their custody. This form should be available in different 
languages 10 
"Further", it continued: 
"... the detainee should be asked to sign a statement attesting that he has been 
informed of these rights". 
6 See Luxembourg II, pars 71. 
7 See Sweden I, para 29. 
8 An addition proffered in Hungary I, para 49. 
9 In other visit reports, the terms "document" (see, e. g., France I, para 46; Italy I, para 48) or 
"brochure" (see, e. g., Liechtenstein I, para 32) have been preferred 
'o See Sweden I, para 29 (and now Sweden III, para 26); and, similarly, Germany I, para 39; Greece I, 
para 44; and Romania I, para 43. It is worth noting that the CPT has formulated similar precepts in 
respect of other categories of detainee: see, e. g., Spain IV, para 43 (regarding newly-arrived prisoners); 
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Such gestures, the Committee holds, are "hardly onerous, easy to implement and 
undeniably useful". ' 1 
Developing the basic precept: explaining a detainee's rights intelligibly 
The need to ensure that a person detained by the police properly understands his 
situation and the rights of which he may avail himself is a precept which clearly 
inheres in the putative duty to inform. The CPT's approach to the issue is twofold, 
taking account, first, of the lay character of the overwhelming majority of persons 
held in police custody; and, second, the possibility of their being foreign nationals. 
Accordingly, in a formula which, in its generality, conceivably addresses both these 
points, the Committee has, in some visit reports, appended to its basic precept a 
condition which requires the act of informing to take place: 
"... in a language which [detainees] understand". 12 
Both aspects of the duty will now be considered separately. 
The need to avoid confusion among detainees 
Section 61(1) of the Portuguese Code of Criminal Procedure13 provides that an 
accused person is entitled to be informed by the court or the criminal investigation 
department before which he is to appear of the rights available to him. Such rights 
include: 
"[t]he right to choose his own defence counsel or ask the court to appoint 
one... the right to be present during any procedural acts which directly concern 
7`h GR, para 30 (regarding foreign nationals detained under aliens legislation); and 8`h GR, para 53 (regarding psychiatric patients and their families). 
11 See Belgium II, para 38; and, similarly, 6" GR, para 16. 12 See, e. g., Netherlands I, para 35; Iceland I, para 29; and Belgium I, para 36. 13 The Codigo de Processo Penal, Decreto-Lei 78/87,17 February 1987. 
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him; to be heard by the investigating court or judge whenever they are called 
upon to take any decision affecting him; to remain silent; to intervene in the 
inquiry and investigatory procedure; and, in accordance with law, to appeal 
any decision taken against him". 14 
The provisions of section 61(1) are seemingly "reproduced on a card carried by police 
officers which is apparently read to those arrested by them". 15 Visiting the country in 
January 1992, the CPT "fear[ed] that the technical nature of [the] wording [of section 
61(1)] could well render [the card] unintelligible to many detained persons". 16 
Similarly, at the Helsinki Central Police Department and Helsinki 
Detoxification Centre, Finland, in May 1992, detained criminal suspects, a delegation 
noted, were given a "booklet setting out their rights". 17 To the Committee's 
disappointment, however, the booklet "simply reproduced the relevant legal 
provisions, " the "clear" result of which, it averred, was that the "complexity of the 
language employed might render it obscure to many detainees". 18 Consequently, 
"[i]n order to ensure that persons in police custody are duly informed of their rights", 
to both the Finnish and Portuguese Governments, the CPT recommended, inter alia, 
that: 
"systematically at the outset of their custody, [such persons] be given a form 
setting out those rights in a straightforward manner". 19 
Clearly 
- 
and understandably 
- 
therefore, the CPT considers that persons detained by 
the police should be informed of their rights in a way which is not so technical as to 
14 See Portugal I, App 3, paras 7-8. 
's Ibid. See also para 47 of the substantive report 16 Ideen, para 47. 
17 See Finland I, para 42. 
18 Ibid. 
19 See Portugal I, para 48; and Finland I, pars 43 (emphasis added). See, similarly, Netherlands I, para 
48; and Italy I, pars 180 (information on rights to be set out in a "simple" manner). 
130 
be unintelligible. Accordingly, it regards the simple repetition of the salient 
provisions of the relevant legislation as inappropriate; not even nationals of the Party 
concerned, it believes, can be expected to understand such a gesture. 20 It would seem, 
therefore, that the form or booklet used to convey the necessary information should be 
explanatory, not merely recitative. 
Of course, some rights are self-explanatory: the right to inform a relative or 
friend of one's detention, for example, requires little elaboration. Others, however, 
like the melange of rights of which persons detained by the Portuguese police must, 
by law, be informed, may require further explanation before they may be considered 
properly capable of being understood. The tenor of the CPT's remarks to the 
Slovenian authorities following its visit in early 1995 arguably lends weight to this 
contention. In Slovenia, it was alleged by "a certain number" of detainees, either 
their rights "had not been fully explained to them... or they had not fully understood 
the significance of the forms which they had signed"21 In the view of the CPT, the 
forms concerned 
- 
which were used to convey the information required by Article 4 of 
the Slovenian Code of Criminal Procedure 
- 
"could usefully be supplemented by a 
written statement of rights, phrased in straightforward terms", to be given to detainees 
at the outset of their custody. 22 
Even more pertinently, to the Liechtenstein authorities, following a visit to the 
country in April 1993, the Committee observed that: 
20 Although the CPT's recommendations in this area relate to the provision of writt en information only, 
it may be assumed that it considers that the same precept should apply to any oral explanation offered 
bZy officers. 
See Slovenia I, para 37. 
22 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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"... la brochure [setting out the relevant rights] devrait comporter des 
explications sur la procedure qui leer est applicable et leurs droits en la 
matiere". 23 
To other Parties, the CPT has suggested that a detainee should be able to certify that 
his rights have been explained in a manner understood by him. 24 
The detention offoreign nationals 
Inevitably, on apprehending a foreign national who cannot 
- 
or, cannot fully 
- 
understand the language spoken locally in the country in which he is detained, police 
officers face considerable difficulties in discharging the kinds of explanatory duties 
just outlined. However, it is obvious from the Committee's published work that, in its 
view, any mutual misunderstanding can never justify apparent acts of discrimination 
against such persons in the exercise of their rights. For, as we have seen, it considers 
that written information on rights should be made available to all detainees as from 
the outset of detention "in different languages". " 
Problems of comprehension were raised by the CPT in its first Irish visit 
report. Visiting Ireland in 1993, a delegation noted that, with one notable exception - 
regarding the right to request a medical examination26 
- 
the country's Criminal Justice 
Act 1984 appeared to mirror the CPT's basic precept on police officers' primary duty 
to inform. 27 At the same time, however, the Act, it observed, "[did] not expressly 
state... that detainees should be informed of their rights in a language which they 
23 See Liechtenstein I, para 32. Although this recommendation was made in the context of the detention 
of persons under domestic aliens legislation, it may be regarded as equally applicable, it is submitted, 
in respect of the detention of a State's own nationals. 
24 See Italy I, para 48; and Luxembourg I, para 34. The need for detainees to record the fact that they 
have been made aware of their rights may now be said to be part of the CPT's fundamental precept in 
the present connection: see further below, pp 189-90. 
" See above, p 128. See also, Liechtenstein I, para 32; and San Marino I, pars 31. 26 However, cf now Ireland II, Para 25. 
r See Ireland I, para 48. 
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understand... "28 As a result, the information form given to detainees, was available 
"only in English", and some foreign detainees interviewed complained that they had 
understood neither the oral nor the written information with which they had been 
furnished29 In the light of these findings, the CPT recommended, first, in a reflection 
of its original formula, that the language in which persons detained by the Irish police 
are told of their rights should be one which they understand; and, second, that the 
written form on which their rights are listed should be "available in a variety of 
languages". 30 
What the CPT means by terms like "variety" and "appropriate" as applied to 
the languages in which, it avers, information forms should be made available, we can 
only speculate. Undoubtedly the particular circumstances obtaining in States parties 
must be taken into account, so that the languages most commonly spoken by persons 
detained by the police therein, including minority groups, ought to feature strongly. 
Accordingly, we should not be surprised that the Committee recommended to the 
Liechtenstein authorities in 1995 that: 
"... the form [setting out a person's rights and the procedure applicable to him] 
should be available in the languages most frequently spoken by 
[detainees]... s31 
Applied elsewhere, such a recommendation would mean that in Finland, for example, 
the relevant information might be issued, inter alia, in Russian, Swedish and 
28 Ideen, para 49. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. By the time of the CPT's second periodic visit, in 1998, the information notices with which 
detainees in Irish police custody were furnished, were available "in no less than nine languages": see 
Ireland II, para 25. See, similarly, UK I, para 13 (information forms to be made available in a "wide 
range" of languages); and Finland I, pares 42-3 (information to be given in an "appropriate range" of 
languages, since, at the time of the visit, it was available "apparently... only in Finnish" and, therefore, 
"incomprehensible" to foreign detainees). 
31 See Liechtenstein I, pars 32. 
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Norwegian, as well as 
- 
as in all Parties 
- 
English, French and, arguably, German. 
Indeed, commendably, in their Response to the CPT's first visit report, the Finnish 
authorities revealed that the booklet on the rights of detainees 
- 
which, they stated, 
they were in the process of preparing "on the basis of... CPT recommendations" 
- 
would be available in EC languages and in Russian and Estonian, "at least". 32 
In other visit reports, the Committee has suggested, in addition, that: 
"... the relevant form(s) used for informing detainees of their right to contact a 
member of their family, etc. be translated into a wide range of languages and 
that an interpreter be made available if necessary to ensure that a detainee is 
informed of his rights... "33 
This is a welcome elaboration of the Committee's rather spare fundamental position 
and conveys, it is submitted, a genuine sense of what the Committee believes is 
required of police officers in the present connection. It may, however, require of 
Parties a considerable financial commitment if it is to be rendered meaningful in 
practice. 
State party practice 
In examining Party practice on this, the safeguard from which, to all intents and 
purposes, all others flow, the CPT has encountered procedures of varying quality. 
Some Parties have made no provision at all; others, very good provision; others still, 
what can only be described as inchoate provision. Although it is simplistic to reduce 
perceived police procedure to categories of good, bad and mixed practice in this way, 
32 See Finland Response I, CPT/Inf (93) 16, p 21. 33 See Austria I, para 60,2°d indent (emphasis added); and, in the same connection, Liechtenstein I, 
para 32; Turkey I, para 61; and Poland I, para 62. 
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for the purpose of illustrating the extent of the task faced by the Committee in seeking 
to effect improvements, it is a most convenient and economical conceit. 
Poor practice 
Examples of systems which compare unfavourably with CPT precepts in this area are, 
it should be stated, few. Moreover, such systems would appear to be deficient only in 
a few 
- 
albeit important 
- 
respects. They include that which operated in Norwegian 
police establishments when visited in 1993. There, a CPT delegation observed: 
"... apart from the oral notification of the right to be assisted by a lawyer, 
given immediately before the first interrogation, no... measure [informing 
detainees of their rights] appear[ed] to be taken! '. 34 
Similarly, in the Hameenlinna and Turku City Police Departments, Finland, in May 
1992, it was noted that: 
"[n]o written information was available... 905 
In Luxembourg, in January 1993, gendarmerie officers interviewed admitted that: 
"... ils n'informaient pas systematiquement les personnes retenues de 
nationalite etrangere de leur droit de contacter un agent consulaire". 36 
Good practice 
Notwithstanding a general absence of provision in respect of non-English-speaking 
detainees in England and Wales in 1990, in its first UK visit report the CPT 
determined that it was "satisfied" that persons detained by the police in the 
34 See Norway I, pars 37. 
33 See Finland I, para 42 (cf Helsinki Central Police Department and Detoxification Centre: above, p 
130). In their responses to the visit report, the Finnish authorities reacted very positively to the 
promptings of the CPT in this area: see Finland Follow-up report I CPT/Inf (94) 3, p 8; and Finland 
Response I, op cit n 32, above, at 20-21. 
36 See Luxembourg I, pars 33. 
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jurisdiction are informed of both their right to notify a third party of their detention 
and their right of access to legal advice, 37 since its delegation "saw the form used for 
this purpose and noted also that the custody record opened for each detainee 
contained a statement to be signed by [him] attesting that he had been informed of his 
ri ghts". 38 The CPT was similarly satisfied, it appears, following its second periodic 
visit to the Party in May 1994. Then, it was clear, in the establishments visited 
detainees were furnished with information "both orally and in writing". 39 Further, the 
written notices seen were both "clear and complete" 40 
Contemporary practice in Scottish police establishments, however, offered less 
satisfactory provision. In those establishments visited, the delegation learned, the 
necessary information would be given to detainees "orally, but not in writt en form"al 
Contrarily, in Northern Ireland, the CPT discovered in 1993, Codes of Practice issued 
under PACE (NI) 1989 and the EPA 1991 provide that information as to rights shall 
be given to a detainee, "including in the form of a written notice" 42 The only 
disappointing aspect of this arrangement, the CPT noted subsequently, was the 
absence of any express reference on the written notice to a detainee's right to request 
a medical examination. 43 However, he may be made aware of the right, albeit rather 
circuitously, from the written form, which refers expressly to his right to consult the 
Codes of Practice, "from which the right to be examined by a doctor [may] be 
ascertained"' 44 Notwithstanding this perceived deficiency, "[d]iscussions with 
detainees confirmed, " the Committee asserted, that police practice was "fully in 
37 It appears, however, that, at the time of the visit, no information on the right to request a medical 
examination was given to detainees. 
38 See UK I, pars 213. 
39 See, similarly, Ireland I, pars 48. 
40 See UK III, pars 43. 
41 Idem, pars 296. 
42 See UK H, para 72. 
43 See, similarly, Ireland I, para 48; and Iceland II, pars 25. 
UK 114 para 72, note 8. 
136 
compliance" with the provisions of the Codes 45 Further, it observed, positively, as in 
England and Wales, a person detained by the police in Northern Ireland is also "called 
upon to certify on his custody record that he has been informed of his rights" 46 
In France, reform of the country's Code de Procedure Penale, has prescribed 
that: 
"... [t]onte personne placee en garde a vue doit immediatement etre informee 
des droits [d'informer un membre de sa famille, d'etre examine par un 
medecin et d'entrer en contact avec un avocat] ainsi que des dispositions 
relatives a la duree de la garde a vue... 
... 
Mention de cet avis est portee au proces-verbal et emargee par la personne 
gardee a vue; en cas de refus d'emargement, il en est fait mention. 
Les informations mentionees au premier alinea doivent etre communiquees a 
la personne... dans une langue qu'elle comprend". 47 
Interestingly, this provision is strikingly similar to the CPT's basic precept, as 
developed over time. 48 
Mixed practice 
Austrian law provides that anyone arrested in connection with an offence, whether 
administrative or criminal in character, is entitled to be informed by the arresting 
officer(s) of his rights 49 According to police officers interviewed in 1990, however, 
in practice, the obligation to inform detainees, inter alga, of their right not to be held 
45 Idem, Para 72. 
1 Ibid. See, similarly, Ireland I, para 48. 47 See France Response I, CPT/Inf (93) 2, para 121 (regarding Article 10 of La lot no. 93-2 janvier 
1993 portant reforme de la procedure penale renforce sensiblement les garanties des personnes 
fardees a vue). 
8 See, similarly, Slovenia I, para 37 (regarding the terms of Article 4 of the country's Code of Criminal 
Procedure). 
49 See Austria I, pars 13. 
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incommunicado is observed merely "as a general rule"50 
- 
which admission was 
rendered all the more credible, it is submitted, by the receipt of allegations from a 
number of prisoners met during the visit. 51 At the same time, however, it was the case 
that the forms used by Austrian police officers to inform detainees of their right to 
contact a third party were available "in several languages"52 and that among the 
"impressive" number of measures being taken or planned by the Austrian authorities 
to address identified shortcomings in the country's criminal justice system was "the 
preparation of a new information notice for detainees explaining to them their 
rights ". 53 
German law in this area comprises, in essence, three tiers of guarantees. 
Regarding persons suspected of a criminal offence "who are the subject of a criminal 
inquiry", M sections 136 and 163a of the country's Code of Criminal Procedure 
provide that "before any interrogation... [they] must be informed of the offence of 
which they are suspected... [and of] their right of silence and their right to consult a 
lawyer". 35 Laudable though the tenor of these provisions is, when measured against 
the CPT's own precepts, the Code is notable for several significant omissions. First, 
it is clear that detainees are not entitled to be informed of all their rights, not even of 
all their fundamental rights, by the police. Second, the duty to inform arises not at the 
moment detention begins, as the CPT would prefer, but only before the 
commencement of any interrogation, which may, of course, be some time later. 
Finally, no account would appear to be taken of detainees who are not the subject of a 
criminal inquiry, but who have been apprehended for some other reason. 
so Ideen, para 58. 
sl Ideen, para 57. 
32 Ideen4 para 58. 
s' Ideen, para 101(8'" indent). 
54 A "Beschuldigter. " 
55 See Germany lApp i, para11. 
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To a certain extent, other provisions of the Code address this last point. 
Section 163b provides that criminal suspects apprehended merely "for the purposes of 
establishing their identity-must also be informed of the offence concerned". 56 
However, it is not clear from the CPT's account of German law whether such 
detainees are entitled, in addition, to be informed of all their rights. Similarly, 
Sections 55 and 136(5) of the Code provide that persons "questioned as witnesses" by 
the German police "must be informed of their right of silence.., if there is a risk that 
they or members of their family may be subject to criminal proceedings". 57 At the 
same time, however, "[t]here is no requirement that they be informed of their right of 
access to a lawyer". 
Conclusion 
The CPT's circumscription of the duty on police officers to inform a detainee of his 
rights is readily apprehended in its published work. It requires the police authorities 
expressly to inform a detainee without delay of all his rights, at the very least in 
written form, and to obtain the detainee's signature attesting that he has been so 
informed or to explain the absence of any such signature. It also requires that account 
be taken of both the lay character of the vast majority of detainees and of the 
possibility of their being foreign nationals (the latter of which conceivably connoting 
the provision, where necessary, of an interpreter). 
As far as State party practice is concerned, a perusal of visit reports 
demonstrates, yet again, that it is, to say the least, mixed. Only practice in England 
and Wales, it seems, offers anything which bares comparison with the Committee's 
ss Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
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fundamental precept, while, again, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish law and practice 
fall short. 58 As things stand, therefore, the standards set by the CPT, simple though 
they may be, are still somewhat more advanced than Party practice and procedure in 
this area. 
" It may be conjectured, however, that the apparent frequency with which safeguards in police custody 
afforded by Scandinavian States fail to match CPT precepts may be the result more of such Parties 
candour and willingness to co-operate with the CPT, than that all other States parties, both individually 
and collectively, offer more comprehensive protection. It is also the case, of course, that the protection 
afforded by these former Parties is not deficient in every respect; it is deficient only in a few, albeit 
significant, respects. Many (more) serious deficiencies, as we have seen, have been identified 
elsewhere. 
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10 
The Interrogation of Detainees 
Introduction: a general prohibition of ill-treatment 
In its report to the UK authorities following its ad hoc visit to Northern Ireland in July 
1993, the CPT described the physical ill-treatment alleged to have been inflicted on 
persons detained in so-called Holding Centres in the period prior to its visit. ' The 
"most common" allegations heard concerned "[s]laps, punches, pulling hair, repeated 
blows to the back of the head with the base of the hand and overturning the chairs on 
which detainees were sitting". 2 Two female detainees interviewed claimed to have 
been subjected to "physical forms of sexual harassment... touching breasts and rubbing 
legs... "3 Pointedly, certain medical records seen by the visiting delegation in the 
course of the visit were "consistent" with many of the allegations heard. 4 "[V]arious 
forms of psychological ill-treatment"5 were also alleged, the CPT observed, the 
"most serious" of which concerned: 
"... threats... to arrange that persons detained or members of their families 
would become targets of a paramilitary group... threats to include 
compromising material in. 
.. 
interview notes unless the detainee [concerned] co- 
operated; misleading information concerning the legal position of members of 
the detainee's family; shouting and other forms of verbal abuse, including of a 
1 The "Holding Centres" are establishments used for the questioning of persons detained under 
Northern Ireland's prevention of terrorism legislation. At the time of writing, they are in the process of 
being de-commissioned. In 1993, the CPT visited three such Centres: Gough Barracks Holding Centre, 
Armagh, Castlereagh Holding Centre, Belfast and the Strand Road Police Station, Londonderry (which, 
at the time, had not been used for questioning under the legislation for some months). 2 See UK II, para 32. It is worth noting, however, that no person being held at the Centres just prior to 
or at the time of the visit made allegations of ill-treatment. The most recent allegations related to a 
Feriod four months before the visit and "most" related to periods pre-dating the visit by a year or more. 
Ibid. 
" Idem, para 33. Two cases feature at length in the report 3 Original emphasis. 
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sexual nature vis-ä-vis women detainees; other types of intimidating 
behaviour, in particular banging the table in the interview room; [and] 
pressurising detainees to become police informers in exchange for their 
release". 6 
In its visit report, the CPT readily acknowledged that "tangible evidence of 
psychological ill-treatment is difficult to obtain... [especially] in the absence of any 
means of being able to hear what is said during the interview process". Nevertheless, 
it was of the opinion that its findings in the Holding Centres did "give rise to [a] 
legitimate concern" about the treatment of detainees therein: the "sheer number of 
allegations received, and their consistency as regards the types of ill-treatment 
employed and the authors", 7 it observed, were "striking". 8 "In the light of all the 
information at its disposal", the Committee indicated, it had been forced to conclude 
that persons arrested in Northern Ireland under the PTA 1989 ran a "significant risk of 
psychological forms of ill-treatment during their detention at the holding centres and 
that, on occasion, resort [might] be had by detective officers to forms of physical ill- 
treatment" 
.9 For its own part, the Committee considered that: 
"[t]he questioning of persons detained in relation to terrorist offences cannot 
be expected to be a pleasant process". '° 
Nevertheless, it maintained: 
"... threats of death or serious injury (whether direct or oblique), threats to put 
`dirt' in the interview notes unless information requested is provided, shouting 
6 UK H, Para 34. 
7 "[F]or the most park.. members of detective units... [not] uniformed police officers with custodial 
duties... ": idem, Para 31. 
8 Idem, Para 109. 
9 Idem, Para 110. 
10 Idem, Para 108. 
142 
into the ears of detainees or insulting them... is behaviour which has no proper 
place in the interrogation process". " 
"Of course", it added, emphatically, "resort to physical violence would be equally 
unacceptable". 12 Although principally concerned with the interrogation of terrorist 
suspects, the Committee's opinions on the alleged conduct of officers in the Holding 
Centres towards persons in their charge are just as significant, it is submitted, in 
respect of the interrogation of other types of detainee. Accordingly, they will be 
treated as such for the purposes of this study and what follows must be seen in this 
light. 13 
The provision of guidance on the interview process 
As we shall see, the CPT is of the view that one of the best means of forestalling ill- 
treatment during interrogations is to furnish police officers with comprehensive 
guidance on the interview process. There are a number of reasons why such guidance 
is important. While, to a certain extent, axiomatic, they are, nevertheless, worth 
considering in detail: 
(i) In order to clarify the nature of the interview itself 
In Sweden, "as a rule", the Committee noted following its visit in 1991, an arrested 
person's defence counsel is entitled to sit with him during his interrogation by the 
police. 14 According to persons interviewed in the course of the visit, however, the 
t' Ibid. This position, apparently, was "fully accepted by senior RU. C. officers with whom the 
delegation spoke". 
12 Ibid. 
13 In this connection, see now Netherlands if, para 13 (regarding the 
- 
now prohibited - application of 
various forms of psychological pressure to criminal suspects 
- 
e. g. the showing of photographs of a 
victim's body and, occasionally, his/her family and the scene of the crime, the suggestion that a 
victim's family has received telephone threats 
- 
in the course of "intensive" interrogations lasting 
"several days'). 
14 See Sweden I, para 26. 
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extent of such counsel's powers of intervention was a matter of dispute. Police 
officers, for their part, insisted that he was to play a "passive", not an "active", role. '5 
The CPT chose not to take issue with this view, choosing, rather, to offer the less 
controversial opinion that "[t]his... matter... might usefully be clarified by instructions 
or guidelines". 16 
There is much merit, therefore, in the view of the CPT, in the provision of 
clear and precise guidance on interrogation procedure. Adherence to such guidance, it 
follows, logically, would obviate the kind of confusion and potential for dispute 
apparent in the uncodified Swedish system. In addition, the risk of the police being 
the object of vexatious claims on the part of persons formerly in their custody might 
be reduced if their conduct during interviews were the subject of greater 
circumscription 
- 
particularly if, as in Finland in 1998, any guidance formulated was 
also made available to detainees and their lawyers. 17 
(ii) In order to prevent 
- 
or at least minimise the risk of 
- 
abuse 
Beyond bringing clarity to the interrogation process, guidelines may help to minimise 
the potential for abuse inherent in all custodial situations. In this respect, the manner 
in which, in the absence of formal guidance, police officers could exploit the poor 
regimes obtaining in the Finnish police establishments visited in 1992 in order to 
obtain information from detainees, invited strong CPT criticism. "[I]t was clear from 
conversations with many... remand prisoners", the Committee observed in its 
subsequent visit report, that the "routine" way in which they were obliged to spend 
"up to 23 hours each day alone in featureless cells... possibly for weeks on end", could 
be exploited by their interrogators: the "prospect of the police exercising their 
is Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See Finland II, pars 40. 
144 
discretion to move them to the local remand prison 
- 
where inter alia they would be 
allowed to associate with other prisoners 
- 
was seen as an inducement to provide 
information". 18 "[S]uch a state of affairs", it declared unequivocally, "is not 
acceptable". 19 
(iii) In order to reduce the risk of unintended or accumulative ill-treatment 
While valuable in preventing or reducing the likelihood of deliberate acts of ill- 
treatment by police officers, the formulation of precepts on interview procedure may 
also help eliminate more subtle 
- 
perhaps, even, unintended 
- 
kinds of ill-treatment. 
Accordingly, better circumscription of the character and duration of interviews than 
was afforded in the Codes of Practice to which officers in Northern Ireland's Holding 
Centres were subject in 1993, for example, might conceivably have reduced the 
"degree of psychological pressure amounting to ill-treatment" which the CPT 
considered their methods of interrogation could engender. 20 In the Centres: 
"... detainees could be questioned for up to twelve hours a day, during six 
sessions of approximately two hours each, as follows: from 9am to 1 lam, then 
a fifteen minute break; from 11.1Sam to lpm then a break for lunch from lpm 
to 2pm; from 2pm to 4pm, then a fifteen minute break; from 4.15pm to 6pm, 
then a break of one hour for dinner from 6pm to 7pm; from 7pm to 9pm, 
followed by a fifteen minute break, and finally, from 9.15pm to l lpm" 2' 
The questioning itself 
"... was conducted by two teams of two detectives operating in relays 
throughout the day 
- 
two officers always being present at each interview". 
18 Idem, para 24. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See UK II, para 75. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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This process "might continue for several days and, exceptionally, for up to seven 
days". It was described by the CPT as "intensive, particularly if applied over a 
prolonged period of time" and could, "depending on the individual concerned", be 
considered to constitute ill-treatment 23 (It should be recalled in this connection that 
under the terms of contemporary prevention of terrorism legislation in Northern 
Ireland, with the authority of the Secretary of State, a person could be detained 
without charge for up to seven days. 24) Surprisingly, the CPT neither recommended 
the creation of a less intensive interview procedure nor better circumscription of the 
guidelines to which interviews in the Centres were subject 25 Rather, it sought to 
encourage greater care on the part of the Centres' Medical Officers when determining 
whether detainees were, in a psychological sense, "(still) fit to be interviewed", more 
especially, if "particularly vulnerable" 
- 
i. e. if juvenile, mentally ill or mentally 
handicapped. 26 These are, of course, laudable objectives 
- 
and useful adjuncts to the 
CPT's evolving body of standards on the role of medical doctors in protecting 
detainees against ill-treatment. 27 However, they fail precisely to address the concerns, 
voiced so forcefully by the CPT in its second UK visit report, about the character - 
particularly the intensity and duration 
- 
of the interview process itself and may be said 
to represent, therefore, an opportunity missed. 
State party practice: a general absence of formal guidance 
Where it is clear that a contracting Party has seriously considered the question what 
23 Ibid. 
24 See above, p 76. 
" See similarly Spain II, para 69, wherein the Committee noted, without taking the matter much 
further, that its findings in April 1994 had indicated that, "on occasion", detainees - "more particularly 
terrorist suspects" 
- 
could be interrogated for "lengthy periods". 26 UK II, Para 75. 
27 See generally above, Chapter 8. 
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guidance may be of use to police officers in the execution of their inquisitorial duties, 
the results can be striking. Visiting France in 1991, for example, the Committee was 
plainly impressed by the contents of circular No. 09600, drafted as long ago as 4th 
March 1971, which adumbrates various "mesures a prendre pour assurer le respect des 
garanties fondamentales de la personne humaine a 1'occasion de la police judiciaire". 
In its subsequent visit report, the CPT quoted paragraph 13 of the circular in full, 
averring that it "deserves to be cited". 8 It is also worth quoting here, for it throws 
into sharp relief the kind of considerations to which, we may infer, in the view of the 
CPT, police officers ought to adhere in the discharge of their duties: 
"Chaque officier et agent de police judiciaire doit combattre le reflexe qui 
consiste a rechercher avant tout l'aveu au lieu d'essayer de reunir des charges 
precises et de proceder a des constatations materielles susceptibles d'etablir les 
agissements delictueux des personnes mises en cause. Ce reflexe est de nature 
a entrainer le recours a des procedes d'intimidation ou de contrainte, pratiques 
non seulement immorales et illegales, mais susceptibles d'engager 1'enquete 
dans une fausse direction. On n'insistera a cet egard jamais assez sur 
l'obligation imperative pour les enqueteurs de controler les aveux recus et les 
etayer par des preuves materielles". 29 
It has been the more common experience of the CPT, however, to encounter police 
officers who have been subject to no, or at most imprecise, guidance on the manner 
and environment in which they are required to conduct interrogations. 30 This absence 
- 
or imprecision 
- 
may be said to have devalued the presence in the domestic 
28 See France I, para 47. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See, e. g., Austria I, para 65 (no guidelines at all); Malta I, para 89 (no guidelines; according to one 
officer interviewed, "every inspector has his on methods"); and Spain I, para 58 - now Spain V, pars 
49 (no formal rules or guidelines). 
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constitutions and/or Criminal Codes of the States parties concerned of specific 
provisions inter alia prohibiting and severely punishing the torture and ill-treatment 
of detainees by public servants, particularly since a general lack of guidance appears 
to vest in police officers: 
"... a considerable degree of discretion on such matters as informing the 
detainee of the identity of those present during the interview, the maximum 
possible length of a given interview without a break, rest periods between 
interviews, the places in which an interview may take place, whether the 
detainee may be required to stand while being questioned, the interviewing of 
persons who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol, etc. 01 
Invested with such discretion, police officers are well placed, if so inclined, to abuse 
their position of authority. For instance, in December 1990, it was clear to the CPT 
that in Danish police establishments: 
"... it lay with the police officers responsible for questioning [detainees] to 
assess the need to interrupt the interview according to the state of fatigue or 
hunger of the person concerned". 32 
Clearly, the risk of abuse of power in such circumstances is high - although the 
presence of a lawyer during interrogations, as provided for in Danish law33 - could 
provide some check on police excesses. 
The lack of guidance on interview procedure in a number of States parties to 
the ECPT contrasts sharply with their provision of often developed and 
thoroughgoing legal regimes in respect of, inter alia, the prohibition and punishment 
31 See Spain I, para 58 (emphasis added). 32 See Denmark I, para 129. 
33 Ibid. 
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of ill-treatment by law enforcement personnel. As well as proscribing overt acts of 
torture and ill-treatment by such personnel, these regimes, as encountered by the CPT, 
have, in the specific context of police interview procedure, sought to proscribe: 
(i) efforts on the part of police officers to compel interviewees to make a statement or 
confession; 34 
(ii) recourse to coercion generally during interviews; 35 
(iii) the use of "perfidious" or other unlawful means of questioning; 36 
(iv) the exploitation of a detainee's exhaustion; 37 
(v) the issuing of threats; 38 and 
(vi) the use of "physical constraint... medicines... or hypnosis". 39 
Positive obligations imposed on interviewing officers have included: 
(i) the duty to treat persons being questioned "in a calm and objective manner" ; 4° 
(ii) the duty to ask "clear and unambiguous questions" ; 41 
(iii) the duty to afford interviewees "the opportunity for regular meals and sufficient 
rest"42 
(iv) the duty to inform detainees before their interrogation, inter alia, of the charges 
against them, 43 the fact that they will "not necessarily be released as a result of any 
admissions made"44 and their right not to answer questions45 as well as the duty to 
record the interrogation; 46 
34 See Denmark I, App 2, para 9; and, similarly, Netherlands I, para 49; and Slovenia I, para 38. 35 Ibid. See also, Finland I, para 44; and Iceland I, para 38. 36 Ibid. See also, Germany I, para 40; Norway I, para 38; and Iceland II, para 26. 
" See Finland I, para 44; and Germany I, para 40. 38 See Finland I, para 44; Norway I, para 38; and Iceland II, para 26. 39 See Germany I, para 40; Norway I, para 38; and Italy I, para 51. 40 See Finland I, para 44; and Norway I, para 38. 41 See Iceland I, para 38. 
42 See Finland I, para 44; and, similarly, Iceland I, para 38 (now Iceland II, para 26); and Norway I, 
Para 38. 
3 See Norway I, para 38; and, similarly, Denmark I, App 2, para 9. µ See Norway I, pars 38. 45 Ibid. See also Denmark I, App 2, para 9. 
" See Netherlands I, para 49. 
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(v) the duty to note in writing in the interview record any breaks in examinations, 47 as 
well as the times when interviews begin and end; 48 and 
(vi) the duty to inform interviewees of the name and identity number of the officers 
conducting the interview, if the detainee requests them49 
Before turning to consider identifiable CPT precepts in the area of interview practice 
and procedure, it should be noted that the formulation of guidance should comprise 
just one part of a general strategy to safeguard the detainee during questioning. This 
strategy ought, really, to commence with the training and education of police officers, 
of which instruction on interview procedure is merely one, albeit a fundamental, part; 
officers cannot be expected to operate effectively without having been instructed on 
appropriate interview technique. 
The Committee's basic precept: the formulation of codes of conduct 
At first sight, the CPT itself would appear to take a detached, even non-committal, 
view as to how best to conduct interviews with detainees, acknowledging that: 
"[t]he art of questioning criminal suspects will no doubt always be based in 
large measure on experience". 50 
At the same time, however, it has stated, more firmly, that: 
"... clear rules or guidelines should exist on the way in which police interviews 
are to be conducted". s' 
47 See Germany I, Para 41; and Luxembourg I, Para 35, note 2. 
" See Iceland I, Para 38; and, similarly, Belgium I, Para 49; France I, Para 48; and Luxembourg I, Para 
35, note 2. 
49 See Germany I, Para 41. 
S0 See Greece I, Para 46; and, similarly, UK II, Para 74; and UK III, Para 298. 51 See 2'd GR, Para 39; and, similarly, Hungary I, Para 50; and France I, Para 48. 
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Further, it has insisted, even where some provision, ostensibly protective of 
interviewees, is made by a Contracting party, it nevertheless: 
"... considers it essential for... very general provisions... to be supplemented by a 
formal code of conduct for interrogations setting out in detail the procedure to 
be followed on a number of specific points". 52 
Accordingly, the issuing of directives or similar guidance to officers is, it seems, 
insufficient. Such directives or guidance, the Committee holds, "cannot replace a 
code of conduct... established at the national level by the competent authorities". S3 In 
fact, so important to the CPT is codification in this area that when it has found that no 
domestic provision has been made at all, it has been markedly less measured. In 
circumstances such as these, it has stated, codes of practice should be adopted "as a 
matter of urgency". 54 
Justifying the basic precept 
We have already considered why, in a general sense, guidance on the interrogation of 
persons in police custody is of value in the prevention of ill-treatment. Regarding the 
formulation of codes of conduct in particular, the CPT has sought to stress, simply, 
that: 
"... [they] help to underpin the lessons taught during police training". 55 
In addition, of course, codes of conduct afford national authorities an opportunity to 
52 See Greece I, Para 46. 
53 See Italy II, para 58. S4 See Austria I, para 66; and Malta I, p8 ("Summary of the CPT's main findings") and para 89. 
ss See, e. g., Poland I, pars 56; and, similarly, Slovenia I, para 39; and Ireland I, para 50. 
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render all law and subordinate regulation on the questioning of detainees workable in 
practice. 56 
Developing the basic precept 
The contents of codes of conduct 
To date, it is submitted, in developing guidance on the interrogation of detainees, the 
nature of the balance which the CPT has sought to strike between, on the one hand, 
experience and, on the other, codification, has not been made clear in its published 
work. However, in its first analysis of Norwegian law and practice in this area, it did 
acknowledge that it "fully concur[red]" with the view of the country's Minister of 
Justice, as expressed in a Circular of 2nd December 1985, that: 
"[t]here are limits to what formal rules of police investigation can achieve as 
regards a proper balance between the respect due to persons questioned and 
the need to solve a case". 57 
"[N]evertheless", the CPT added, "certain aspects [of the interrogation procedure] 
should be covered by formal provisions". 58 Regrettably, the Committee failed to say 
anything more on the nature of the putative balance to be struck between pragmatism 
and formality. What is clear, however, is its belief that a number of important 
residual matters ought to be the subject of codification. As to those matters, the CPT's 
views are worth quoting in full. As might be expected, given its preventive mandate, 
any interview code, it believes, should contain, first, "a clear [and unequivocal59] 
56 See, e. g., Belgium H, pars 39. 
57 See Norway I, pars 39. 
511 Ibid. In Norway, it should be noted, police officers are "expected" to follow a particular 
interrogation practice, elaborated, inter alia, in Prosecution Instructions: idenn, pars 38. 39 See Ireland I, para 50. 
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prohibition of recourse to any form of ill-treatment", 60 as well as, equally predictably, 
the "threat" of ill-treatment. 61 In addition, it considers, such a code: 
"... should deal inter alia with the following: the systematic informing of the 
detainee of the identity (name and/or a number) of those [police officers] 
present at the interrogation; the permissible length of an interrogation; rest 
periods between interrogations and breaks during an interrogation; places in 
which interrogations may take place; whether the detainee may be required to 
remain standing while being interrogated; the interrogation of persons who are 
under the influence of drugs, alcohol, medicine, or who are in a state of shock. 
It should also be required that a record be systematically kept of the time at 
which interrogations start and end, of the persons present during each 
interrogation and of any request made by the detainee during the 
interrogation". 62 
More specifically, the Committee believes that: 
"[t]he position of specially vulnerable persons (for example, the young, those 
who are mentally disabled or mentally ill) should be the subject of specific 
safeguards" 63 
Clearly, the Committee has chosen not to elaborate an exhaustive set of guidelines. 
However, those cited above may be said to represent, inevitably, the more significant 
provisions of the code sought. 
60 See UK II, pars 74; and UK III, para 298. 61 This, we can infer from the Committee's endorsement of Irish practice in this regard: see Ireland I, 
ara 50. 
2 See, inter alia, Greece I, para 46; 2°d GR, para 39; Portugal I, para 50 (now Portugal II, para 59); Czech Republic I, para 34; Spain V, pars 55; and Spain VI, para 32. 63 Ibid. See also Poland I, para 57 (cf Polish law (para 56)); and Romania I, para 45 (cf Romanian law (pare 44)). 
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Particular aspects of the recommended code 
Why the CPT should seek to encourage Contracting parties expressly to codify this 
particular corps of guidelines may be demonstrated by reference to Party practice in 
this area. 
- 
Length of interrogations 
In Germany, in December 1991, a CPT delegation observed that police officers were 
subject to "no specific rules on the maximum length of interrogations". According to 
officers interviewed, "prisoners could be questioned for up to twelve hours, on 
condition that they showed no signs of fatigue" TM In its subsequent visit report, the 
CPT alluded to the absence of guidance on the matter, without, regrettably, suggesting 
what it would regard as a more satisfactory length of interrogation. We may be sure, 
however, that it considers questioning for up to twelve hours quite inappropriate. 
A clearer 
- 
though far from authoritative 
- 
account of the CPTs view on the 
matter has emerged from its dialogue with the Icelandic authorities in the wake of its 
visits in 1993 and 1998. Police interrogations in Iceland are regulated by the 
country's Criminal Procedure Act, Section 66.2 of which provides, inter alia, that a 
person may not be questioned "for more than six hours at a time" 65 Although, in its 
first visit report, the CPT offered no opinion as to the merit of Section 66.2, merely 
asking 
- 
albeit with evident concern 
- 
whether, in Iceland, "a detained person could 
be interrogated for six hours without any break whatsoever... ", 66 in its second report, 
it was prepared to state, more robustly, that, in its opinion, "only very exceptional 
circumstances [can] justify such a prolonged interrogation session without a break". 
Accordingly, it invited the Icelandic authorities "to revise Regulation No. 395/1997, 
6' See Germany I, para 41. 
65 See Iceland I, pars 38; and now Iceland II, para 26 (regarding Regulation No. 395/1997). 
' Ibid (emphasis added). 
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so as to make clear that breaks from interviewing should in principle be made at 
shorter intervals than six hours". 67 Unfortunately, as in its first German visit report, 
the Committee did not suggest a more appropriate interview duration. 
- 
The questioning ofjuveniles 
As we have seen, the CPT considers that "the young" represent a "specially 
vulnerable" category of detainee and should, accordingly, "be the subject of specific 
safeguards". 68 In this connection, it should be recalled that the Committee has 
"welcome[d]" the formulation in some jurisdictions of a prohibition against the 
questioning of young persons in the absence of "an appropriate person and/or 
lawyer". 69 
- 
Taking account of a detainee's state of mind: the questioning of persons 
affected by drugs, medication or alcohol 
Even in the absence of wilful acts of ill-treatment on the part of police officers, the 
use of certain routine, but unregulated, practices when interviewing detainees may 
threaten the latter's state of health and prove, ultimately, detrimental to the 
investigation concerned. In its first Austrian visit report, for example, the CPT 
expressed "concern 
... 
about the possible questioning of detainees suffering from the 
effects of drugs or alcohol" 70 Visiting the country in 1990, its delegation had gained 
the "impression" that one person spoken to had been questioned by the police "while 
he was experiencing withdrawal symptoms, without any previous medical 
consultation". 71 It may be inferred from this that the Committee considers that a 
medical examination of persons reasonably suspected of being in a state of 
withdrawal from drug or alcohol consumption 
- 
and, a fortiori, those who are still 
61 See Iceland II, pars 26. 
68 See above, p 153. 
69 See above, p 73. 
70 See Austria I, para 65. 
71 Ibid. The detainee concerned had also alleged that he had been ill-treated while being questioned: 
idem, para 46. 
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intoxicated 
- 
ought to precede and, presumably, in the event of adverse findings, 
prevent, their interrogation. 
The Committee might also have indicated that when the police are seeking to 
question a person whom they reasonably suspect to be intoxicated or, as in Austria, 
suffering withdrawal symptoms following a period, or periods, of intoxication, a 
failure to seek and obtain a prior medical opinion as to his fitness for interview might 
undermine the whole interrogation process. Not only might the interview lack 
objective medical justification and, therefore, endanger the welfare of the detainee 
concerned; but, as a means of advancing the police investigation, evidence obtained 
from a medically unfit interviewee may, ipso facto, be flawed. As such, it may be of 
little worth to 
- 
and perhaps, even, mislead 
- 
the police. Indeed, in a clear threat to 
the administration of justice, it could, if relied on, undermine the very integrity of the 
investigation itself. 
Other features of the interview process relevant to the CPT's mandate 
The presence of `witnesses' at interviews 
As might be expected, the formulation of codes of conduct, while, arguably, the most 
significant aspect of the discourse between the CPT and States parties on police 
interview procedure, is not the only one. Certain idiosyncrasies manifest in a number 
of national criminal justice systems examined by the Committee in the course of its 
work have induced from it clear expressions of interest and are, ipso facto, worth 
considering here. In Finland, Sweden and Iceland, for example, legislation on 
criminal investigation procedure provides for the presence of a witness during the 
interrogation of criminal suspects. In Finland, at the request of the person detained, a 
"credible and competent" witness may be present during interviews, except "[i]n cases 
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of urgency". However, interviews of suspects aged under 18 must be conducted in the 
presence of a witness. 72 In Sweden, "to the extent possible, a reliable witness 
commissioned by the investigating authority shall be present at examinations"; 73 and, 
in Iceland, again as far as possible, an "articulate and reliable witness" should be 
present at police interrogations 74 
Formal efforts like these to protect persons undergoing police interview are 
particularly laudable where 
- 
as was apparently the case in all three Parties 
-a 
detainee's right of access to a lawyer, especially at the pre-arrest stage of the criminal 
process, may be somewhat attenuated in practice. 5 In the view of the CPT: 
"[c]ertainly, the presence of a witness during interrogation can represent an 
important safeguard [against ill-treatment]... i76 
This assertion aside, the CPT omitted expressly to endorse the formal witness 
arrangements laid down in any of the three Parties concerned. Accordingly, while the 
tenor of its observation is approbatory, it would be precipitate to describe it as 
representing an incipient standard; the CPT has not yet suggested to other Parties that 
such procedures might usefully reinforce the safeguards extant in their own criminal 
justice systems 
- 
even where such safeguards are, in its view, flawed. Further, in 
practice, it appears, the notional impartiality of two of the three witness procedures 
concerned was, on close examination, somewhat vitiated. First, in Sweden, as we 
have already seen, the witnesses called upon were, by law, "commissioned by the 
investigating authority"; while, in Finland, according to both detainees and police 
n See Finland I, para 46 (citing Section 30 of the country's Pre-Trial Investigation Act 1987). 73 See Sweden I, para 35 (citing Section 10 of Chapter 23 of the country's Code ofJudicial Procedure). 74 See Iceland I, para 41 (citing Section 72.2 of the country's Criminal Procedure Act). 
's See, e. g., Finland I, paras 33 and 34; Sweden I, para 25; and Iceland I, paras 33 and 34. See also 
above, inter alia, pp 78 and 80. 
76 See Finland I, pars 47. 
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officers interviewed in 1992, "the witness involved was usually a police officer". -n 
This clearly raises questions as to the credibility of both procedures. Indeed, in the 
light of such practice, the CPT suggested to the Finnish authorities that: 
"... in addition to being credible and competent [a witness] should also be 
demonstrably impartial. It is open to question whether a police officer can be 
considered to meet this latter criterion". 78 
The interview of remand prisoners by the police 
It is, of course, not only at the outset 
- 
that is, in the pre-charge or pre-arrest stage 
- 
of 
a criminal investigation that the police may wish to question a criminal suspect. Even 
after he has been charged with a criminal offence and, where it has been deemed 
necessary, remanded in custody for trial, the police may, quite legitimately, wish to 
interview him further. This questioning might relate either to the offence with which 
he has been charged or to other matters. In such circumstances, the question arises, to 
what kind of access should the police be entitled? The Committee, for its part, 
believes that a situation in which, for the purposes of further questioning, police 
officers retain "free access" to persons remanded in prison establishments, particularly 
where such persons are required to return to police premises for the duration, "lends 
itself to abuse". The removal of inmates from prison by the police, it has stated, 
should be "subject to the authorisation of a judge or public prosecutor". 79 Further, 
"from the standpoint of the prevention of ill-treatment", it has observed: 
"it would be far preferable for further questioning of persons committed to 
prison to take place in prison rather than on police premises. The return of 
"Idem, para 46. 
78 Idem, Para 47. 
79 See Norway I, paras 41 and 136; and, similarly, Iceland I, paras 42 and 164 (and now Iceland II, pare 
27, regarding the 
- 
unchanged 
- 
situation in 1998, almost five years after the first periodic visit). 
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prisoners to police premises for whatever purpose should only be sought and 
authorised when it is absolutely unavoidable... s80 
The timing of interviews 
Section 24 of Finland's Pre-Trial Investigation Act 1987, provides, inter alia, that 
"[n]o one may be questioned [by the police] between 9.00 pm and 6.00 am without 
special cause". 81 In the report drawn up in the wake of its visit to the country in 1993, 
the CPT "welcome[d]" this provision, 82 a gesture that suggests, without being 
emphatic, that the precept might, ultimately, usefully supplement its own evolving 
corpus of standards on police interview procedure. In the same connection, visiting 
Spain in April 1994, a CPT delegation, we may infer from its subsequent visit report, 
was disturbed to find that "on occasion detained persons (and more particularly 
terrorist suspects)... have their formal statements taken during the night" ; 83 while, in 
the wake of its visit to the Netherlands Antilles in June 1994 and commenting on 
Section 41 of the country's Code of Criminal Procedure 
- 
which authorises the police 
to detain criminal suspects for questioning for a maximum of six hours, though longer 
if detained between the hours of 10 pm and 8 am" 
- 
the Committee sought to know, 
whether, as a consequence, questioning might take place at night, 85 a request which 
betrayed, it may be argued, a certain unease about the possibility. 
80 See Czech Republic I, pars 15. 81 See Finland I, pars 44. 
82 Ideen, pars 45. 83 See Spain II, pars 69. 
84 See Netherlands (NA) I, para 12. 85 Ideen, pars 58. 
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The environment in which interrogations take place 
As might be expected, the CPT is alarmed when it encounters interrogation rooms "of 
a highly intimidating nature". 86 Such facilities, it considers, "have no place in a 
modem police service". 87 
The ease with which investigating officers can secure access to detention areas 
Visiting Brixton Police Station, England, in 1997, the CPT learned that it was "not 
unknown for detective officers to enter the custody suite". In its subsequent visit 
report, it remarked that it would be "advisable" for police officers involved in the 
investigation of offences to avoid entering an establishment's custodial areas. 88 
Evidently, the Committee considers that a clear distinction should be drawn between 
the custodial and investigatory responsibilities of the police; personnel involved in the 
latter, it may be inferred, should not be able to secure access to detainees unless it is 
for the purpose of questioning, which activity should take place in an appropriate 
environment. 
Conclusion: the limitations of codes of practice 
Even where there exists in a State comprehensive regulation of 
- 
or, at least, guidance 
on 
- 
the interview process, it is, of course, always possible for domestic authorities, 
whether permissively or unwittingly, to allow situations to develop in which the will 
of a detainee may be broken in an unsatisfactory fashion, but where no putative code 
of conduct appears to have been violated. In such circumstances, the inherent 
86 See, e 
. 
g., Turkey I, para 74 (regarding interview rooms seen in a number of police establishments 
visited in 1997. Unfortunately, the CPT omitted to describe the facilities in its subsequent visit report, 
although its critical reference to a "small, black and sound-proofed `identification room"' seen 
elsewhere in one of the establishments visited may indicate the kind of environment encountered). 
_7 Ibid. 
88 See UK IV, para 63. 
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inflexibility of such codes is plain to see. The two following instances, it is 
submitted, offer interesting insights in this regard. 
In their treatment, detention and questioning of both criminal and terrorist 
suspects, the security forces in Northern Ireland are, as we have seen, subject to a 
variety of Codes of Practice. 89 Yet, visiting in 1993, the CPT was deeply disturbed, 
certainly insofar as terrorist suspects were concerned, by the "sheer 
number... and... consistency" of allegations of physical and psychological ill-treatment 
made against such forces. 90 If proven, such alleged mistreatment may be considered, 
ipso facto, clearly to have breached specific provisions of the Codes of Practice. At 
the same time, however, and less obviously, various objectionable features of 
detention in the Holding Centres at the time of the visit, each one regrettable, though 
not, of itself, unconscionable, may be considered, cumulatively, to have caused 
detainees greater distress than discrete acts of deliberate ill-treatment. In this regard, 
the CPT proclaimed, rather forcefully, that: 
"[e]ven in the absence of an overt act of ill-treatment, there is no doubt that a 
stay in a holding centre may be 
- 
and is perhaps designed to be -a most 
disagreeable experience. The material conditions of detention are poor91... and 
important qualifications are, or at least can be, placed upon certain 
fundamental rights of persons detained by the police. 92 
... 
To this must be 
added the intensive and potentially prolonged character of the interrogation 
process. The cumulative effect of these factors is to place persons detained at 
the holding centres under a considerable degree of psychological pressure. 
89 Such Codes, developed under PACE (NI) 1989 and the EPA 1991, it will be recalled, have been met 
with general 
- 
though far from unqualified 
- 
CPT approval: see above, inter alia, pp 75-6 and 136-7. 90 See UK II, para 109. 
91 Castlereagh Holding Centre, in particular, was criticised in this regard. 
'Z "[I]n particular", the CPT noted, "the possibilities for contact with the outside world are severely limited throughout the whole period of detention and various restrictions can be placed on the right of 
access to a lawyer". 
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The CPT must state, in this connection, that to impose upon a detainee such a 
degree of pressure as to break his will would amount, in its opinion, to 
inhuman treatment". 93 
Clearly, in such circumstances the immanent rigidity in drafting and application of 
otherwise laudable and comprehensive codes of conduct on interview procedure is 
exposed and their ultimate value in the protection of detainees rendered open to 
question. As means of systematising and regulating the questioning of persons 
detained by the police and the environment in which that questioning may take place 
and, consequently, as tools in the struggle to eliminate ill-treatment, such codes, it is 
submitted, do possess serious flaws and lacunae. 94 At the same time, however, it 
would be misconceived to view both their function and shortcomings so clinically; 
their formulation and implementation should be seen as simply one of a range of 
precepts, adherence to which ought better to protect persons detained and questioned 
by the police. As such, it may be stated, they supplement the CPT's corpus of 
standards most valuably. 
93 See UK II, para 109. 94 It has been observed that a number of States parties to the ECPT have expressed the view that codes 
of conduct, particularly as advocated by the CPT, are `unnecessarily formalistic": see Evans and Morgan (1998), p 290. 
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11 
The Electronic Recording of Police Interviews 
Introduction: a general absence of provision 
While the CPT, as we have just seen, has done much to codify standards on the 
conduct of police interrogations, the question how best to record interviews with 
detainees is one that it has sought to explore in a quite separate and distinct way. 
Contemporary law and practice among States parties in this area may be said to vary 
from the very basic to 
- 
in very rare instances 
- 
near-conformity with the relevant CPT 
precepts. Further, in a number Parties, law and practice may be seen to diverge from 
such precepts, occasionally quite markedly. For instance, in Finland, where 
legislation expressly "authorise[s]" the electronic recording of police interrogations, a 
CPT delegation "found no evidence of the use of such techniques" when visiting in 
1992.1 A similar dissonance between law and practice was perceived in Germany, in 
December 1991,2 Norway, in 19933 and, seemingly, Switzerland, in July 1991.4 In 
many more Parties still, however, no legal or practical provision would appear to have 
5 been made at all. 
State party practice: the two extremes 
Among the most undeveloped recording techniques to have been observed by visiting 
CPT delegations were those employed by the Austrian and Maltese police forces, 
when scrutinised in 1990. In both Parties, it seems, police interviews with criminal 
1 See Finland I, Para 48. The authorising legislation referred to is section 39 of the Pre-Trial 
Investigation Act and section 17 of the Decree on Pre-Trial Investigation and Coercive Criminal 
Means, 17 June 1988/575. 
2 See below, p 164. 3 See Norway I, Para 40. 
4 See below, p 164. 
s See, e. g., Greece I, Para 47; Hungary I, Para 52; and Spain II, Para 71. 
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suspects were recorded "exclusively manual[ly]". 6 Similarly, in Germany, it was 
noted in December 1991, police interrogations were "usually recorded manually, even 
though the electronic recording of interrogations was permitted under... [existing] legal 
provisions (in particular the Code of Criminal Procedure)"; 7 while, in Switzerland, 
earlier that same year, it was observed that police interrogations were "le plus souvent 
dactylographies" 
- 
although, "rarely", at the commissariat central de la police 
municipale de Beme, "it was possible electronically to record interrogations with the 
detainee's consent". 8 
By contrast, in England and Wales, the CPT noted in its first UK visit report, 
"[a] distinct code provides for the tape recording of most police interviews in relation 
to serious offences"9 
-a category which, "with effect from 1 December 1992", and 
subject to the consent of the detainee concerned, has included, "on a trial basis", 
terrorist offences. 1° According to the CPT, on the evidence of its delegation's visit in 
August 1990, adherence to the code among police officers "would appear to be the 
rule, subject to certain specific exceptions". " In Scotland, police officers asserted in 
1994, "all interviews conducted by CID officers [are] tape-recorded"; 12 while, in 
Northern Ireland, it was noted in 1993, the audio-tape recording of police interviews 
with persons arrested under PACE (NI) 1989 
- 
i. e. non-terrorist criminal suspects - 
was "standard practice". 13 However, there was no such recording of interviews with 
persons detained under PTA 1989 
- 
i. e. suspected terrorist suspects. '4 
6 See Austria I, para 67; and Malta I, para 90. 
7 See Germany I, Para 43. 
8 See Switzerland I, para 127. In Greece, in 1993, the CPT learned, an electronic recording system was 
"not currently used": see Greece I, para 47. 
9 See UK 1, para 18. 
10 See UK II, pars 88; and UK III, para 44. 
11 See UK I, para 221. The exceptions referred to were not explained by the Committee. 12 See UKIII, pars300. 
13 See UK II, para 83. 
14 Ibid. 
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The CPT's basic precept and rationale 
Given such varied 
- 
and, on the whole, undeveloped 
- 
practice among States parties, it 
is no surprise that the CPT's preference for the electronic recording of police 
interviews has been frequently expressed in its published work. Such recording, it 
considers, represents: 
"... another useful safeguard against the ill-treatment of detainees (as well as 
having significant advantages for the police)". 15 
These "advantages" were expounded in the Committee's second Spanish visit report, 
wherein, having reiterated its recommendation on the introduction of a system of 
electronic recording of interrogations made in its first such report, 16 it sought to 
emphasise the "legitimate interests of the law enforcement agencies" which such a 
system would serve. "In particular", it proclaimed: 
"... it would provide a complete and authentic record of the interrogation 
process, thereby greatly facilitating the investigation of allegations of ill- 
treatment and the correct attribution of blame". 17 
The benefits of the electronic recording of interviews, both for detainees, in respect of 
the "reinforce[d]" protection against ill-treatment which it affords, and for police 
officers, in respect of their better protection against unfounded allegations of abuse, 
"is not seriously contested by anyone", the CPT has asserted elsewhere. 18 Thus, 
actuated by this sense of the appropriateness of electronic recording techniques, in, 
is See 2'' GR, pars 39; and, similarly, Poland I, para 58; and Romania I, pars 46. 16 See Spain I, para 59. The recommendation was also contained in a letter sent to the Spanish 
authorities just prior to its second visit. 
" See Spain II, pars 71. See, in the same connection, Slovenia I, para 40; and Ireland I, para 51. 18 See UK II, para 83 (a response to the protracted debate in Northern Ireland in 1993 as to the benefits 
and disadvantages of electronic recording). 
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inter alia, its first Austrian and Maltese visit reports, the Committee recommended 
that the national authorities: 
"... explore the possibility of introducing a system of electronic recording of 
police interviews offering all appropriate guarantees". 19 
Developing the basic precept: the provision of "appropriate 
guarantees" 
The CPT has offered a certain, limited guidance to Parties regarding its use of the 
term "all appropriate guarantees" to describe the kind of safeguards to which, it 
considers, the electronic recording of police interviews should be subject. To the 
Swedish authorities, for example, having learned from interviews with police officers 
in 1991 that the tape recording of interrogations lay "at their discretion", it suggested 
not only that the electronic recording of interviews should be "standard practice" in 
police establishments, but also that, by way of "appropriate guarantee", such 
recording might comprise: 
"... a two-tape system, one tape to be sealed in the presence of the detainee, the 
other used as a working copy". ° 
It would be similarly "appropriate", it has suggested, to oblige the police to obtain the 
detainee's prior consent to the recording of his interrogation. 21 However, these 
instances aside, the CPT has yet to elaborate a comprehensive body of safeguards 
which might circumscribe any system devised for the recording of police interviews. 
'9 See Austria I, para 67; and Malta 1, para 90. See, in the same connection, Denmark I, paras 130 and 
143; and Belgium I, para 50. 
20 See Sweden I, para 34. See, similarly, Germany I, para 43; and France I, para 49. 21 See, e. g., Greece I, para 47; Slovenia I, para 40; Switzerland I, para 127; and Romania I, para 46. 
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Balancing potentially conflicting interests: the Northern Ireland 
experience 
It may be that the CPT has good reason for refraining generally from developing its 
basic precept. It may be that there is little to add to that which it has already 
elaborated: either a Party provides a system of electronic recording or it does not. It 
may be that the Committee's priority has been simply to encourage the adoption of 
appropriate systems among States parties, which, by and large, have not made any 
provision; in which case, little further elaboration is necessary at this juncture. At the 
same time, however, there have been instances when the Committee has been 
prepared both to consider in detail and to encourage the development of certain 
procedures in relation to particular situations obtaining in States parties. 
One of the most interesting of these instances occurred in the wake of an ad 
hoc visit to Northern Ireland in 1993, during which contemporary law and practice on 
the tape-recording of police interviews was subject to particular scrutiny. Following 
its visit to England and Wales in 1990, the Committee had observed that the 
contemporary system for the tape recording of police interviews in respect of serious 
criminal offences in the jurisdiction "seemed to offer all appropriate safeguards" 22 
Further, after its visit to Northern Ireland in 1993, it will be recalled, the CPT 
determined that the risk of the psychological 
- 
and, indeed, physical - ill-treatment of 
suspected terrorists by certain members of the security forces was "significant". 23 It 
will also be recalled that the Committee, in its subsequent visit report, averred that 
"[o]f course, tangible evidence of psychological ill-treatment is difficult to obtain, in 
22 See UK I, pars 221. 
23 See above, p 142 (referring to UK II, para 110). 
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the absence of any means of being able to hear what is said during the interview 
process" 24 
This observation was prompted by the visiting delegation's findings in respect 
of the interrogation of terrorist suspects in the country's Holding Centres. In this 
regard, in seeking to establish why the number and consistency of allegations of ill- 
treatment received by its delegation had been so "striking": 
"[t]he fact that, unlike persons detained under P. A. C. E. (N. 1. ) no tape- 
recordings are made of interviews with persons detained under the P. A. 
must... be taken into account. At present there is no means whatsoever for 
anyone other than the detainee and his interviewers to know what is said 
during an interrogation". " 
Consequently, the Committee reflected: 
"... detective officers minded to resort to psychological forms of ill-treatment 
could... do so with virtual impunity". 26 
It might have been expected that in the light of these considerations, the CPT would 
only reluctantly have entertained arguments that sought to gainsay its preference for 
the introduction of the routine electronic recording of police interviews. What we 
find in its visit report, however, is an open-minded and sensitive discussion of a 
contentious subject. The Committee, for its part, stated that, without wishing to 
"rehears[e] all of the many arguments which have been advanced for and against 
electric recording", 27 it was prepared to consider the "central argument against" the 
procedure: i. e. that its introduction in the Holding Centres as standard practice: 
24 Ibid (referring to UK II, para 35). 
zs See UK II, para 109. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Idem, para 83. 
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"... could enable paramilitary groups to monitor the content of interviews.. 
. 
in 
particular as a result of legal procedures involving the disclosure 
of 
-recordings in court". 
28 
The "corollary" of this argument, the CPT suggested, "is that the introduction of 
electronic recording might well discourage suspects from providing valuable 
information to the security forces". 29 Generously, it acknowledged that, "[i]n the 
context of Northern Ireland, this argument should be given due weight". For, "[t]here 
can be no doubt that certain, if not all paramilitary groups operating in the Province 
possess both the organisational capacity to `police' the interview process and, where 
they judge appropriate, the ruthlessness to exact severe retribution". 30 The 
Committee's choice of language here, while conciliatory, is revealing, it is submitted. 
Beyond contemporary Northern Ireland, we may interpolate, this argument should be 
given less, perhaps significantly less, weight; the risk of individual criminals 
monitoring and exploiting the content of electronically recorded interviews, and 
thereby discouraging others from furnishing the police with valuable information, 
does not outweigh the value of the procedure itself as a means of obtaining such 
information, it may be suggested. 
Beyond this principal objection, a number of other arguments against the 
introduction of electronic recording techniques were advanced by police officers in 
the course of the visit. Again, the Committee treated them with indulgence, even 
when it found them less compelling. Thus, "the delegation was... given to understand" 
by officers interviewed that "certain intelligence information could be obtained in the 
course of an interview which would not necessarily be reflected in the interview 
28 Ideen, para 84. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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records (notes)". 31 The fact that such information had been obtained, the officers 
stated, "would not be revealed in the event of the interview notes being the subject of 
disclosure in... a civil action arising out of an allegation of ill-treatment". However, 
they insisted, "it would be revealed if a tape-recording of the interview was disclosed 
in court". 32 
"It is indisputable", the CPT acknowledged, in response, "that, in the course of 
an interview with a [terrorist suspect], sensitive information can be revealed which is 
of great utility to the security forces in the fight against terrorism, and [it] recognises 
the need to ensure that those who provide such information are not unnecessarily 
endangered". 33 However, it is also the case, it suggested, that, where interviews are 
electronically recorded, it is possible to deal with the problem of disclosure without 
undermining the integrity of the procedure. For example, it could be argued, as the 
visiting delegation itself did, that "a suspect who provided intelligence information 
would be unlikely to instigate procedures involving the disclosure of the tape 
recording"; 34 while the prospect of disclosing potentially sensitive intelligence might 
be overcome if detainees were permitted "to request that an interview not be 
recorded". 35 Neither argument, it seems, mollified the officers interviewed. The first 
they appeared to consider naive, for, despite the undoubted sincerity of the CPT's 
efforts to intuit the future conduct of a suspect who has provided intelligence 
information, "[he] could", they insisted, "be instructed to begin... a procedure [in 
. 
which the disclosure of the tape recording is required]" 36 
31 Ideen, para 85. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Idem, para 87. 
34 Ideen, para 85. 
3s Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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As for the second contention, the officers "advanced that allowing detainees to 
request that an interview not be recorded would not overcome the problem, as the fact 
that such a request was made might well itself subsequently be revealed (thereby 
jeopardising the position of the person concerned)". 37 "Nor were the police officers 
well disposed" to a third proposed solution to the problem of disclosure, which would 
involve the silent video recording of interviews, notwithstanding their "accept[ance] 
that the potential problem of police officers being identified to a wider audience could 
be overcome by technical means". Their objection was, again, the risk to suspects. 
For, "it was advanced that the possibility of a video recording which showed a too 
relaxed demeanour on the part of a suspect, or even the very fact that he had spoken 
with police interviewers [at all], being disclosed in court proceedings could jeopardise 
the suspect's position; and knowing this, the suspect might refrain from 
communicating with the interviewers". 38 
For its part, the CPT, while "recognis[ing] the need to ensure that those who 
provide [sensitive] information are not unnecessarily endangered" by the practical 
consequences of interrogation and disclosure procedures, considered that "the 
advantages which would flow from the introduction of electronic recording in terms 
of the prevention of ill-treatment during police interrogations and the protection of the 
police against unfounded allegations of ill-treatment must also be taken into 
account". 39 "This is all the more true", it asserted, "when the available evidence 
suggests [as it did in Northern Ireland in 1993] that the safeguards against ill- 
treatment already in place may not be proving fully effective" 40 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ideen, para 86. 
39 Ideen, pars 87. 
40 Ibid. The manner in which existing safeguards against ill-treatment by the security forces were 
found to be deficient in Northern Ireland at the time of the visit was discussed at paras 52-75 of the 
report. 
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Emolliently, in the wake of its visit to the jurisdiction, the Committee did offer 
the view that "[s]triking the right balance in this area is a delicate and complex 
matter" 41 Nevertheless, it continued, in the Holding Centres the "current absence of 
any form of electronic recording of interviews with persons detained under the P. T. A. 
places undue emphasis upon security considerations" 42 Consequently, it suggested a 
fourth "approach" to the problem of the disclosure of sensitive information in court 
proceedings and the threat to individuals posed thereby. Perfectly simple in construct 
and inviting no direct comment from the UK authorities in their Response to the visit 
report, 43 it "envisage[d] the introduction of electronic recording" of all police 
interviews, but: 
"... subject to appropriate adjustments to the procedures on the disclosure of 
matters in court proceedings and the introduction of safeguards guaranteeing 
the material security of recordings". 44 
Seeking to justify developments of this kind, the CPT cited the introduction, on a trial 
basis, in England and Wales in 1992 of the audio-tape recording of all interviews with 
terrorist suspects, subject to their consent. 45 The Committee, for its part, while 
recognising that the situation in Northern Ireland was "not on all fours" with that in 
England and Wales, did consider that the results of the trial "could presumably offer 
some useful guidance" to the Northern Ireland authorities regarding the possible merit 
of such a procedure. 46 Further, it suggested, notwithstanding the circumstances 
obtaining in Northern Ireland at the time of the visit, measures like the electronic 
41 Idem, para 88. 
42 Ibid. 
43 The Response focused on the general thrust of the Committee's proposals in this regard; it did not 
address the question of disclosure: see UK Response II, CPT/Inf (94) 18, pars 29. 44 See UK 1I, para 88. 
45 See further above, p 164. 
46 UK II, pars 88. 
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recording of police interviews "could be implemented without undermining the 
capacity of the security forces. 
.. 
to combat terrorism" 47 Consistent with previous 
utterances, "at the same time", it continued, such measures would better equip 
members of those forces "to counter unjustified allegations of ill-treatment". As to 
the type of electronic recording "envisaged", the CPT averred that: 
"... clearly an audio (with or without video) recording would be preferable 
from the standpoint of preventing ill-treatment and unfounded allegations of 
ill-treatment... "48 
Further, in circumstances in which the authorities cannot or are, at least, reluctant to 
countenance audio recording, "even a silent video recording", it stated, "would 
represent an important step forward as compared to the present situation, at least 
insofar as physical ill-treatment is concerned" 49 
Further safeguarding detainees: the video monitoring of police 
interviews 
The video recording of police interviews is a practice which the CPT considers has 
merit. In its first UK visit report, for example, having observed, as we have seen, that 
the tape recording of police interviews with persons suspected of serious criminal 
offences in England and Wales appeared, in 1990, to be carried out both as a rule and 
subject to all appropriate guarantees, it sought to know, further, whether the 
authorities planned to introduce the video recording of such interviews. Given this 
line of questioning, it may be conjectured that the Committee regards such a measure 
47 Idem, para 111. 
" Ideen, pars 88. 
49 Ibid. 
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as the logical next step in the development of safeguards against ill-treatment in 
police custody. 
It need hardly be stated that ideal interview monitoring arrangements comprise 
both their video recording 
- 
in order to facilitate an immediate response to perceived 
ill-treatment 
- 
and their tape recording 
- 
in order to reinforce detainees' protection 
against such ill-treatment, to forestall the making of malicious and unfounded 
allegations of police abuse and, of course, as an evidential record of the interview 
itself. 50 It was in the light of such considerations that the CPT examined in some 
detail the closed circuit television ("CCTV") monitoring of interviews in Northern 
Ireland's Holding Centres, in the course of its visit to the province in 1993. The 
system had been introduced in 1980, the Committee learned, following expressions of 
"[c]oncern about the treatment of persons detained [in the Centres]". 51 Physically, the 
system's most striking feature was its image-only reproduction; it lacked any means 
of determining what was said during interviews. 52 
The system operated in the following way: each interview room was 
monitored by two, wall-mounted cameras linked to a screen in a central monitoring 
room. The monitoring room at Castlereagh Holding Centre, in which members of the 
visiting delegation spent "approximately 30 minutes", comprised, inter alia, "a bank 
of 40 small (13 x 18cm) black and white screens, two per interview room, as well as 
two other screens perched on an adjacent shelf for want of room". 53 The Code of 
50 In Ireland, a specially-commissioned committee of inquiry (the "Martin Committee") has 
recommended that "as a safeguard towards ensuring that inculpatory admissions to the [police] are 
properly obtained and recorded... the questioning of suspects [should] take place before an audio-visual 
recording device": see Ireland I, para 52 (original emphasis). By the time of the Committee's second 
periodic visit, in 1998, pilot trials of such devices were underway. They would be introduced 
nationally, it learned, if they demonstrated "an effective and economic basis... for so doing": see 
Ireland II, para 26. 
sl See UK II, para 76. 
52 Ibid. The CPT, as we shall see, subsequently lamented the absence of an audio recording dimension. 53 Idem, para 77. 
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Practice in accordance with which the CCTV monitoring system was used provided 
that when interviews take place, "it was obligatory for the system to be switched on, 
and for the monitoring room to be manned at all times by an officer of at least the 
rank of Inspector". TM In practice, this officer was "apparently always" a uniformed, 
"as distinct from detective", officer (though this was not expressly provided for in the 
Code of Practice). He was "empowered to interrupt or even terminate an interview", 
which power, so far as the visiting delegation could ascertain from a perusal of the 
monitoring room's incident file and from remarks made by both detainees and 
detectives interviewed during the visit, was exercised "on occasion". 55 
The delegation's examination of the work carried out in the monitoring room 
at Castlereagh reveals much, it is submitted. Although "[o]nly a handful" of 
interviews were in progress at the time of its visit, it found that: 
"... it was difficult to concentrate fully on the screens in operation for more 
than a few minutes at a time. Observing the screens quickly became a tedious 
and tiring experience, an effect which could only be amplified, the greater the 
number of interviews taking place. It was clear... that it would be unrealistic to 
expect a monitoring officer to keep his eyes fixed continuously to the screens 
throughout his time on duty. Further, constant surveillance of the images from 
a given interview room was only possible to the exclusion of surveilling (sic) 
others". 56 
These findings induced the Committee to produce a detailed critique of the Centre's 
monitoring mechanism. Although probable, the Committee averred, that "[a] diligent 
monitoring officer would... quite rapidly spot any sustained bouts of physical violence 
54 Idem, Para 76. 
ss Ibid. 
5" Idem, Para 77. 
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in an interview room... it [was] likely that he would see such an incident for the first 
time only some moments after it had begun". 57 Such reasoning was "borne out", the 
Committee claimed, "by certain entries in the monitoring room's incident file". "It 
follows", it continued, "that the present monitoring arrangements will often fail to 
assist in the attribution of blame for incidents of violence. Further, an isolated and/or 
surreptitious act of violence might well pass completely undetected". 58 In conclusion, 
it suggested, laconically, that the existing system of the silent imaging monitoring of 
interviewees: 
"[c]learly... is not a foolproof means of detecting physical ill-treatment of 
[detainees]... or of preventing unjustified allegations of [such]... treatment". 59 
"Nevertheless", it continued, "it is far preferable to no system at all". Its principal 
virtue was to "enabl[e] action to be taken immediately to put a stop to ill-treatment 
during the interview process". 60 Consequently, it constituted "a useful safeguard in a 
place such as a detention and interrogation centre", where, because of the presence of 
terrorist suspects, "there will inevitably always be a higher risk of ill-treatment 
occurring than elsewhere". 1 Such a system "has little value", however, the 
Committee admitted, "as a means of detecting and preventing psychological ill- 
treatment" 62 In this connection, it is worth recalling the Committee's view that 
"tangible evidence of psychological ill-treatment is difficult to obtain in the absence 
of any means of being able to hear what is said during the interview process". 63 
Overcoming such a difficulty ought to be straightforward, however. The visiting 
s' Iden,, para 78. 
" Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Iden,, pars 90 (emphasis added). 61 Ibid. 
62 Iden,, para 79 (emphasis added). 63 See above, p 142. 
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delegation itself raised with police officers, as "one way of addressing this problem", 
the possibility of introducing a "sound relay" between the interview and central 
monitoring rooms in the Holding Centres. 64 To the objections of police officers 
interviewed that this would "give rise to technical problems and compromise 
security", the CPT gave short shrift, proclaiming that it found "[n]either of those 
arguments convincing" 65 As to the first, it remarked: 
"[i]t would certainly be technically possible to install a sound relay from each 
interview room which could be activated by the monitoring officer vis-ä-vis a 
particular interview room when he deemed it appropriate (e. g. if the 
demeanour of the interviewers or a detainee made him suspicious that the 
latter was being verbally abused or threatened; if the detainee or his lawyer 
had complained that the former had been verbally abused/threatened during an 
earlier interview)" 66 
As for the second objection, "it is difficult to believe", the Committee asserted, "that 
enabling the monitoring officer 
-a police inspector - to hear what is being said in an 
interview room would involve an appreciable security risk". 67 It was with evident 
assuredness, therefore, that the CPT subsequently recommended that the UK 
authorities introduce a sound relay between interview and monitoring rooms. 68 This 
link, it was convinced, with one caveat, would "further enhance" the existing system's 
evident capacity to bring an immediate end to ill-treatment during interviews. 69 
The caveat concerned the fact that "just as the CCTV monitoring system is not 
a foolproof means of detecting physical ill-treatment and preventing unjustified 
6` [1K II, Para 80. 65 pid 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Idcm, Para 9O. 
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allegations of such treatment", the addition of a sound relay to the existing visual 
monitoring system would not render it "a foolproof means of detecting psychological 
ill-treatment and/or preventing unjustified allegations [thereof ". 70 For, "[w]ere 
psychological ill-treatment to be occurring in an interview room", the Committee 
stressed, "there might well be nothing on the CCTV screens to prompt the monitoring 
officer to make use of the sound relay". Further, to compound this practical problem, 
the officer "could in any event only listen attentively to one interview at a time ". 71 
Conclusion 
On the evidence of visit reports, the CPT's precepts on the electronic recording of 
police interviews may be readily apprehended. In the interests of forestalling ill- 
treatment in police custody, as well as malicious allegations of such treatment, it 
would urge States parties to make provision for the audio-tape recording of 
interviews. However, the Committee's ultimate objective, it may be safely 
conjectured (though it has very rarely expressed it), is to see police interviews not 
only audio-tape recorded, but also video recorded. As for the safeguards which it 
considers ought to accompany such recording techniques, these, at present, comprise 
the need to obtain the detainee's prior consent to the recording and the use of two 
tapes, one of which should be sealed in the presence of the detainee, the other used as 
a working copy. 
State party practice in this area would appear, on the whole, to be 
undeveloped, even among Parties whose domestic law makes provision for electronic 
recording techniques. In fact, only police interviews in England and Wales would 
appear systematically to be electronically recorded. There is little evidence that 
7D Idem. Para 81. 
71 Ibid. 
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interviews elsewhere are subject to the same degree of protection. If we are to look 
for reasons why, it may be that the introduction of such systems are considered by the 
local authorities to be inappropriate in their criminal justice cultures or, more likely, 
prohibitively expensive. 72 Whatever their justification, it is clear that the electronic 
recording of police interviews remains only a distant prospect in a considerable 
number, if not a majority, of Parties to the ECPT. This might account for the subtle 
alteration in the manner in which the CPT has sought to promote the precept in the 
course of its working life. In this regard, some commentators have rightly observed 
that the Committee has moved from its position of formally recommending that 
Parties "explore the possibility of making such recordings" (itself hardly a bullish 
assertion), to one in which it simply invites them to do so: "a clear down-grading" of 
its case. Its approach, it seems, these commentators assert, is to suggest the use of 
electronic recording when it considers that the authorities "might be receptive to it", 
without really ever pressing the matter strongly. 
n See, e. g., Spain Response III, CPT/Inf (96) 10, p 138 (wherein the Spanish authorities averred that 
the use of audio'-video recording techniques is a "desirable objective", but, "for budgetary 
considerations... is not feasible in the short run"). 
" See Evans and Morgan (1998), pp 290.1 (and, in the same connection, Morgan and Evans (1999), pp 
45-6). 
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12 
Recording Events in Police Custody: the Use of Custody 
Registers 
Introduction: the CP2 s basic precept 
Much of what the CPT regards as good practice in the recording of matters relevant to 
detention by the police was laid down in the early years of its operation. For instance, 
in its 2°" General Report, it recommended the keeping of 
"... a single and comprehensive custody record-for each person detained [by 
the police], on which would be recorded all aspects of his custody and action 
taken regarding them"! 
Justifying the basic precept 
In advocating the maintenance of comprehensive detention records for every person 
taken into police custody, the CPT is actuated by the dual belief that: 
"... the fundamental safeguards granted to persons in police custody would 
[thereby] be reinforced (and the work of police officers quite possibly 
facilitated)'.. "2 
As to the second, parenthetical justification, to police officers, of course, the diligent 
completion of detailed records may prove valuable in forestalling unjustified and 
time-consuming allegations of ill-treatment and, therefore, in ensuring that the 
performance of their public duties is not unnecessarily hindered. 3 
' See 2d GR, Para 40. 
2 Ibid. See similarly Austria I, pare 69; and Malta I, pare 92. 
3 See, in this connection. Italy II, para 60. 
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Developing the basic precept 
The CPTs basic formulation has been invoked in most visit reports. In a number, 
however, it has been altered and supplemented in a variety of noteworthy ways. 
The scope of the custody record 
As to those "aspects of custody" deemed worthy of formal record, the Committee has 
offered the following, non-exhaustive list: 
"... when deprived of liberty and reasons for that measure; when told of rights 
[and when such rights invoked or waived]; signs of injury, mental illness, etc; 
when next of kin/consulate and lawyer [and doctor5] contacted and when 
visited by them; when offered food; when interrogated; when transferred or 
released... items in the person's possession... i6 
Further, since it is the view of the CPT that custody records should contain "full 
details of any action or occurrence involving the detainee", 7 we may be sure that a 
merely superficial account does not accord with its precepts. Accordingly, matters 
like the reason behind a detainee's removal from remand prison at the instigation of 
the police and the holding of identification parades8 should be dutifully recorded. In 
addition, and unsurprisingly, all "unusual" events which occur during custody, the 
Committee considers, should form part of an individual's custody record. 9 
4 As at August 2000, only reports to the Governments of Liechtenstein and, surprisingly 
- 
given the 
CPT's expressions of concern about other aspects of police custody therein 
- 
Greece and Turkey, had 
not invoked it. 
A provision added, inter alia, in France I, pars 50; Czech Republic I, para 35; and Poland I, pars 60. 
6 See Zed GR, pars 40; and, similarly, Romania I, pare 48. 
7 See UK I, Para 214. 
8 See Czech Republic I, para 15. 
9 See Germany I, Para 45. 
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The requirement to maintain records should not be circumvented 
On visiting the Criminal Investigation Department in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in February 
1995, the CPT was "concerned to note that... the detention of a person was not always 
immediately recorded in the custody register". 10 Indeed, on the day of the visit, "there 
appeared to be a backlog of seven detentions to be recorded". Further, according to 
one "high-ranking" officer interviewed, no record at all would be kept "if the person 
concerned was released within six hours of arrest". In response, in a crisp and 
trenchant recommendation, the CPT suggested that: 
"... steps be taken to ensure that whenever a person is detained in a police 
establishment, for whatever reason (including for identification purposes) and 
for whatever length of time, the fact of his detention is recorded without 
delay". 11 
Importantly for present purposes, this recommendation clearly indicates that 
appropriate recording should, in the view of the CPT, commence the moment 
detention begins; the Committee cannot countenance an accumulation of incomplete 
records. 
Recording all types of police custody 
In many visit reports, in characterising the moment when a person is "deprived of 
[his] liberty" as a recordable event, the CPT has used the term "arrest". 12 This is 
unfortunate, it is submitted, since, in some State's legal systems, the latter term 
connotes a particular moment in the criminal justice process occurring some time after 
the point of initial apprehension. It is, accordingly, too limiting a phrase to be of use 
10 See Slovenia I, paras 42 and 95. 
t' Ibid. 
12 See, e. g., Italy I, Para 53; Switzerland I, Para 129; and Hungary I, Para 53. 
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in a general formula of this kind; it fails to take account of situations in which, for 
example, a person is detained for the purpose merely of establishing his identity. The 
term "deprivation of liberty" would appear, by contrast, to encompass every kind of 
detention by the police and may be considered, therefore, more appropriately to 
circumscribe the requirements of the Committee in the present connection. 
Accordingly, it should resist using the term "arrest", it is submitted, and apply its 
original formula more routinely. In this regard, the Committee has, occasionally and 
helpfully, used the more illuminating portmanteau term "apprehended/arrested" to 
describe the moment of deprivation of liberty and, therefore, the moment at which the 
first entry should be made in a person's custody register. 13 
Specific junctures in the criminal justice process: charge, court appearance and 
transfer 
The moment when a suspect is charged with the commission of a criminal offence is 
one juncture in the criminal justice process which, in a number of visit reports, the 
CPT has added to its list of recordable incidents. 14 Further, to the final feature cited 
by the CPT in its original list 
- 
the moment of transfer or release of the person 
concerned 
- 
it has frequently added a third juncture of significance, namely, "when 
brought before the relevant judge", 15 "competent magistrate", 16 public prosecutors? or 
the "competent court". 18 Elsewhere, the Committee has identified its somewhat 
inchoate reference in its original formula to the transfer of detainees as connoting, 
more specifically, the point at which a person is transferred to a remandprison. 19 It 
13 See Norway I, para 42; and Sweden I, para 37. 
14 See, e. g., Malta I, para 92; Austria I, para 69; and Denmark I, para 132. 
's See, inter alia Hungary I, para 53; and Netherlands (NA) I, para 60. 
16 See Germany I, para 45; and San Marino I, para 34. 
'7 See Iceland I, para 43. 
18 See Norway I, para 42. 
19 Ibid. See also Luxembourg I, para 37. 
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also connotes, as might be expected, any transfers back to police custody for further 
questioning. 20 
Inadequate State party practice 
Among States parties to the ECPT, practice on the maintenance of custody records 
may be considered to be variable, to say the least. For the most part, indeed, it has 
failed to match the CPTs own simple prescription. 
The distribution of material over several documents 
One of the most commonly criticised procedures in visit reports has been the practice 
of recording information relating to a single detainee in two or more registers. For 
example, in some Parties, the Committee has observed, "some aspects of police 
custody [are] reflected in... reports of police interrogations 
... 
others in-custody 
registers", 21 and others still in nothing more formal than ad hoc registers. 2 
Elsewhere, a detainee's information has been found to be "spread over a variety of 
documentsi23 or recorded on separate forms representing different stages in the 
custody process24 or held partly on computer and partly manually. 25 In one notable 
instance, to the Committee's "surprise", information was found to be "spread over 
several registers" under a "complex" system "based on... different teams of 
officers... [with] each team opening its own register" 26 
20 See, e. g., Czech Republic I, para 14 (strikingly, perusal of official records at Prague-Pankrac 
Remand Prison in February 1997 revealed that one prisoner had been removed on the authority of the 
police 
- 
for an unspecified purpose 
- 
"some fourteen times" between April and June 1995). 
21 See Norway I, para 42; and, similarly, France I, para 50. 
1 See Netherlands (NA) I, para 59; Luxembourg I, para 37; and Belgium I, para 51. 
23 See Austria I, para 69; and, similarly, Czech Republic I, para 35 (a "proliferation of different 
forms"); Belgium I1, para 41 (use of "diverse" registers and forms); and Romania I, para 47 (use of 
"several" documents). 
24 See Finland I, pars 49; and, similarly, Poland I, para 59. 
25 See Iceland I, para 43. 
26 See Germany 1, Para 44. 
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Inconsistent completion of custody records 
Another seemingly common failing among Parties has concerned the rigour and 
consistency with which custody records are completed. In Danish police stations in 
December 1990, for example, only "certain aspects" of detention were routinely 
recorded; "no record was kept of... e. g. time when the arrested person was informed of 
his rights; request by the arrested person to have legal advice; time when a third party 
was informed of the person's arrest; requests for access to a medical doctor; [and] any 
waiving of his rights by the arrested person... "27 The fundamental nature of these 
guarantees is striking and the Committee's highlighting of their absence, therefore, 
understandable 28 They should feature routinely in all custody records. 
In Italy, in March 1992, a delegation discerned "une difference sensible de 
situation entre les etablissements de la police et des carabiniers". 29 In the former, 
custody registers were maintained, albeit whose contents, it seems, were presented 
"de maniere sommaire"; in the latter, "[a] l'invers, aucun registre de ce type n'a ete 
presente" 30 However, such inconsistency notwithstanding, it cannot really be stated 
that the Committee has found many examples of particularly bad record-keeping 
practice among States parties. In fact, practice can fairly be described as poor in only 
a handful of instances. For example, in Spain, in April 1994, "particularly serious" 
record-keeping deficiencies were apparent in the detention area at the Guipuzcoa 
Civil Guard Headquarters, San Sebastian. There, the visiting delegation was 
informed, "no records whatsoever" were kept; "all custody information was kept by 
the investigating group or branch of the Civil Guard in different premises... " 
27 See Denmark I, Para 131. 
28 See, similarly, Malta I, Para 91. 
29 See Italy I, Para 52. 
30 Ibid. See now Italy II, Para 59. See, similarly, Sweden I, Para 36 (regarding the lack of care 
apparent in the completion of records in the police establishments visited in 1991, which contrasted 
sharply with the -impress[ive]" records of the 15 minute-interval cell checks viewed at Arlanda Airport 
Police Station in the course of the same visit). 
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Consequently, the Committee noted, it was "materially impossible to maintain 
accurate custody records", 31 a state of affairs rendered all the more execrable, it is 
suggested, by the fact that the CPTs recommendation on record-keeping practices, 
issued in the wake of its first periodic visit to the country in April 1991,32 "had not 
been acted upon". 33 Interestingly, the situation appeared to contrast starkly with that 
obtaining in establishments run by the Basque Autonomous Police ("Ertzaintza"). 
Consequences of a failure to make appropriate provision 
In those police establishments visited in May 1990, the CPT observed in its first 
Austrian visit report, "no record [was] kept of certain important aspects of a prisoner's 
custody". 34 This would appear to have had significant consequences, principally 
- 
and 
most obviously 
- 
for the person concerned, but also for police officers themselves and, 
as it happened, the visiting delegation. For, as a result of contemporary practice, there 
existed no record of when meals were offered to and accepted by detainees, 35 which 
meant that for officers and the delegation alike, it was "impossible to check" the 
veracity of an allegation made by one detainee interviewed that he had received 
nothing to eat or drink between his being taken into police custody at midday and 
10.30 pm, when he met the delegation. 36 Similarly, as a result of failures properly to 
complete records in police establishments visited in the Czech Republic in February 
1997, the Committee remarked in its first visit report, "police officers were unable, on 
31 See Spain II, Para 76. 
32 See Spain I, pare 65. 
33 Spain II, para 76. 
34 See Austria I, pars 68. 
35 An omission also perceived in Spain and Switzerland during visits in 1991: see Spain I, para 64; and 
Switzerland I, para 128. 
36 Austria I, pare 54. See, in the same connection, Norway I, para 24. 
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the basis of the information which had been recorded, to account for all of the 
movements of detainees who had recently been held in police custody". 7 
Good State party practice 
While it is possible to identify numerous instances of inconsistent and, occasionally, 
poor record-keeping practices in police establishments visited by the CPT, it is also 
possible to identify others in which, among other qualities identified, a particular 
conscientiousness on the part of officers in completing custody records has elicited 
from the Committee a certain satisfaction and, occasionally, praise. 
England and Wales 
In 1990, during its first periodic visit to the UK, for example, the CPT observed that 
in the police stations visited, custody records were so "assiduously" maintained that 
"even a request by a detainee for a glass of water was recorded". 38 Further, a new 
record was opened for each person detained'39 and, seemingly uniquely among 
Parties, notice boards were used "to keep track of the situation of each detainee (time 
of arrest; review of detention; time of charge; etc)". 40 Seeking to intuit the authorities' 
objective in erecting the latter, the Committee considered that it was "no doubt to 
ensure that police officers did not fall foul of any of the requirements laid down in 
[the country's] Police and Criminal Evidence Act". 1A "very useful" 
- 
and, clearly, 
unforeseen - concomitant of their existence, it also noted, was their value "in the 
context of the [visiting delegation's] own activities" 42 
37 See Czech Republic I, para 35. 
38 See UK I, para 214. 
39 Idem, para 213. 
40 Ideen, Para 215. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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Northern Ireland 
Following its ad hoc visit to Northern Ireland in July 1993, the CPT observed that the 
manner in which custody records were apparently maintained by law enforcement 
officers in the jurisdiction, whether in respect of terrorist-related or non-terrorist- 
related offences, corresponded with its own precepts on the subject. Thus, it noted 
that for every person detained by the law enforcement authorities, a record was kept 
of. 
"... all relevant aspects of [their] custody and action taken regarding them 
(when deprived of liberty and reasons for that measure; when told of rights; 
signs of injury, mental illness, etc.; when a friend or relative and lawyer 
contacted and when visited by them; when offered food; when interrogated; 
when transferred or released, etc. )" 43 
Further, like those viewed in the English police establishments visited in 1990, the 
records perused in 1993, the Committee stated, had been "scrupulously" completed by 
officers. 
The Netherlands and Hungary 
Visiting police stations in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Volendam in the Netherlands, 
in September 1992, the CPT noted that the "principal" events of a person's detention 
were recorded on computer. As a consequence, it appears: 
"[e]ach detainee was monitored individually from the moment he entered the 
premises to his departure (admission; appearance before the Deputy Crown 
43 See UK II, para 73. See, similarly, Ireland I, para 53 (regarding custody records seen in police 
establishment visited in October 1993). 44 Ibid. Similarly, records seen in the Irish establishments visited in 1993 were found to be "diligently" 
completed (see Ireland I, pars 53). With one exception, this was also the case in 1998 (see Ireland II, 
para 27). See in the same connection Finland I, pare 49. 
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Counsel; personal possessions; meals; distribution of bedding; controls by 
supervisory staff; time spent in recreational area; shower; exercise; police 
interviews; interview with a lawyer; visit by a doctor; date of appearance 
as before the judge; etc)". 
The CPT, for its part, "welcome[d]" such recording techniques and, significantly, it is 
submitted, sought to know whether the system might be deployed "more widely" in 
the country. 46 
At the time of the Committee's periodic visit to Hungary in November 1994, 
the domestic police authorities were "in the process of introducing a computerised 
system [of record-keeping] to replace the manual registers which had been used to 
record certain features of detention [hitherto]... X47 The CPT approved: "the new 
system", it stated, "clearly had the potential to provide a single and comprehensive 
custody record for each person detained". 48 In other words, we may interpolate, 
provided they satisfy its own proclaimed standards as adumbrated earlier in this 
chapter, computerised records, the Committee considers, may be said usefully to 
supplement existing methods of safeguarding detainees. 
Further, related precepts 
Obtaining the detainee's signature 
The CPT has supplemented its fundamental position on the maintenance of custody 
registers with the view that in respect of some recordable features - "for example, 
45 See Netherlands I, para 51. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See Hungary I, pans 53. 
48 Ibid. 
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items in the person's possession, the fact of being told of one's rights and of invoking 
or waiving them": 
"the signature of the detainee should be obtained and, if necessary, the absence 
of the signature explained" 49 
Accordingly, visiting English police stations in 1990, a delegation "noted", with 
satisfaction, that "the custody record opened for each detainee contained a statement 
to be signed by [him] attesting that he had been informed of his rights". 50 
Affording the detainee's lawyer access to custody records 
Given the peremptory language in which it is framed, the CPT would appear to be 
brook no denial of its view that: 
"... the detainee's lawyer should have access to... a custody record". s' 
This injunction has been repeated throughout its published work. Moreover, the 
Committee believes, it should be heeded regardless of the manner in which the 
relevant information is recorded 
- 
which, for the most part, as we have seen, is 
manual. However, even in those few instances in which the records examined by 
visiting delegations have been computerised, it can clearly be inferred from the 
Committee's subsequent remarks that its adherence to its fundamental position 
remains unaltered. For instance, from the Dutch authorities, it sought to know 
49 See, inter alia, 2°6 GR, para 40; France I, para 50; and Germany I, para 45. 
so See UK I, para 213. Evans and Morgan have noted that the CPT has laid less emphasis on this 
safeguard in reports on visits to a number of eastern European Parties: see Evans and Morgan (1998), p 
287 and Morgan and Evans (1999), p 47. It is submitted, however, that the Committee has no need to 
be so moderate. Respect for this particular safeguard ought not to place an undue financial - or, pace 
Morgan and Evans, bureaucratic - burden on States. 
51 See, 2a' GR, para 40. 
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whether information held in the computer systems of the police stations visited in 
1992 could be "made available to the detainee and his lawyer". 52 
Specially appointed "custody officers" 
Although time-consuming, the scrupulous maintenance of detailed and accurate 
custody records for each person detained by the police is, as we have established, of 
great importance in the proper investigation of crime and the rebuttal of allegations of 
police ill-treatment. To entrust it to officers who must also carry out various other 
functions in their capacity as law enforcement personnel demonstrates great faith in 
their management abilities and risks creating a conflict between the interests of the 
criminal investigation and those of persons detained. The possibility that such a 
conflict may develop appears to have preoccupied the CPT during its visit to the 
Guipuzcoa Civil Guard Headquarters in San Sebastian, Spain, in April 1994. There, it 
was "concerned to hear that... some of the custodial duties were carried out by 
members of the investigating or operational group". 53 In other words, it may be 
inferred, officers responsible for investigating a particular crime also had custodial 
- 
and, concomitantly, protective - responsibilities in respect of those persons suspected 
of having committed it and brought to the Headquarters, inter alia, for questioning. 
Such responsibilities include, of course, the maintenance of individual custody 
registers. Having noted this state of affairs, the CPT suggested that: 
"... the existence of a `custody officer' (as distinct from an officer merely 
posted to the detention area), accountable for the well-being of detainees 
52 See Netherlands I, para 51. 
53 See Spain II, para 77. 
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during the period of time spent under his custody, can greatly enhance the 
protection of detainees against ill-treatment". -4 
On the particularities of the custody officer's role, the Committee was silent, save in 
one, unsurprising respect: "in view of the special requirements involved", it 
suggested, the protection of detainees would be "particularly" enhanced if custody 
officers were "specifically selected and trained for the job". 55 
The use of closed-circuit television ("CCTV") to monitor persons in custody 
Self-evidently, in order effectively to record events in police custody, the authorities 
must regularly monitor the welfare of persons in their charge. In this regard, the CPT 
recently "welcome[d]" the introduction of CCTV monitoring systems in certain police 
establishments in London. 56 Visiting one such establishment in 1997, a delegation 
witnessed a CCTV system in operation. It could monitor the entire custody suite 
- 
except the interior of cells and the establishment's showers - and the station yard. 
Further, vehicles used for the transportation of detainees to and from the station 
possessed a similar facility. In its report on the visit, the Committee sought to know 
whether the authorities planned to introduce the system nationwide, 57 from which 
request it may be inferred that it found the arrangement agreeable. It may be expected 
to promote such system's wider use in future visit reports. 
Indeed, in its first Andorran visit report, regarding its delegation's discovery, 
in 1998, of the installation of a "sophisticated" CCTV system in the new premises of 
the Police Headquarters (which system included the use of infra-red cameras to 
54 Ibid. 
ss Ibid. 
56 See UK IV, para 60. The development of such systems followed the publication of a special report, 
"Lessons from Tragedies", on deaths in police custody in the London area. 
sý Ibid. 
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facilitate night-time monitoring of detainees), the CPT offered much encouragement. 
However, it did express misgivings about the deployment of cameras inside every 
detention cell, particularly in light of the fact that cell doors in the establishment were 
fitted with large glass panels, which facilitated external supervision. 58 
Conclusion 
The CPT's prescription on the manner in which events in police custody should be 
recorded is the straightforward one that a single record should be opened for each 
detainee in which all aspects of his custody are set out in comprehensive fashion. The 
duty to open such a record obtains the moment detention begins, regardless of how it 
is characterised in the domestic criminal justice system. Further, in respect of some 
recordable features, the detainee's signature should be obtained or its absence 
explained. It is also the case that a detainee's lawyer ought to enjoy access to his 
client's record. The rigour with which States parties adhere to these precepts may be 
said to vary. While the overwhelming majority of police establishments, it seems, 
make provision to record events in custody, a number do so only by means of several 
documents, and many of the records kept are not always scrupulously maintained. 
Further, the scope of custody records viewed has, on occasion, been called into 
question. As with other safeguards on police custody, some of the most developed 
recording practices may be found in the British Isles; while, the move towards 
computerised records in the Netherlands and Hungary has been greeted with approval 
by the CPT. 
sS See Andorra I, Para 28. 
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13 
Complaints and Inspection Procedures 
I. Providing an independent and effective complaints mechanism for 
persons in police custody 
Introduction: the basic precept and rationale 
"Naturally", the CPT asserted to the Greek authorities in the wake of its visit to the 
country in March 1993: 
"one of the most effective means of preventing ill-treatment by public officials 
lies in the diligent examination by the prosecuting authorities and the courts of 
all complaints of such treatment brought before them and, where appropriate, 
the imposition of a suitable penalty". 1 
To act with such diligence and effectiveness, the Committee considered, would have a 
"very strong dissuasive effect" on officers who might otherwise be minded to engage 
in ill-treatment 2 It is this sense that a meaningful system of complaints investigation 
possesses the potential to forestall the ill-treatment of detainees in police custody that 
informs all of the CPT's work in this area. It is worth noting in this connection that in 
1993, the visiting CPT delegation determined that the risk of ill-treatment of certain 
categories of detainee by the Greek police was "significant" and that, "on occasion", 
recourse might be had to severe ill-treatment or torture. 3 At the same time, according 
1 See Greece I, Para 30 and, similarly, Para 266. In the same connection, see Spain I, Para 63 (now 
Spain VI, Para 14); and Poland I, Para 21. 
2 Ibid. See, similarly, UK I, Para 182; Portugal I, Para 19; and UK IV, Para 9 (a large section 
- 
paras 
9-58 
- 
of the fourth published report to the UK authorities is devoted to the effectiveness of legal 
remedies for police misconduct in England and Wales). 
3 Ideen, Para 25. 
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to "several" prisoners met, the public prosecutor to whom they could complain "had 
displayed little interest in the matter". 
Developing the basic precept 
A general failure to elaborate on the part of the CPT 
In its 2°d General Report, seeking to augment its catalogue of precepts on the 
protection of persons detained by the police, the CPT remarked, inter alia, that: 
"... the existence of an independent mechanism for examining complaints about 
treatment whilst in police custody is an essential safeguard". S 
This is a simple and unadorned statement; its practical requirements would seem to 
have been left for future elaboration. Such elaboration, it is submitted, should 
comprehend, inter alia, the composition of the body authorised to examine complaints 
(whether, for instance, serving or former police officers may be permitted to sit in 
adjudication); the extent of such body's investigative competence and powers; 
whether police officers may be appointed to carry out the necessary investigations; 
and the kinds of sanction available to the body in the event that a complaint is upheld. 
An opportunity to offer elaboration of this kind was missed by the CPT in its first 
Maltese visit report, wherein it proclaimed that it "fully share[d]" the view of the 
country's Deputy Prime Minister, who, in 1990, stated that "there was... no satisfactory 
procedure for examining complaints against the police" and that the creation of a 
"formal internal review procedure", with the possibility of reference to an 
4 Idem, para 30. 
See 2"d GR, para 41. See also Finland I, para 51 (now Finland II, para 41); and Iceland I, para 44 
(now Iceland II, para 28). The CPT, it should be noted, considers that access to similar complaints 
mechanisms should be possible in other custodial environments, too: see, e. g., 2'd GR, para 54 
(regarding prisons); and 8'" GR, para 53 (regarding psychiatric establishments). Space constraints, 
sadly, preclude further analysis of such mechanisms. 
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"independent body" in the event of an unsatisfactory outcome, was necessary. 6 The 
Committee, for its part, while recommending the establishment of such a "formal 
administrative procedure... at the earliest opportunity", 7 did not, unfortunately, go on 
to offer any opinion as to its content. 
The kind of elaboration which the CPT might, at some point, offer may be 
indicated by the two following examples of State party practice: 
(i) Speed of response to a complaint 
Visiting Austria, in 1990, the CPT declared itself "impress[ed]" by the contents of an 
"important circular" issued by the Ministry of Justice to senior judicial figures and 
public prosecutors several months before the visit. The circular offered "instructions 
on the procedure to be adopted by the prosecuting authorities in the event of 
allegations of ill-treatment by the police". Significantly, it addressed Austria's 
obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 8 , If 
.. 
allegations [of ill-treatment] are brought 
to their notice and do not seem manifestly unfounded", the circular provided: 
"prosecutors are requested to take immediate action by initiating a judicial 
investigation in order to establish the facts 
... 
The investigation must be 
conducted on a priori basis in order to guarantee the right of the person 
concerned to impartial proceedings and protection from intimidation (in 
accordance with Articles 13 and 16 of the [UN] Convention) and also to 
determine whether the statements made are of the same nature as those 
6 See Malta 1, Para 94. 
7 Ibid. See also Para 16 and p8 of the report 
8 See Austria L Para 21. 
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referred to in Article 15 of that Convention (statements made as a result of 
torture)" 9 
(ii) Avoiding contact between the complainant and police officers and staying 
proceedings against a person once a complaint is made 
Other features of the Austrian circular to be the object of particular CPT attention 
- 
and, arguably therefore, approval - include a request that judges and public 
prosecutors: 
"ensure that the possibility of a transfer to police premises is no[t]... envisaged 
in the case of persons detained on remand [in prison establishments] who 
allege that they have been subjected to ill-treatment by the police"; 
and a recommendation that: 
"[w]hen an inquiry is opened into allegations of ill-treatment by the 
police 
... 
the charges against the alleged victim be suspended until the inquiry 
has been completed, subject to the condition that this does not result in an 
extension of the period of detention on remand (if so, the inquiry must be 
conducted independently of the proceedings against the individual 
concerned)". lo 
In other respects, the CPT has been prepared to offer its views on the complaints 
process, from which, it is submitted, it may be possible to obtain some impression of 
what it considers represents a practicable mechanism for investigating complaints 
against the police. 
I ibid (emphasis added). Interestingly, in the matter of Qani Halimi Nedzibi v Austria (Communication 
No. 8/1991; UN DOC. CAT/C/11/D/8/1991), the UN Committee Against Torture determined that the 
Austrian authorities had unreasonably delayed investigating the Applicant's claim of torture when, in 
breach of Article 12, UNCAT, they had failed to act on an allegation for some 15 months. 
io Ibid. 
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The need for independence 
That the CPT believes that police complaints procedures ought to be assured an 
independent and impartial status within domestic criminal justice systems is 
undeniable. Descriptions of such procedures by reference to such terms occur 
throughout its published work1 i and the question of the extent of their independence 
and impartiality in practice has frequently exercised the Committee. It should be 
noted, however, that the CPT is conscientiously even-handed in its approach to the 
question of independence, seeking to view it as much from the perspective of police 
officers against whom a complaint is made as from the perspective of the individual 
complainant, particularly in respect of the nature of any disciplinary proceedings to 
which the complaint may ultimately lead. 
- 
Achieving independence in practice 
In its first Austrian visit report, regarding Government proposals, issued in May 1990, 
to reform and "reinforce" the country's heavily criticised police disciplinary system, 
the CPT suggested that any such review should, inter alia: 
"... envisage the participation of an independent person (e. g. a magistrate) in 
the decision making process... "12 
For, such participation, it believed: 
"... would both improve the intrinsic quality of the [disciplinary] procedure and 
enhance public confidence in its fairness". 13 
11 See, e. g., UK III, para 3Ol. 
12 See Austria I, para 97 (2od indent). 
13 Ibid. 
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-A mechanism which must be independent in fact as well as in law 
From its observations to the Austrian authorities, it is clear that what the CPT desires 
above all else in any mechanism established to investigate complaints against the 
police is distance from the force being investigated. This explains why, when 
informed by the Finnish authorities in 1998 that formal responsibility for examining 
complaints of ill-treatment by police officers in the country lay with the National 
Public Prosecutor's Office, "assisted by the staff of the National Police Commissioner 
or, in any event, by the staff of police units other than those of the suspected police 
officers" 
-a development "welcome[d]" by the Committee as "more independent" 
than the previous mechanism 
- 
it nevertheless considered the Prosecutor's work to be 
vitiated by the fact that "under the new system the police are still in practice 
conducting inquiries into their own shortcomings". 14 
Similarly, in Sweden, while responsibility for the investigation of complaints 
against the police rests, ultimately, with a public prosecutor, the fact that "the 
necessary investigative work", the CPT learned in 1998, "is performed by police 
officers", renders the process, in its view, insufficiently independent. "[I]n order for 
the investigation of complaints against the police to be fully effective", it asserted in 
its subsequent visit report: 
"the procedures involved must be, and be seen to be, independent and 
impartial. In this respect... it would be preferable for the investigative work 
concerned to be entrusted to an agency which is demonstrably independent of 
the police". 's 
'a See Finland II, para 42. 
Is See Sweden Ill, para 27. See, similarly, Iceland II, para 28 (wherein the CPT highlighted calls for a 
"truly external body, that is fully independent of the police"). Visiting England and Wales in 1997, the 
CPT was concerned to learn of a police complaints procedure throughout the operation of which the 
police maintain "a firm grip": the chief officer of the force against which a complaint is made retains 
"sole discretion' to determine whether to record the complaint in the first place; investigations are 
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The consequences of a failure to confer on an organ an appropriate degree of 
independence were eloquently spelt out by Lord Colville in his report "on the 
operation of the EPA in 1992", as quoted, with approval, by the CPT in its report on 
its visit to Northern Ireland in 1993. In 1992, the Committee noted, of the 395 
complaints of ill-treatment of persons arrested under the EPA 1991 made to the 
Independent Commission for Police Complaints for Northern Ireland ("the 
I. C. P. C. "), 16 "[n]one... [had] resulted in disciplinary sanctions against police 
officers". '7 This outcome, the CPT declared, was "striking". 18 Accordingly, it could, 
it stated, "agree" with Lord Colville, who considered that: 
"... if a disciplinary system19 seldom if ever reaches an adverse decision about a 
person who works, after training, within a disciplined structure, it is more 
likely that the system is faulty than that nobody in that profession or discipline 
ever makes even the most minor mistake or commits some foible. The public 
do not believe it and lose confidence in the system. The profession or 
discipline loses more in efficiency and usefulness than its individual members 
gain by a perceived, or real immunity i20 
It is important, therefore, that any procedure for the investigation of complaints 
against law enforcement personnel is demonstrably independent of them - as well as, 
"conducted and controlled" by officers, invariably drawn from the ranks of the force being 
investigated; and the assessment of the criminal and/or disciplinary implications of such investigations 
is made by the originating chief officer: see UK IV, paras 48-9 (referring to the CPT's very detailed 
exposition of the formal complaints system which operates in the jurisdiction at paras 16-25). 
16 For a description of the mandate of the I. C. P. C., see UK II, para 25. 
See UK II, para 92 (reflecting on the I. C. P. C. 's 5th Annual Report). 
18 Ibid. 
19 For present purposes, the term may be regarded as connoting also complaints mechanisms, since the 
one inheres in the other. 20 UK II, para 93 (citing para 6.3 of Lord Colville's report). A loss of public confidence in the 
domestic police complaints system, occasioned, according to the CPT's interlocutors, by the 
infrequency with which officers are charged with an offence and/or disciplined notwithstanding the 
existence of evidence of wrongdoing, and marked by a preference to pursue grievances through the 
civil courts rather than established procedures, was also remarked on by the CPT following its visit to 
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it should be stated, given what we know of the CPT's views on the matter, of all other 
parties to the complaint 21 Interestingly, it is not only public confidence in the 
procedure which may suffer if its independence cannot be demonstrated satisfactorily; 
according to Lord Colville, the "efficiency" and "usefulness" of the police force itself 
may be put at risk. 
It is axiomatic that where an organ mandated to entertain complaints from 
persons detained or formerly detained by the police is, or is seen to be, closely aligned 
with the officers whom it is ostensibly monitoring, then the entire mechanism is 
vitiated. This would explain the CPT's alarm at hearing from one public prosecutor 
interviewed in the course of a visit to Romania in 1995 that when in receipt of a 
complaint against the police 
- 
which complaint, by law, he was duty-bound to 
investigate 
- 
his approach would be premised on the notion that "les policiers sont 
mes collegues. Je considererais cette allegation comme un mensonge d'un 
recidiviste' 21 
The existence of a variety of avenues of complaint 
The CPT has written favourably about the apparent independence of Dutch police 
complaints procedures and, while it would be precipitate to describe the country's 
system as an exemplar for States parties to the ECPT, few other domestic systems, it 
England and Wales in September 1997: see UK IV, para 11 (and, for details of criticisms levelled at the 
"watchdog" Police Complaints Authority, para 50). 
ZI See in this connection Ireland I, paras 54-5 
- 
and now Ireland II, para 16 (regarding the composition 
of a police complaints disciplinary tribunal, one member of which was a senior officer in the police 
force to which the person facing charges belonged, and the two others drawn from the board which 
referred the complaint to the tribunal. Such an arrangement was "unlikely to be considered as impartial 
by either complainants or police officers", the CPT averred, while the presence of serving officers on 
both the Complaints Board and disciplinary tribunal was "capable of damaging public confidence in the 
capacity of the complaints system to deal objectively with complaints about police conduct"). In 
England and Wales, the CPT observed recently, police disciplinary hearings are held "in private, 
usually with police officers acting as adjudicators, prosecutors and counsel for the defence" (see UK 
IV, paras 34 and 51). In order to be and be seen to be, impartial, it suggested, in consequence, on the 
panel hearing such disciplinary matters independent members should "preponderate" (idem, para 56). 
See Romania I, para 26. 
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is clear, have been so well received. Worth noting in particular in this regard is the 
Committee's view, expressed in its first report to the Dutch authorities, that there is 
merit in providing access to a range of complaints mechanisms. Visiting the country 
in 1992, a delegation learned that "[i]n addition to the usual judicial and 
administrative remedies" available to persons alleging ill-treatment by the police, 23 
anyone wishing to complain about police activities could apply to so-called 
Complaints Commissions. These Commissions, the Committee stated, are "partially 
or entirely composed of lay persons" and are authorised to "conduct inquiries [into the 
substance of a complaint]... make recommendations to the Head of the police force in 
question (usually the Mayor)... [and] produce annual reports [on their activities]" 24 
The Committee, for its part, declared itself "favourably impressed" by the "range" of 
complaints procedures available to persons alleging ill-treatment by the Dutch 
police. 25 It suggested, further, that the existence of an "extensive" number of avenues 
of complaint is: 
"... an essential factor in preventing ill-treatment by the security forces". 6 
Setting an investigation in motion: whether or not a formal complaint is necessary 
More often than not, an investigation into police ill-treatment is activated by means of 
a complaint, made formally or otherwise, by the alleged victim or by his family or 
legal representative on his behalf. However, there may be circumstances in which 
alleged victims or their families are unwilling or are unable to take the necessary 
23 Although the CPT did not indicate precisely what these "usual" remedies were, it is worth noting that 
the "administrative remedies" referred to undoubtedly included the possibilities of applying to the 
National Ombudsman and the Complaints Committees of the country's two Houses of Parliament: see 
Netherlands L Para 54. 
u Ibid. The CPT did not state who else might sit on a Commission which is only "partially" composed 
of lay persons. Neither did it state whether Commission recommendations enjoy any kind of normative 
force. 
" Idem, Para 160- 
26 Idem, Para 55. 
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steps, notwithstanding the existence of evidence of sufficient probative value to 
justify such action. The question arises, therefore: should an objectively justifiable 
investigation into, inter alia, police ill-treatment be allowed to lapse for want of a 
formal initiating device? One would expect the CPT to answer in the negative and, 
without being express, it appeared to state as much in its first Portuguese visit report. 
Visiting Portugal in January 1992, a delegation was informed that "the prosecution of 
certain types of [police] ill-treatment was only possible on the basis of a formal 
complaint by a private citizen". 27 However, when interviewed, two local judges 
- 
"to 
whom detainees [were] presented immediately after a period of police custody" 
- 
claimed that they "regularly encountered... detainees who displayed injuries consistent 
with ill-treatment by the police". Most such detainees, they stated, were "apparently 
reluctant to make a written statement about the treatment they had received out of 
concern that it could prove to their detriment in the context of the criminal 
proceedings being brought against them". 28 If the judges were correct in their 
interpretation of contemporary attitudes towards Portugal's police complaints system, 
then, it is submitted, many investigations will have been stymied ab initio, rendering 
the process as a whole rather impotent and its credibility somewhat undermined. 29 
In the light of its delegation's findings, the Committee, in a gesture from which 
its views on the matter may be readily inferred, sought to know from the Portuguese 
Government: 
"whether appropriate action can be taken [by the relevant authorities] upon 
information received which suggests that ill-treatment has occurred, even in 
27 See Portugal I, pars 19 (emphasis added). 
28 Idem, para 15. 
29 It is worth noting, however, that the countr y's Deputy Ombudsmen were of the view that the decline 
in the number of complaints of police ill-treatment was starting to reverse itself. 
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the absence of a written statement by the alleged victim ". 30 
Whether or not, in the absence of a written statement, the CPT would wish for 
subsequent written confirmation from the alleged victim or his representative before 
an investigation may be authorised is not, unfortunately, readily apparent from its 
request. However, from remarks made recently to the Spanish authorities, it would 
appear that the Committee is of the view that no such confirmation is required; the 
authorities should initiate an investigation into possible police ill-treatment simply if 
there is sufficient evidence to justify it. For, in its sixth published visit report, seeking 
to emphasise ways in which domestic police complaints mechanisms may be rendered 
more effective, it suggested that: 
"[e]ven in the absence of an express complaint, action should be taken if there 
are other indications (e. g. lesions recorded in a forensic medical report; a 
person's general appearance) that ill-treatment might have occurred". 31 
Re-activating prematurely terminated investigations 
Similar considerations of formality arise in circumstances in which an alleged victim 
of ill-treatment, having made a formal complaint, subsequently withdraws it or in 
which an investigation is discontinued in some other fashion. Again, some insight 
into the CPT's views on the matter may be obtained from its report on its visit to 
Northern Ireland in 1993. Therein, referring to the "total absence" of disciplinary 
sanctions imposed on police officers in cases adverted to in the fifth Annual Report of 
the ICPC, the Committee observed that "in the majority of cases (246), the 
30 portugal I, para 19 (emphasis added). 
31 See Spain VT, para 14. 
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investigation of the complaint was discontinued as a result of the complainant's 
`failure to co-operate with the investigation'... "32 
This "problem" of the discontinuation of a "large number" of cases for want of 
co-operation left the CPT to lament that "[i]t is neither in the interests of the 
prevention of ill-treatment, nor in the legitimate interests of the [Royal Ulster 
Constabulary], that the investigation of allegations of ill-treatment should be thwarted 
in so many cases". 33 "[O]vercoming" such a problem, however, is clearly not easy, 
since the Committee offered no solutions; it simply sought to know whether the UK 
authorities were considering ways of addressing it. 34 More significantly, however, 
without being express, it did intimate that in its view, it should be possible to "re- 
activate" an investigation following the successful conclusion of any civil proceedings 
brought in connection with the alleged ill-treatment. 35 
Barriers to prospective complainants: institutional inertia and the protection of 
police officers against false allegations of ill-treatment 
It has already been seen how, in Portugal, in 1992, according to two judges whose 
work brought them into close proximity with persons in police custody, potential 
complainants might be deterred from lodging a formal complaint against officers for 
fear that such action could prejudice the trial of the substantive charge(s) against 
them. 36 A reading of other visit reports would suggest that the problem of deterrence 
is neither confined to Portugal nor to the perceived prejudice of the criminal trial of 
the complainant. For example, in Greece, in 1993, according to a report drawn up by 
the Ministry of Public Order in the wake of the Committee's visit, a "special inquiry" 
32 See UK II, para 92. 
33 Ideen, para 96. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See above, p 203. 
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into the interrogation methods employed at the Athens and Thessaloniki Police 
Headquarters37 had revealed, inter alia, that the making of formal complaints against 
officers was "rare". 38 Responding, the Committee suggested that: 
"... the fact that few formal complaints of ill-treatment are recorded is not 
necessarily a reliable guide as to the degree of risk of ill-treatment [at a 
particular establishment]. Detained persons who have been ill-treated will 
often hesitate before seeking to commence proceedings, out of fear of further 
prejudicing their legal situation or in the belief that such a step would be 
unlikely to prove successful". 39 
Indeed, it continued, "[n]umerous persons met by the delegation in the course of its 
visit... [had] stated that they had been discouraged by the police and/or by their own 
lawyer from pursuing a complaint of ill-treatment, it being argued that it would not be 
in their best interests" 40 Clearly, therefore, at the time of the visit, there existed, 
among detainees at least, a conviction, perhaps even cynicism, as to the futility of 
recourse to the domestic police complaints procedure. However, the apparent 
complicity of defence lawyers in police efforts to dissuade potential complainants is, 
perhaps, more worrying. It suggests the existence of a much deeper systemic malaise 
with the potential to prejudice the position of genuine victims of ill-treatment. 
The situation perceived by the visiting delegation to Austria in 1990 perhaps 
more readily typifies the kind of institutional obstacles liable to be faced by potential 
complainants and against which the CPT must campaign if its precepts are to be given 
practical expression. There, notwithstanding the existence of a number of avenues of 
37 Which inquiry had itself been prompted by the CPT's observations (on which see, generally, Greece 
I, paras 17-22). 
3s See Greece I, Para 23. 
391bid. 
40 Ibid. 
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redress available to alleged victims of police ill-treatment, 41 potential complainants 
could be deterred by the prospect of their having to face "counter proceedings... on the 
following grounds: defamation... the fact of having knowingly exposed a person to 
criminal proceedings or action by other authorities; or [the placing of] false evidence 
before a court or public authority" 42 It was the first of these grounds, that of 
defamation, which concerned the CPT. 43 According to both prisoners and certain 
police officers interviewed during the visit: 
"the possibility 
- 
apparently frequently used 
- 
for police officers to bring 
criminal proceedings for defamation against someone who accuses them of ill- 
treatment often deters people who have been genuinely ill treated from 
lodging a complaint" 44 
Responding in balanced fashion, the CPT acknowledged that: 
"... police officers, no less than anyone else, should have means of redress open 
to them when someone lays false accusations against them and thereby 
exposes them to the danger of unjustified prosecution". 43 
However, it continued, in furnishing police officers with a right to institute counter- 
proceedings against their accusers, it is important to ensure that: 
"... the balance between competing, legitimate interests.. 
. 
is evenly 
established" 46 
In Austria, the CPT averred, this balance had "perhaps" not been struck. 
41 See Austria I, Para 19. 
42 Idem, Para 20. 
43 The Committee voiced a similar concern in its first Norwegian visit report: see Norway I, Para 44. 
44 Austria L Para 96. 
45 Ibid. See, similarly, Norway I, Para 44. 
46 Ibid. See, similarly, p. 7 of the report, "Summary of the CPT's main findings" (5t' sub-para); and 
Norway 1, Para 44. 
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Consequently, it was "of the opinion" that: 
"... measures should be taken with a view to guaranteeing that persons who 
have been ill treated should not be discouraged from lodging a complaint". 7 
The Committee did not, however, suggest ways in which the balance and concomitant 
guarantee might be achieved, 48 save in one, tangential respect. It had, it stated, "taken 
note of the ongoing discussion" in the country concerning, inter alia, the concept of 
"an `Ermachtigungsdelikt' (action ultra vires), the idea being that a police officer 
should seek authorisation from a superior authority before bringing defamation 
proceedings, failing which he would face a penalty" 49 Without actually expressing 
approval of such a formal check on the freedom with which defamation proceedings 
might be brought against a complainant, the Committee, it may be said, in this way, at 
least intimated that the notion possesses merit. 
Conclusion 
Drawing together the disparate evidence of CPT visit reports, it may be speculated 
that if it were to set out to devise a system for the investigation of complaints of ill- 
treatment against law enforcement personnel, that system would comprise, inter alia, 
the following: "a fully-fledged independent investigating agency"50 (possessed, 
perhaps, of a judicial element5), incorporating guarantees of impartiality and 
47 Ibid. The Committee sought information on the "measures envisaged in this field" by the Austria 
authorities. 
48 The Committee's report to the Norwegian authorities was similarly silent. 
49 Austria I, pars 96. 
50 See UK IV, para 55. 
" For instance, it was observed in 1997 that the functions of the Police Complaints Authority in the Isle 
of Man were performed by a retired senior judge and tlhat, in contrast to England and Wales, there was 
no evidence of a lack of public confidence in the existing procedures: see UK IV, para 164. 
208 
protection from intimidation for alleged victims of ill-treatment, whose investigations 
would be activated immediately upon receipt of a complaint. That agency would, in 
addition, have the power to direct that disciplinary proceedings be initiated against 
officers and, "in the interests of bolstering public confidence", would be authorised to 
remit a case directly to the prosecuting authorities in order that the latter may consider 
52 
whether or not to institute criminal proceedings. 
Particular protection, reflecting their status, would be afforded persons 
detained on remand (for example, a prohibition on their being transferred to police 
premises and a- conditional 
- 
suspension of the charges against them). It would be 
the case further, it may be suggested, that the standard of proof required in 
complaints/disciplinary cases would be the civil one of a balance of probabilities, 
rather than the criminal one of beyond reasonable doubt; 53 and that the authorities 
would be obliged to render inadmissible in subsequent legal proceedings evidence 
obtained as a result of ill-treatment. M 
As far as State party practice is concerned, it is difficult to get a sense of the 
nature and extent of police complaints mechanisms across Convention territory from 
visit reports. It is only really possible to determine to what extent those mechanisms 
which have been examined conform to CPT precepts. In this respect, the 
Committee's principal concern, it appears, is the extent to which complaints 
procedures are and may be seen to be independent, particularly in respect of the police 
force the conduct of whose officers is being investigated. Other matters of concern 
32 Idem, pars 55 (reflecting on the rather attenuated powers of the Police Complaints Authority in 
England and Wales). 
53 See UK II, pars 94 (as interpreted by Evans and Morgan in Evans and Morgan (1998), p 293, n 235); 
and now, more convincingly, UK IV, paras 54 (6t' indent) and 164. 
54 See Portugal I, pars 52. 
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include the readiness with which potential complainants may be dissuaded from 
pursuing a complaint, whether through fear of the consequences for themselves or of 
prejudicing their legal position or through a cynicism about the likelihood of their 
complaint being appropriately received and handled. The CPT, it is submitted, would 
do well to embark on a thorough examination of complaints mechanisms as they 
currently operate in States parties, for its coverage to date has hardly been 
comprehensive. 
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II. The systematic inspection of police establishments 
Introduction: the basic precept 
In its published work the CPT has frequently emphasised "[t]he need for effective 
control and supervision" of the activities of law enforcement agencies 
. 
55 In the hope 
of encouraging such control and supervision and in terms reminiscent of its entreaties 
regarding the creation of independent and impartial police complaints mechanisms, it 
has asserted that: 
"... it would be desirable for an independent person or body to be authorised to 
inspect on a regular basis the conditions of detention [obtaining in police 
establishments]". 56 
Also reminiscent of its analysis of established police complaints procedures, the CPT 
has appeared most well-disposed towards the Dutch 
- 
and, as we shall see, UK 
- 
systems of inspection. As to the former, the CPT's approbation would appear to 
derive above all from the fact that criminal investigations by the police are conducted 
"under the authority and control of the judicial authorities (principally the Crown 
Counsel)". 57 Commenting on this arrangement in the wake of its visit in 1992, the 
Committee suggested that: 
55 See, e. g., Turkey I, para 41. 
s6 See, e. g., Malta I, para 93. It is worth noting that the Committee is of the view that similar 
mechanisms ought to exist in respect of other custodial establishments: see, e. g., 2d GR, pars 54 
(regarding prisons); and 8th GR, para 55 (regarding psychiatric establishments). Again, unfortunately, 
sace constraints preclude detailed analysis of these sibling arrangements. 
5F See Netherlands I, pars 53. Similar arrangements, it is worth noting, obtain in Greece: see Greece I, 
para 49. 
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"... regular [and unannounced58] visits to police detention areas by the judicial 
authorities concerned could have a significant impact in terms of the 
prevention of ill-treatment". 59 
Visits like these, it believes, "should be seen as an intrinsic part of [such authorities'] 
duty to control and direct the work of the police in criminal proceedings". 60 Given the 
Committee's invocation of this formula in other published reports, too, 61 we shall take 
it as the point from which to begin our exploration of its precepts in this area. 62 
Breaching closed cultures 
The regular inspection of places of detention is significant, it is submitted, not only in 
respect of domestic efforts to create and maintain humane custodial environments, but 
also, less conspicuously, in respect of the kind of the co-operation which the CPT can 
expect to encounter when embarking on a visit. In Austria, in 1990, for example, its 
delegation was "sometimes met with reticence" when seeking to obtain access to 
establishments. 63 Although the Committee subsequently speculated that such 
58 This addition to the formula was suggested in Spain II, para 72 (now Spain VI, para 29); and 
Romania I, para 26. 
59 Netherlands I, para 53. In other reports, the term "prosecuting or judicial authorities" has been used 
to describe the organ which, the CPT considers, should be mandated to visit police establishments: see, 
e. g., Netherlands (Aruba) I, para 230. 
60 See Poland I, para 24. 
6; See, e. g., Norway 1, para 45; Greece 1, para 49; Italy 11, para 61; and Turkey 1, para 41. Spanish 
police establishments, it seems, are subject to a regime of inspection similar to that created in the 
Netherlands, about which the CPT has also been enthusiastic, notwithstanding the Spanish judiciary's 
apparent failure fully to exploit it (as well as its constitutional role in the examination of complaints of 
police ill-treatment): see Spain I, paras 60-61; Spain II, paras 72,73 and 208; Spain V, para 52; and 
now Spain VI, paras I5 and 30. 
62 It is worth noting that where provision has been made for the inspection of police establishments by 
senior police officers rather than an independent body, the CPT has been indulgent, encouraging their 
development, where necessary: see, e. g., Ireland I, para 56 and Ireland I, para 18. Its preference, 
however, it is clear, is for the creation of wholly independent inspectoral mechanisms: see Ireland I, 
tiara 57 and Ireland II, pars 19. 
3 See Austria I, Para 10. 
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reticence might have been partly attributable to the failure of central government to 
distribute to the appropriate agencies information on the Committee's activities 
- 
"especially in the case of the police, who were only vaguely, or not at all, aware of the 
CPT's visit and... role"64 
- 
it was, it claimed, "no doubt" also due to the fact that: 
"... [Austrian] police officers are unaccustomed to such visits, the system 
currently in force not providing for inspection by independent external 
bodies". 65 
At the time of the visit, the "system" in operation appears to have provided for the 
monitoring of unconvicted criminal suspects by way of unannounced weekly visits 
from the competent President of the court of first instance. 66 By contrast, "no 
provision" had been made, the Committee observed, for the "systematic inspection by 
independent bodies outside the police" of the welfare of suspected administrative 
offenders. 7 
How the fundamental precept may be developed 
The Dutch experience: independent experts 
In 1988, seemingly on their own initiative, the city authorities in Amsterdam 
established a "Commission for the Supervision of Police Cells". This Commission, 
"composed of independent experts", 68 was authorised to "supervise... the treatment of 
detainees and ensure... compliance with standards laid down by the municipality". 69 In 
fulfilling that remit, the Commission enjoyed "free access to places of detention" and 
6' Ibid. The police force had been furnished with a Ministry of the Interior circular on the work of the 
Committee and the objects of its parent convention only three days in advance of the delegation's visit 
6s Ibid. 
66 Idem, pars 16. 
'7 Ideen, Para 17. 
68 Unfortunately, the CPT did not explain this term in its first Dutch visit report 
*9 See Netherlands 1, pare 52. Prior to the CPT's visit in 1992, an "identical" commission bad 
"apparently" been established in Rotterdam. 
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was entitled to interview both detainees and police officers 70 It was, in addition, 
"empowered to give opinions to the Mayor" on all matters relating to police cells", 
including, it appears, the treatment of the occupants of such cells. The Commission 
was not mandated to entertain complaints about the police from individual detainees 
and was, consequently, obliged to work quite independently of the local body 
established for that purpose. 72 However, like that body, it was authorised to publish 
an annual report on its activities. 73 Thus, like the CPT, the Amsterdam Commission 
performed a "preventive function", representing: 
"... an effective means of preventing the ill-treatment of persons held by the 
police and, more generally, ensuring satisfactory conditions of detention in 
places of detention". 74 
Having found much to commend in the work of the Commission, 75 in the wake of its 
visit in 1992 the CPT: 
"... invite[d] the Dutch authorities to consider extending a supervisory system 
of this kind to all police and gendarmerie detention areas". 6 
It is worth remarking, in passing, that the mandate of the Amsterdam Commission 
strongly reflected that of the CPT itself. It would be surprising, therefore, if the CPT 
had offered anything other than high praise in the circumstances. 
70 Ibid. The extent of police officers' obligation, if any, to co-operate with the Commission was not 
considered by the CPT in its visit report. 
71 Who, it will be recalled, often constitutes the Head of the local police force: see above, p 202. 
n See Netherlands i, para 52. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 The Committee declared itself "favourably impressed" by it: idem, para 160. 
76 Idem, pars 52. 
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The role of Lay Visitors in the UK 
As it did in the light of its delegation's experience in the Netherlands, on discovering 
points of congruence between its own work and similarly mandated domestic organs 
of inspection in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1990 and 1993, the 
Committee expressed much approval. In particular, it "learned with interest" of the 
system of lay visits to police stations which operates in England and Wales. 77 
Established by Home Office Circular, 78 the lay visitor system provides for the 
appointment of 
"... ordinary members of the public... as independent observers, with the right 
to visit police stations without prior notice and to speak in private with 
detainees". 
A similar system operates in Northern Ireland, the existence of which, the CPT 
averred, in its second UK visit report, has "few parallels in other Western European 
countries" and "can only [be] commend [ed] ". 80 Indeed, generally, it has insisted, the 
work of lay visitors, like that of the Amsterdam supervisory Commission, is: 
"... capable of making an important contribution towards the prevention of ill- 
treatment of persons held by the police and, more generally, of ensuring 
satisfactory conditions of detention in police stations". 81 
77 See UK I, para 226. 
78 No. 12 of 1986. 
79 üK I, para 20. The right of organs of inspection to hold private discussions with detainees would 
now appear to constitute part of the CPT's body of precepts in this area: see Spain VI, para 29. 
80 See UK II, pars 97. See also Dickson, Brice and O'Loan, Nuala, Visiting Police Stations in Northern 
Ireland, 45 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 1994, pp 210-18 ("Dickson and O'Loan (1994)"). 
81 Ibid. 
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The monitoring of particularly sensitive establishments 
As we have seen, unique in the UK's criminal justice system are the so-called 
"Holding Centres" situated in Northern Ireland. 82 Lay Visitors mandated to visit 
police establishments in the province are not authorised to carry out visits to such 
Centres. Rather, they are subject to a quite separate regime of inspection undertaken 
by the office of the Independent Commissioner for the Holding Centres, 83 whose 
"principal purpose", according to his terms of reference, is: 
"... to provide further assurance to the Secretary of State [for Northern Ireland] 
that persons detained in Holding Centres are fairly treated and that both 
statutory and administrative safeguards are being properly applied". TM 
Further to this role as conduit to central government: 
"[h]is appointment is 
... 
intended to reassure the public that the police have 
nothing to hide and that persons detained in Holding Centres are not being ill 
treated or denied their rights". 85 
In order to fulfil this mandate, the Commissioner is authorised, "on an unannounced 
basis": 
... 
[to] inspect the areas [in Holding Centres] where persons are detained or to 
which they have access, scrutinise custody records to ensure compliance with 
the Codes of Practice issued under the [Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions] Act 1991] and conduct interviews with detained persons. It is 
[also] foreseen that his inspections shall include attention to the monitoring of 
interviews by CCTV and the electronic time stamping of interview notes". 86 
V See, generally, above, p 141, n 1. 
83 See, generally, UK II, paras 24 and 98; and Dickson and O'Loan (1994), at 215 et seq. 
34 UK 11 Para 98. 
85 Ibid. 
" Idem, Para 99. 
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With one notable misgiving, concerning, as we shall see, the precise extent of the 
Commissioner's powers of intervention, the CPT has described the creation of his 
office as "a most positive development". 87 It may be said with some certainty, 
therefore, that his terms of reference comprise features which ought seriously to be 
borne in mind when identifying CPT standards in this area. It should also be noted in 
this connection that although the Holding Centres are products of the unique problems 
which have obtained in Northern Ireland for over 30 years now, the mechanisms by 
and the standards against which they are monitored may be said to possess universal 
qualities. Accordingly, regimes of inspection like that of the Independent 
Commissioner 
- 
or, for that matter, lay visitors 
- 
serve a purpose and operate in ways 
which may greatly assist the CPT in its efforts to identify ways of eliminating ill- 
treatment, regardless of the type of establishment in which organs like them are 
mandated to operate. 
As to the nature of the access to detainees to which the Independent 
Commissioner in Northern Ireland is, by law, entitled, the CPT determined that it is 
"unclear" whether he may intervene "while interrogations are in progress". 88 The 
accuracy of this assessment was confirmed by the Commissioner himself in the course 
of the visit. However, he did point out that it was "open to him to request"89 that an 
interrogation be halted in order that he might speak with a detainee 
-a right which, "in 
exceptional circumstances (when it was felt interruption would seriously prejudice an 
important police investigation)", he would be "invited to forego immediate[ly]", 90 
unless, after observing the interview on the CCTV monitor, he was "of the opinion 
$1 Idem, Para 100. 
88 Ibid. 
89 The Commissioner's powers were described no more robustly than that in the report. 
90 It will be recalled that a similar - though, seemingly, more highly circumscribed 
- 
bar can operate to 
delay CPT inspections by virtue of Article 9(1), ECPT: see, above, p 15. 
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that there were grounds for concern about the welfare of the person concerned", in 
which case he would be "granted immediate access to him". 91 
The CPT, for its part, clearly considered that there is merit in a system of 
inspection in which 
- 
in contrast to the situation in Northern Ireland 
-a visiting 
inspector may intervene while interviews are in progress. For, it described such a 
power as "[o]ne possible option" in the development of a more effective mandate for 
the Commissioner. 92 At the same time, however, it accepted that: 
"... the presence of an external investigatory authority during police 
interrogations can prove to be a disruptive influence, without serving any 
useful purpose from the standpoint of ill-treatment". 
It is apparent from this even-handed and conscientious treatment of the Independent 
Commissioner's powers of intervention that the CPT considers that if he 
- 
and, by 
extension, other, similar inspectoral authorities 
- 
are to be, at once, effective and 
discreet, a balance must be struck between two potentially conflicting interests. As to 
the nature of that balance, important above all else, it seems, is the need to ensure 
that: 
"... a means be found of enabling the Commissioner, at his discretion, to hear 
for himself what is said during police interviews at the Holding Centres". 94 
Without such a facility, the Committee considered, "it could prove difficult for the 
Commissioner effectively to advise the Secretary of State as to whether persons 
detained at the Centres are being fairly treated". 95 
91 UK II, Para 99. 
92 Idem, Para 101- 
93 Ibid. In what was, presumably, a glimpse into its own operational difficulties, the CPT ascribed this 
aaopreciation to its own experience. 
Idem, Para 100 (emphasis added). This precept was put in recommendatory form at Para 101 of the 
report. 
95Ibid. 
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In order to achieve the necessary balance in practice, the CPT recommended 
that the British authorities install sound relay systems in the Holding Centres, linking 
interview rooms with a central monitoring room. 96 "[I]t could not reasonably be 
advanced", it suggested, "that such a measure could jeopardise security, or inhibit 
detainees from providing information to the police". 97 In similar vein, it suggested 
that the UK authorities might usefully consider granting the Commissioner access to 
the electronic recordings of police interviews with terrorist suspects. 98 As we have 
seen, at the time of the visit, while the audio tape recording of police interviews with 
non-terrorist criminal suspects appeared to be "standard practice", interviews with 
persons suspected of terrorist-related activities benefited from no such safeguard. " 
Conclusion 
Like its analysis of domestic police complaints mechanisms, the CPT's examination 
of police inspection procedures seems inchoate. Its precepts in the area, though 
welcome, lack specificity, referring simply to "independent persons or bodies" and 
"regular" inspections, without ever really addressing the nature, composition and 
powers of such organs or suggesting a timetable for visits. Fortunately, its 
examination of, inter alia, Dutch and UK practice in this area does illuminate certain 
aspects of the inspection regime from which it may be possible to predict how its 
standards are likely to develop. Nevertheless, further, detailed analysis of a safeguard 
which, in the light of its mandate, represents something fundamental to the CPT 
would be welcome. 
'6 Ideen, para 101. See also pare 80 of the report, and above, p 177. 
97 Ibid. Officers interviewed in 1993, it should be recalled, had complained of "technical problems" 
and "compromise[d] security" when the possibility had been raised with them: idem, para 80. 
" Idem, para 102. 
99 Ideen, para 83. 
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PART III 
Standards on Imprisonment 
14 
The Development of CPT Standards on Imprisonment: 
An Introduction 
Self-evidently, the CPT "must examine many questions when visiting a prison". 1 Its 
principal concern, however, it has stated, is the ill-treatment of prisoners by custodial 
staff. it must, it maintains, "pay special attention" to allegations of such treatment. 2 In 
this regard, we should not lose sight of the fact that "all aspects [of prison life] are of 
relevance to the CPTs mandate", since: 
"[i]ll-treatment can take numerous forms, many of which may not be 
deliberate but rather the result of organisational failings or inadequate 
resources". 
3 
Accordingly: 
"[t]he overall quality of life in an establishment is... of considerable 
importance... [It] will depend to a very large extent upon the activities offered 
to prisoners and the general state of relations between prisoners and Staff' 
.4 
The Committee's concerns, therefore, are genuinely far-reaching. 
Interrelationship of the particularities of prison life 
Although in what follows, we shall examine in turn a number of discrete features of 
prison life relevant to the CPT's mandate, much as the CPT itself does in its visit 
reports, it must always be borne in mind that it is only when examined collectively 
1 See 2nd GR, Para 44. 
Z Ibid. 
3 ibid. 
" Ibid. 
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that the effect of such features on prisoners' welfare can truly be gauged. To look at 
each one in isolation, therefore, is a rather artificial exercise, useful only for academic 
purposes. In practice, the overlap between many aspects of prison life is so great that 
deficiencies in any one area may strongly determine the quality of others. In 
examining the adequacy or otherwise of detainees' overall quality of life, therefore, 
matters like the material conditions in which they are accommodated and the regime 
to which they are subject are, in reality, inseparable. 5 This inseparability was most 
pointedly expressed in the Committee's first UK visit report, following its 
identification, in 1990, in a number of English prisons visited of 
11 
... 
a trinity of interrelated problems: overcrowding, lack of integral sanitation 
(which results in the 'slopping out' procedure) and inadequate regime activities 
for prisoners". 
Only by improving one element of this "potent mixture", 7 the Committee proclaimed, 
would it be possible to improve others. 8 For, as it has noted elsewhere, problems like 
these are "inextricably linked", 9 so inextricably linked in some instances, in fact, that 
"significant and lasting progress" in respect of one element (e. g. regime activities; 
staff-inmate relations) may be considered "dependent upon eradicating" another (e. g. 
overcrowding; poor material conditions of detention). '0 
Identifying precepts according to type of establishment 
Perusing its work, it is possible to identify certain precepts which the Committee 
3 See, e. g., Hungary I, Para 94 (regarding the quality of life obtaining in Budapest Remand Prison, 
Hungary, when visited in 1994). 
6 See UK I, Para 36 and, further, paras 41 and 60. 
7 Idem, Para 57. 
8 Idem, paras 58 and 62. 
9 See, e. g., Italy I, Para 80. 
lo See, inter alia, Spain II, Para 133; Portugal II, Para 102; Ireland I, Para 71; and UK III, Para 342. 
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regards as applying mainly or, indeed, exclusively, to particular kinds of prison 
establishment. In this regard, it has suggested, inter alia, that different standards may 
apply to short-, as opposed to long-, stay establishments and to juvenile, as opposed to 
adult, detention centres. However, it is also fair to say that most precepts in the area 
of imprisonment may be regarded as applying with equal force in respect of every 
kind of prison establishment, without exception. 
The Committee's linking of particular standards to particular kinds of custodial 
establishment has, to a certain extent, influenced the structure and content of the 
present work. Thus, distinctions will be drawn, where necessary, between those 
standards that may be considered particular to the detention of male prisoners and 
those particular to female ones; or between those uniquely applicable to the 
administrative detention of foreign nationals, and those more appropriate to the 
detention of suspected or convicted criminal offenders. Where the drawing of such 
distinctions may be considered unnecessary 
- 
because there is nothing subject- 
specific about the precept in question 
- 
it is proposed to illustrate it by reference to 
examples drawn from CPT analyses of all kinds of establishment. 
Fundamental principles 
Underlying all the precepts elaborated by the CPT in respect of the prison 
environment, are a number of principles of fundamental importance, generically 
philosophical in origin, though practical in application. These principles may be 
identified in or, at least, extracted from, the CPT's published work. For the CPT, it is 
safe to surmise - and, it is to be hoped, States parties to the Convention - they may be 
considered to represent irreducible core values in the detention and treatment of 
prisoners. They may be listed as follows: 
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1. "The act of depriving someone of his liberty brings with it the responsibility 
for the State to detain him under conditions which respect the inherent 
dignity of the human person". " 
This may regarded as the CPTs basic premise from whence springs much of the rest 
of its standard-setting work. The "aim" of adherence to its standards, it has stated, is 
to "ensur[e] that the physical and mental integrity of inmates is guaranteed". 12 As we 
shall see, on a number of occasions it has been prepared to upbraid national 
authorities for "not discharging... [this] fundamental responsibility". 13 
2. A convicted prisoner, in spite of his imprisonment, "retains all civil rights 
which are not taken away expressly or by necessary implication". la 
The words quoted are those of Lord Wilberforce in the celebrated case of Raymond v 
Honey. '5 Restating this "well-known judicial pronouncement" in its first UK visit 
report, the CPT proclaimed that: 
"... the fact of imprisonment does not deprive a person of all his rights". 16 
The Committee developed the Raymond v Honey principle subsequently, in its first 
Belgian visit report, wherein, under the heading "legal protection of detainees", it 
recalled the "innumerable complaints" received by its delegation and the "state of 
legal insecurity" palpable among inmates, in the various prisons visited in November 
1993, as well as remarking on the absence in Belgian law of "formally recognised 
rights for prisoners". 17 In the light of such findings, it made two observations: 
(i) that a "minimum level of legal protection should be afforded detainees"; and 
(ii) that a "certain number of elementary legal rights should be recognised in law". is 
II See Greece I, Para 95; and, similarly, Italy I, Para 79; and Spain II, Para 131. 12 See Portugal II, Para 181. 
13 See Greece I, Para 272; and, similarly, Italy I, paras 79 and 187; and Spain II, Para 131. 
14 See UK I, Para 23. 
is [1982] 1 All ER 756 at 759. 
16 See, similarly, Spain I, App II, Para 14, regarding the provisions of the Spanish Constitution. 
17 See Belgium I, Para 248. 
is ibid. 
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Thus, without offering much in the way of detail, the CPT established a most 
fundamental precept: that certain, essential rights of prisoners ought to be formally 
guaranteed in order that detainees may enjoy at least a minimum level of legal 
protection. Accordingly, whereas Raymond v Honey affirmed certain negative 
obligations on the part of the State (i. e. not to remove certain, basic civil rights of 
prisoners unless permitted to do so either expressly or impliedly19), the Committee's 
observations in its first Belgian visit report focused rather on a positive obligation of 
the State (namely, the duty to enshrine in law certain fundamental rights). 
3. All categories of prisoner are to be treated equally, whatever their status. 
This principle may be inferred in certain observations made by the CPT in its 
published work. Following its first visit to Spain in April 1991, for example, in the 
course of which it examined, inter alia, domestic prison inspection mechanisms, it 
sought to know whether the country's principal mechanism, that of the "supervisory 
judge", in fact "safeguard[s] the rights of all prisoners (i. e. both sentenced... and... on 
remand)" so 
4. An appropriate allocation of (financial) resources may be a prior condition of 
any improvement in the quality of prison life. 
This premise follows from the CPT's occasional prompting of national authorities to 
provide the "necessary financial support" for recommended or envisaged changes. 21 
It is a theme that emerges strongly in its published work. It noted in its first Bulgarian 
" Lord Bridge, indeed, asserted that a citizen's basic rights "can only be taken away by express 
enactment" (at 762) (emphasis added). 
20 See Spain 1, para 186 (emphasis added). It should be noted, however, that, on account of their 
different legal statuses and circumstances, a certain differentiation between the treatment accorded, 
inter alia, remand and convicted prisoners may be perfectly justifiable. It may not be possible, for 
example, to furnish such prisoners with exactly the same kinds of regime. However, this is an area of 
study which lies outside the scope of the present work. Accordingly, for present purposes, it would be 
more accurate, perhaps, to talk of an equality of treatment insofar as the protection against Ill-treatment 
of different categories of prisoner is concerned. 
21 See, e. g., Malta II, para 54. 
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visit report, for example, that officials at Stara Zagora Prison, when interviewed in 
1995, had complained that a plan to refurbish the establishment had existed for the 
previous five years, but that its implementation had been "prevented" due to "a lack of 
financial resources". 2 For its part, the CPT observed that: 
"[it] fully accepts that in times of economic difficulty, sacrifices have to be 
made... However, there are certain basic necessities of life the provision of 
which must be considered as a priority in institutions where the State has 
persons under its care and/or custody... Any failure to meet this requirement 
can lead rapidly to situations falling within the scope of the terminhuman and 
degrading treatment". 23 
It is clear from these remarks that the CPT considers that, in depriving persons of their 
liberty, the State should take cognisance of certain fundamental human requirements, 
respect for which trumps all other considerations, and that, consequently, the 
necessary resources should be found to guarantee that respect, regardless of the 
general economic climate. 
Following its delegation's visit to the poorly maintained Radnevo Psychiatric 
Hospital in the course of the same visit, the CPT also observed, less peremptorily, that 
beyond providing the "basic necessities of life", it may be acceptable for Parties to 
adopt an incremental approach to meeting standards and/or making improvements; 
that is to say, to effect change as and when the finance is available, possibly based on 
a pre-determined set of priorities. For, it is "[o]bvious", it maintained, that: 
22 See Bulgaria I, para 124; and, similarly, paras 188,192 and 194 (regarding Radnevo Psychiatric 
Hospital); and, elsewhere, Denmark II, para 88; and Germany II, paras 89 and 97-8. 
23 Ideen, para 195. 
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"... as soon as economic circumstances permit, additional steps should be 
taken to improve living conditions in the wards and to return the hospital's 
premises in general to a satisfactory state of repair". 24 
In a more sophisticated form, this basic prescription requires of States parties that, 
when necessary, they "develop an appropriately-funded strategy for the progressive 
modernisation of the... prison estate", which strategy should, inter alia, "set firm 
deadlines for the entry into service of [any] additional accommodation... required to 
enable... [the] renovation work to be completed", and, in addition 
- 
and crucially 
- 
guarantee that the "necessary funds [are] made available to ensure that [the strategy] 
can be implemented". 25 Clearly, the CPT considers not only that improvements in the 
prison estate should receive appropriate financial support, but, less self-evidently, that 
that financial support should be dispensed in a considered and, where appropriate, 
carefully structured way, to the extent, even, that provision for its allocation should be 
made by reference to a determined hierarchy of priorities. 
Of course, it should always be borne in mind 
- 
though, curiously, the CPT, for its 
part, has generally failed to emphasise the fact 
- 
that not all improvements are 
dependent on financial support for their successful implementation. Those that 
demand nothing more than an attitudinal change on the part of the prison authorities 
and staff, for example, are, undoubtedly, capable of being effected without financial 
consequence. This is a point to which we now turn. 
5. Serious economic and social difficulties "can never excuse deliberate ill- 
treatment". 
Sensitively, when visiting Bulgaria in Spring 1995, the CPT took cognisance of the 
24 Ibid (emphasis added). See, similarly, para 203 of the report, regarding findings at Lovetch 
Neuropsychiatric Hospital. 
25 See Germany II, paras 99 and 187 (regarding post-re-unification problems in Berlin). 
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fact that the country was "currently facing extremely serious problems", notably a 
"simultaneous 
... 
grave economic crisis and an alarming increase in the crime rate". It 
was of the opinion, nevertheless, that the "negative repercussions" of these 
phenomena ought not to license the deliberate ill-treatment of detainees. 26 
6. A place of detention should not have to accommodate categories of detainee 
for which it was not designated and/or designed. 
The CPT expressed itself most emphatically in this respect in its second Danish visit 
report. Therein, writing about Esbjerg Local Jail, which was the subject of a visit in 
1996, and which, as its denomination suggests, was used principally for various kinds 
of short-term detention, it noted that the establishment was also obliged, in practice, to 
accommodate problematic prisoners transferred from the State Prisons 27 Given the 
lengths of sentence being served by the latter and the material conditions and regime 
obtaining at Esbjerg at the time of the visit, 28 the CPT felt compelled to conclude that 
even if regime activities were "enhanced", the jail would "[still] not be in a position to 
offer appropriate activities to prisoners serving long sentences... i29 Developing its 
theme and without leaving much room for doubt as to its "[m]ore general" position on 
the question, the Committee asserted that: 
"... by their very nature, local jails [and, by implication, all establishments used 
for the short-term accommodation of detainees] are not in a position to provide 
an appropriate custodial environment for prisoners serving long sentences". 30 
It appeared to be actuated by similar considerations when reflecting on delegation 
visits to the two police prisons in Zurich, Switzerland, in July 1991. There, its 
26 See Bulgaria I, Para 5. 
27 See Denmark II, para 77. 
28 It was observed, Inter alia, that some of the cells were cramped and regime activities limited: idem, 
paras 78-81. 
Idem, pars 82. 
30 Ibid. See also para 146 of the report. 
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delegation had observed, the temporary accommodation of convicted prisoners 
waiting for places to be found in a more appropriate penal environment, had resulted 
in overcrowding. 31 The Committee, as might be expected, expressed the "hope" that 
the two prisons "rapidement... revenir a leur destination initiale, a savoir la detention 
par la police... de courte duree". 32 Worth noting, too, in this connection are the similar 
concerns of the CPT regarding the appropriateness of holding remand prisoners on 
police premises for "prolonged" periods of time. 33 
7. Detention in smaller prison establishments should be avoided, as far as 
possible. 
The CPT's rationale for this particular conviction would appear to be that smaller 
establishments, by their very nature, are not disposed to offer satisfactory material 
conditions of detention and regime arrangements. This, at least, we can infer from its 
observations on the proposed fate of the Schwarzenburg district prison and other 
similar establishments in Switzerland, when visited in 1996. At Schwarzenburg 
-a 
"small" prison establishment situated in the Canton of Berne 
- 
the visiting delegation 
encountered only one detainee. He was found to be "dans un etat depressif et 
confessait un sentiment d'extreme solitude". 34 Although his material conditions of 
detention were "good", he was, notwithstanding his state of mind, not being 
permanently monitored and had been offered no out-of-cell activity at all, not even 
outdoor exercise. It is no surprise, therefore, that the CPT acknowledged, "with 
satisfaction", the purport of proposals to "reorganis[e]" the canton's prison estate. 
This reorganisation "prevoyait la fermeture des petits etablissements de detention 
accessoires, comme celui de Schwarzenburg, au profit de cinq prisons regionales". 35 
31 See Switzerland I, para 29. 
32 Idem, pars 31. 
33 See Norway I, para 28 and Norway 11, paras 7-13. See also below p 243. 
34 See Switzerland II, pare 62. 
33 Idem, pars 63. 
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The CPT "welcome[d]" the proposals and recommended that the 
reorganisation be accorded the "highest priority". 36 Clearly, therefore, its findings at 
Schwarzenburg were a source of profound disquiet. Indeed, given the situation 
obtaining at the time of the visit, it observed in its second Swiss visit report, the 
establishment's premises could be considered "peu compatibles avec une detention 
prolongee". 37 
Conclusion 
It has not been the intention of the present chapter to provide an exhaustive treatment 
of general standards on imprisonment. Its purpose, rather, has been to set out a 
number of the many underlying, considerations to which, in the view of the CPT, 
States ought to give due weight in formulating and developing penal policy and 
thereby to serve as an introduction to the more detailed analyses of particular aspects 
of detention which follow. Such considerations may be regarded as inhering in many 
of the precepts examined below. 
It has been stated before in this work, but it is nevertheless worth emphasising 
again, that, while much of the content of subsequent chapters concerns detention in 
prison establishments, a number of precepts relate also 
- 
sometimes exclusively - to 
other kinds of institution. Accordingly, although it is expedient to consider all 
precepts examined in this, Part III, of the present work under the designation 
Imprisonment, it is a conceit which may serve to mask the range and complexity of a 
number of them. However, in the text itself, it should be apparent just when detention 
in one of these other categories of establishment is in issue. The aim, overall, is to 
36 Ibid. See also para 153 of the report. 
17 Idem, para 62. 
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provide the reader with an exhaustive account of CPT standards in the areas 
discussed, taking account, where necessary, of the different environments in which 
persons may be detained. 
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15 
Prison Overcrowding 
Introduction 
The notion of prison overcrowding is a simple one to comprehend. Broadly, an 
establishment may be said to be overcrowded when it is "required to cater for more 
prisoners than it was designed to accommodate"! It is overcrowded, in other words, 
when the number of detainees it holds exceeds its physical capacity so to do. 
Calculating the number of detainees held in an establishment at any one time 
is a straightforward matter; calculating its physical (or occupational) capacity much 
less so: account must be taken, it is submitted, not only of more obvious factors, like 
the number and size of prison cells, but also of more abstruse considerations, like the 
effects on capacity of a prison's age, design and penal purpose (whether, for example, 
it is intended for short-term or long-term accommodation) and the amount and 
character of out-of-cell time afforded detainees therein (since the nature and extent of 
out-of-cell activities may affect the tolerability of the cellular environment). There is 
nothing in its published work to suggest that the CPT uses any one method to quantify 
an establishment's accommodation capacity. Rather, it would appear to determine the 
appropriateness of occupation levels on a more or less ad hoc basis, taking account of 
the particular circumstances obtaining in the establishment being visited. This may be 
a very sensible approach, since the variety of features which, as we have just seen, can 
affect a prison's physical capacity may render a figure arrived at under any rigid 
formula open to question. 
See Vs GR, para 46. 
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Recent population trends 
Throughout its working life, prison overcrowding has remained one of the CPT's 
most compelling concerns. To the Irish authorities, for example, following its visit in 
1993, it offered the general comment that "[o]vercrowding is a problem which 
bedevils many prison systems... "2 This view is hardly surprising given the apparent 
trend over the last ten to fifteen years, among a number of States parties to the ECPT 
to make greater use of incarceration in the execution of penal policy. In 1996, for 
example, assessing progress made in the penal sphere since first visiting the UK in 
1990, the CPT adverted to the "considerable rise" in the prison population seen in 
England and Wales "in recent times". At the time of this, its second, periodic visit, 
the population stood at 48,400 
- 
"and was continuing to rise at a rate of 200 per 
month". 3 This figure was over 6,000 inmates greater than that predicted by the UK 
authorities in their Follow-up report to the Committee's first periodic visit 4 
Consequently, their assertion that "the average prison population and available 
accommodation will come into balance in 1995"5 was "no longer valid". 6 Indeed, at 
the time of the visit, a "projected surplus" in the prison estate of 3,200 places 7 had, in 
fact, become a "shortfall" of 2,900.8 By the time of the CPT's fourth visit to the 
jurisdiction, in September 1997, it was clear that the prison population in England and 
2 See Ireland I, Para 97. 
1 See UK III, Para 75. 
4 See UK Follow-up report I, CPT/Inf (93) 9, Para 48. It should be noted that this 6000 surplus figure 
was correct only insofar as the prison population for the year 1993-4 was concerned; the UK 
Government's population projection for the year 1995-6 
- 
covering the period of the visit - was, in 
fact, 45,700, which yields a surplus of 2,700 inmates. 
See UK Response I, CPT/Inf (91) 16, p 14. 
6 See UK III, Para 75 (and, similarly, Para 79). 
See UK Follow-up report I, op cit, n4 above, Para 48. Again, the figure cited actually represents the 
surplus predicted for the year 1993-4; that predicted for 1995-6 was, as we have just seen, 2,700. 
i See UK III, Para 75. 
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Wales had "continued to rise, outstripping each successive revision of population 
predictions". 9 
A similar picture emerged during the Committee's first visit to Greece in 
March 1993. There, it was observed, "the number of prisoners [accommodated 
throughout the entire prison estate] had more than doubled over the last 12 
years-whereas, the official capacity of the prison system at the time of the 
delegation's visit stood at 3900, the number of prisoners actually held amounted to 
6700". 10 An even greater 
- 
indeed, "exponential" 
- 
population rise, from around 200 
to over 500 prisoners, was observed to have taken place on the island of Martinique 
over a similar period of time. l l 
The phenomenon of prison overcrowding is, therefore, a problem just as, if not 
more, compelling today than it was at the CPT's inception. As recently as 1997, the 
Committee drew attention to the fact that during "several" visits made in the previous 
working year, its delegations had "once again" encountered this particular "evil", 
leading to the impression that overcrowding still "blights penitentiary systems across 
Europe". 12 Interestingly, the Committee has determined that overcrowding is "often 
particularly acute" in remand prisons. However, "in some countries", it has insisted, 
the problem has "spread throughout" the entire prison estate. 13 Indeed, the problem 
may be considered "sufficiently serious" throughout Europe, it has asserted, as to 
justify "call[s] for cooperation at the European level, with a view to devising counter 
9See UK IV, para 70. By January 1998, the prison population had reached 62,970. Even HM Prison 
Service's own annual audit of resources, published in July 1997, had concluded that "there is no 
realistic prospect of the prisoner population and available accommodation coming into balance in the 
foreseeable future": idem, pars 71. 
1° See Greece I, paras 94 and 272. 
11 See France (Martinique) I, para 25 (note 2). 
12 See 7'h GR, para 12. Extrapolating from figures produced by the Council of Europe, some 
commentators have corgectured that "[i]t is likely that between one-half and two-thirds of all the prison 
systems in Europe contain some establishments that are overcrowded... ": see Evans and Morgan 
(1998), p 324. 
13 Ibid. 
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strategies ". 14 It has been "most pleased to learn" therefore that counter-offensive 
work has already begun "within the framework of the European Committee on Crime 
Problems", " whose "successful conclusion", it has expressed the hope, "will be 
treated as a priority". 16 
The particular significance of (prison) overcrowding in the work of the 
CPT 
As might be predicted, to the CPT "[o]vercrowding is an issue of direct relevance to 
[its] mandate; "17 of such relevance, in fact, that on occasion during visits, it has 
considered it "the principal obstacle to providing better conditions of detention... s18 
Consequently, policies for its eradication, it has insisted, have a "pivotal role to play" 
in improving such conditions. 19 
Extent of CPT tolerance 
Notwithstanding such firm expressions of principle, it is to be noted that, on occasion, 
the CPT has appeared prepared to tolerate a certain amount of overcrowding. During 
its first visit to Spain in April 1991, for example, it observed that the inmate 
population at Basauri Prison exceeded its "official" capacity by some 40%20 
Although the resulting "cramped, occasionally very cramped" cellular conditions 
were "far from ideal'- the "majority" of inmates were being held two, three or four 
to a cell measuring in size between 10 and 18 sq. m. 
- 
they "could not fairly be 
is Idem, Para 15. 
is The European Committee on Crime Problems is a subordinate organ of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe. 
16 See 7'" GR, Para 15 
"See 2, d GR, Para 46; and also 7t` GR, Para 13; and Spain I, Para 117. 
18 See Portugal II, Para 97; and, similarly, Italy II, paras 120 and 122. 
19 Idem, Para 180. For an examination of such policies, see below, p 256 et seq. 20 See Spain I, Para 119. The establishment was found to be holding 285 prisoners, whereas its official 
capacity was a mere 210 (idem, Para 88). 
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described as intolerable, " the Committee averred, particularly since prisoners enjoyed 
"considerable" out-of-cell time and freedom of movement within the establishment 21 
As a result, it seems, the CPT refrained from seeking an immediate reduction in the 
prison's inmate population 
- 
something which it might have been expected to do were 
it unyielding in its opposition to prison overcrowding. Rather, it recommended a 
more measured, two-stage strategy, comprising efforts, first, to "contain" the 
overcrowding and, second, "in due course to reduce the inmate population! '. 2 
The Committee adopted a similarly moderate approach in the face of 
overcrowding at Algeciras Prison encountered during the same visit. There, inmate 
numbers (the establishment was holding 252 prisoners at the outset of the visit2) 
exceeded the establishment's official capacity (of 192) by approximately 30%2a 
- 
though it had been much higher, apparently, "in the recent past". 25 Again, 
notwithstanding these less than satisfactory physical conditions, the Committee only 
went so far as to recommend that the inmate population be "kept under 250 and as 
close as possible to 200' . 26 Interestingly, both these figures are greater than the 
establishment's official capacity; indeed, the first 
- 
the prescribed upper limit of 
acceptability 
- 
is only marginally below the actual population levels observed during 
the visit 27 
21 Ibid. See, similarly, Spain II, paras 125 and 130 (regarding findings in the Madrid Prison for Women 
in April 1994: availability of activities to prisoners offset "serious" levels of overcrowding). On the 
significance of both adequate out-of-cell time and freedom of movement in, at least, mitigating the 
effects of overcrowding, see below, pp 264-5. 
22 Ibid. See, further, below, p 261. 
21 Ideen, Para 88. 
24 Ideen, Para 120. 
u According to the prison transfer register, the population had "peak[ed]" at 380, "double" its official 
capacity, 5 months before the visit; while overcrowding had remained "severe" until a matter of days 
before its commencement. 
26 See Spain I, Para 123. 
n For a further, similar expression of tolerance (regarding findings at the Court of First Instance Prison, 
Vienna, in May 1990), see Austria I, Para 33. 
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Regarding the levels of overcrowding observed in Brixton, Leeds and 
Wandsworth Prisons in the UK in mid-1990, the CPT recommended, inter alia, the 
creation of: 
"[a] ceiling... consisting of a certain percentage figure over the [official 
capacity], beyond which the acceptance of additional inmates... would be 
inadmissible". 28 
Clearly, the CPT considers that there may be instances in which it is quite acceptable 
to exceed set population targets, even if the practical effect is to perpetuate prison 
overcrowding. Indeed, it appears that, on occasion, the CPT is prepared to 
countenance not inconsiderable levels of overcrowding. Unfortunately, from its 
published work, it is not possible to identify anything which resembles policy on the 
matter, analysis of which might enable one to predict in what circumstances it is 
likely to demonstrate tolerance. 29 
The relevant prison population 
The manner in which "official" inmate capacities are calculated is also an issue of 
concern to the CPT. In this respect, visiting the prison of Puerto de Santa Maria II, 
Spain, in April 1991, it found that although the establishment's actual population level 
of 954 was "slightly below its official capacity... it was probably the most 
overcrowded establishment seen by the delegation in Spain". 30 In the Committee's 
29 See UK I, para 61. See, further, below, p 260. 
2' Indeed, contrarily, in its fourth published report to the UK authorities, the CPT expressed profound 
reservations about the practice of accommodating a number of prisoners above the prison estate's 
certified normal accommodation 
- 
i. e. its uncrowded capacity 
- 
in order to create its "usable 
operational capacity" 
- 
i. e. "the degree of overcrowding which the Director General [of the Prison 
Service] judges to be the maximum safe level, taking account of both the physical constraints and the 
additional risks to control and security". Such a practice, the Committee considered, could lead to a 
certain institutional acceptance of the phenomenon of overcrowding. Accordingly, this so-called "safe 
overcrowding", it suggested, "should not be allowed to become the benchmark... ": see UK IV, paras 
71-2 and 76. 
30 See Spain I, para 125. 
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view, "[t]his raise[d] the question of how the official capacity ha[d] been worked 
OUt". 31 
Clearly, therefore, overcrowding does not only occur when, most obviously, 
the actual population in an establishment exceeds its official capacity, but may also 
arise, more illusorily, when that official capacity has been incorrectly calculated. On 
the evidence of published visit reports, worth noting in this connection, it is 
submitted, is the fact that the practice whereby an establishment's "official" 
population capacity is, seemingly, increased beyond, sometimes considerably beyond, 
its "optimal" capacity 
- 
i. e. that which the establishment is physically capable of 
sustaining 
- 
is not necessarily one sought to be artfully concealed by prison 
authorities. On the contrary, such authorities have, on occasion, spoken with candour 
about admitted discrepancies between the two figures. For example, at the maison 
d'arret San Vittore, Italy, in March 1992, the prison director himself admitted that his 
establishment's "optimal" capacity was some 800 detainees, while its "official" 
capacity was 1,295.2 Similarly, visiting the Carabanchel Prison Complex, Spain, in 
April 1994, it was evident to a CPT delegation that the official capacity of 1,285 at the 
Madrid I Prison was exceeded somewhat by its "so-called `operating' capacity" of 
2,134, "plus 203 auxiliary places"; while, at the Prison for women, the 
establishment's optimal capacity of 626 (plus 73 auxiliary places) was effectively 
double its official capacity of 369.33 
31 Ibid. "Apparently", it had been based, inter alia, on the premise that "standard" cells of 9 sq. m. may 
each accommodate 3 prisoners. 
32 See Italy I, para 67. The establishment's actual population at the time of the visit was almost 2,000 
detainees, a figure described by the CPT as "outrageous": idem, para 77. 33 See Spain II, para 98. In fact, when visited, the Madrid I Prison was accommodating 2,184 inmates 
and the Prison for Women 637 (plus "50 offspring up to the age of six"). 
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Findings 
The recurrence of the "evil" of overcrowding in the CPT's published work is striking. 
Naturally, its extent has varied from Party to Party and even between establishments 
within the same Party. For instance, during its first periodic visit to the UK in 1990 
the Committee observed levels of occupation in prisons visited which varied from the 
satisfactory to the quite unacceptable. In both Wandsworth and Brixton Prisons 
"significant" levels of overcrowding obtained because official population capacities 
- 
of 1,275 and 729 inmates, respectively 
- 
were exceeded by actual population levels of 
1,516 and 1,005.34 Worse, at Leeds Prison, where an actual inmate population of 
1,205 was "almost twice" the establishment's certified capacity of 627, levels of 
overcrowding were said to have been "outrageous". 35 By contrast, at Holloway 
Prison, one of two female prisons visited in 1990, an actual population of 473 was 
"somewhat less" than the establishment's official capacity of 517.36 
Elsewhere in Europe, prison establishments visited have been found to be, 
inter alia, "grossly overcrowded" 
. 
3? For example, Greece's Korydallos Prison for 
men, built to accommodate 480 prisoners, when visited in 1993, was found to be 
holding, at 1,410 inmates, "almost three times" as many. 38 Rather candidly, the Greek 
authorities, the Committee subsequently noted, "made no secret" of the fact that 
"overcrowding was a nationwide problem". 39 Similarly, visiting Portugal, in May 
34 See UK I, paras37,38and39. 
35 Idem, para 39. See, similarly, France I, paras 83,91 and 97; Italy I, paras 77 and 186; Spain 11, para 
129; and France (Martinique) I, para 27. 
36 Idem, para 120. Interestingly, at the second female prison visited, while actual occupation levels did 
not exceed official capacity figures, inmates had been allocated in such a way as to produce a certain 
amount of overcrowding. idem, paras 128-131 and 232. 
37 See Greece I, paras 94 and 272; and Portugal I, para 71. Immigration detention facilities and police 
establishments, too, have been found to be "grossly overcrowded": see Turkey I, paras 56 and 69, 
respectively. 
38 Greece I, paras 91 and 105. 
39 Idem, paras 94 and 272. See also in this regard, paras 91,110 and 113 of the report (regarding 
Korydallos Prison for women, described as "severely" and "unacceptabl[y]" overcrowded); pars 91 
(regarding the Korydallos Prison Complex Psychiatric Unit 
- 
though cf para 178); and paras 92 and 
117 (regarding Larissa Prison). 
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1995, the CPT was given to understand that overcrowding was an "ill 
which... affect[ed] the whole of the... prison system... s4° Evidently, the problem had 
obtained for some time, for, during its first periodic visit, in January 1992, it had 
observed that the Judicial Police Group Prison, Lisbon, had been accommodating 
"almost twice the number of prisoners it was designed to hold" (i. e. 155, as opposed 
to a certified figure of 80). 41 On its return, "some three and a half years [later]" and 
"notwithstanding [its previous] recommendation... to reduce substantially" the 
number of persons held in the prison, it was clear to the Committee that the situation 
had, in fact, deteriorated: while the official capacity had remained static, actual 
occupation levels had risen to 169.42 
Elsewhere, levels of overcrowding encountered have been such as to be 
"rarely observed" by the CPT; 43 "chronic"; -4° "extremely high"; 45 "extraordinary"; a6 
"serious" ; 47 and "completely unacceptable". 48 Indeed, in one notable instance 
- 
on the 
island of Martinique (July 1994) 
- 
overcrowding, more particularly predicted 
overcrowding, was found to be so acute that the authorities had been forced to 
contemplate the opening of a brand new prison establishment, incomplete at the time 
40 See Portugal II, pars 97. 
41 See Portugal I, paras 54 and 71. 
42 Portugal II, para 76. For a similar deterioration at Linho Prison over the same period, see para 80 of 
the report. Further, returning to the country in 1996, Oporto Prison was found to be seriously 
overcrowded: see Portugal III, para 7. 
43 See Italy I, pars 67 (regarding the maison d'arret San Vittore, Milan: above, p 237); and now Italy II, 
paras 65 and 96 (some 3 years after the CPT's first visit, the actual population of the establishment had 
risen to 2,245). 
µ See France I, para 98 (regarding the levels of overcrowding obtaining throughout the entire French 
prison estate in 1991). However, cfFrance III, paras 76-79. 
Idem, paras 82 and 91 (regarding the maison d'arret de Marseille-Baumettes, France (1991), where 5' 
the number of prisoners actually held (2,156) exceeded the establishment's official capacity (1,534) by 
40% (though see now France III, para 81); and, similarly, Portugal II, paras 90 and 91 (regarding 
Oporto Prison (1995): official capacity 500; actual numbers held 1,120). 
1 See Spain I, para 127 (regarding the women's unit of the Prison of Puerto de Santa Maria 11(1991): 
official capacity 46; actual population 72, a situation, the CPT learned, which was "not... exceptional"). 
47 See Slovakia I, paras 68 and 75 (regarding the "closed" section of Bratislava Prison, Slovakia (1995): 
actual population 750; official capacity 570). 
`$ See Czech Republic I, para 49 (regarding the "cram[ing]" of up to 17 prisoners in unfurnished cells 
measuring less than 10 sq. m. in the "escort area" at Prague-Pankrac Remand Prison (1997)). 
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of the Committee's visit, with an already overcrowded prison population. 
Unsurprisingly, the CPT considered the prospect to be "highly regrettable". 9 
The existence of prison overcrowding 
-albeit in a less acute form - has also 
been noted in a number of other States parties, including Switzerland, 50 Gennany, si 
Belgium, 52 Ireland'53 Hungary, T4 Austrians and Romania. 56 
Effects of overcrowding 
Having briefly examined the extent of prison overcrowding among States parties to 
the ECPT, as revealed in published visit reports, it may be appropriate, now, to 
consider precisely how, in the Committee's view, the phenomenon may manifest 
itself in practice. What possible effects on the prison estate may overcrowding have? 
Simply stated, the Committee considers that: 
"[a]ll the services and activities within a prison will be adversely affected if it 
is required to cater for more prisoners than it was designed to accommodate; 
the overall quality of life in the establishment will be lowered, perhaps 
significantly... "57 
Thus, overcrowding may profoundly affect all aspects of prison life and may, 
accordingly be considered to represent one of the most serious impediments to the 
creation of a better quality of life in places of detention. 58 Its impact may be most 
49 See France (Martinique) I, paras 29,30 and 42. 
so See, Switzerland I, inter alia, paras 14,17, and 146; and Switzerland II, para 97. 
st See, e. g., Germany I, para 61; and Germany II, paras 104 and 118. 
s2 See, e. g. Belgium I, paras 81-3; and now Belgium II, para 82. 53 See, e. g., Ireland 1, para 97. Visiting for a second time, in 1998, the CPT was left with the 
impression that overcrowding was an "endemic feature" of the Irish prison estate: see Ireland II, para 
57. 
"See, e. g., Hungary I, Para 87. 
ss See, e. g., Austria II, para 96. 
56 Where, in 1995, approximately 50,000 prisoners were being held in a prison estate whose official 
capacity was a mere 14,000 places: see Romania I, para 96. 
s' See 2°d GR, para 46. See also Spain I, para 117. 
sS See Ireland I, para 97. 
240 
acutely felt, however, in the following areas: a prison's physical environment; the 
prison regime; staff 
-inmate and inter-inmate relations; and prison services, 
particularly health care facilities. This assessment is borne out by the CPT's rather 
stark conclusion that: 
"[a]n overcrowded prison entails cramped and unhygienic accommodation; a 
constant lack of privacy (even when performing such basic tasks as using a 
sanitary facility); reduced out-of-cell activities, due to demand outstripping the 
staff and facilities available; overburdened health-care services; increased 
tension and hence more violence between prisoners and between prisoners and 
staff... sS9 
It should be added that the CPT regards this list as "far from exhaustives60 and 
believes, more starkly still, that, ultimately: 
"the level of overcrowding in a prison, or in a particular part of it, might be 
such as to be in itself inhuman or degrading from a physical standpoint". '" 
Sadly, this is a conclusion to which the CPT has been led "on more than one 
occasion". 62 It may be useful, therefore, briefly to examine some of the effects of 
prison overcrowding, as observed by the CPT, so that we might gauge just how far- 
reaching they may be. 
59 See 7`h GR, Para 13. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See 2ed GR, Para 46. See also Spain I, Para 117. To the UK authorities, in its fourth published visit 
report, the Committee asserted that `it is a fundamental requirement that those committed to prison by 
the courts be held in safe and decent conditions. For so long as overcrowding persists, the risk of 
prisoners being held in inhuman and degrading conditions of detention will remain": see UK IV, Para 
76. 
62 See 7th GR, Para 13. 
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Overall quality of life 
Self-evidently, where authorities seek to accommodate more persons in an 
establishment than its physical capacity would ordinarily permit, they risk 
"imped[ing] the operation of all sectors of activity [therein]", with the result that 
detainees' "general quality of life [may be] considerably weakened". 63 Conversely, of 
course, where that physical capacity is not exceeded, detainees' quality of life is likely 
to be `much higher. "64 Overcrowding, therefore, may be considered to undermine 
prison authorities' capacity to meet their putative "fundamental" duty to detain 
persons in conditions which respect their inherent dignity. 65 
Effects on neighbouring establishments 
That fundamental duty may be seriously undermined when the repercussions of 
overcrowding are felt not only in the establishment immediately affected, but also in 
neighbouring establishments, obliged to accommodate any population overspill. This 
excess population may comprise categories of prisoner for whose detention the latter 
establishments were not designed. They may be left, therefore, not only overcrowded 
themselves 
- 
by virtue of an influx of prisoners from elsewhere 
- 
but with a detainee 
population for whose needs they may be ill-prepared to cater. For example, visiting 
Switzerland in July 1991, the CPT found that Zurich's two police prisons, authorised 
to accommodate a variety of short-term detainees, 66 were having also to accommodate 
63 See France I, pars 102 (an opinion offered in respect of the maison d'arret, Nice, where in 1991, 
population levels exceeded by 200% the establishment's official capacity. ). 
64 See UK I, para 119 (regarding findings at Holloway Prison in 1990: above, p 238). 
65 See Greece I, paras 95 and 272. 
66 Namely, persons arrested or placed "en garde a vue , temporary detainees, foreign detainees in the 
process of being expelled, persons sentenced to short terms of imprisonment or in transit and, 
exceptionally, young persons. 
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long-term prisoners due to "significant" overcrowding in the region's cantonal and 
district prisons. 67 In consequence, they too had become overcrowded. 8 
More striking still, in the UK, in May 1994, "certain areas" of Liverpool 
Prison had become so overcrowded that neighbouring police stations were obliged to 
accommodate the excess population (at a rate of three detainees per cell). 69 It need 
hardly be stated that a police station is not an appropriate environment for the 
detention of prisoners expected to be held for long periods of time. Indeed, the CPT 
itself has sought to "stress that... police custody cells... are not suitable for periods of 
detention [for convicted/remand prisoners] lasting more than a few days". 70 
Prolonged periods of detention of such persons on police premises, it considers, "may 
lead to high risk situations". 71 
Lastly and almost risibly, in Greece, where, as we have seen, Korydallos 
Men's Prison was severely overcrowded when visited in March 1993, because the 
neighbouring Psychiatric Unit, though overcrowded itself, 72 offered "somewhat 
better" material conditions than the main prison building, a number of healthy 
prisoners had been emboldened to seek admission "by feigning mental illness" 73 
Resource implications 
To accommodate more detainees than was originally intended in an establishment 
necessarily strains its resources. This fact was made abundantly clear during a visit to 
67 See Switzerland I, Para 12. An expansion of the Zurich district prison was authorised (and 
commenced) in 1991(idem, Para 21). However, the construction of a completely new prison had been 
rejected by referendum a decade earlier (Para 29). 68 Idem, Para 14. 
69 See UK III, Para 76. Interestingly, Liverpool Prison itself had not been forced to adopt such a rate of 
occupation. 
70 See Iceland II, Para 70 (regarding the detention of a remand prisoner in a cell at Akureyri Police 
Headquarters in 1998); and, similarly, Netherlands II, Para 29. 
71 See Netherlands (NA) H, Para 56. 
72 See Greece I, Para 91 (the Unit's "envisaged" capacity was approximately 140; its population at the 
time of the visit, 240). 
73 Idem, Para 178. 
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the Centre Penitentiaire de Luxembourg in January 1993. There, the authorities were 
having to accommodate. an excess population of 100 detainees. 74 Consequently, 
finding the resources to furnish detainees, first, with sufficient food and, second, with 
adequate facilities and equipment had proved particularly difficult. In both respects, 
budgets had been calculated and allocated "en fonction de la capacite theorique 
initiale de l'etablissement". 75 As a result of overcrowding, the prison authorities had 
been left with a food budget of 101 F/Lux. per detainee per day (as compared with an 
optimal budget of 130 F/Lux). Naturally, the CPT remarked, "any increase in the 
prison population would see this figure further reduced". 76 Further, and hardly 
surprisingly, its delegation was "struck" by the "considerable" number of complaints 
received regarding the "quantity" of food provided daily. " 
As for the prison's stores of equipment, the delegation learned that there were 
no reserve stocks of mattresses, bedding and hand towels; that stocks of work clothes 
were "almost exhausted; " and that the practice of providing clothing for "indigent" 
detainees had had to be brought to an end. 78 Unsurprisingly, the Committee 
recommended that all the deficiencies observed be remedied "dans les meilleurs 
delais". 79 
Adherence to national codes of conduct 
It is worth noting that in one instance in which prison overcrowding has been found to 
obtain nationwide, the Committee has considered the phenomenon to have "seriously 
74 The establishment's optimal capacity ("capacite theorique initiale") was 270, its official capacity 350 
and its population at the time of the visit 370: see Luxembourg I, pars 40. 
73 Idem, Para 64. 
76 Ibid 
"Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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undermined" government efforts to implement a "modem and progressive" code of 
basic rules for the treatment of prisoners. 80 
The physical environment 
The correlation between occupancy levels and the quality of the physical environment 
in places of detention was most succinctly expressed by the CPT in its first Belgian 
visit report. Therein, commenting on differences observed in the material 
environments of the maison pour peines and the maison d'arret at Lantin Prison in 
November 1993, it remarked that it had been "better" in the former due to the "simple 
fact" that it had been subject to no overcrowding. 81 
Elsewhere, more insistently, it has proclaimed that overcrowding, more 
particularly "severe" overcrowding: 
64 
... 
cannot fail to have extremely negative repercussions on material, hygienic 
and psychological conditions of detention... s82 
As to material conditions, the "negative repercussions" which, in the experience of the 
Committee, overcrowding may be considered to cause, have included, at Korydallos 
Prison for men in Greece, March 1993, "very poor" living space, "inadequate" 
ventilation83 and a standard of cell cleanliness and hygiene found "wanting". 84 In 
addition, the Committee remarked in its first Greek visit report, "[i]n many cells 
[viewed] prisoners [were] to all intents and purposes confined to their beds, there 
80 See Greece I, para 94. The Code in question was adopted in 1989; clearly, it was still proving 
impossible to implement some 4 years later, at the time of the visit. 
11 See Belgium I, para 120. 
82 See Spain II, para 113. 
83 See, similarly, UK I, para 40 (regarding the consequences of overcrowding at Brixton, Leeds and 
Wandsworth Prisons); and Bulgaria I, para 122 (regarding Stara Zagora Prison, where ventilation was 
found to be "often prejudiced" by overcrowding). 
84 See Greece I, para 106; and, similarly, para 118 (regarding Larissa Prison); and Spain II, pars 118 
(regarding Madrid I Prison, April 1994). However, cf Slovakia I, para 79 (regarding the "generally 
clean and well maintained" Bratislava Prison, 1995). 
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being no room for other furniture". 85 Worse, "[i]n some of the most overcrowded 
cells, there [were] more prisoners than beds". 86 
In Belgium, where, in November 1993, the prison de St-Gilles was clearly 
subject to a similar shortage of beds, detainees had been "forced to sleep on 
mattresses placed on the ground". 87 Further, as at Korydallos Prison, in the UK, in 
March 1990, at Brixton, Leeds and Wandsworth Prisons, the practice of holding three 
persons in cells of an acceptable size, really, only for one, had rendered prisoners 
"practically confined to their beds, their buckets and washing bowls taking up most of 
the spare floor space". As a result, the CPT claimed, the installation of "[a]dditional 
cell furniture other than a small table or chair [was] out of the question". 88 Similarly, 
when visited in April 1994, the so-called "double" cells (each measuring 
approximately 22 sq. m. ) on the 1" floor of the 6t' Gallery at the Madrid I Prison, 
Spain, were found to be accommodating "up to 10 prisoners" in two bunk and two 
three-tier beds. Consequently, "there was just enough space for a table, a few chairs 
and a cupboard". Such conditions, the Committee stated, were "deplorable" and 
could "fairly be described as inhuman and degrading". 89 
Other discernible effects on the physical environment occasioned by excessive 
cell occupancy levels encountered by the CPT have included: 
83 Ibid. See, similarly, para 118 (dormitory overcrowding at Larissa Prison had meant that "[t]he space 
taken by beds [had] precluded the presence of tables and chairs... '). 
86 Idem, pars 106. 
87 See Belgium I, para 138. See, similarly, France I, para 74 (regarding recourse to similar measures at 
the Centre de Retention Administrative de Nice, 1991); and Ireland II, para 49 (in 1998, according to 
the Irish authorities' own figures, overcrowding in Mountjoy Prison had meant that an average of 
between 40 and 50 prisoners were obliged to sleep on mattresses on the floor). 
88 See UK I, pars 40. 
89 See Spain II, paras 119 and 129. (By contrast, double cells on the ground floor of the 6`h Gallery, 
each accommodating 5 working prisoners, offered "adequate" living space). Findings in Gherla Prison, 
Romania, in 1995, were even more shocking (e. g. a dormitory measuring 30 sq. m. was having to 
accommodate 26 detainees): see Romania I, para 106. 
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(i) a loss of privacy when using in-cell sanitary facilities, particularly where 
- 
as at the 
Centre Penitentiaire de Luxembourg (January 1993) 
- 
those facilities are separated 
from the rest of the cell only by a curtain or partition, rather than by means of a 
separate sanitary annex. 90 
(ii) a failure to guarantee access upon demand to out-of-cell sanitary facilities. In 
April 1991, at Algeciras Prison, Spain, one dormitory measuring 40 sq. m. was found 
to be "crammed" with 27 beds while "adjacent washing and sanitary facilities 
consisted [only] of 1 toilet, 1 shower and two washbasins". 91 It is not difficult to 
imagine the problems of access confronting occupants of the dormitory in such 
circumstances. 
(iii) difficulties in maintaining satisfactory standards of hygiene. In its first French 
visit report, the CPT remarked that the prospect of maintaining "good" standards of 
hygiene in the maisons d'arret in Marseilles and Nice could "only be compromised" 
by the high levels of overcrowding observed therein in late 1991.92 "[D]urable 
progress in this regard can only be achieved", it asserted, "by a significant freeing 
up"93 of the two establishments. 
One rather striking consequence of overcrowding-induced hygiene problems 
emerged from the CPT's visit to Modelo Prison, Spain, in April 1994. Of "particular" 
concern to the visiting delegation, it remarked subsequently, in its second Spanish 
visit report, had been the "risk of transmission of pulmonary tuberculosis" in the 
establishment 
- 
notably in the light of the "rather dirty and unhygienic" condition of 
90 See Luxembourg I, paras 62-3. See, similarly, UK IV, paras 73 (regarding the situation observed in 
Dorchester Prison in September 1997). 
91 See Spain I, Para 124. 
SeeFrance I, Para 111. 
93 The word used in the report is "desencombrement". 
247 
"many" of its cells. Such a state of affairs was "scarcely surprising", the Committee 
declared, given the "severe" levels of overcrowding obtaining at the time. 94 
(iv) obli iginng the  prison authorities to "improvise and bring into play other areas [of an 
establishment] as detention facilities". 95 A "most striking" illustration of this 
phenomenon was apparent in Larissa Prison, Greece, when visited in March 1993. 
There, a "dining room facility located within the kitchen area" had been requisitioned 
by the prison authorities in order to accommodate an extra 54 prisoners. "Resort to 
bunk beds, " the Committee observed, "meant that the maximum possible use had 
been made of the room available, with the result that the provision of tables and chairs 
had been possible. "96 Indeed, "from the standpoint of living space, " it continued, 
prisoners occupying the improvised facility had been "better off than those held 
in... dormitories". Nevertheless, it concluded, their conditions of detention were 
"totally inappropriate". Similarly, also in Larissa, "a workshop had been converted 
into a dormitory for juvenile prisoners". It was found to be accommodating 33 
inmates quite "adequate[ly]" at the time of the visit. 97 
A more curious illustration of prison authorities' capacity for improvisation 
was offered in the CPT's first Belgian visit report. Therein, the Committee recalled 
that in the male prison at l'etablissement penitentiaire de St-Andries in November 
1993, overcrowding had been so great that certain detainees on ordinary prison 
location had been obliged to share cells with prisoners subject to a regime of "strict 
cellular confinement". As a result, the former had been forced to accept the latter's 
94 See Spain Il, para 113. 
95 See Greece I, para 119. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
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restrictions; an encumbrance which the CPT unsurprisingly characterised as 
"unacceptable". 98 
(v) a marked deterioration in the atmosphere in cells. While such deterioration is a 
largely self-evident consequence of overcrowding, it is nevertheless worth 
considering just how serious it may be. At the maison d'arret Regina Coeli, Italy, in 
March 1992, for example, where floor space of just 9 sq. m. in the "chambres dortoirs" 
contained 6 beds, the atmosphere was found to be "particularly oppressive". 99 
(vi) the denial of personalised living-space. Also at Regina Coeli, as a result of the 
pressure on living-space occasioned by overcrowding, the prison authorities had 
found it impossible to furnish detainees with the storage facilities necessary to keep 
their personal effects. Consequently, they had been forced to keep them, inter alia, 
"in cardboard boxes on the floor, " with the result that they were denied even the 
simplest of personal pleasures. ' 00 
(vii) the obstruction of improvement or renovation work in an establishment and/or to 
its regime. In the view of the CPT, levels of overcrowding may, occasionally, be so 
great 
- 
and other physical features so poor 
- 
as to render it "illusory" to imagine that 
significant and necessary changes to an establishment are possible and the quality of 
prison life improved. 101 During its second periodic visit to the UK, in 1994, for 
example, it became clear to the CPT that the "need to keep the maximum possible 
amount of space available to accommodate [a growing population of] prisoners" had 
9' See Belgium I, pars 95. 
See Italy I, para 63. It should be noted, however, that detainees obliged to stay in such cells did have 
access to "une piece de sejour" of the same dimensions. 
10° Ideen, para 64. See, similarly, Turkey I, Para 91 (overcrowding in the dormitories of Izmir (Buca) 
Prison in October 1997 had forced prisoners to store their clothes in boxes or to hang them between 
beds). 
101 See France (Martinique) I, paras 48 and 95. 
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caused "major renovation work" at Leeds, Liverpool and Wandsworth Prisons to be 
"delayed". 102 One "early casualty" of these delays, it observed, was the December 
1994 "target date" for the ending of the practice of "slopping out". 103 This, it was 
convinced, would "not be met in any of the prisons visited". 104 
The prison regime 
In truth, to date, the CPT has offered few examples of the way in which overcrowding 
may affect particular aspects of the prison regime. It has confined itself, principally, 
to more general observations. Thus, to the Greek authorities, it simply remarked that 
overcrowding at Larissa Prison, when visited in March 1993, had contributed to a 
"major disruption" of the prison regime. '°5 Similarly, to the Spanish authorities, it 
suggested that the "already limited" regime activities offered at Basauri Prison in 
April 1991 had been "[i]nevitably... strained" by the establishment's "cramped, 
occasionally very cramped" cellular conditions; 106 and that, at the Modelo and Madrid 
I Prisons, visited in 1994, the rather inadequate provision of out-of-cell activities had 
been "inextricably linked" to the presence of overcrowding. 107 As if to emphasise the 
link, regarding its findings at the Madrid I Prison, the Committee suggested that the 
"material infrastructure" necessary to sustain an appropriate programme of activities 
102 See UK III, para 76. 
103 This target date had been intimated in the UK Government's Response and Follow-up report to the 
CPT's first periodic visit: see UK Response I, op cit, n5 above, at para 7 and UK Follow-up report I, 
op cit, n4 above, at para 60. "Slopping out" is a term used to describe the process whereby detainees 
defecate or urinate in buckets, pots or other receptacles and are periodically released from their cells in 
order to discharge them in an appointed facility. The process may be necessary in cells which are not 
equipped with integral sanitation: see, generally, 2°4 GR, para 49. The Committee has characterised the 
Practice as "degrading": see, e. g., Ireland I, para 100. 
°` See UK III, para 76. See also pares 56 and 71 of the report. Visiting the Isle of Man Prison in late 
1997, the CPT found that the practice of slopping out remained in operation in some cells (see UK N, 
para 112). The Isle of Man, it should be noted, possesses its own legal and administrative system, the 
remit of which includes the formulation of policy on deprivation of liberty. Even in mid-1998, it 
seems, slopping out was a (very rare) feature of some English prison regimes: see Prison Reform Trust, 
Prison Report, 1998, Issue No. 43, at p 20 and Issue No. 44, at p 21. 
105 See Greece 1, para 117. When visited, the establishment's occupancy rate stood at over 200%. It 
also had a "serious" under-staffing problem. 
106 See Spain I, para 119. 
107 See Spain II, para 133. See similarly UK I, para 58. 
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"already existed"; it was simply that in order to render the programme sustainable in 
practice, the prison population would have to be kept within its official capacity. '°8 
The point was just as trenchantly made to the Luxembourg authorities when, 
following its visit in 1993 and considering a project to construct a brand new prison 
adjacent to the Centre Penitentiaire, 109 the CPT sought to: 
"souligner l'importance qu'il ya d'assurer, dans le cadre du project de 
construction 
... 
l'adequation entre la capacite totale de 1'etablissement et les 
infrastructures en matiere d'activites (travail, education, sports, etc. ). "110 
Elsewhere, the existence of overcrowding in an establishment has been closely linked 
by the Committee to a sense among prisoners of "a monotonous and purposeless 
existence", so impoverished has the establishment's regime become as a result of the 
problem. " 
Given all this, it is not surprising that the CPT believes that an "improvement 
of regime activities is an objective which, to a large extent, is dependent on reducing 
overcrowding": 112 "remove that and the problem of inadequate regimes 
- 
though it 
will not resolve itself 
- 
will at least become solvable. "113 
Lastly in this connection 
- 
although not strictly a question of regime - it 
should be pointed out that where prison cells are overcrowded, self-evidently, 
"relationship-related ifficulties" may follow. "a 
108 Ibid. When visited, the prison's "official" capacity of 1,285 inmates was actually exceeded by 
almost 1,000: idem, pars 98. 
109 See Luxembourg I, para 41. 
"o Idem, para 72. 
111 See Spain IV (regarding Ceuta Prison in 1997). 
112 See Portugal II, para 102. This conclusion was precipitated by the discovery of serious 
overcrowding in at least three of the four prisons visited during May 1995. 
113 See UK I, pars 58. 
114 Idem, para 60 (regarding the practice of holding three detainees in cells intended only for one at 
Leeds and, "on occasion", Brixton, Prisons (1990)). 
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Prison services 
- 
Reception arrangements 
As the CPT remarked to the UK authorities following its first periodic visit: 
"[w]hen a prison is overcrowded, the efficiency of all its services will be 
adversely affected". ' 15 
The Committee was prompted to make this observation in the light of the 
unsatisfactory state of the reception arrangements seen at Leeds, Wandsworth and 
Brixton Prisons. Explaining precisely how "adversely affected" these arrangements 
were at the time of the visit, the CPT noted that the "considerable" pressure under 
which reception staff were having to work by virtue of the excessive numbers of 
prisoners they were obliged to accommodate, had "inevitably undermined" their role 
in suicide prevention and the protection of potentially vulnerable prisoners. 116 This 
sense of the inadequacy of the reception arrangements examined was rendered all the 
more acute, it seems, by the suicide of a young male inmate during the delegation's 
visit to Leeds Prison. He had previously been held in a single cell together with two 
other inmates. "? 
Reception arrangements at the Centre Penitentiaire de Fort-de-France, on 
Martinique (July 1994), have also been described as suffering as a result of 
overcrowding 
- 
though, clearly, the problem went much deeper than that. There, 
overcrowding, the Committee remarked in its first visit report, was such that "une 
separation stricte entre les prevenus et les condamnes ne pouvait pas... etre 
assuree". 
"8 
115 Ideen, pars 103. 
116 Ibid. 
11 Ideen, para 64. 
"s See France (Martinique) I, pars 33. As to the level of overcrowding referred to here by the CPT, see 
above, p 233. 
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- 
Prison health care services 
Prison health care services may become particularly strained when the establishment 
which they serve is overcrowded. Indeed, it is the view of the CPT that the provision 
of a satisfactory level of health care 
- 
which, it considers, is "always a demanding 
task" 
- 
may be "rendered all the more difficult" when a prison is, inter alia, 
overcrowded. For: 
"[t]he physical and psychological well-being of a prisoner 
- 
already at risk by 
virtue of the very fact of incarceration 
- 
will be further prejudiced under such 
conditions. The health care services of the prison concerned will tend to 
become overwhelmed by day-to day requests for medical attention and have 
no time to pursue a health policy of a preventive nature. " 119 
Certainly, in the Centre Penitentiaire de Fort-de-France on Martinique, in 1994, 
preventive health care policies appeared to be seriously threatened by the 
accommodation of perfectly healthy detainees in the prison infirmary due to 
overcrowding elsewhere in the establishment. The visiting delegation learned that 
this was a "regular" occurrence, carried out at the direction of the prison director, not 
a member of the health care staff and without the latter's prior consultation. 120 
Lastly in this connection, it is worth stressing that it is, of course, quite 
unacceptable to oblige patients to share beds and to render their living-space nugatory 
in the event of overcrowding, particularly in an environment in which infectious 
disease is prevalent. However, this, it seems, was precisely the effect of 
121 
overcrowding in the prison hospital at Jilava, Romania, when visited in 1995. 
"9 See Spain I, Para 132. 
120 See France (Martinique) I, Para 59. 
121 See Romania I, Para 159. 
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Precepts on overcrowding 
Introduction 
Naturally, the CPT wishes to see a "permanent end" to the phenomenon of prison 
overcrowding. Understandably therefore, to those measures "designed to bring [this] 
about", it accords a "very high priority. "122 As we saw above, the CPT considers that 
the elimination of overcrowding, where it exists, leaves authorities free to address 
other deficiencies extant in a particular establishment or, indeed, in the prison estate 
generally. Accordingly, where overcrowding occurs, it has stated, "the priority of 
priorities must be 
- 
through one means or another 
- 
to reduce" it in the 
establishment(s) concerned. For, "if this is not achieved", it believes, "attempts to 
improve conditions of detention [therein] will inevitably founder". 123 
However, the Committee appears to have shrunk from tackling the problem of 
overcrowding in its entirety. It has limited its utterances on the matter, thus far at 
least, merely to the promotion of its reduction (and ultimate elimination) and not the 
means by which this might be achieved. 124 Accordingly, it remarked to the UK 
authorities, in the wake of its visits to Leeds, Liverpool and Wandsworth Prisons in 
May 1994 that "[i]t is not for the CPT to prescribe the manner in which [the problem 
should be addressed]". 125 Nevertheless, the Committee has been prepared at least to 
infer certain solutions based, inter alia, on the experiences of and action taken by 
States parties themselves. It has also been quite prepared to recommend means by 
which the effects of overcrowding may be mitigated. 
122 See, e. g., Portugal II, paras 98 and 180; and UK M, paras 79 and 369. 123 See Greece I, pars 122; and, similarly, Netherlands (NA) I, paras 94 and 167. lu However, cf below, p 258 er seq. 125 See UK III, pars 79. 
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Reducing and/or eliminating overcrowding 
Respect for official capacity figures 
In resisting overcrowding, the CPT has stated, prison authorities' "minimum 
objective" should be "to respect the official capacity of the establishment[s 
affected]". 126 Meeting this objective is not, however, it seems, imperative. The 
Committee demonstrated a certain flexibility on the matter, for instance, when, 
regarding levels of overcrowding encountered in the Lisbon Judicial Police Group 
Prison, Portugal, in January 1992,127 it proclaimed that keeping the prison population 
within the limits of its official capacity (of 80) was merely something to be 
preferred, 128 in other words, it is submitted, something to which to aspire, not 
necessarily something to pursue as an article of faith. 
It is, of course, only possible to strive to meet the "minimum objective" when 
there exist official capacity figures towards which to work. In late 1993 in Ireland, 
for example, the problem of overcrowding was found to be "complicated, " inter alia, 
by the "lack of official capacity figures for prison establishments... no official limit 
had been set for the maximum number of prisoners who might be held in each 
establishment". 129 While the CPT did not expressly recommend the creation of such 
limits in its subsequent visit report 
- 
though, it did recommend the introduction of an 
"enforceable ceiling" on the inmate population of each prison"' 
- 
its preference for 
their existence may be clearly inferred from the rather vexed tenor of its remarks to 
the Irish authorities. Thus, the starting-point in the struggle to contain prison 
126 See Italy I, pars 79 (a prescription offered in the light of the "outrageous" levels of overcrowding 
obtaining at the maison d'arret San Vittore, in March 1992: see above, p 237). 
127 See above, p 239. 
128 See Portugal I, para 76. 
129 See Ireland 1, pars 97. 
130 Idem, paras 98 and 187. Such ceilings cannot, however, be considered akin to official capacity 
figures: see further below, p 260. 
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overcrowding may be said to lie not in the effort to attain the "minimum objective" of 
meeting official population figures, but, where necessary, in the setting of those 
figures themselves. 
The two types ofprecept 
As for measures designed to reduce and, ideally, eliminate overcrowding, in the view 
of the CPT 
- 
and notwithstanding its avowed reluctance to offer prescriptions 
- 
they 
comprise, essentially, two types: first, the creation of more prison places to 
accommodate expanding populations (i. e. "prison building programmes"); and, 
second, the formulation of policies intended to limit and/or regulate prison population 
levels. The genesis of both types is, perhaps, best illustrated by way of example. 
During its first periodic visit to the UK in 1990, the Committee learned, inter 
alia, that an "important prison building programme" was underway, that "other 
[unspecified] policies, which could lead to a reduction in the number of persons being 
sent to prison, [were] under consideration"131 and that, consequently, the authorities 
"hope[d] that by the mid-1990s the problem of overcrowding [would] be largely 
overcome". 
132 This hope was "shared" by the CPT. 133 However, in the light of 
findings made during its second periodic visit, almost four years later, the Committee 
could "only conclude, with regret, that such an assumption [was] no longer valid". 134 
Consequently, it considered that the UK authorities "must be prepared to make more 
radical efforts to address the problem of overcrowding", noting, in passing, that: 
131 See, similarly, France I, paras 98 and 99 (regarding the proposed construction of 25 new prisons and 
the introduction of "other measures" in 1991); Spain I, para 128 and Spain II, para 137 (regarding, the 
"expected" creation of 2,851 additional prison places in 1992); and Greece I, paras 94 and 272 (regarding a prison building/extension programme designed to increase national prison capacity by 
over 1,800 places, March 1993). 
132 See UK 1, para 59. 
133 See UK III, para 79. 
134 Ibid. 
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"... in those European countries which enjoy uncrowded prison systems, the 
existence of appropriate policies to limit and/or modulate the number of 
persons being sent to prison has tended to be an important element in 
maintaining the prison population at a manageable level". 135 
In the struggle to eliminate prison overcrowding therefore, it may be assumed that the 
formulation of policies to limit and/or regulate prison populations represents the 
CPT's preferred approach. However, we should not thereby regard prison building 
programmes as having, in its view, no merit at all, only that it does not regard them as 
of themselves, a single or, at least, principal, panacea. Indeed, such a view may be 
inferred in the Committee's 7th General Report. Therein, commenting on the "route" 
taken by "some" countries in tackling the problem of overcrowding by increasing the 
number of prison places, 136 it suggested that: 
"[f]or its part, [it] is far from convinced that providing additional 
accommodation will alone offer a lasting solution". 137 
"Indeed", it continued, "a number of European States have embarked on extensive 
programmes of prison building, only to find their populations rising in tandem with 
the increased capacity acquired by their prison estates". "By contrast", it suggested, 
policies designed to limit and control prison numbers have, "in certain States", made 
an "important contribution" to the fight against overcrowding. 138 These policies, it 
'3s Ibid. The CPT offered no examples of the countries referred to in this connection. 
'36 To those examples cited above, at n 131, might be added, inter alia, Belgium (see Belgium I, para 
86); the Netherlands Antilles (see Netherlands (NA) I, paras 66 and 95; and Portugal (see Portugal It, 
para 97). 
37 See 7th GR, pars 14. See, similarly, Ireland II, pars 59 (regarding the Irish authorities' "ambitious" 
prison building plan which, in 1998, was scheduled to provide an additional 1,100 prison places by 
August 1999 and a further 900 by 2002). 
138 Ibid. See, in the same connection, Portugal II, paras 98 and 180 (in response to the Portuguese 
authorities' expressed commitment to a "major" prison building/renovation programme); and now 
Portugal III, para 19 (regarding a proposed "Action Plan for the Prison System", unveiled in April 
1996, comprising, Inter alia, "an enhanced role for non-custodial penalties" and a reduction of the 
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has stated elsewhere, should be "multifaceted" and comprise, inter alia, the 
introduction of new measures "at the legislators' and sentencers' level". 139 
Developing the basic precept 
Although there appears little to add to the CPT's fundamental position as to what, in 
its view, represent the best means of reducing and/or eliminating prison 
overcrowding, it has occasionally in its published work appeared to supplement hat 
position in some incremental way. 
- 
Custodial sentence to be a punishment of last resort 
For instance, to some national authorities it has suggested that in determining what 
steps to take in order to bring prison populations into balance with available inmate 
accommodation: 
"... reference might usefully be made to Committee of Ministers' 
Recommendation R (92) 17 concerning consistency in sentencing, and more 
particularly to recommendation B 5(i), according to which `custodial 
sentences should be regarded as a sentence of last resort, and should therefore 
be imposed in cases where, taking due account of other relevant 
circumstances, the seriousness of the crime would make any other sentence 
clearly inadequate"'. 140 
To States parties whose penal policy is informed, it seems, by the spirit of 
recommendation B 5(i), the CPT has offered praise: "in a welcome departure from the 
situation observed... in many... other States which it visits", it remarked to the 
average time spent on remand and hailed by the CPT as "amongst the most ambitious and promising 
programmes] yet encountered by [it]'); and Romania I, pars 98. 
See UK IV, para 77 (reflecting, the CPT explained, the conclusions of the 12`h Council of Europe 
Conference of Directors of Prison Administration, held in November 1997). See, similarly, 
Netherlands (NA) IIl, Para 26 (wherein the CPT observed that measures should be taken at the 
"statutory" level if prison overcrowding is to be satisfactorily dealt with). 140 See, e. g., Czech Republic I, para 48; and Ireland 11, para 59. 
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Swedish authorities in 1999, for instance, "none of the prisons visited [in February 
1998]... suffered from overcrowding"; a state of affairs which, it was given to believe, 
was mirrored throughout the entire prison estate. "Apparently", it continued, "this has 
been achieved by making greater use of alternatives to prison such as suspended 
sentences, conditional release, community service and other community-based 
sanctions". 141 
If such alternatives to custodial sentences are to be more widely introduced 
and rendered effective, the argument runs, then national authorities must be prepared 
to consider the issuing of detailed sentencing guidance to judges. In this connection, 
it was with evident approval that the CPT, in its fourth published UK visit report, 
cited the terms of the Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation R (92) 17, 
which provides, inter alia, that: 
"[i]n view of the clear adoption by the Council of Europe of the policy of 
restraint in the use of imprisonment, this might be a topic suitable for 
legislative restrictions on sentencers. But, whatever the method used to 
implement the policy, it should be linked with more detailed guidance for 
judges. In order to ensure consistent answers to the question, `which varieties 
of offence are too serious for non-custodial sanctions? ', consideration should 
be given to the development of criteria". 142 
In encouraging States parties to formulate strategies for the reduction of 
overcrowding, the CPT has also focused attention on the remand prisoner population, 
which may comprise a not insignificant proportion of the overall prison population. 
141 See Sweden III, para 32. See in the same connection Spain VI, para 74 (regarding the authorities' 
increased use of "open regimes" in prison establishments, weekend detention and alternatives to 
imprisonment, all of which, the CPT was encouraged to see in 1998, had led to a reduction in the 
prison population); and, similarly, Iceland II, para 40 (regarding the situation perceived during the visit 
of Mar&April 1998). 
142 See UK N, para 77, n 32. See, similarly, Ireland II, para 59. 
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In this regard, it has suggested, "[d]ue account" should be taken of Committee of 
Ministers' Recommendation R (80) 11 concerning custody pending trial, which sets 
out the general principle that: 
"... no person charged with an offence shall be placed in custody pending trial 
unless the circumstances make it strictly necessary. Custody pending trial 
shall therefore be regarded as an exceptional measure and it shall never be 
compulsory nor be used for punitive reasons". 143 
- 
The creation ofpopulation "ceilings" 
Considering other alternatives to prison building programmes, to other Parties, with a 
view to "reinforc[ing]" the "status" of official capacity figures in prisons, the CPT has 
recommended the creation of a "ceiling... consisting of a certain percentage figure 
over the [official capacity], beyond which the acceptance of additional 
inmates... would be inadmissible". 144 In the view of the Committee, adherence to 
such a mechanism "should prevent any future slide" into a situation in which 
overcrowding becomes intolerable. '45 
- 
Involving other agencies in the execution of sentences 
To the UK authorities, in particular, the Committee has suggested that "the 
effectiveness of action to tackle [overcrowding] 
... 
might be enhanced by the active 
participation of agencies other than the Prison Service". 146 While offering no 
elaboration, it may be possible that what the CPT was here referring to was a penal 
culture in the UK 
- 
perhaps unique among States parties to the ECPT147 
- 
in which the 
143 Ibid (main text). See also Ireland II, para 59. 
14ý See UK I, pars 61. 
145 Ibid. On the island of Martinique, just such a "ceiling" has, it seems, been (judicially) created and, 
more importantly, enforced: see France (Martinique) I, para 28. However, cf Netherlands (NA) II, 
pares 20-21 ("unacceptable" occupancy levels found in Koraal Specht Prison in 1997, notwithstanding 
the introduction of a policy of capping the prison population). 
' See UK III, pars 79. 
147 See, e. g., Stephen Shaw, The Role of NGOs in Assisting and Promoting the Work of the CPT, in 
APT, Acts of the Strasbourg Seminar (1995), pp 231-6. 
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active participation of a wide range of NGOs (whose objective is not only to monitor 
penal conditions, but to provide, inter alia, valuable rehabilitative and educational 
support for prisoners), combined with the work of more formal organisations, like 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons and a network of social services, means that the 
infrastructure required if overcrowding is to be successfully resisted is, in fact, already 
in place. 
- 
Introducing a measured strategy for population reduction 
Regarding findings at Basauri Prison, Spain, where, in April 1991, despite a prison 
population at 140% of official capacity, physical conditions were "not... intolerable" 
and out-of-cell time "considerable", the CPT, it will be recalled, recommended the 
implementation of a two-stage strategy to reduce overcrowding, comprising measures 
"designed to contain" the overcrowding and "in due course to reduce" the inmate 
population". 148 If followed, a strategy like this, it is submitted, would be likely to 
prove less onerous to the authorities than one requiring, for example, the taking of 
immediate steps to reduce overcrowding. It has much to recommend it, therefore, 
particularly in circumstances in which overcrowding is so acute or the prison 
infrastructure so strained that to take more radical steps may not be practicable. 
However, whether or not the CPT would be quite so generous in the absence 
of such mitigating features as satisfactory out-of-cell time and freedom of movement 
is not clear in its remarks to the Spanish authorities. For present purposes therefore, 
the approach recommended should be regarded as limited to the kinds of situation 
encountered at Basauri Prison; it would be presumptuous to suggest its wider 
application. 
1" See Spain I, para 119. See also above, p 235. 
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Congenial State party policies 
Occasionally, without ever really expressing either approval or disapproval, the 
Committee has cited certain policies adopted by States parties with a view to reducing 
and/or regulating overcrowding. Thus: 
(i) in March 1993, it has noted, "[a]t the same time" that they were formulating a 
major prison building/extension programme, 149 the Greek authorities were adopting or 
planning "various measures... which should help to reduce the prison population". 
Among them were proposals to release prisoners conditionally "after the serving of 
3/5 of [their] sentence, instead of 2/3 as had been the rule hitherto"; and the 
"conversion of a part of the sentence of some prisoners into a financial penalty". lso 
However, while the early release of certain prisoners may, clearly, help reduce 
the prison population, the CPT is not without misgivings as to the propriety of the 
practice. In Ireland, in late 1993, for example, recourse to early release procedures, it 
observed, had merely "complicated" the existing "quandary" surrounding 
overcrowding. 151 There, the authorities: 
"... [made] daily use of the executive power of the Minister of Justice to order 
the early release of prisoners... every evening each Governor [was] obliged to 
telephone the Department of Justice with the prison's population for the day. 
If that figure [was] over a limit determined by the Department, the Governor 
[would] be informed during the following morning of the prisoners whom the 
Department wishe[d] to be released". 152 
However: 
149 See above, p 256, n 131. 
150 See Greece I, paras 94 and 272. See, similarly, Belgium I, para 86; and Netherlands (NA) II, para 
20 (regarding the so-called "freedom train'). 
's' See generally above, p 255. 
'52 See Ireland I, para 97. 
262 
"[t]he criteria used by the Department... to determine which prisoners to 
release were not known to staff in the prisons visited and this system... known 
as the `revolving door syndrome'... was widely regarded as operating in an 
arbitrary fashion". 153 
Clearly therefore, the CPT is, to say the least, equivocal about the value of early 
release procedures in the fight against overcrowding. The possibilities of their 
lacking transparency and operating arbitrarily would appear to be of particular 
concern. Nevertheless, nothing in the Irish visit report 
- 
or, indeed, elsewhere, it may 
be said 
- 
suggests that the Committee is opposed to such procedures in principle. On 
the evidence available 
- 
and provided satisfactory safeguards are in place 
- 
there 
seems no reason why it should object to their use. 
(ii) in Icelandic prisons, when visited in July 1993, "in order to avoid overcrowding", 
the CPT has remarked, the authorities applied a "so-called 'queuing stsy em". What 
this meant in practice was that "[o]n average, about a hundred individuals who ha[d] 
been sentenced by the courts to terms of imprisonment remain[ed] at liberty, pending 
a summons from the Prison Service to serve their sentence". 154 
(iii) where overcrowding obtains only in some of an establishment's cells 
- 
the prison 
as a whole, remaining free of the problem 
- 
then, clearly, prisoner allocation 
procedures may be said to be deficient in some way. For example, at the Klagenfurt 
police prison, Austria 
- 
whose official capacity, in late 1994, was 95 detainees and 
whose actual population, 47155 
- 
it was observed that although the maximum capacity 
of certain multiple occupancy cells had been reached, other cells 
- 
"four in total" 
- 
153 Ibid. The "syndrome" was said, in addition, to have made it difficult to plan regime activities in the 
prisons concerned. 
s` See Iceland I, para 51 (and now Iceland II, para 40). 155 See Austria II, para 65. 
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remained empty. '56 Significantly, in the view of the CPT, the maximum capacities of 
certain of the cells had been incorrectly calculated. As a result, it considered that they 
were holding more prisoners than they could satisfactorily physically accommodate. 
Consequently, it recommended a "better distribution of detainees in relation to the 
number of cells available". 157 It may be said, therefore, that, in the opinion of the 
CPT, in allocating detainees, prison authorities should consider how to make best use 
of available accommodation; it is not necessarily appropriate to fill one cell to 
capacity before starting to fill another 
- 
particularly where, in its view, cell capacity 
figures may be set too high. 158 
Mitigating the effects of overcrowding 
In circumstances in which it is impractical to envisage an immediate end to 
overcrowding, thought must be given to ways in which its effects might best be 
alleviated. It is clear from its published work that the CPT is exercised by this need 
- 
though, to date, it is submitted, its standards in this area have remained to a large 
extent undeveloped. Those (potential) standards which may be identified in its work 
are largely the product of inference and, accordingly, may be open to question. 
Nevertheless, they may comprise the nucleus of a workable code. 
The provision of enhanced freedom of movement (and the development of other 
aspects of the prison regime) 
Visiting the maison d'arret Regina Coeli, Italy, in March 1992, the CPT observed that 
the "negative aspects" of overcrowding were "somewhat mitigated" by the 
authorities' recourse, first, to an "open door" policy, under which, daily, between the 
136 Ideen, para 66. 
157 Ibid. See also para 163. 
158 See also below, pp 266-7. 
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hours of 8.30 am and 3.00 pm, inmates were guaranteed "free movement" in their 
accommodation wings; and, second, to a policy of association, under which detainees 
were permitted to visit other detainees between 5.00 pm and 6.30 pm. 159 The 
Committee clearly found such arrangements congenial160 
- 
even if, in other respects, 
notably regime activities and the management of inter-prisoner relations, the 
establishment was found to be deficient. 
As at Regina Coeli, when visited in March 1993, some dormitories in the 
hospital at the Korydallos Prison Complex, Greece, offered "rather restricted" living 
space. This deficiency had been "palliated", however, the CPT remarked in its first 
Greek visit report, by certain regime arrangements, namely, the provision of "ready" 
access to exercise yards and shower facilities. 161 
Thus, it may be said that the freedom to move about a prison establishment for 
a meaningful part of the day may be regarded by the Committee as an important tool 
in the struggle to neutralise the effects of overcrowding. The provision of "ready" 
access to outdoor exercise facilities and showers162 and a (limited) freedom of 
association may also be regarded favourably in this connection. 
The provision of enhanced work activities 
It may be said that where an overcrowded establishment is in a position to offer 
meaningful work 
- 
as well as, of course, other regime 
- 
activities to a significant 
proportion of its inmates, notwithstanding the strain on its resources occasioned 
thereby, the deleterious effects of overcrowding are likely to be alleviated. Thus, at 
the Centre de semi-liberte at Ducos on Martinique, where, in July 1994, the number of 
'59 See Italy I, para 72. 
16° See, in the same connection, Spain I, paras 119 and 126 (regarding the "considerable" out-of-cell 
time 
- 
and freedom of movement possible 
- 
for inmates of Spain's Basauri and Puerto de Santa Maria II 
Prisons, April 1991). 
161 See Greece I, pars 171. 
162 Though what this means in practice is not clear upon demand?; once a day?; once every 36 hours? 265 
beds available suggested that some 50 detainees might be accommodated in premises 
officially capable of holding only 16, the CPT observed that "the majority of 
detainees worked outside during the day". 163 Though somewhat inscrutable, from the 
tenor of its remarks to the French authorities, it was clear that the Committee was 
pleased by the manner in which relief from such potential overcrowding might be 
brought to inmates at the Centre. 
A progressive improvement in regime as overcrowding is reduced 
Notwithstanding the last two points, it is unreasonable, it is submitted, to expect the 
negative effects of overcrowding to be readily alleviated by the simple expedient of 
developing one or more areas of the prison regime. It is less unreasonable however, 
to expect an improvement in regime 
- 
and presumably, therefore, in the quality of 
prison life generally 
- 
concurrently with a reduction in levels of overcrowding. The 
freeing up of prison accommodation should be considered as prefiguring or, indeed, 
accompanying the development of regime activities. It would appear to have been in 
this spirit that the CPT, in recommending to the Dutch authorities a "thorough 
examination" of the ways in which the regime in Koraal Specht Prison, Netherlands 
Antilles (June 1994), might be improved, suggested that: 
"... fuller programmes [of activities] be progressively introduced as 
overcrowding is reduced". 164 
Prison authorities to use all available space to accommodate detainees 
Given the general levels of overcrowding obtaining in the maison d'arret Regina 
Coeli, Italy, when visited in 1992,165 the CPT was "surprised" to find one section of 
163 See France (Martinique) I, para 44. 
164 See Netherlands (NA) I, paras 97 and 168. See, similarly, UK I, para 62 (regarding the state of 
affairs in the three local prisons visited in August 1990); and Spain IV, para 31 (regarding findings in 
Ceuta Prison in 1997). 
163 See Italy, para 58 (official capacity: 871 detainees; actual population: "almost" 950). 
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the establishment, comprising some 34 cells, "virtually empty". 166 (At the time of the 
visit three detainees occupied the section; and the relevant registers showed that the 
number of its occupants generally varied between one and six. ) The Committee was 
told that confinement in the section concerned was restricted to disciplined and other 
isolated prisoners and that by order of the central prison authorities, it had to be kept 
free for certain other categories of detainee, "not otherwise defined". 167 To the CPT, 
"such an approach is hardly reasonable when it is known that chronic overcrowding 
prevails in the rest of the establishment". It added, parenthetically, that in other 
sectors of the prison "reserve" cells existed, capable of being used in emergencies. 168 
The CPT's approach to the use made of available accommodation in prison 
establishments is, on the evidence of its experience at Regina Coeli, very clear: if the 
accommodation is free and the establishment concerned is otherwise overcrowded, 
then it ought to be used, regardless of its designated function. 169 
Increasing staff members 
In endeavouring to cope with an increased 
- 
and possibly increasing 
- 
prison 
population, the employment of, inter alia, more prison officers may be beneficial. 
Regulation of the prison environment and the organisation of regime activities may be 
enhanced thereby. It was doubtless in this spirit that the CPT "welcome[d]" the 
initiative taken by the Belgian authorities following its first periodic visit to the 
country in November 1993 
- 
during which, it established that overcrowding affected 
166 Ideen, para 66. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 See, similarly, Turkey 1, paras 91,93 and 97,1" indent (regarding the CPT's recommendation to 
exploit "all... available prisoner accommodation" in the light of findings in 1997 that while 
overcrowding was widespread in the wing of Izmir (Buca) Prison accommodating "common law" 
prisoners, half the accommodation units in the wing reserved for convicted terrorists was left empty); 
and 103 and 110,1` indent (regarding Mersin E-type Prison). 
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the entire Belgian prison estate170 
- 
to release the funds necessary to recruit 157 new 
officers and 19 additional administrative and nursing staff. 171 
Conclusion 
In contemporary Europe, it should be clear from the above analysis, the problem of 
prison overcrowding represents one of the most compelling of penal concerns. It is an 
indubitably widespread phenomenon, with deep historical roots. Very few Parties to 
the ECPT would appear to be immune from it; its effects are felt in western, southern, 
central and eastern, and parts of northern Europe. Only Scandinavian Parties, notably 
Sweden, where, as we have seen, the Government's approach to the matter has 
induced CPT approbation, appear to have contained the problem. Understandably, 
overcrowding is something about which the CPT has expressed a profound 
apprehension, particularly in the light of its view that it may give rise to inhuman or 
degrading treatment. Consequently, it is a principal concern when visiting places of 
detention. Where it exists, the Committee believes, its eradication or, more 
realistically perhaps, reduction, represents one of the key elements in any strategy to 
protect prisoners against ill-treatment. 
Notwithstanding such concerns, the Committee has yet to formulate distinct 
precepts on the kinds of measure which, it considers, States parties could usefiilly 
adopt in order to reduce and, ultimately, eliminate the phenomenon. It acknowledges 
that the principal measures adopted by States in this regard comprise the creation of 
more prison places and/or the formulation of policies designed to limit and/or regulate 
the numbers of persons sent to prison. Its preference, clearly, is for greater efforts to 
be made in respect of the latter. However, it has taken few steps to elaborate its 
10 See above, p 240. 
171 See Belgium I, para 130. 
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views. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a number of potential precepts in its 
work based on its comprehensive analysis of Party practice. It has highlighted and, in 
some cases, commended, often idiosyncratic approaches to the problem and it clearly 
views such approaches as possessing a certain merit (e. g. the prospect of introducing 
early release procedures, inter alia, in Greece in 1993; the "queuing system" 
obtaining in Iceland also in 1993; the "open door" policies operating in maisons 
d'arret in Italy in 1992; and the implementation of "open regimes" and weekend 
detention in Spanish prison establishments in 1998). Further, it has referred, in 
approving terms, to other Council of Europe initiatives on the matter (notably 
Committee of Ministers' Recommendation R (92) 17 regarding, in particular, the 
imposition of a custodial sentence as a measure of last resort). The topic, therefore, is 
one on which, demonstrably, CPT practice has been strongly influenced and, 
occasionally, led inter alia by that of Parties. To study it affords one an intriguing 
insight into the manner in which CPT standards may be formed. Accordingly, it is 
one feature of the Committee's work to which we shall return. 172 
Overcrowding in combination with other institutional 
deficiencies 
Introduction 
As we have seen, prison overcrowding is, of itself, a source of anxiety for the CPT. 
In combination with other environmental deficiencies, however, its effects, naturally, 
are compounded. Consequently, the Committee is "particularly concerned" when, in 
the course of a visit, "it finds a combination of overcrowding, poor regime activities 
172 See below, p 492 et seq. 
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and inadequate access to toilet/washing facilities in the same establishment". 173 
Indeed, such is the "inextricable link" between these three elements, the CPT has 
remarked, that: 
"to assess [the problem of overcrowding] properly, it... needs to be seen in the 
light of the position [in the establishment concerned] as regards integral 
sanitation and regime activities". 174 
As for the risks posed to the prison environment by the presence of all three 
phenomena, it considers that: 
"each alone [would] be a matter of serious concern; combined they form a 
potent mixture. The three elements interact, the deleterious effects of each of 
them being multiplied by those of the two others". "S 
Consequently, having observed, in the UK, in 1990, just how acute these "deleterious 
effects" may be, the Committee remarked that: 
"[i]t is a generally recognised principle that people are sent to prison as a 
punishment, not for punishment. However, many prisoners met [in the three 
male prisons visited]... understandably perceived their conditions of detention 
as being in themselves a form of punishment". 176 
As for the "cumulative effect" on prisoners of this "pernicious combinations177 of 
conditions, in the view of the CPT, it is potentially "extremely detrimental". 178 
Indeed, "under certain circumstances, " it has insisted 
- 
and as might be expected, 
173 See 2°d GR, para 50. See, similarly, Portugal II, pars 95. 174 See UK I, para 41 
175 Idem, para 57. 
176 Ibid. 
'n Ide, %rara 229; and UK 111, paras 78 and 368. 
178 See 2 GR, para 50; and Portugal II, pars 95. See also Bulgaria I, paras 113 and 239. 
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given its views on the possible effects of overcrowding alone179 
- 
"[i]t could be 
considered to amount to inhuman and degrading treatment". 180 Accordingly, where 
the combination is present, it holds, the problem should be addressed "with the utmost 
urgency" 
. 
181 
Before considering the particular combination of overcrowding, inadequate 
regime activities and poor sanitation in detail, it should be acknowledged that a 
pernicious combination of deficiencies can, not surprisingly, exist in other forms, too. 
In June 1994, at the Koraal Specht Prison in the Netherlands Antilles, for example, 
systemic overcrowding and an impoverished regime were found to exist in 
combination with a "poor level of cleanliness and hygiene" 
- 
which is not necessarily 
the same thing as poor sanitation. 182 As it happened, these three problems were 
"compounded" by a fourth deficiency, namely, the "generally run-down state of the 
establishment". 183 "To subject prisoners to such conditions of detention", the CPT 
averred subsequently, "amounts... to inhuman and degrading treatment". 1TM 
Accordingly, it sought to highlight its concerns by means of an immediate observation 
at the end of its visit. '85 
Similarly, visiting Portugal in May 1995, the Committee found in both the 
Oporto Judicial Police Prison and C Wing of Oporto Prison, that, in addition to the 
combination of shortcomings identified above, other "elements" rendered the position 
I" See above, p 241. 
180 See Portugal II, pars 95. In May 1995, those circumstances were found to obtain in Oporto Judicial 
Police Prison (idem, para 85 et seq), and in C wing of Oporto Prison (para 90 et seq). See also UK I, 
paras 57 and 229; UK lII, paras 78 and 368; Bulgaria I, paras 113 and 239; and France I, para 93. 
sl See UK I, pars 57. 
'82 See Netherlands (NA) I, paras 65 and 165. 
183 Ibid. See similarly, France 1, para 93 (regarding the material conditions of detention of the 
"majority" of detainees held in two accommodation blocks in the maison d'arret de Marseille-Baumette 
in late 1991, including the "bad general state of repair" of the cells viewed); and Ireland I, para 104 
(regarding, the "dirty and dilapidated" cellular conditions in which a "considerable number" of 
prisoners in Mountjoy, Limerick and Cork Prisons and St. Patrick's Institution were held in 1993). 
84 Ibid. 
185 Idem, paras 10 and 166. 
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of prisoners held therein "even more objectionable". These elements comprised, at 
the Judicial Police Prison, a "complete denial" of outdoor exercise, and, in C Wing of 
Oporto Prison, an absence of "effective staff supervision, " which, the CPT contended, 
gave rise to a "potentially perilous environment". 186 
Findings 
In its first UK visit report, under the heading "inhuman or degrading treatment arising 
from the conditions of detention", the CPT, in describing material conditions 
observed in prisons visited in 1990, sought to remind the authorities that: 
"[m]uch has been written, by Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons and 
others, about the ills that currently beset local prisons in England. Prominence 
is always given to a trinity of interrelated problems: overcrowding, lack of 
integral sanitation (which results in the "slopping out" procedure) and 
inadequate regime activities for prisoners". 187 
Hardly surprisingly, therefore, the visiting delegation "paid particular attention" to 
these questions when attending Brixton, Leeds and Wandsworth Prisons, '88 a degree 
of scrutiny still necessary some four years later when, making its second periodic visit 
and "fully conscious of the considerable efforts" made by the UK authorities to 
improve matters since its first, the CPT found, nevertheless, that "certain areas" of 
Leeds, Liverpool, Wandsworth and Barlinnie Prisons were "still 
... 
blighted" by the 
'16 See Portugal II, paras 95 and 179, (and also paras 89 and 94 of the report). See, similarly, Slovakia 
1, para 188 (in Bratislava Prison, Slovakia, in 1995, for the "great majority" of inmates seen, the denial 
of proper outdoor exercise had compounded problems of overcrowding and the absence of any regime, 
rendering their quality of life "very poor"). 187 See UK I, pars 36. 
188 Ibid. One of the two female establishments visited in 1990, Bulwood Hall Prison, also suffered from 
the "trinity" of problems: idem, para 129 et seq. 
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same combination of problems. Accordingly, "further action", the Committee 
suggested, "[was] required". 189 
Effects on the prison environment 
It is probably true to say that many of the negative effects of prison overcrowding 
identified above also affect establishments subject, in addition, inter alia, to 
inadequate regime activities and poor sanitation. However, it is probably also true 
that a number of effects may be attributable, specifically, to the presence in an 
establishment of the particular concatenation of conditions with which we are 
concerned here 
- 
effects which cannot be attributed simply to one or other of the 
individual elements which together constitute the trinity. 
Overall quality of life in prisons 
It was the view of the CPT, following its visit to the UK in 1990, that "[t]he 
combination of excessively cramped accommodation, lack of integral sanitation and 
very limited out-of-cell time" obtaining in Leeds and Brixton Prisons in particular, 
had "result[ed] in totally unacceptable conditions of detention for the persons 
[affected]". 190 More specifically, reflecting on the concept of "dynamic security, " 
which, at that time, was being "promoted" by the UK prison authorities and which 
comprised, inter alia, the treatment of prisoners "as individuals" and the development 
of good staff-inmate relations, the Committee suggested that: 
"[o]f course, treating people as individuals and developing good relationships 
between staff and prisoners is not easy in an overcrowded prison in which the 
189 See UK III, paras 78,343 and 368. Indeed, at Barlinie, the problem was compounded by the "poor 
state of repair" of many cells. 190 See UK I, para 60. 
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facilities for providing purposeful activities for prisoners are inadequate". 191 
Accordingly, it stated, "[t]he notion of dynamic security will become much more 
relevant to.. 
. 
prisons when overcrowding is reduced and regimes can be improved". 192 
Rather trenchantly, the CPT noted in this respect that Holloway Prison, visited at the 
same time was not overcrowded. Thus, it seemed directly to connect the successful 
realisation of the concept of "dynamic security" with the absence of that combination 
of conditions which otherwise might inhibit it. For, at Holloway, free of the 
"threefold set of problems" encountered at the three male prisons visited and 
benefiting from "good" staff-inmate relations, there obtained, the CPT stated, a "much 
higher" general quality of fife. 193 
Prison medical services 
It goes without saying that, just as prison overcrowding renders the provision of 
satisfactory health care services a particularly onerous task, 194 "[i]n a prison that is 
overcrowded, does not provide prisoners with ready access to toilet facilities and 
offers very few regime activities, that task takes on herculean proportions". 195 
Accordingly 
- 
and reflecting observations made in the specific context of 
overcrowding 
- 
the CPT has offered the view that a prisoner's physical and 
psychological well-being "will be seriously prejudiced under conditions of this sort"; 
prison medical services will tend to be "overwhelmed" by daily requests for attention 
'91 Idem, Para 85. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Idem, Para 119. 
194 See above, p 253. 
195 See UK I, Para 141; and, similarly, Portugal I, Para 113 (provision of satisfactory level of health 
care rendered "very difficult" by such conditions); Portugal II, Para 121; Italy I, Para 109 ("tres 
ardue'); and Ireland I, Para 114 ("all the more difficult"). 
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and, able only to "react to events", will have "no time to pursue a health policy of a 
preventive nature"196 
- 
"for example, regarding the prevention of epidemics' 
. 
197 
Insofar as the UK is concerned, this was, the Committee has stated, "generally 
speaking, the situation... found [in 1990] at Brixton, Leeds and Wandsworth Prisons, 
in particular at the first two establishments". By contrast, "[t]he position at Holloway 
Prison", it noted, "was far better". 198 
Suicide prevention policies 
Aside from more general effects on the quality of prison life and services, in the 
specific context of suicide prevention policies, the CPT has made it clear just how 
determinative to their success or failure is the presence in an establishment of the 
"trinity" of problems identified above. To the CPT: 
"[t]he central plank of a suicide prevention programme in a prison... must be 
to address the problems of overcrowding, lack of integral sanitation and 
inadequate regimes. It may be true that the conditions found in 
many... prisons will rarely be the sole and unique cause of a suicide; however, 
for someone who is already predisposed to taking his life, they might often 
prove the last straw". 199 
Precepts 
While, of course, very important, little need really be said here, it is submitted, about 
CPT precepts on policies for the elimination 
- 
or, at least, mitigation - of the 
196 UK I, para 141. See also Ireland I, para 114. 
197 See Italy I, para 109. 
198 See UK I, para 142. Health care services at Bulwood Hall Prison were not exaniined in 1990 
because the visiting team did not include a doctor. 
"9 Idem, para 172. See also UK IV, para 140 (in the light of findings in the Isle of Man Prison when 
visited in 1997). 
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combination of overcrowding, poor sanitation arrangements and impoverished regime 
activities. For, many of them have already been considered in the specific context of 
overcrowding, and the remainder would best be addressed in sections devoted to the 
other two problems, neither of which falls within the scope of the present work. 
However, it may be worth emphasising what the CPT considers constitutes its 
priorities in this area. In this regard, to the UK authorities, regarding the 
"inextricabl[e] link" which, as we have seen, it determined existed between 
overcrowding and inadequate regime activities in several establishments visited in 
1990, it suggested that: 
"... the emphasis must be placed on eliminating overcrowding; remove that 
and the problem of inadequate regimes 
- 
though it will not resolve itself 
- 
will 
at least become solvable". 200 
This brings us back to the phenomenon of overcrowding. Clearly, in the view of the 
CPT, where it exists, it may be said to be the one fundamental problem whose 
eradication may materially alter the way in and extent to which the quality of life 
generally in establishments may be improved. Indeed, it may prove impracticable to 
address other difficulties if problems of overcrowding have not first been attended to. 
200 See UK I, pars 58. 
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16 
The Use of Force and/or Instruments of Physical Restraint 
Against Persons Deprived of Their Liberty 
Introduction 
In its 2°d General Report, the CPT averred that: 
"[p]rison staff will on occasion have to use force to control violent [or 
disturbed'] prisoners and, exceptionally, may even need to resort to 
instruments of physical restraint. These are clearly high-risk situations insofar 
as the possible ill-treatment of prisoners is concerned, and as such call for 
specific safeguards". 
Although the Committee was here referring to the use of force and/or instruments of 
restraint specifically in prison establishments, in what follows 
- 
and somewhat self- 
evidently 
- 
it will be clear that it considers that the same precepts ought to apply, 
mutatis mutandis, in respect of detention, inter alia, by the police, the immigration 
authorities and staff in juvenile detention centres and psychiatric establishments. 
The consequences for detainees of the application of measures of force or 
restraint are axiomatic. "[I]nvariably", the Committee has stated: 
"in those rare cases where the use of [force and/or] instruments of restraint is 
justified, this will... impinge upon the dignity of the detained person to whom 
such devices are applied". 3 
Further, when such measures are applied inappropriately, it holds, they may create 
'A phrase added by the Committee in Spain I, at pars 98. 2 See 2°" GR, Para 53. See also UK III, pars 310. 
3 See Germany II, Para 166. 
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"serious hazards to the physical well-being of [persons] 94 and, as we shall see, may be 
considered to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment and even torture. 
Grounds on which measures of force/restraint may be resorted to 
In the experience of the CPT, recourse to force and/or measures of restraint against 
detainees may be legitimised by national authorities on a number of grounds. Such 
measures have, for instance, been held to be lawful, inter alia, with a view to calming 
violent prisoners or those who, it is feared, may commit acts of self-harm or suicide5 
- 
that is, when they are considered "unavoidably necessary for [the detainee's] life or 
health or that of others". They have also been legitimised in order to permit prison 
staff to carry out their duties or implement security measures "if it appears that there 
is no other way of achieving their purpose". 7 
Methods of restraint 
The CPT has expressed opinions on a variety of methods of force and restraint 
techniques encountered during visits. Instances involving certain types of measure 
have recurred frequently; others, by contrast, have come as something of a surprise to 
visiting delegations. It is worth considering many of them here, as a preface to our 
examination of CPT precepts on the subject. It is worth noting, too, also in a 
prefatory sense, the terms of Rule 39, EPR, which provides that: 
"The use of chains and irons shall be prohibited. Handcuffs, restraint jackets 
and other body restraints shall never be applied as a punishment. They shall 
not be used except in the following circumstances: 
4 See Greece I, para 202. 
3 See Denmark I, para 32. 
6 See Sweden I, para 127. 
7 See Germany I, pars 18. 
278 
a. if necessary, as a precaution against escape during a transfer, provided 
that they shall be removed when the prisoner appears before a judicial or 
administrative authority unless that authority decides otherwise; 
b. on medical grounds, by direction and under the supervision of the medical 
officer; 
c. by order of the director, if other methods of control fail, in order to protect 
a prisoner from self-injury, injury to others or to prevent serious damage 
to property; in such instances the director shall at once consult the medical 
officer and report to the higher administrative authority". 
The CPT's fundamental view on the kinds of restraint technique which, it accepts, 
may legitimately be used in places of detention was succinctly expressed in its second 
German visit report. Therein, while accepting the routine attenuation of detainees' 
dignity occasioned by the application of such devices, it averred that: 
"... it is important to ensure that this effect is not aggravated by the nature of 
the restraints applied". g 
Handcuffs 
In March 1992, a CPT delegation visited the maison d'arret San Vittore, Italy, during 
which visit it witnessed the arrival of a number of detainees, each restrained by "very 
tight" irons and joined to the next man by chains. Indeed, so tightly fitted were the 
irons, it was observed, that when removed, several detainees were left with contusions 
on their wrists-9 For its part, the CPT offered the view, subsequently, that if, "as a 
precautionary measure", it is considered necessary to restrain a detainee during his 
= See Germany II, para 166. 
9 See Italy I, para 152. 
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transfer to and from establishments, then appropriately applied handcuffs ought to be 
the method adopted. 1° The Committee's inference here is clear, it is submitted: 
applied properly, handcuffs are an acceptable method of controlling detainees who, in 
the interests of security, are considered to require some form of restraint. Indeed, it 
has stated elsewhere that the use of plastic handcuffs in the enforcement of removal 
orders against foreign national detainees may be considered "unexceptionable". " 
However, much depends, obviously, on the circumstances in which handcuffs 
are applied. For instance, visiting the Sasinkova Street Police Station, Bratislava, 
Slovakia, in 1995, a delegation witnessed two persons handcuffed to radiators. While 
the first detainee was able to sit on a bench, the second was found standing with his 
face to the wall, with "no opportunity" to sit down 
- 
an adjacent chair being used by a 
police officer acting as his monitor. He remained thus for two hours. Passing 
members of the public, moreover, could see both detainees. 12 Further, it appeared 
from the delegation's observations that the practice of handcuffing persons to 
radiators in police stations throughout Slovakia was "common". Indeed, a "certain 
number" of persons interviewed alleged that they had been restrained thus for several 
hours, in "painfully contorted" positions. 13 In the Committee's view: 
"[h]andcuffing detained persons to radiators (or another object in a room) is a 
practice which should be avoided; proper custody facilities should be provided 
instead". 14 
10 Ibid. 
11 See Germany III, para 12. 
'2 See Slovakia I, para 35. 
13 Idem, para 15. 
14 Idem, paras 35 and 183. See, similarly, Romania I, pars 88 (regarding the practice in a number of ill- 
equipped police establishments visited in 1995 of handcuffing detainees to chairs and other items of 
fumiture); and Spain VI, paras 52 and 60 (wherein the CPT described the practice of handcuffing 
prisoners 
- 
"in a variety of positions" 
- 
to metal rings attached to beds in the segregation unit of Salto 
del Negro Prison in 1998 as `unacceptable"). 
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Further, it considered: 
"it is clearly unacceptable for persons to be kept handcuffed in full view of 
members of the public visiting the police station concerned and/or to be 
obliged to stand for lengthy periods". '5 
In a similarly striking instance, in late 1996, the CPT received a "number" of 
allegations from representatives of NGOs 
- 
"corroborated by convincing photographs 
and video images" 
- 
that Danish police officers "on occasion drag detainees to distant 
police vehicles by their handcuffed wrists, without providing any support to the arms 
and shoulders". 16 The physiological effects of prolonged suspension by the wrists, the 
CPT subsequently suggested to the authorities, is to cause "peripheral nerve damage 
of a potentially serious nature". Accordingly, it recommended that Danish police 
officers be given clear instructions that such a practice is unacceptable. '7 
The CPT has also had cause to deprecate the inappropriate use of handcuffs in 
penal environments. For instance, in its fourth UK visit report, it was prompted to 
criticise the practice, apparent during its delegation's visit in 1997, of applying 
handcuffs to disciplined prisoners in the Isle of Man Prison. Such prisoners, its 
delegation learned, remained handcuffed at all times when outside their cells, 
including when participating in outdoor exercise and apparently when receiving 
visits. '8 When interviewed about the measure, the prison Governor insisted that 
"there was nothing punitive about [it]; it was necessary to prevent escape... s19 The 
CPT, for its part, "whilst recognising the force of that argument", observed that "the 
use of handcuffs over a prolonged period as a precaution against escape is not 
is Ibid. 
16 See Denmark II, para 14. 
'7 Ibid. See also para 135 of the report. 18 See UK IV, para 105. 
19 Ideen, para 107. 
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acceptable. Other means can and should be found of countering such a risk". 20 It 
suggested further that: 
"... the practice of routinely handcuffing prisoners when outside their cells is 
highly questionable, all the more so when it is applied for a prolonged period 
of time. It is axiomatic that handcuffs should never be applied as a 
punishment. Further, to be handcuffed when receiving a visit could certainly 
be considered as degrading for both the prisoner concerned and his visitor" 
. 
21 
Accordingly, it sought an "urgent review" of the practice. 22 The Committee was 
similarly emphatic in its sixth Spanish visit report following its delegation's discovery 
in 1998 that acutely agitated psychiatric patients in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 
Prison might be handcuffed to their beds. "[A]s a matter of principle", it insisted, "the 
use of handcuffs to restrain psychiatric patients to their beds is completely 
unacceptable; other, more appropriate, means of restraint must be found". 23 
Wrist locks 
Like handcuffs, wrist locks, used appropriately, are a largely uncontroversial means or 
restraint. Visiting Brixton and Wandsworth prisons, England, in 1990, for example, 
delegations were able to witness the forcible removal of prisoners to segregation 
units. 24 In both instances, the detainees concerned were restrained by means of wrist 
locks. 25 In its report on the visit, the CPT remarked that it has "no criticism to make" 
of the wrist lock as a method of restraint; "applied correctly", it suggested, "it is no 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
u In this regard, the CPT was alarmed to receive information that all prisoners placed in the 
establishment's egregation unit as a punishment or for reasons of good order and discipline would be 
handcuffed during outdoor exercise. 23 See Spain VI, para 89. 
24 See UK I, para 88. 
Idem, para 89. 
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doubt an effective means of controlling someone who is being violent while at the 
same time of limiting injuries on all sides". 6 
Irons, chains and shackles 
In the course of visits to Butzow and Hamburg Remand Prisons, Germany, in April 
1996, the CPT noted that when it was considered necessary, inmates could be 
attached to "restraint beds" and secured by means of "heavy metal shackles" around 
their hands and feet. These shackles, it was observed, "held [the detainees'] bodies, 
under strain, in an unnatural and potentially harmful position". 27 At Tegel Prison, in 
the course of the same visit, the Committee was shown a "prototype" of a new set of 
metal shackles, intended to replace the "leather straps" which had hitherto been used 
for the restraint of detainees. Designed by prison officers themselves, the shackles 
consisted of a pair of handcuffs and footcuffs, attached to loops on the side of a bed 
by short chains, "each of which ended in a yachting-style, quick-release clasp". 28 
Clearly disturbed by its findings, the CPT suggested to the German authorities that 
"there are means of mechanically restraining a prisoner which are less humiliating" 
than those encountered during its visit. Accordingly, it recommended that recourse to 
metal shackles in German prisons be dispensed with. 29 
In the previous year, the Committee had been "concerned" to find similar 
immobilisation mechanisms being used in the psychiatric section of Lovetch Prison 
Hospital, Bulgaria. Although health care staff there had intimated that they had never 
had cause to use the irons concerned, they had suggested that they might occasionally 
26 Ibid. 
21 See Germany I, pars 165. So-called "body chains", apparently used 
- 
without authorisation - by 
Swedish prison service transport officers in 1998, also obliged detainees to remain in an unnatural 
position: see Sweden III, pars 69. $ Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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be used by security staff during the transfer of a patient 30 The CPT's response was to 
the point: 
"[n]eedless to say", it suggested, "to place a [psychiatric] patient (or, for that 
matter, any person deprived of his liberty) in irons [is] totally unacceptable". 31 
Unsurprisingly, it recommended the removal of the irons seen. 
In other visit reports, the Committee has counselled the avoidance of irons 
which attach only to the feet. To the Belgian authorities, for example, regarding its 
delegation's discovery of the apparent use of shackles in one of the etablissements de 
Defense Sociale32 visited in 1997, it expressed "reservations". Attaching such 
instruments to a person's feet, it suggested in its subsequent visit report, "peut 
presenter un risque pour un patient tres agite". 33 
The CPT has, on occasion, invoked the European Prison Rules in support of it 
stance against the use of irons, chains and shackles. In its first Maltese visit report, 
for example, reflecting on the provisions of the country's contemporary Prison 
Regulations, it remarked that those regulations which permitted the use of irons were 
"in flagrant contradiction" with the Rules and, "more generally... grossly outdated" 
.m 
When visited in 1990, the Maltese authorities, for their part, had sought to assure the 
Committee that the Regulations concerned had "fallen into desuetude", that new 
regulations were being prepared and that until their implementation, the prison 
35 
authorities were being advised to "heed the European prison rules". 
3o See Bulgaria I, pars 215. 
31 Idem, para 218. 
32 Such establishments are used for the accommodation of persons with a variety of psychiatric 
disorders. 
33 See Belgium II, para 231. 
34 See Malta I, para 17. See, in the same connection, Italy I, para 152. 35 Ibid. On the relevant Rule (Rule 39), see above, p 278.284 
Body belts, immobilising straps, leg locks, ligatures, etc. 
- 
Body belts 
In the Segregation Unit of Wandsworth Prison, England, in 1990, a CPT delegation 
inspected a method of restraint described as a "body belt". It consisted of a leather 
waist belt attached to which were two handcuffs. When applied, the arms would be 
held closely to the side of the body. The restraint was fitted, on request, to a member 
of the delegation, who felt "very cramped" as a consequence. It was observed that 
"wearing it could quite quickly become a most uncomfortable experience". 36 Under 
contemporary regulations, use of the belt for the purpose of controlling a prisoner 
could only be authorised by the prison Governor. 37 According to the Unit's detention 
register, the belt had been used on four occasions in 1990.38 The CPT, for its part, 
considered that a body belt is: 
11 
... 
a potentially dangerous form of restraint; it [might] often exacerbate rather 
than improve a prisoner's psychological state and might also entail physical 
risks for the prisoner. Use of [a] belt will rarely 
- 
if ever 
- 
be justified". 39 
However, reconciled to the fact that, notwithstanding its views, recourse to body belts 
remained lawful in England and Wales, the Committee recommended to the UK 
authorities that, "[f]or so long as (and to the extent that)" this remained so, a number 
of safeguards ought to apply 
- 
some of which, as we shall see, are capable of much 
broader application: 
(i) body belts should be stored outside segregation units; 
(ii) the issue and use of such belts ought always to be subject to the express 
36 See UK I, para 92. 
37 Idem, para 93. 
38 Ideen, para 92. 
39 Idem, para 93. 
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authorisation of the Governor or his deputy; 
(iii) prisoners restrained by such belts ought to be subject to "constant and adequate" 
supervision by "appropriately trained" staff; and 
(iv) body belts should be removed "at the earliest possible opportunity" 40 
- 
Immobilising straps 
As a result of at least two encounters, the CPT's position regarding the use of straps 
attached to various parts of a person's body as a means of restraint is not a favourable 
one. In Greece, in March 1993, at the Attica State Mental Hospital, it was observed 
that the "standard method" of restraining disturbed patients was to immobilise them 
"by means of a padlocked strap on one arm and another strap on the opposite leg" 41 
This "very incapacitating" method of restraint, the CPT noted, in its subsequent visit 
report, was used even on elderly patients and, in its view, "constitute[d] a potentially 
dangerous procedure for an agitated patient". 42 Witnessing its application on one 
occasion, its delegation had observed that the efforts of the patient so immobilised to 
free himself "placed him in a painfully contorted position". Indeed, the Committee 
averred, "confined in full view of other patients", his situation had been both 
"harassing and degrading... as well as distressing for the unwilling onlookers" 43 
The CPT expressed similar views following its visit to the Western Prison, 
Denmark, in December 1990. There, it found that beds in the designated "special 
security cells" 
- 
which beds were the only fu nishings in the cells, it would appear - 
had been fitted with "leather bracelets designed to immobilise the hands along the 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Greece I, para 253. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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body, a broad leather strap to immobilise the trunk and leather bracelets to immobilise 
the ankles". 44 Once restrained in this way, and notwithstanding the existence of alarm 
buttons on one side of each bed "within reach of the fingers", "no movement is 
possible", the CPT averred. "Any attempt to move the hands and feet proves painful 
because of the rubbing of the rough leather against the skin45... Very soon, the various 
joints swell as the blood has more difficulty in circulating. To say the least, the 
position very quickly becomes highly uncomfortable". 46 
- 
Leg locks 
The use by the Danish police for restraint purposes of a mechanism known as a "leg 
lock" was the subject of an exchange of correspondence between the CPT and the 
Danish authorities in the interregnum between the two periodic visits of 1990 and 
1 996 47 As witnessed during the second of these visits, the application of this device 
involves the handcuffing of a person behind his back, the flexing of one of his legs 
across the other and the wedging of one foot behind the handcuffed wrists 48 
Following criticism from Amnesty International and discussions with senior police 
officers and police associations, 49 use of the device was suspended in mid-1994 by 
way of ministerial Circular. However, a number of other forms of leg-lock restraint 
remained unaffected by the Circular 
- 
albeit subject to an "exhaustive medico-legal 
review". so 
44 See Denmark I, para 34. 
4' The leather wrist straps, indeed, appeared to be blood-stained to the visiting delegation. 46 Denmark 1, para 34. See also Greece I, para 253 (regarding the inappropriate use of ligatures made 
from gauze bandages as a means of restraint; they were said to have caused circulatory disorders - 
namely, cyanosis and hypothermia 
- 
in a young girl). 47 See Denmark Response I, CPT/Inf (96) 14, pp 160 and 182-3. 
" See Denmark H, para 13. 
49 See Denmark Response I, op cit, n 47 above, at p 182. 
so See Denmark II, para 13. 
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Notwithstanding this suspension, during its second periodic visit, the CPT was 
"concerned" to learn that an official complaint had been made following the restraint 
of an individual by means of a "manual" leg lock. 51 As a result of its application, it 
seems, the person concerned had sustained a broken left leg and a shattered kneecap. 
The CPT, for its part, while not urging the complete withdrawal of the device as a 
means of restraint, did recommend that the Danish authorities "continue closely to 
monitor" instances in which leg locks are applied in order "to ensure that they are not, 
on occasion, being applied by police officers in an over-zealous fashion". 52 
- 
Full face helmets 
Under German law, officers of the Federal Border Guard (or "BGS") are, in 
exceptional circumstances, authorised to place a "full-face motorcycle helmet 
(without a visor)" on foreign national detainees against whom a removal order is 
being enforced. Examining the "detailed internal instructions" on the practice in the 
course of its visit in 1998, the CPT noted that use of such helmets is only permitted 
"when there is a risk of self-injury by a deportee or of a BGS officer being bitten". 
Further, their application may only be authorised by a senior officer and anyone to 
whom they are applied must be "permanently supervised, with a view to verifying that 
his respiratory functions [are] not hindered". 53 While concerned by the apparent 
failure on the part of the authorities at the time of the visit to provide for the recording 
of the use of the helmets, the CPT, in its subsequent report, offered no view as to their 
appropriateness as a means of restraint. We can only infer, therefore, that it considers 
their application to be unexceptionable. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. See also para 135 of the report 
53 See Germany III, pars 17. 
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Sedation 
The sedation of detainees is an issue of particular relevance in the treatment of 
mentally disturbed persons. It is not proposed to examine the use of such treatment 
here, however, because it may be more appropriately considered elsewhere, in the 
context of the use of force and legal restraint in particular circumstances 
- 
more 
precisely, in the treatment of psychiatric patients. 54 However, it is worth considering 
here the administration of sedatives or tranquillisers in non psychiatric environments, 
in particular, as part of the process of expelling foreign nationals. 
Under the heading "Mauvais traitements", in its first French visit report, the 
CPT recalled how, during its 1991 periodic visit, its delegation heard allegations of 
the injection of tranquillisers, under restraint, into persons on the point of expulsion 
from the country. Notwithstanding the comments of a senior police official, who 
claimed that so-called "contrainte chimique" had not been used for three years, other 
"credible" sources indicated that the practice still obtained, "although [resorted to 
only] exceptionally". 55 Subsequently, in its 7th General Report, the CPT referred to its 
receipt, during 1996, of a number of "disturbing" reports from "several" countries 
regarding the means of coercion employed in the expulsion of immigration detainees. 
Among the allegations received, it stated, were a number concerning the involuntary 
administration of tranquillisers. 56 Addressing such reports, the Committee sought to 
stress 
- 
in a formula which, it is proposed, should be regarded as its basic position on 
the question 
- 
that: 
54 See, generally, below, p 314 et seq. 
ss See France 1, Para 69. See, similarly, Switzerland I, Para 97 (regarding alleged expulsion procedures 
at the Centre d'enregistrement des requerants d'asile, Geneva, July 1991). 56 See 7th GR, Para 35. 
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"... any provision of medication to persons subject to an expulsion order must 
only be done on the basis of a medical decision and in accordance with 
medical ethics". 57 
On the administration of sedatives generally, the CPT has chosen not to express a 
preference for their use against a person's will over recourse to mechanical restraints 
in the treatment of agitated detainees, proclaiming that "[t]he choice 
... 
gives rise to a 
fundamental medical problem which it is not for the CPT to settle definitively". 58 
Cold water sprays 
The CPT's fundamental position on the use of cold water sprays to subdue agitated 
detainees is unequivocal: they are not to be countenanced. Thus, having learned, 
during a visit to the Youth Re-education Home, Hlohovec, Slovakia, in 1995, that in 
cases of "affected behaviour, drunkenness or aggressiveness", staff are authorised to 
give a detainee a "Scottish shower... i. e. 3 to 10 minutes of spraying with water in 
order to calm him down", the Committee offered the view that such practice is "not 
acceptable". It recommended that the Slovakian authorities "remove... [it] from the 
list of authorised means of coercion". 59 
In the event, however, that custodial authorities are seeking to quell a 
disturbance involving a number of detainees, from remarks made to the Finnish 
authorities in the wake of the alleged hosing of a detainee at Helsinki Central Prison 
in December 1997, it would appear that the CPT is prepared to make exceptions. For, 
how else is one to interpret its assertion that: 
" Idem, para 36. See, similarly, Spain IV, para 11 and Germany III, pars 18 (following the receipt of 
allegations of the sedation of deportees in 1996 and 1998 respectively. In Germany, indeed, it was 
claimed that the sedation was carried out by non-medically qualified personnel). 58 See Switzerland I, para 134. 59 See Slovakia I, para 153. See, similarly, Germany I, paras 66 and 214 (regarding the alleged use of a 
cold water spray at Tegel Prison, Berlin, December 1991). 
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"... spraying with water a recalcitrant prisoner who is not acting in concert 
with others cannot be justified"? 60 
The Committee has expressed particular concern about the use of cold water sprays 
on intoxicated detainees. For instance, the discovery, in 1996, of the "occasional" 
practice of placing intoxicated persons in "grilled" shower units and hosing them 
down with cold water 
- 
"in order to calm them down" 
- 
at two "sobering-up" centres 
in Poland, elicited from it the following response: 
"To place intoxicated persons in a cage-like structure and spray them with 
cold water is a rather undignified procedure which could well be considered as 
degrading. Further, intoxicated persons have a tendency to lose body heat; 
consequently, spraying them with cold water is also inappropriate from a 
medical point of view" 
. 
61 
Accordingly, it recommended that "resort no longer be had to this practice... ". 
Incapacitating sprays 
The administration of sprays in order to subdue agitated detainees by rendering them 
incapacitated would appear to be regarded by the CPT as a recourse to arms or 
weapons on the part of law enforcement personnel. For instance, it has described the 
carrying of tear gas canisters by Maltese police officers as a breach of domestic 
regulations prohibiting, inter alia, the bearing of arms; 62 and has stated that among a 
"large range of weapons" seen in a prison "armoury" on Cyprus in 1992, were tear gas 
grenades and "personal protection" sprays. "' 
60 See Finland II, para 53 (emphasis added). 61 See Poland I, pars 187. 
62 See Malta I, para 78. 
63 See Cyprus 1, pare 114. 
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The Committee, it seems, is, in principle, opposed to the use of incapacitating 
gases or sprays in places of detention, as the following instances vividly illustrate. In 
Spanish law, it has noted, the various "means of coercion" which prison officers are 
authorised to use in the course of their duties include so-called "adequate" sprays (that 
is, "sprays having an adequate effect") TM On examining such sprays in the course of 
visits to a number of prison establishments in April 1991, the Committee found them 
to contain, inter alia, CS gas. 65 Further, during one such visit, to Alcala- 
Meco/Madrid II Prison, the Committee heard allegations 
- 
regarding, it should be 
noted, historic, rather than contemporary, instances of ill-treatment 
- 
about the use of 
incapacitating gas against detainees as a prelude to beatings. 
In its view, such gases or sprays are means of coercion "which lend 
themselves to abusive use". 67 Moreover, with specific reference to the perceived 
situation in Spain, it suggested to the authorities that "prison officers in many other 
countries appear to be able to perform their duties quite effectively without having 
recourse to [restraint methods of this kind], in particular when it is a question of 
exercising control over individual prisoners". 68 Actuated by these sentiments, the 
CPT encouraged the Spanish authorities to "remove [incapacitating] sprays from the 
list of means of coercion that may be resorted to by prison officers". 9 
In its second Spanish visit report, the Committee sought to broaden the 
application of this precept, recommending not only that such sprays be "definitively 
64 See Spain I, App II, Para 21 (citing Article 123 of the Spanish Prison Rules 1981); and Spain II, Para 
105. 
65 Spain I, Para 107. 
66 Idem, Para 91. 
67 Ideen, Para 107. 
68 Ibid. Further CPT unease in this connection was apparent in Cyprus I, at Para 114. 69 Ibid. 
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removed" from the list of authorised means of coercion, 70 but also that their use 
"within all places of detention, whatever their nature, be prohibited". 71 More recently, 
however, it appears to have moderated its position slightly, averring to the French 
authorities, in the light of its receipt of a number of allegations regarding the use of 
tear gas at a juvenile detention centre during its visit in 1996, that: 
"... the use of tear gas in order to control a recalcitrant detainee who is not 
acting in concert with other detainees is unjustifiable. Custodial staff should 
be trained in other control techniques in respect of such a detainee. More 
generally... only exceptional circumstances could justify the use of gas as a 
means of control inside places of detention". 72 
Truncheons and batons 
CPT precepts on the use of truncheons or batons in prison and other establishments 
may be reduced to two essential themes comprising, first, the wearing or carrying of 
such instruments by members of custodial staff, and, second, their use to quell 
disturbances. 
- 
The carrying of such instruments 
Visiting the Madrid Detention Centre for foreigners, Spain, in 1991, a CPT delegation 
observed that supervising police officers "carried long truncheons in full view of the 
detainees". 73 In the Committee's view, such practice is "hardly conducive to good 
[staff-inmate] relations". Accordingly, it subsequently recommended that the officers 
70 See Spain 11, para 105. Visiting in April 1994, the Committee learned that the use of incapacitating 
sprays had been "banned on a provisional basis" by the Spanish authorities three days before its 
delegation's arrival. 
71 Ibid. See also para 217 of the report. 
n See France III, para 74. See, similarly, Czech Republic I, para 78 (wherein the CPT suggested that 
the use of incapacitating gas "[can] only be justified under very exceptional circumstances"). 73 See Spain I, para 71. 
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concerned refrain from carrying the truncheons, "or, at least, carry truncheons that can 
be and are hidden from view". 74 
Further, it need hardly be stated that the presence of items like baseball bats or 
(non-standard) wooden batons in an establishment is strongly deprecated by the 
CPT. 75 
- 
The use of such instruments 
The "most common" type of disturbance at the Madrid Detention Centre for 
foreigners at the time of the Committee's visit 
- 
in the subduing of which, presumably, 
use of the aforementioned large truncheons was contemplated 
- 
was fighting among 
detainees. Regarding the management of such incidents, the CPT suggested to the 
Spanish authorities that: 
"trained... officers should not need to have recourse to truncheons to deal 
effectively with [such incidents]". 76 
This view has been developed elsewhere. In the Committee's first Slovenian visit 
report, for instance, in the light of allegations and findings of ill-treatment regarding 
action taken by the authorities to quell disruptive behaviour in some of the penal 
establishments visited in February 1995,77 the CPT urged the government to: 
"... issue clear instructions to the effect that the use of batons as a means of 
dealing with aggressive behaviour or passive resistance is only permissible if 
74 Ibid. See, similarly, 9`h GR, para 27 (in the light of delegation findings in a "number" of juvenile 
detention establishments visited in the course of 1998); and Bulgaria I, paras 108 and 238 (regarding 
the perceived "tendency" of officers at Stara Zagora prison, when visited in 1995, to "brandish 
truncheons in... detention areas"). 
's See, e. g., Finland II, para 54 (regarding the discovery of such instruments in Riihimaki Prison in June 
1998; staff there described them as "only of symbolic significance in representing their authority"). 76 See Spain I, para 71. However, visiting the Barcelona Detention Centre for foreigners in April 1994, 
the Committee heard "a few" allegations that detainees were, "on occasion", struck with truncheons, 
particularly in the break-up of fights: see Spain II, para 84. See, generally, Slovenia I, paras 51-56 and 98-99. 
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absolutely necessary to safeguard the physical integrity of staff or other 
inmates or to prevent serious damage to property". 78 
It added, further, that: 
"[i]t should be stated unambiguously that there can never be any justification 
79 for using batons against a prisoner who has been brought under control 
. 
Apparently, Slovenia's "Rules on the execution of the duties of prison officers 
concerning the use of means of coercion" provide, inter alia, that batons should not, 
in principle, be used in cases of passive resistance. 8° 
Electric shock batons 
Without yet having insisted on their removal from premises visited, 81 the CPT, as 
might be expected, given the potential for their abuse, has been discomforted by 
discoveries, inter alia, on prison premises of instruments capable of administering 
electric shocks. For instance, on examining two metal cupboards used for the storage 
of "different means of coercion and associated equipment" at the prison of Puerto de 
Santa Maria I, Spain, in April 1991, a delegation found a number of long batons with 
such capabilities. One such baton had been fitted with batteries. 82 The CPT 
subsequently chose not to confront the authorities directly on the matter, rather, 
asking them simply, in what circumstances the batons' use could be authorised and 
78 Ideen, paras 57 and 100. See, in the same connection, Czech Republic I, pare 41 (in the light of 
allegations of the use of batons against prisoners prior to the CPT visit of February 1997). 79 Ibid. 
S0 Ibid. 
81 Although see now Czech Republic I, para 78 (electric shock devices "should never be used in 
rison"). Z See Spain I, para 108. 
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who might use them. 83 It has adopted a similar approach in respect of the use of such 
instruments by police officers. M 
The use of or threat to use dogs 
Two years prior to the CPT's visit in 1996, the Main Bridewell Police Station in 
Liverpool, England, had been obliged to hold, in addition to criminal suspects, both 
remand and convicted prisoners due to a shortage of space in Liverpool Prison. These 
additional prisoners had been accommodated in an area administered by police 
officers from the so-called "Prison Dispute Control Unit" (or "P. D. C. U. "). 85 When 
subsequently interviewed by the visiting CPT delegation, "[m]any" prisoners in the 
establishment alleged that fellow inmates had been ill-treated by police officers 
because their behaviour had been considered disruptive. 86 For his part, the Inspector 
in charge of the P. D. C. U. "openly welcomed" the establishment's "bad reputation" 
among prisoners, since, he claimed, it "facilitat[ed] the work of his officers". He held 
"similar" views about the presence in the custody area of a police dog handler and a 
large German shepherd dog: "this, he said, was a good way to `threaten and control' 
the inmates". 87 The CPT, in turn, disagreed, proclaiming that: 
"[i]t is axiomatic that to use a dog in such a manner cannot be considered 
acceptable". 88 
Thus, while not objecting to the use of police dogs per se by law enforcement 
agencies, the CPT does find objectionable their use in order to threaten and control 
83 Ibid. See, similarly, Cyprus I, para 114 (regarding the "electric prods" seen in the Nicosia Central 
Prisons, November 1992). 
84 See, e. g., Bulgaria I, para 36; and Netherlands (NA) II, paras 43-4 (regarding allegations heard about 
and findings made in the Criminal Investigation Department at Rio Canario, in 1997). 85 See UK III, para 18. 
86 Ibid. Details of the allegations may be found at paras 19 and 20 of the report. The CPTs conclusion 
as to the risk of ill-treatment in the establishment ("not inconsiderable") can be found at para 22. 
87 Idem, para 21. 
88 Ibid. 
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detainees. What concerns it most in this regard, it would appear, is the risk that the 
dogs might be used "inappropriate[ly]" 
- 
i. e. outwith the procedural constraints, if 
any, imposed on their handlers 
- 
thereby occasioning unnecessary injury to 
apprehended persons. For example, photographs seen by the visiting delegation to 
Denmark in 1996 "suggested", the Committee has stated, that allegations heard in the 
course of its visit that dogs were used too readily as a controlling device were well- 
founded; the photographs appeared to show that persons against whom dogs had been 
used had been bitten on the arms, legs and, in one case, genitals. 89 As it happens, the 
Danish authorities themselves have characterised the guidance given to police officers 
on the use of dogs as "inadequate" and have emphasised the need for a new code on 
the matter. 90 
Immobilisation by mouth: the use ofgags 
Examining the treatment of foreign nationals held in administrative detention in the 
United Kingdom during its periodic visit of May 1994, the CPT heard a "certain 
number" of allegations of ill-treatment concerning, for the most part, the use of gags 
and body belts on and physical force against, persons, under escort, prior to their 
expulsion. 91 One, now notorious, instance of such alleged ill-treatment expressly 
referred to by the Committee in its subsequent visit report was that involving Ms. Joy 
Gardner who was arrested, inter alia, by immigration officers in July 1993. She died 
four days later, "allegedly as a result of having been bound and gagged". 92 In the 
wake of Ms. Gardner's death, a "joint Home Office/Police Review of Removal 
Procedures in Immigration Cases Involving the Police" was instituted, the results of 
" See Denmark H, para 16. 
90 Ibid. 
91 See UK III, para 172. 
92 Ibid. 
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whose inquiries were passed on to the CPT. Among a list of recommendations on the 
use of restraint techniques contained therein, the CPT noted, "with satisfaction", in its 
third UK visit report, was a "complete end" to the use of techniques involving 
immobilising the mouth. 93 
The carrying of firearms by persons in direct contact with prisoners 
In the Lisbon Judicial Police Prison, Portugal, in May 1995, it was "apparent" to a 
visiting CPT delegation that certain officers who enjoyed "direct contact" with 
prisoners carried firearms when on duty. "[N]o clear policy" on the matter appeared to 
exist, the Committee remarked subsequently 
- 
an absence seemingly reflected in other 
Portuguese establishments. 94 Commenting on this state of affairs, the Committee 
offered the view that: 
"... the carrying of firearms by staff who are in direct contact with prisoners is a 
dangerous and undesirable practice. It could lead to high-risk situations for 
both prisoners and prison officers". 95 
Further, quoting with approval from the European Prison Rules on the subject, it 
proclaimed that: 
"[e]xcept in exceptional circumstances, staff performing duties which bring 
them into direct contact with prisoners should not be armed. Furthermore, 
staff should in no circumstances be provided with arms unless they have been 
fully trained in their use" 96 
93 Idem, para 173. The Review's recommendation on the use of means of immobilising the mouth was 
subsequently accepted by the Home Secretary and included in revised guidance issued to all police 
forces: see UK IV, para 65, n 21. 
9' See Portugal 11, para 148. See, similarly, Netherlands (NA) II, para 41 (regarding Koraal Specht 
Prison in December 1997). 
95 Idem, para 149. 
96 Ibid, citing Rule 63.3, EPR. 
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Consistent with this position, the CPT has also stated that the use of "explosive 
devices causing temporary blindness" as a means of coercion against prisoners "[can] 
only be justified under very exceptional circumstances". 97 
The wearing of riot gear by staff in contact with prisoners 
By virtue of section 4.2 of Scottish Prison Service Circular 79/1993, upon admitting a 
prisoner "and while. 
.. 
of the opinion that [he] poses an immediate threat to their 
safety", Scottish prison officers are "entitled to use protective clothing and/or such 
control and restraint procedures as are compatible with the prevention of injury to 
staff or prisoners". 98 As a consequence, until shortly before the CPTs visit in May 
1994, staff in one of Peterhead Prison's small units for violent or disruptive prisoners 
had been "wearing protective clothing in all day-to-day contacts with every prisoner 
held there". Even at the time of the visit, members of staff were wearing such 
equipment in their contacts with one (of four) prisoners held in the unit. The visiting 
delegation was able to observe the prisoner concerned being served lunch by three 
prison officers "wearing riot gear 
- 
including helmets with full face visors". When 
interviewed, the officers, supported by the local branch of the Scottish Prison Officers 
Association, made it clear that they would "much prefer to wear this equipment during 
their dealings with all prisoners in [the unit] and could not guarantee that they would 
not revert to doing so after the delegation's visit". 99 
As to the effects of the practice on life in the unit, the CPT subsequently 
suggested to the UK authorities that staff-inmate relations there "could hardly have 
97 See Czech Republic I, para 78 (referring to the provisions of domestic law in this area). 98 See UK III, pars 322. 
99 Ibid. 
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been worse... [The] practice certainly served to foster confrontational attitudes on the 
part of both staff and prisoners". 100 Accordingly, it sought to emphasise that: 
"... it is quite unacceptable for riot gear to be wom by prison staff in their day- 
to-day contacts with prisoners". 101 
Regarding the practice's effects on life and relations outside the unit, the CPT offered 
the view that "it is quite unrealistic to expect staff who have been used to viewing 
inmates through the visor of a helmet to readily adapt to working with the same 
prisoners in an open and associative regime". 102 Unsurprisingly, it suggested that the 
policy of permitting prison staff to wear riot gear in all day-to-day contacts with 
certain prisoners be discontinued. 103 
The slapping of detainees 
The "few" allegations of the physical ill-treatment of prisoners at the hands of prison 
officers heard in Slovakia in June/July 1995 related to just one establishment, 
Leopoldov Prison, and concerned "hasty and harsh reactions such as slaps and 
truncheon blows.. 
"104 Examining six formal complaints alleging the excessive use of 
force at the prison, the CPT noted that in all six instances, the prison governor and 
supervising public prosecutor had determined that the force used had been 
"justified". '°5 In one case, it was observed, a slap administered by an educator to a 
prisoner who had refused to obey instructions had been "deemed to be a legitimate use 
of force". 106 In this connection, to the visiting delegation both a senior member of 
100 Ideen, para 331. 
101 Ibid. See in the same connection Ireland II, para 90 (regarding a similar practice - part of the so- 
called "barrier-handling regime" 
- 
in the special unit at Portlaoise Prison in 1998). 102 Ibid. 
103 Ideen, paras 333 (2"d indent) and 397. See, similarly, Ireland H, para 92. 104 See Slovakia I, pars 70. 
ios Idem, para 71. 
1°6 Ibid. 
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staff and the prison governor remarked that slapping was "not a normal practice" but 
that in the case in question, the educator's action had been considered "justified" since 
he had used "only moderate" force. 107 Responding, the CPT offered the view that: 
"[i]t is undeniable that, in certain circumstances, the use of force may be 
necessary to control undisciplined prisoners; however, slapping prisoners is 
not an appropriate response". 108 
Threats to place detainees in physically unsuitable environments 
While visiting Nicosia Central Prisons, Cyprus, in May 1996, a CPT delegation was 
told by a number of segregated detainees that they had been "threatened" with a move 
to another accommodation block, the cells of which were "very small" (4 sq. m. ), 
deprived of any form of lighting, poorly ventilated and remote from the remainder of 
the prison complex. 109 In the view of the CPT: 
"[t]o place a prisoner in such a cell, no matter what the grounds or for how 
short a period, or to threaten him with such a measure, [is] unacceptable". "' 
As it happens, the prison Director insisted to the visiting delegation that the cells had 
never been used 
- 
and, indeed, that there was no intention to use them - as prisoner 
accommodation, notwithstanding the presence of bedding in three of them. The CPT, 
in turn, suggested that the cells be "rendered unusable" for accommodation purposes. 
Exacting retribution against disruptive detainees 
Like the use of irons, " recourse to corporal punishment against agitated and/or 
disruptive detainees was, in principle, permitted by the Prison Regulations in force in 
101 Ibid. 
'°8 Idem, para 72 (original emphasis). 
I°9 See Cyprus II, para 57. 
110 Ibid (emphasis added). See also Rule 37, EPR, which prohibits, inter alia, "punishment by placing in a dark cell 
... 
as punishment... for disciplinary offences". 111 See above, p 284. 
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Malta when visited in 1990.112 As it did in respect of the former, the CPT regarded 
the Regulations on corporal punishment to be "in flagrant contradiction" with the 
European Prison Rules "and more generally... grossly outdated". 113 In this regard, 
Rule 37 of the EPR provides, inter alia, that: 
"... corporal punishment... shall be completely prohibited as [a] punishment... for 
disciplinary offences". 
Even where there exist in establishments formal disciplinary procedures for dealing 
with violent and/or disruptive detainees and a punctilious staff to attend to them, in 
the immediate aftermath of a disturbance there is always a danger that an informal, 
unregulated system of punishment may be created. It was the possibility that such ad 
hoc systems of retribution might exist, it would appear, which preoccupied the CPT 
following an incident of hostage-taking in Herrera de la Mancha Prison, Spain, prior 
to its periodic visit in April 1991. When interviewed during the visit, two of the 
prisoners who had participated in the episode alleged, inter alia, that, having been 
overpowered 
- 
and the incident, consequently, brought to an end 
- 
they had been 
"severely beaten... subsequently confined to a cell for three to four days, without food 
or clothes, and handcuffed throughout to a bed without a mattress, at no time being 
released for the purpose of complying with the needs of nature". ' 4 In its subsequent 
report to the Spanish authorities, the CPT observed that: 
"[a]fter serious acts of violence by prisoners, in particular those in which 
prison officers are taken hostage and/or injured, there will inevitably be a great 
temptation to exact summary retribution. However, the ability to resist that 
112 See Malta I, pars 17. 
113 Ibid. Even when it is clear that corporal punishment is no longer a feature of a Party's penal 
culture, the CPT nevertheless insists that the redundant provisions in the relevant penal code be 
removed: see UK N, para 154 (regarding the range of sanctions provided for in the Isle of Man's 
Prison Rules 
- 
"today of purely historical interest"). 
114 See Spain I, para 101. 
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temptation is precisely one of the hallmarks of a professional prison officer or 
law enforcement official". ' 15 
Further, commenting on an incident alleged to have taken place just before its 
delegation's visit in 1992 in a unit for prisoners subject to a restrictive regime in 
Demersluis Prison, the Netherlands, in which an inmate was said to have been "badly 
beaten" 
- 
i. e. kicked and punched while being held upside-down 
- 
by members of 
staff after he had punched a prison officer, 116 the CPT offered the view that: 
"[r]egardless of the behaviour of the prisoner concerned 
- 
he freely admitted 
that he had punched a prison officer 
-a concerted attack of the kind described 
[by the inmates claiming to have witnessed it] could not under any 
circumstances be considered to be an acceptable response on the part of prison 
staff'. 117 
Electro-convulsive therapy 
Although better characterised as a form of medical treatment inter alia, for 
psychologically disturbed detainees than as a means of restraint, the use of electro- 
convulsive therapy (or "ECT") on detainees may be considered in the context of the 
present analysis, it is submitted, since the CPT holds that many of the same 
procedural safeguards apply. Further, though less positively, many of the same 
injuries may be occasioned by its inappropriate application. 
The CPT takes the view that "ECT... is a recognised [i. e. well-established and 
scientifically valid118] form of treatment for psychiatric patients suffering from 
particular disorders". At the same time, however, it considers that "care should be 
lls Ideen, para 102. See, similarly, UK III, paras 309 and 394 (regarding the perceived behaviour of 
prison officers in the aftermath of incidents in Scottish prisons (May 1994)). 16 See Netherlands I, para 63. 
117 Ideen, para 64. 
118 See Turkey I, pars 178. 
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taken that ECT fits into the patient's treatment plan, and its administration must be 
accompanied by appropriate safeguards". 119 Of particular concern to the Committee 
in this regard is the administration of ECT in its "unmodified form (i. e. without 
anaesthetic and muscle relaxants)". 120 Visiting Bulgaria in 1995, it was informed that 
in both Radnevo and Lovetch Psychiatric Hospitals, ECT was practised in just such an 
unmodified form 
- 
albeit far less frequently than had previously been the case. 121 The 
Bulgarian authorities, for their part, insisted that, as administered in the "majority" of 
the country's medical establishments, ECT requires the "presence of an anaesthetist 
and... the use of anaesthetics and muscle relaxants; the situation-at Radnevo and 
Lovetch... was... due to financial, organisational and personnel problems". 122 In 1995, 
however, at Lovetch Prison Hospital, while ECT was not in fact administered, the 
delegation learned, due to the absence of the necessary equipment, the Chief Doctor 
was "clearly of the opinion that unmodified ECT was quite acceptable". 123 
As a form of medical treatment, the CPT seems prepared, in principle, to 
accept the use of ECT, believing that its application "can be indicated in certain 
cases". 124 In the light of its findings in Bulgaria in 1995, however, it declared that: 
"... the practice of unmodified ECT can[not] be considered as acceptable. 
Apart from the risk of fractures or other untoward medical consequences, the 
process is as such degrading for both the staff and patients concerned". 125 
119 See 8`s GR, Para 39. 
120 Ibid. 
121 See Bulgaria I, Para 185. 
'22 Idem, Para 187. 
123 Ibid. See, similarly, Turkey I, Para 178 (regarding the suggestions of certain doctors met in the 
Bakirkoy and Samsun Hospitals in 1997 that "modified ECT might not be as effective as the treatment 
in its unmodified form"). 
124 Idem, Para 186. 
lu Ibid. 
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Indeed, it has stated subsequently that given such considerations, "ECT should always 
be administered in a modified form". 126 Unsurprisingly, the Committee sought 
confirmation from the Bulgarian authorities that having followed its guidance on the 
issue, the use of unmodified ECT in the two establishments concerned 
- 
as well as in 
any other establishment where it had previously been practised 
- 
had been 
"eliminated". 127 
On the safeguards which, in its view, should attend the use of ECT, the CPT 
has stated that: 
"ECT must be administered out of the view of other patients (preferably in a 
room which has been set aside and equipped for this purpose), by staff who 
have been specifically trained to provide this treatment. Further, recourse to 
ECT should be recorded in detail in a specific register". 129 
Seeking to justify the creation of such safeguards, the Committee has suggested that 
"[i]t is only in this way that any undesirable practices can be clearly identified by 
hospital management and discussed with staff'. 129 It is no surprise, therefore, that at 
both the Bakirkoy Mental and Psychological Health Hospital and Samsun Regional 
Psychiatric Hospital, Turkey, in 1997, it was alarmed to find that ECT "was given in 
the ward concerned, usually in the patient's room... [I]n the prison ward at the Samsun 
Hospital, ECT was administered in full view of the other patients... it was clear that in 
126 See 8th GR, para 39. The CPT has insisted, further, that it is "unaware of any scientific evidence to 
suport" the view that unmodified ECT is more effective than modified ECT: see Turkey I, para 178. 12 See Bulgaria I, paras 187 and 246. See now Bulgaria Follow-up Report I, CPTIInf (97) 1, p 145 (use of unmodified ECT in the two establishments had been discontinued for a year; and the presence 
of an anaesthetist when ECT is administered is now guaranteed). 128 8`s GR, para 39. As an example of practice which almost matches such strictures, see Finland II, 
para 131. 
Ibid. 
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other closed wards of that hospital, patients waiting to be given ECT would have sight 
of patients who had just been given that treatment". 130 
Interestingly, at Bakirkoy, the visiting delegation was informed of a proposal 
to establish a "full 
-fledged ECT centre within the establishment where all such 
therapy would be given". 131 For its part, the CPT, in a gesture which must be 
interpreted as a further development of its standards in this area, suggested 
subsequently that: 
"... a centralisation and standardisation of ECT procedures would be a most 
welcome development. Such a centre should ideally be equipped with full 
resuscitation equipment and have modem anaesthetic equipment, an up-to- 
date ECT machine which effectively measures and controls the dose of 
electricity, and a recovery room in which patients would stay before returning 
to their wards". 132 
The use offorce/restraint in particular circumstances 
Given the range of establishments with which the CPT is concerned in its work, it 
must perforce examine the application of force against and/or instruments of restraint 
on persons in many different environments. It would be appropriate, therefore, to 
consider whether and, if so, how, its precepts in this area vary according to the 
circumstances in which the force/restraint is applied. However, regardless of the 
environment or circumstances in which such measures are applied, it is the view of 
130 See Turkey I, para 179. The Turkish authorities subsequently informed the Committee that a 
"separate room" had been set aside for the application of ECT at Samsun and "steps taken to ensure 
that such therapy is given there". 
131 Idem, para 180 (original emphasis). 132 ibd. 
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the CPT, as might be expected, that they be applied "in a professional manner taking 
care to minimise all suffering and injury". 133 
Use of force/restraint by police officers at the time of apprehension and in the 
initial stages of custody 
From a perusal of the CPT's published work, the most common forms of ill-treatment 
alleged to have been perpetrated by police officers performing custodial duties have 
comprised the following: the inappropriate application of handcuffs, 'TM slaps, blows 
and kicks administered after an apprehended person has been brought under control135 
- 
occasionally when being restrained in an unnatural or contorted position (e. g. hands 
handcuffed behind back, hands/ankles attached to items furniture136); blows from 
truncheons, batons137 or other wooden, metal or plastic objects; 138 blows to the head 
or ears with heavy books; 139 and placement for long periods in a particularly 
uncomfortable position, "such as arms outstretched, knees bent, on tiptoe or kneeling 
on a chair". '4° 
Some instances of alleged ill-treatment, if true, may conceivably have 
amounted to torture. The Committee has heard allegations, for instance, of 
asphyxiation, involving the placing of a plastic bag over a detainee's head, the open 
end of which is secured round his neck; 141 the administration of electric shocks from 
specially-designed instruments; 142 (threats of) immersion of a detainee's head in 
133 See Switzerland I, para 132; and, similarly, regarding, specifically, the forcible removal of agitated 
prisoners, Ireland I, para 66. 
34 See, e. g., Finland II, para 13. 
135 See, e. g., Austria I, para 42 and, further, Austria II, inter alia, paras 14 and 17; UK II, paras 28-9; 
and Germany II, paras 11-14. 
136 See, e. g., Hungary I, pars 17; Slovakia I, para 15. 137 See, e. g., Hungary I, paras 17-20,59 and 150; Portugal II, para 12. 
138 See, e. g., Bulgaria I, paras 18 and 23; Slovakia I, para 15; Switzerland 11, para 13 (electric cord). 
139 See, e. g., Austria I, paras 42-4; Portugal II, para 12. 
140 See Slovakia I, paras 15 and 16 (vii). 
'a' See Austria II, pars 15; and Spain V, para 15 (a technique known as "la bolsa"). 142 See Austria II4 pars 15. See also Bulgaria I, para 18.307 
water; 143 threats to use a firearm; 144 beatings on the soles of detainees' feet (known as 
falaka); 145 and attacks on detainees by police dogs. 146 
The CPTs response to allegations of ill-treatment at the time of 
arrest/apprehension 
- 
as well as, moreover, to the discovery of substantiating 
(especially medical) evidence 
- 
has been consistent: 
"[it] fully recognises that the arrest of a criminal suspect is often a hazardous 
task, in particular if the person concerned resists arrest and/or is someone 
whom the [apprehending] officers have good reason to believe may be armed 
and dangerous. The circumstances of an arrest may be such that injuries are 
sustained by the person concerned (and possibly also by police officers), 
without this being the result of an intention to inflict ill-treatment. However, 
no more force than is reasonably necessary should be used when effecting an 
arrest [and transporting detained persons to a police station. 14'1 Furthermore, 
once arrested persons have been brought under control, there can never be any 
justification for them being struck by police officers". 148 
In one recent report, the CPT has gone further and suggested that "[a]s regards more 
particularly the use of restraint techniques [in the course of a person's arrest], the use 
of such means should always be an exceptional procedure, applied for the shortest 
possible time", 149 
143 Ibid. 
1« Idem, para 17. See also Slovakia I, para 15. 
145 See, e. g., Portugal II4 para 12; Bulgaria I, paras 18-21 and 25-26; and Slovakia I, para 15. 146 See, e. g., Slovakia I, paras 15 and 16 (v); Switzerland II, para 12. 147 A clause added by the CPT at UK III, paras 280 and 389. 143 See, inter alia, Hungary I, para 23; Denmark II, para 12; Sweden III, para 10; Poland I, pars 20; and 
Spain VI, para 13. See also UK II, para 30 (regarding the work of the "security forces" in Northern 
Ireland). 
149 See UK N, para 66 (a view proffered in the light of the CPT's examination of a number of cases in 
which restraint techniques employed by police officers seeking to effect an arrest had resulted in a 
person's death). On the safeguards which, in the view of the CPT, should attend the application of 
instruments of restraint 
- 
including the requirements of exceptionality and shortness of duration - see 
below, p 335 et seq. 
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The considerable pressures under which police officers must operate, 
particularly when effecting an arrest, have recently been acknowledged by the CPT. 
To the Irish authorities, having heard a number of allegations concerning the ill- 
treatment of persons detained by the Garda Siochana in 1998, some of which 
appeared to be related to events subsequent to the death of an officer in 1996 and 
others to an alleged assault on an officer, it supplemented its fundamental position on 
the use of force at the time of arrest as elaborated above, with the following 
observation and request: 
"... it is clear that exposure to highly stressful or violent situations can generate 
psychological reactions and disproportionate behaviour. The CPT would like 
to be informed... whether any preventive measures have been taken with a 
view to providing support for members of the Garda Siochana who are 
exposed to such situations". '50 
Clearly, the Committee considers that domestic authorities ought to be sensitive to the 
effect on police officers of their work in a potentially difficult and highly charged 
environment, sensitive in a way that they have perhaps failed to be hitherto. '5' 
The CPT's anxiety about the use of force by the police at or shortly after the 
moment of apprehension has been made plain in other, less expected ways, too. To 
the Polish authorities, for example, regarding the fact that when a suspected drink- 
driver refuses to comply with his statutory requirement to provide a blood sample, 
staff in the country's "sobering-up" centres "would", it was discovered in 1996, "take 
it by force (if necessary with police assistance)", it proclaimed: 
130 See Ireland II, pars 15. 
's' On staff support structures generally in places of detention in which forceirestraint may be used, see 
below pp 370-1. 
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"[t]he forcible taking of blood or other samples can lead to high-risk situations 
from the standpoint of ill-treatment. To avoid such situations, one might 
consider attaching adverse legal consequences to a refusal to give a sample 
required by law rather than proceeding to take the sample by force in the event 
of a refusal to provide it". 152 
Lastly, regarding the possibility of the abusive use of force during interrogations in 
police custody, unsurprisingly, the CPT has stated that: 
"... it is axiomatic that such acts [are] totally inadmissible: they would be in 
flagrant violation of both [States parties'] domestic law and international 
instruments binding upon [them]". 153 
Use of force against persons who are or who become violent or agitated in police 
custody 
Agitated detainees at Schoneberg Police Detention Centre, Germany, when visited in 
1996, were said to be placed in a "tranquillising cell". In addition, however, they 
could be restrained by handcuffs (attached at both the wrists and ankles), should they 
remain agitated after such placement. 154 Records seen by the visiting delegation 
indicated that such restraints had, historically, been applied for up to an hour at a 
time. 155 In the view of the CPT, such procedures are "highly questionable". 
Accordingly, it recommended to the German authorities that: 
"... in cases where a person in police custody is, or becomes, highly agitated, 
the police should immediately contact the competent doctor and act in 
accordance with his opinion". 156 
152 See Poland I, para 195. 
'53 See Hungary I, pars 24. 
154 See Germany II, Para 25. 
153 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. See, similarly, Iceland II, paras 17 and 29 (with particular reference to intoxicated detainees). 310 
The Committee's discomfort at the possibility of recourse to measures of restraint on 
police premises was apparent, too, it is submitted, in its report to the Polish authorities 
following its first ever visit to the country in 1996. Therein, referring to its 
delegation's discovery of "various items (e. g. a metal bed fixed to the floor of a cell, 
equipped with rings which would facilitate physical restraint; leather straps; straight 
jackets/body belts)" in a detention area close to the cells used by the Opole District 
Police Command, it offered the view that "the presence of [such items] in a police 
establishment is, to say the least, unusual". '57 
Application offorce/restraint following disorder in prisons 
-A general prohibition of ill-treatment 
While visiting Barlinnie Prison, Scotland, in May 1994, the CPT heard allegations 
concerning the ill-treatment of two prisoners in the course of their being transferred to 
the establishment's segregation unit. Both persons alleged that they had been beaten 
by prison officers, inter alia, while handcuffed in a prison van in transit from other 
establishments. In both cases, their medically recorded injuries were found to be 
consistent with their allegations. 158 Although the CPT found no evidence of a 
"generalised" problem of ill-treatment in Scotland's prison estate, it did feel that 
prisoners considered to be violent and/or disruptive may, "on occasion", be victims of 
such treatment, "especially in the aftermath of a major incident". '59 Accordingly, to 
the Scottish prison authorities, it issued the predictable, though, nonetheless, 
fundamental recommendation that they: 
'" See Poland 1, pars 28. 
15$ See UK III, paras 306 (and 393). See also pars 307 of the report, regarding the alleged ill-treatment 
of another segregated prisoner, elsewhere, by staff wearing protective helmets. 
'59 Idem, paras 309 and 394. 
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"deliver the clear message [to their subordinates] that the ill-treatment of 
prisoners is not acceptable under any circumstances and will be dealt with 
severely". 160 
In a recent visit report, the CPT brought its fundamental precepts on the use of 
force/restraint in prison establishments into line with that which, as we have just seen, 
it has promulgated for some time now in respect of the use of force by police officers 
at the time of arrest. Prison staff, the Committee acknowledges, "will, on occasion 
have to use force to control violent and/or recalcitrant prisoners and exceptionally 
may even need to resort to instruments of physical restraint". It also believes, 
however, that "the force used should be no more than is strictly necessary and, once 
prisoners have been brought under control, [that] there can be no justification for them 
being struck". 161 
- 
Use of force once a detainee has been subdued 
As to the last point in this formula 
- 
viz., the use of force once a detainee has been 
brought under control 
- 
the CPT has, on occasion, been emphatic. In 1996, for 
example, a former detainee of the Sandholm Institution for Detained Asylum Seekers, 
Denmark, complained to a visiting delegation that following an altercation with staff, 
he had been forcibly restrained in an unnatural position and struck, sustaining a 
fracture to one arm. An internal investigation into the incident had concluded that no 
more force than is necessary had been used by the officers concerned in the 
circumstances and that the restraint techniques applied had been "performed 
16° Ibid. 
161 See Spain VI, para 56. 
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correctly". 162 The CPT, however, was "unconvinced" by this official response to the 
incident and sought to emphasise to the Danish authorities that: 
"... the prohibition of striking persons who have been brought under control 
applies equally in the penal as in the police sphere". 163 
- 
The intervention of outside (security) forces in subduing prison disturbances 
Having received reports in the course of its 1992 visit that in the alleged ill-treatment 
of detainees at both Linho and Vale de Judeus Prisons, Portugal, 164 outside security 
forces 
- 
known colloquially as "intervention squads" 
- 
had been involved, the CPT 
sought to "stress" to the Portuguese authorities that intervention of this kind "can 
often engender a high risk of ill-treatment of detainees". 165 Consequently, it 
suggested that certain safeguards should apply when outside intervention is deemed 
necessary following prison disturbances, noting that: 
"... it is especially important that [such situations] are subject to rigorous 
means of control. More specifically, it is desirable that any such interventions 
should take place in the presence of the civil and legal authorities responsible 
for public order". 166 
These civil and legal authorities, it is clear from remarks made by the Committee 
elsewhere, should be both "fully independent of the [outside intervention force 
concerned] and the prison and charged with observing and subsequently reporting 
upon the carrying out of the intervention ,. 167 Their presence, it holds, "will 
... 
have a 
162 See Denmark II, para 48. 
163 Ideen, paras 49 and 138. See, similarly, Germany II, paras 48 and 179; and Spain VI, pars 56. 
'64 For details of which alleged ill-treatment, see Portugal I, para 60. 165 Ibid. See, similarly, Netherlands (NA) III, pars 14 (regarding the deployment of police officers in 
Koraal Specht Prison in 1997, whose role it was to replace and continue the work of the prison's 
internal `riot squad" (the Mobile Eenheld)). 
'66 Ibid. See also France I, pars 87; and, similarly, Germany I, pare 65; and Netherlands I, pars 148. 167 See Turkey I, para 87. 
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dissuasive effect on anyone minded to ill treat prisoners and enable unfounded 
allegations of ill-treatment to be refuted in a convincing manner" 
. 
168 
Such precepts notwithstanding, the CPT's preferred approach is "to avoid if at 
all possible that such interventions take place". It favours the quelling of disturbances 
by "peaceful" means. 169 It is sufficiently realistic, however, to acknowledge that 
"from time to time an intervention by [outside agents] to deal with a prison 
disturbance will prove unavoidable". '70 Such interventions, it believes, should be 
"limited to the direst of emergencies". 171 Further, it is important, it insists, that in the 
course of such interventions, it is possible to identify individual officers. Corporate 
anonymity, the Committee believes, merely compounds the risk of 172 
The restraint of mentally disturbed persons 
Whether to use means of restraint against detainees suffering, inter alia, from 
personality disorders who become agitated or violent is a question most often faced, 
quite obviously, by the management of establishments formally entrusted with the 
care of such persons. However, the need to use force/restraint against psychologically 
disturbed persons accommodated in prison establishments is something which, given 
the frequency with which it occurs, 173 ought not to be ignored in the present context - 
though it should always be borne in mind that the CPT is of the view that mentally ill 
prisoners ought always to be placed in establishments pecifically adapted to care for 
168 Ibid. 
169 Means which, of course, require the provision of suitable training for prison officers: see, e. g., 
Netherlands (NA) II, pars 17 and now Netherlands (NA) III, para 20. See also below, p 360 et seq. 170 Turkey I, Para 87. 
171 See Netherlands (NA) III, para 40. 
'n See Netherlands (NA) III, para 14. The uniform of the police officers drafted into Koraal Specht 
Prison to replace the establishment's own riot squad, as outlined above, at p 313, n 165, did not permit 
the identification of individual officers, the CPT observed in 1999. 
"' Throughout its published work the CPT has referred to situations in which visiting delegations have 
encountered mentally disturbed persons on prison premises. 
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them. 174 Accordingly, when the Committee averred to the Bulgarian authorities, 
following its visit in 1995, that "[i]n any psychiatric facility, the restraint of patients 
will on occasion be necessary [and that] this is a subject of particular concern to the 
CPT, given the potential for abuse and ill-treatment", 175 we can be sure that it holds 
precisely the same views on the application of restraint against mentally disordered 
persons detained in other establishments and that all appropriate precepts may be said 
to apply mutatis mutandis thereto. 
- 
The significance of good management 
While the appropriate management of staff in any custodial establishment is crucial to 
efforts to forestall the ill-treatment of detainees, whether resulting from the over- 
enthusiastic application of measures of restraint or from other conduct, the 
maintenance of what the CPT has termed "[p]roper managerial control" in psychiatric 
establishments may be considered of particular significance, given the dual 
therapeutic/custodial role of staff who work there. In terms of the balance to be struck 
between the two functions, as applied, in particular, to the use of instruments of 
restraint, the CPT is of the fundamental view, that: 
"... management should ensure that the therapeutic role of staff in psychiatric 
establishments does not come to be considered as secondary to security 
considerations". 176 
'" See, inter alia, 3'1 GR, para 43; Italy I, paras 118-9; and Denmark I, para 80. See also in this 
connection Rule 100.1, EPR, which provides that "[p]ersons who are found to be insane should not be 
detained in prisons and arrangements hall be made to remove them to appropriate establishments for 
the mentally ill as soon as possible". 
"' See Bulgaria I, para 216; and, similarly, Romania I, para 186; and, more generally, 8's GR, para 47. 176 See 8" GR, para 31. 
315 
- 
Recourse to force/restraint in inappropriate custodial environments 
In March 1993, visiting the ten isolation cells of the Psychiatric Unit at Korydallos 
Prison Complex, Greece, the CPT learned that persons placed there 
- 
"exclusively... severely disturbed prisoners" 
- 
would be "systematically strapped to 
their beds" and held thus "for several 177 Decisions on their transfer to such 
cells and the provision of medication to them would "often" be taken by unqualified 
health-care staff "without prior consultation of a doctor", who might not see the 
persons concerned until an elapse of two days. '78 In the view of the CPT, these kinds 
of arrangement are "totally unsatisfactory and, more specifically, could well 
exacerbate rather than relieve... a prisoner's mental state. They involve a clear risk of 
ill-treatment, albeit as a result of inadequate staff resources and/or lack of training 
rather than malevolence". 179 Consequently, it intimated that the Unit ought to be 
"upgrade[d]... into a fully-fledged psychiatric hospital facility" or, failing that, "cease 
to operate as a psychiatric facility [at all]", so that mentally ill prisoners might be 
transferred to another, "properly equipped" establishment. 180 Clearly, the CPT is 
concerned by the possibility that mentally disturbed persons may be subject to 
physical restraint in a penal 
- 
more specifically, non-hospital 
- 
environment, even 
where the facility in question may be formally designated to accommodate such 
persons. Is] 
177 See Greece I, Para 185. 
178 Idem, Para 187. 
179 Idem, Para 188. 
180 Idem, Para 189. 
181 See also in this respect Italy I, paras 118-19 (regarding the accommodation in isolation units of two 
psychiatrically disturbed detainees seen by visiting delegations to the maisons d'arret Regina Coeli and 
Rebibbia in March 1992). It goes without saying that the CPT finds the restraint of agitated 
psychiatric patients in a physically dangerous environment quite unacceptable: see, e. g., Spain VI, Para 
110 (regarding the possibility that disturbed patients might be strapped to a fixed chair in a so-called 
"immobilisation" room at San Juan de Dios Psychiatric Hospital (1998). Bloodstains on the wall 
behind the chair 
- 
apparently caused by a restrained patient banging his head against it - the CPT 
remarked, "attested to the unsuitability of this facility"). 
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- 
The CPT's basic precept 
In Denmark, the Herstedvester Institution performs a "hybrid" detention role: 
simultaneously treating persons suffering, inter alia, from serious mental disorders 
and accommodating certain kinds of serious criminal offender. When visited in 
December 1990, over half the establishment's detainees were undergoing 
psychiatric/psychological treatment. Formally, however, it functioned under the aegis 
of the Ministry of Justice. Accordingly, its regime was "first and foremost" a prison 
regime. 192 "This dichotomy and the resultant ambiguity", the CPT observed in its 
subsequent visit report, "are sources of conflicts in decision-making on the treatment 
of [detainees]; the legal and therapeutic points of view often diverge... The outcome is 
a degree of uncertainty as to exactly what type of regime is to be applied to the 
prisoners". 183 Indeed, the visiting delegation "witnessed such a conflict 
- 
of a fairly 
violent kind in an emergency situation", between the establishment's governor and a 
psychiatrist concerning the placement in solitary confinement of an aggressive 
detainee and the physical restraint of another. 184 Commenting on this 
- 
and other 
problems brought about by the establishment's dual function 
- 
the CPT observed, inter 
alia, that: 
"... the placement in solitary confinement of a mentally ill prisoner and the 
recourse to means of restraint can be considered as acceptable only if the 
treatment of such a prisoner is under the entire and sole responsibility of 
medical personnel"! " 
182 See Denmark I, para 75. 
183 Idem, pare 76. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Idem, para 80. See, similarly, Belgium II, para 232. 
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This, the CPrs basic position on the restraint of violent and/or agitated mentally 
disturbed detainees, has been elaborated in other reports. In its first Icelandic visit 
report, for example, it offered the view that such persons: 
"... should be treated through close supervision and nursing support, combined, 
if considered appropriate, with sedatives. The use of means of physical 
restraint shall only rarely be justified and must always be either expressly 
ordered by a medical doctor or immediately brought to the attention of such a 
doctor for approval". '86 
Interestingly, when visited in 1993, Iceland's Sogn Institution for Mentally Ill 
Offenders operated a policy on the treatment of violent patients which appeared to 
reflect that sought by the CPT: when necessary, the visiting delegation was informed, 
the patient concerned would be "confined to his room and... kept under permanent 
supervision by staff. If necessary, tranquillisers might be administered. The use of 
means of physical restraint was formally prohibited... [I]n such cases the doctor would 
immediately be contacted and, if appropriate, his permission sought for the 
administration of tranquillisers". 187 
Further elaboration of the basic precept 
- 
particularly as regards the balance to 
be struck between the use of restraints and tranquillisers 
- 
was offered to the German 
authorities in the light of the Committee's findings regarding the treatment of patients 
suffering delirium tremens at Butzow Prison hospital unit in April 1996. Such 
patients, the visiting delegation learned, were placed in the intensive care unit and, if 
necessary, "immobilised in their beds by means of cloth straps attached to their hands 
' See Iceland I, para 156. See, similarly, Belgium I, para 200; and, more generally, 3`d GR, para 44. On the question of (medical) authorisation in the application of measures of physical restraint 
generally, see below, p 343 et seq. $7 Idem, para 157. The CPT, for its part, "welcome[d]" the Institution's approach. For a similarly 
favourable comparison with the CPTs basic precept, see Italy I, para 117; and Poland I, para 136 (regarding practice in the Psychiatric Hospital at Wroclaw Remand Prison in 1996). 
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and feet and an abdominal belt". Their treatment "did not include the administration 
of appropriate medicines to control their acute state of confusion [which] inevitably 
affected the duration of the application of physical restraints" 
. 
188 For its part, the CPT 
observed that: 
"... it is now widely recognised that to limit the treatment of delirium 
tremens189 to physical restraints is clearly insufficient and potentially 
dangerous. The prompt administration of tranquillisers is an integral part of 
the therapy commonly employed in this type of treatment; this keeps resort to 
physical restraints to a strict minimum". 190 
Further development of the basic precept may be inferred in observations made by the 
Committee in the wake of its second visit to Malta in July 1995. There, it had 
observed, the use of instruments of physical restraint at Mount Carmel (psychiatric) 
Hospital had been "consigned to the annals of history" and replaced with a policy 
whereby "[p]atients considered to represent a danger to themselves or others were 
dealt with, in the first instance, by verbal persuasion, which failing, staff would 
administer a sedative injection before moving the person concerned to a single room". 
This development was "welcome[d]" by the CPT. 191 
- 
The need for specially trained staff 
When interviewed in April 1994, members of staff at Santa Coloma Mental Hospital, 
Spain, told the CPT that "various injuries (mainly bruising and marks of handcuffs 
188 See Germany I, para 136. 
189 And, it might be argued, a fortiori, more serious psychiatric disturbances. 10 See Germany I, para 136. The CPT recommended that the policy at Butzow be "reviewed 
accordingly". Recourse to instruments of physical restraint in respect of agitated psychiatric patients 
has not been entirely discountenanced by the CPT, however; their use, it stated recently, "may 
exceptionally be justified": see Spain VI, pars 89. 19' See Malta II, paras 107 and 133. For a policy which, similarly, "favourably impressed" the CPT, 
see France I, para 170. 
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applied too tightly)" are "frequently" observed when disturbed persons are taken to 
hospital by the law enforcement agencies. Such persons are "nearly always 
handcuffed and often bound". Further, one detainee interviewed claimed to have been 
"beaten and dragged by the hair and clothes" 
- 
though no injuries were recorded on his 
arrival at hospital. 192 Reflecting on this state of affairs, the CPT observed that: 
"[h]andling mentally disturbed persons will always be a difficult task and, 
whenever possible, this task should be given to specially trained staff'. 193 
Whenever (untrained) custodial staff are permitted or are obliged to assist in the 
management of such persons, the Committee has remarked elsewhere, they should 
only do so "under the authority and close supervision of... [specially trained] health 
care staff'. 194 Such a precept may be said to apply a fortiori when the restraint of 
mentally disturbed persons is being contemplated. Indeed, in the light of a patient's 
death at Rampton Special Hospital, England, alleged to have been caused by the 
application of control and restraint measures, some two years prior to its visit in May 
1994,195 the Committee offered the view that: 
"[i]n a [mental health institution], health care staff will inevitably be 
confronted with agitated and violent patients. Appropriate training in the 
management of such situations is essential, in order to reduce the risk of the 
abusive use of force. Emphasis should be placed in this context on the various 
levels of response possible, of which resort to physical restraint is only 
one". ' 96 
11 See Spain II, para 205. 
193 Ibid. 
194 See Finland II, pare 88 (responding to findings in June 1998 that members of custodial staff at 
Helsinki Central Prison were authorised to isolate psychiatric patients without obtaining the prior 
assent of health care staff). I" See UK III, para 241. 
196 Idem, para 242. 
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In England and Wales, the management and control of aggressive behaviour in 
psychiatric establishments is subject to a "number of important guidelines", enshrined 
in a Code of Practice. According to the CPT, however, when interviewed in 1994, 
"many" members of Rampton's health care staff had possessed "only a scant 
knowledge" of them. Accordingly, the training of such staff, it recommended, should 
aim to rectify this deficiency, particularly in the light of reports received by the 
visiting delegation that resort to physical control and restraint techniques in the 
establishment "tended to be the rule rather than the exception, when staff were faced 
with aggressive behaviour". 197 
The medical treatment of detainees without their consent 
While strictly on the periphery of the practice of the use of force or measures of 
restraint against detainees, the administration of medical treatment to an individual 
without his consent may be considered worthy of examination here because of the 
element of involuntariness which it entails. We start from the axiomatic position that 
although the issue of the medical treatment of detainees without their consent may 
conceivably arise in any custodial environment, for obvious reasons, it is most likely 
to arise in the context of the detention of psychiatric patients. Consequently, much of 
what follows relates to the treatment of such persons. However, the precepts 
identified may be held to apply, it is submitted, irrespective of the custodial 
environment in which a person is held and, accordingly, should not be viewed 
narrowly. 
In the view of the CPT, "in exceptional circumstances, there can be a sound 
clinical and ethical basis for the treatment of patients without their consent". 198 At the 
'97 Ibid. 
198 See Netherlands II, pars 57. 
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same time, however, it considers that such treatment "require[es] an increased 
vigilance" on the part of the authorities, who should devise "very strict rules, offering 
to the patient all appropriate guarantees [against abuse]... 0199 To a large extent, the 
guarantees 
- 
both medical and legal 
- 
contemplated by the CPT in this regard reflect 
those which, it maintains, ought to obtain when force/restraint is applied against 
detainees generally. As such, they will be dealt with below. 200 However, in a number 
of important respects, very particular safeguards may be considered to be required in 
the present connection. They are worth examining briefly. 
In Germany, Section 101 of the Act Concerning the Execution of Prison 
Sentences of 16 March 1976, as amended by the Act of 27 February 1985, provides, 
inter alia, that the medical treatment of prisoners without their consent may only be 
ordered by a doctor and is only permissible where there is danger to life or serious 
risk to the health of the prisoner concerned or others. Federal administrative 
instructions go further, requiring that the prisoner be informed of the need for 
treatment and its likely consequences in the presence of a witness, that this exchange 
and any relevant declarations by the patient be recorded and that the patient sign the 
record or that the reasons for any refusal to sign be noted. 201 Notwithstanding such 
safeguards, while visiting the Forensic Psychiatry Department in Straubing Prison in 
December 1991, a CPT delegation perceived shortcomings 
- 
which became "a source 
of disquiet" 
- 
in the recording of treatments administered to patients without their 
consent in accordance with Section 101. In this regard, a parliamentary Committee of 
Inquiry had reported, in 1990, that, with the exception of one particular treatment, "it 
199 See Switzerland 1, paras 140 and 168 (with reference to para 134). Even the existence of a range of 
informal, practical measures in establishments in which involuntary medical treatment may be 
administered "cannot", it seems, "be a substitute for a formal legal and regulatory framework... ": see 
Netherlands H, para 57 (regarding practice in the national psychiatric and forensic observation centre, 
Het Veer Prison, in November 1997). 
200 See p 335 et seq. 
201 See Germany I, App ifi, para 19. 
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had not been possible" to establish from the medical records of the study group of 
patients whether their treatments had been given with or without their consent 202 
Further, from discussions with the Department's head psychiatrist, it emerged that the 
authorities did not consider it appropriate, or even possible, to seek patients' consent 
"on a systematic basis". 203 In its subsequent visit report, the Committee's reaction was 
expressed succinctly. "The CPT", it stated: 
"attaches great importance to the ethical requirement of the `free and 
informed' consent of every patient to his treatment. Any derogation from this 
fundamental principle should be based upon clearly and strictly defined 
exceptional circumstances. In order to ensure complete openness in this 
regard, all relevant information must be carefully recorded". 204 
Accordingly, it recommended to the authorities that: 
"... all treatment administered to patients be immediately recorded in their 
medical records, accompanied by an indication of whether or not the treatment 
is voluntary and any relevant declarations by the patients. In cases where 
treatment is administered without patients' consent, the reasons for doing so 
must be stated" 205 
As to the nature of the consent sought by the CPT, it suggested that it may only be 
considered free and informed "if it is given in the absence of threats or unreasonable 
pressure". 206 It also recommended further procedural guarantees, "in the interests of 
both patients and medical staff', like the requirement of an "on-site, independent 
202 Ideen, para 130. 
203 Ibid. 
2" Idem, para 131. A more recent survey of the forensic psychiatric services at Straubing concluded 
that the recommendations made by the 1990 Committee of Enquiry regarding the recording of 
information "had been implemented": idem, para 132. 203 Ibid. See also para 220 of the report 
206 Ideen, para 134. 
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second medical opinion" and the "transfer of the patient to a closed section of a 
psychiatric hospital outside the prison system". 207 
Subsequently, it has drawn many of these thoughts and precepts together to 
produce a formula which, it considers, should be adhered to when the medical 
treatment of psychiatric patients 
- 
and, by extension, other categories of detainee 
- 
is 
being contemplated: 
"Patients should, as a matter of principle, be placed in a position to give their 
free and informed consent to treatment. The admission of a person to a 
psychiatric establishment on an involuntary basis should not be construed as 
authorising treatment without his consent. It follows that every competent 
patient, whether voluntary or involuntary, should be given the opportunity to 
refuse treatment or any other medical intervention. Any derogation from this 
fundamental principle should be based upon law and only relate to clearly and 
strictly defined exceptional circumstances. 
"Of course, consent to treatment can only be qualified as free and informed if 
it is based on full, accurate and comprehensible information about the patient's 
condition and the treatment proposed; to describe ECT as "sleep therapy" is an 
example of less than full and accurate information about the treatment 
concerned. Consequently, all patients should be provided systematically with 
relevant information about their condition and the treatment which it is 
proposed to prescribe for them. Relevant information (results, etc. ) should 
also be provided following treatment". 208 
207 Idem, Para 133. 
208S ee 8m GR, pars 41. The formula was paraphrased by the CPT in Turkey I, at Para 224. 
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An example of what the CPT regards as inappropriate practice under this formula may 
be found in its first published Turkish visit report, wherein it noted that, as they stood 
in 1997, law and practice on the giving of informed consent to psychiatric treatment 
in the country were "underdeveloped. A form signed by the patient or his/her 
relatives upon admission 
- 
whereby they give their general consent to treatment 
- 
entitle[d] the medical staff to apply any form of treatment considered necessary, 
including ECT". 209 
The formulation advanced in its 8th General Report may be regarded as 
developing that which the Committee set out much earlier, in its third such report, 
when elaborating a number of precepts on the provision of health care services in 
prisons. Then, in a very thorough analysis 
- 
ranging from the kind of information to 
which, in its view, prisoners (and, by extension, their families and lawyers) are 
entitled when medical treatment is being contemplated, to the approaches to be taken 
by the authorities in the event of a hunger strike210 or when seeking to carry out 
medical research 
- 
it had suggested: 
"Freedom of consent... [is a] fundamental right... of the individual... 
"... Patients should be provided with all relevant information (if necessary in 
the form of a medical report) concerning their condition, the course of their 
treatment and the medication prescribed for them. Preferably, patients should 
have the right to consult the contents of their prison medical files, unless this 
is inadvisable from a therapeutic standpoint. 
"They should be able to ask for this information to be communicated to their 
families and lawyers or to an outside doctor. 
209 See Turkey I, para 224. 
210 In respect of which the CPT appeared to remain non-committal. 
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"... Every patient capable of discernment is free to refuse treatment or any 
other medical intervention. Any derogation from this fundamental principle 
should be based upon law and only relate to clearly and strictly defined 
exceptional circumstances which are applicable to the population as a whole. 
"A classically difficult situation arises when the patient's decision conflicts 
with the general duty of care incumbent on the doctor. This might happen 
when the patient is influenced by personal beliefs (eg. refusal of a blood 
transfusion) or when he is intent on using his body, or even mutilating himself, 
in order to press his demands, protest against an authority or demonstrate his 
support for a cause. 
"In the event of a hunger strike, public authorities or professional 
organisations in some countries will require the doctor to intervene to prevent 
death as soon as the patient's consciousness becomes seriously impaired. In 
other countries, the rule is to leave clinical decisions to the doctor in charge, 
after he has sought advice and weighed up all the relevant facts. 21 
... 
As regards the issue of medical research with prisoners, it is clear that a 
very cautious approach must be followed, given the risk of prisoners' 
agreement to participate being influenced by their penal situation. Safeguards 
should exist to ensure that any prisoner concerned has given his free and 
informed consent. 
I" The CPT has also made it clear that to accommodate persons on hunger strike in an isolation unit is 
quite inappropriate: see France III, pars 164. 
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"The rules applied should be those prevailing in the community, with the 
intervention of a board of ethics. The CPT would add that it favours research 
concerning custodial pathology or epidemiology or other aspects specific to 
the condition of prisoners. 12 
"... The involvement of prisoners in the teaching programmes of students 
should require the prisoners' consent. , 213 
As far as the procedure to be followed in the event of a proposed involuntary 
intervention is concerned, that developed under Dutch law would, in the light of the 
CPT's apparent endorsement following its visit to the country in 1997, appear to offer 
something of a model. The "detailed" procedure laid down by the Netherlands' 
Hospital Order Placement (Nursing) Act 1997 provides for, inter alia: 
"... an obligatory consultation... between the Director of the Clinic, the treating 
doctor, and the head of the department and, if the treatment relates to the 
mental health of the patient, the intervention of a psychiatrist; the subsidiarity 
principle (having first tried all other methods of voluntary treatment); 
recording in an ad hoc register and in the patient's file, notification being 
made to the Ministry of Justice and to the Complaints Commission and, if 
need be, to the competent regional Health Inspector; etc. ". 214 
The restraint of prisoners who are receiving hospital treatment 
The transfer of prisoners to a civilian hospital in order to receive medical treatment 
may give rise to significant problems of security. The actions of some detaining 
212 It is worth noting in this connection that Rule 27, EPR provides that "Prisoners may not be 
submitted to any experiments which may result in physical or moral injury". 213 See Td GR, paras 45-9. 
214 See Netherlands II, pars 131. 
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authorities in this regard have, on occasion, concerned the CPT. For instance, visiting 
France in 1991, it learned that prisoners transferred to civilian hospitals for treatment, 
especially in Marseilles and Nice, were, throughout their stay, "attached to their beds 
with handcuffs by the police officers responsible for their security ". 215 Further, the 
French authorities acknowledged that expectant mothers were similarly restrained, 
"[both] during labour and after giving birth". 216 
Regarding the routine practice of restraining hospitalised prisoners, the CPT 
subsequently averred that recourse to such measures must remain "exceptional". 
Regarding the restraint of pregnant women in particular, this, it proclaimed, was a 
"flagrant example of inhuman and degrading treatment"; "other means of effective 
surveillance [could] and must be found"? " Accordingly, it recommended to the 
French authorities, first, that they take measures immediately "in order to guarantee 
that female detainees transferred to hospital to give birth are not attached to their 
bed"; and, second, that they refrain from applying restraint measures of this kind to 
any detainee sent for hospital treatment, "save in exceptional casesi218 
In other visit reports, even this notion of exceptionality has been dispensed 
with. To the Spanish authorities, for example, regarding the practice of handcuffing 
or tying a sick prisoner to his bed during all or part of his stay in hospital, the CPT has 
recommended, simply and unequivocally, that steps be taken to ensure that 
hospitalised prisoners "are not physically attached to their hospital beds or other items 
215 See France I, paras 90 and 220; and now France III, para 142 (regarding the findings of the periodic 
visit in 1996). 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid. See now 1& GR, para 27 (wherein the CPT averred that the shackling or otherwise restraining 
of female detainees to beds or other items of furniture while undergoing gynaecological examination or 
giving birth is "completely unacceptable, and could certainly be qualified as inhuman and degrading 
treatment. Other means of meeting security needs can and should be found"). 218 Ibid. 
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of furniture for custodial reasons". 219 Further, it has described the carrying out of 
medical examinations on persons secured by handcuffs in a non-custodial 
environment as "[an] ethically questionable practice... which [is] inimical to the 
construction of a proper doctor-patient relationship". 220 However, it may be that the 
Committee would regard such practice as appropriate in "exceptional" 
circumstances. 221 
As to the "other means of effective surveillance" of hospitalised prisoners 
referred to in its first French visit report, the CPT has expounded its views elsewhere. 
To the Luxembourg authorities, for example, following its visit in 1993, it suggested 
that the creation of "a custodial unit" within civilian hospitals might be "one possible 
solution" to the problem of maintaining security. 222 Indeed, the Committee continued, 
the two "chambres cellulaires" seen at the Centre Hospitalier de Luxembourg in the 
course of the visit offered a ready-made unit of this kind: their windows and door 
handles had been blocked up and gendarmes were permanently present in a small 
neighbouring room. 223 In such an environment, it averred, recourse to handcuffs or 
chains for restraint purposes 
- 
as authorised in an instruction to the Duchy's 
gendannerie224 
- 
could not be justified. Accordingly, it sought an immediate cessation 
of the use of such instruments and an amendment of the relevant regulation. 225 
Lastly, it should be noted that the CPT has had occasion to describe the 
Z" See Spain I, pars 150. More generally, see 3'" GR, para 36. Interestingly, visiting one hospital in 
the course of its second periodic visit to Spain in April 1994, the Committee was told that the restraint 
of patients was decided "solely on medical grounds... no patients were restrained or attached to items of 
furniture for custodial reasons": see Spain II, para 170. See now Spain IV, para 37. See also France 
in, paras 143 and 144 (2nd indent). 
2" See Netherlands II, para 76. 
221 See France III, para 143. 
See Luxembourg I, pars 110. See also 3"' GR, pars 36; and, similarly, Switzerland II, pars 112; and 
Romania I, pars 131 (following the discovery of three patients attached to their beds by a length of 
cable in the civilian hospital at Dej in 1995). 
2" Ibid. 
22' Idem, pars 109. 
225 Idem, pare 110. 
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presence of custodial staff at medical appointments or during the treatment of 
detainees in civilian hospitals as "not conforming to medical ethics". 6 Rather, as it 
does in respect of the right to a medical examination for persons detained by the 
police, 227 it believes that such examinations or treatment should take place "out of the 
hearing and 
- 
except where medical or nursing staff ask for it in respect of a particular 
detainee 
- 
out of the view of [custodial staff] ". 228 
The restraint of administratively detained foreign nationals 
As we have seen, in its 7th General Report, the CPT referred to its receipt, during 
1996, of "disturbing reports from several countries about the means of coercion 
employed in the course of expelling immigration detainees" 229 The Committee had 
heard allegations, in particular, of the "beating, binding and gagging" of such persons 
(as well as the administration of tranquillisers against their will). 230 Commenting on 
this state of affairs, the CPT remarked that: 
"... it will often be a difficult task to enforce an expulsion order in respect of a 
foreign national who is determined to stay on a State's territory. Law 
enforcement officials may on occasion have to use force in order to effect such 
a removal. However, the force used should be no more than is reasonably 
necessary. It would, in particular, be entirely unacceptable for persons subject 
to an expulsion order to be physically assaulted as a form of persuasion to 
board a means of transport or as a punishment for not having done so. 
226 See France III, para 142. 
1 See, generally, above, p 96. 
221 See France III, para 144,1" indent. 
22' See above, p 289. 
10 See 7th GR, para 35. In fact, reports of this kind pre-date the CPT's 7°i General Report by several 
years: see, e. g., Belgium I, paras 62-3 and 252; and Austria II, paras 29 and 159. 
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Further, the Committee must emphasise that to gag a person is a highly 
dangerous measure". 231 
Lastly in the present connection, it may be worth examining, briefly, the safeguards 
subject to which measures of restraint may be deployed during deportation 
procedures. In this regard, in 1997, at Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam, the CPT was 
pleased to learn of the introduction of a "detailed procedure... aimed at reducing to a 
minimum instances in which such means are used". The procedure comprised, inter 
alia: 
"... [the] appointment of an official from the detained person's holding facility 
with responsibility for escorting him; [and] when indispensable, the 
progressive use of physical means of restraint, if necessary with medical 
supervision". 232 
Given the Committee's "welcome" of such provision, it may be safely conjectured 
that such practices constitute, in its view, part of an humane deportation procedure. 
The physical chastisement of juveniles 
At both detention centres for minors visited in the course of its second periodic visit 
to Portugal in May 1995,233 detainees told the CPT that "an occasional slap" might be 
given by monitors to encourage "appropriate" behaviour among the boys. One such 
'3' Idem, Para 36. See also Spain IV, Para 11 (in the light of a number of alarming allegations of 
assault, sedation, gagging and binding heard in the course of visits to detention centres at Malaga and 
Melilla, in 1997: idem, paras 8-10); Sweden III, Para 68; and, similarly, Germany III, Para 16 (citing, 
with approval, the terms of a recently issued internal instruction on the enforcement of removal orders); 
and Belgium II, Para 20. 
232 See Netherlands II, Para 38. 
233 Namely, the Observation and Social Action Centre, Lisbon and the Padre Antonio de Oliveira Re- 
education Centre, Caxias. 
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monitor, indeed, was prepared to admit that the administration of a "`pedagogic' slap 
was not entirely unknown". 234 Commenting on the practice, the CPT suggested that: 
"[i]n the interests of the prevention of ill-treatment 
... 
it would be preferable for 
all forms of physical chastisement of children to be both formally prohibited 
and avoided in practice". 35 
Rather, it considers, "(juvenile] inmates who misbehave should be dealt with only in 
accordance with prescribed disciplinary procedures" 
. 
236 Further, "[i]t is axiomatic", it 
has asserted, "that publicly to humiliate a minor would be equally objectionable". 237 
The legal regulation of measures of force restraint 
The importance offormal regulation 
As the CPT itself maintains, to render the use of measures of force or physical 
restraint subject to strict legal regulation may be considered necessary "[i]n view of 
the enhanced risk of ill-treatment" occasioned thereby. 238 The importance of such 
regulation to the CPT may be seen in its first Danish visit report, wherein, 
commenting on the treatment of psychiatric patients at the Herstedvester Institution in 
1990, which treatment included the application of measures of force/restraint, it 
offered the view that: 
234 See Portugal 11, Para 153. 
" Ibid. See also Para 184 of the report; and, generally, 9th GR, Para 24. Morgan and Evans have 
criticised this "surprisingly muted" reaction on the part of the CPT, seeing in it a certain confusion and 
asking whether the CPT considers such chastisement to be ill-treatment or not (see Morgan and Evans 
(1999), p 77). Their criticism is redundant, it is submitted. What matters is the CPT's belief that the 
practice should be both prohibited and avoided, regardless of how it may be labelled 236 See 9t' GR, Para 24. 
237 See Czech Republic 1, Para 87 (regarding complaints from girls detained in the Moravsky Krumlov 
Educational Institute in 1997 that they had been the subject of "prurient comments" from staff (Para 
86)). 
233 See Spain II, paras 204 and 227. 
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"... in such a sensitive area as the integrity of the individual, it is essential that 
rules affording prisoners all the appropriate guarantees should stipulate the 
procedure to be followed". 239 
In the same connection, Rule 40, EPR provides, inter alia, that: 
"The patterns and manner of use of... instruments of restraint... shall be 
decided by law or regulation". 
Contemporary Danish practice on the use of force/restraint was provided for, inter 
alia, by way of a circular which stipulated the kind of physical force that might be 
authorised against prisoners. The Committee noted that the wording of some of its 
provisions "[did] not appear entirely consistent". Consequently, it suggested that the 
matter "be clarified". 240 Indeed, even prior to the Committee's visit, clarification in 
the form of "specific legislation" had been recommended by a Danish Ministry of 
Justice working party, which recommendation was subsequently endorsed by the 
CPT. 241 The aim of such clarification, the CPT considered, should be: 
"... to limit the use of means of restraint to situations resulting from clearly 
defined exceptional circumstances". 242 
The consequences of a failure adequately to circumscribe the circumstances in which 
the use of force and/or instruments of physical restraint may be authorised were neatly 
summarised in the CPT's first Greek visit report. Therein, recalling how, when 
visiting a number of mental health establishments in March 1993, its delegation had 
found no evidence of instructions issued to staff on the use of instruments of restraint, 
239 See Denmark I, pars 77. 
210 Ideen, para 22. Regulation on the use of forcetrestraint generally in Danish prisons, the CPT noted, 
is "detailed": ideni, App 2, paras 12-13. 
u' Ideen, paras 37-8. 
242 Ibid. See also pars 136 of the report. 
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"or of any guidance regarding the therapeutic expediency of such a measure", 243 the 
Committee suggested that: 
"[s]uch a situation, where the decision to use instruments of physical restraint 
is left to the discretion of... nursing staff 44 
... 
[means] that there is a serious risk 
of physical restraint being used in excess of requirements". 245 
The contents ofpolicies regulating the use of force/instruments of restraint 
A failure to issue instructions, inter alia, on recourse to instruments of physical 
restraint was also apparent at the Ettelbruck neuropsychiatric hospital, Luxembourg, 
in January 1993. There, "[a]pparently", as in Greece, "the decisions on recourse to 
these measures like their length were, more often than not, left to the initiative of the 
nursing staff" 246 Consequently, the CPT recommended that a "detailed policy" be 
formulated on the question: 
"... comprising notably: the types of case in which resort to these measures 
may be made; the objectives sought by them; their length and regular review; 
the existence of appropriate human contacts; the requirement for increased 
staff supervision". 247 
This list of contents has been augmented in other visit reports. To the French 
authorities, for example, having noted in the course of its periodic visit in 1991 that 
the use of means of restraint at the Centre Hospitalier Specialise de Montfavet did not 
243 See Greece I, para 255 and, similarly, para 282. 244 Who, in the circumstances, were "untrained and numerically inadequate". 245 Greece I, para 255. 
246 See Luxembourg I, para 129. 
247 Ibid. See, similarly, Romania I, para 191 (in the light of similar findings at the Poiana Mare 
psychiatric hospital in 1995); Germany II, para 137; and Spain II, para 204 (1" indent). The CPT has 
issued a very similar recommendation in respect of the regulation of measures of solitary confinement 
and/or discipline: see further below, p 452-3. 
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appear to be subject to any particular regulation, 248 it recommended that an 
"exhaustive" policy be formulated, whose contents should include, in addition to 
those identified above, "specific recording procedures and medical supervision". 249 
To the Bulgarian authorities, regarding the use of leather straps in all three psychiatric 
establishments visited in 1995, the CPT suggested that a policy on restraint: 
"... should make clear that initial attempts to restrain aggressive behaviour 
should, as far as possible, be non-physical (e. g. verbal instruction) and that 
where physical restraint is necessary, it should in principle be limited to 
manual control. Instruments of restraint should only be used as a last 
resort". 25° 
Finally and very specifically, from observations made in the wake of its periodic visit 
to Switzerland in February 1996, it would appear that any policy on restraint 
techniques should, the CPT considers, also deal with the use of police dogs in the 
course of an arrest 251 
Procedure and safeguards on the use of forcelrestraint against 
detainees 
Introduction 
One of the most fundamental guarantees against the abusive use of force or the 
inappropriate application of measures of restraint against detainees is that which the 
CPT has, regrettably, had cause to emphasise perhaps more frequently than any other 
in its published work. It concerns the important role to be played by senior officers or 
248 See France I, paras 200 and 227. 
249 Ideen, Para 203 (0 indent). 
2° See Bulgaria I, Para 218; and, similarly, 8th GR, Para 47. 
"' See Switzerland 114 Para 15. In the course of its visit, the CPT delegation met two detainees in 
Zurich who claimed 
- 
with some justification, it seems 
- 
to have been "severely bitten" by police dogs 
during their apprehension: idem, Para 12. 
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management in places of detention 
- 
and, indeed, by central government252 
- 
in the 
prevention of ill-treatment. For, "it is up to [such authorities]", it maintains, "to 
ensure that their subordinates carry out their responsibilities while respecting [all] 
laws and other relevant regulations and also international human rights instruments 
ratified by [their government]". 253 Accordingly, such officials should take it upon 
themselves: 
"... [to] remind their subordinates that ill-treatment is not acceptable and will 
be the subject of severe sanctions". 254 
"This message", the Committee holds, "should be recalled in an appropriate form255 at 
suitable intervals' . 256 Strongly linked to it is a precept which the Committee has 
invoked almost as frequently, namely, that: 
"... one of the most effective means of preventing ill-treatment lies in the 
diligent examination [by, inter alia, those senior officials] of all complaints 
made against members of law enforcement agencies and, when necessary, in 
the imposition of appropriate sanctions". 257 
Such an approach, it believes, "will have a very important dissuasive effect" on 
officers minded to ill treat detainees, officers who "otherwise could gain the 
impression that they could act with impunity"258 What this requires in practice, it 
seems, is a commitment on the part of the national authorities, where necessary, to 
252 See Italy II, Para 73. 
253 See Romania I, Para 24. 
254 See, e. g., Netherlands (NA) II, Para 45; and Spain IV, Para 47. 255 Which form would include, it seems, a "formal declaration" issued directly by the relevant 
Government Minister: see Belgium II, Para 14. 256 Netherlands (NA) II, Para 45. 
257 See, e. g., France III, Para 24. 
253 See Italy II, Para 24. 
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devolve certain disciplinary responsibilities away from central government into the 
hands of persons in positions of authority in custodial establishments. 259 
As regards the detainee who is the subject of measures of force or restraint, in 
the view of the CPT: 
"... [he] must have available to him all appropriate guarantees, medical as well 
as legal, protecting him against the possibility of abuse". 6° 
It is of the opinion, further, that detainees should be able to avail themselves of such 
guarantees, regardless of the type of force or restraint technique to which they are 
subject. For instance, visiting a number of Scottish prisons in the UK in May 1994, a 
delegation noted that formal safeguards existed in respect of the use of body belts, 
"but that these would appear not to apply to the use of force in a more general 
sense". 261 Consequently, the Committee recommended that the safeguards 
adumbrated in its visit report should be "available to all prisoners against whom any 
means of force (including control and restraint techniques) have been used" 
- 
262 
These two fundamental precepts 
- 
i. e. that all appropriate safeguards should 
be available to every prisoner against whom force or restraint is used, regardless of 
the type of forcetrestraint deployed 
- 
we shall take as our starting-point in our 
examination of the various procedural guarantees sought by the CPT in this area. 
=39 See, e. g., Ireland II, para 39 (regarding the introduction of a new Disciplinary Code for Prison 
Officers in 1996, which vested the power to impose penalties in respect of recalcitrant prison officers in 
the Minister of State and not, as the CPT would appear to prefer, in the prison Governor. "delegation 
of greater responsibility and accountability to Governors in respect of stafr, it observed, "would be a 
positive development"). 
See Switzerland I, para 134. 
261 See UK III, para 310. 
262 UK III, para 310. 
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Force/restraint to be measures of last resort 
As we have seen, the CPT considers that in regulating the use of force/restraint 
techniques, the aim of the authorities should be to limit their use to situations arising 
from clearly defined, exceptional circumstances. 63 We should consider, therefore, 
those circumstances and the requirement of exceptionality. In this respect, the 
Committee's position may be simply stated: recourse to instruments of physical 
restraint, `whether for medical or non-medical reasons", 264 it insists, should be made: 
"... only when all other methods of control fail or when justified on medical 
grounds... "265 
In other words, the use of such instruments "should be the exception rather than the 
rule"266 and may be considered, consequently, "very rarely justified". 267 
For their part, the European Prison Rules offer much greater precision as to 
the meaning of "exceptional circumstances". Rule 63.1, EPR provides, inter alia, 
that: 
"[s]taff of... institutions shall not use force against prisoners except in self- 
defence or in cases of attempted escape, or active or passive physical 
resistance to an order based on law or regulations". 
Proportionality 
Visiting the Kopenick Detention Centre for Foreigners, Germany, in April 1996, a 
CPT delegation heard "a few" allegations concerning the occasional "disproportionate 
263 See above, p 333. 
264 See Germany II, para 161. 
2's See, e. g Sweden I, para 130 (5`h1 indent). Visiting Sweden in May 1991, the CPT was told that, 
consistent with this view, instruments of physical restraint are resorted to "very rarely" in the country's 
son establishments. It found no evidence to the contrary: idem, para 129. See Spain I, para 98. 
26' See Luxembourg I, paras 130 and 166; and, in the specific context of the restraint of psychiatric 
patients, 3'a GR, para 44; and 8th GR, para 48. 
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use of force" against detainees in the application of control and restraint techniques. 268 
In one such case, the CPT noted in its subsequent visit report, a detainee had 
"exhibited medical signs... consistent with his claims that during a check made in a 
dormitory a few days before, he had been dragged outside, peremptorily handcuffed 
behind his back, thrown face down on the floor, punched in the face and kicked". 269 
In a second case 
- 
pre-dating the delegation's visit by several months 
- 
it was alleged 
that, after "repeatedly" calling staff, a detainee had been thrown face first onto his cell 
bed by several staff members, held in position by way of a foot pressed against the 
nape of his neck in order that handcuffs might be applied behind his back and, once so 
restrained, punched on the neck. 270 
These allegations elicited from the CPT the following response, which 
response it is proposed to regard as its fundamental position on the issue of 
proportionality: 
"[t]here can be no doubt that custodial staff may occasionally have to use 
force to restrain violent or disturbed persons. However. 
.. 
no more force than is 
reasonably necessary should be used". 271 
It has proclaimed elsewhere, slightly differently, that recourse to force and/or 
measures of restraint ought never to be "completely without justification" ? 72 
Accordingly, in a reference to the kind of "modem intervention techniques" 
which, it considers, ought to feature in any response to a violent incident or 
263 See Germany II, para 46. 
269 Idem, para 47. 
270 Ibid. Other sources alleged that staff had behaved similarly in January 1996, causing a detainee a 
number of injuries. For allegations and evidence of a similar 
- 
though not "systematic" 
- 
"overreact[ionj" on the part of custodial staff faced with violent, disturbed or disruptive behaviour, see, 
inter alia, Spain I, paras 95-6; and UK I, para 86. See also Slovenia I, paras 52-5 and 99 (regarding 
the similar conclusions of a domestic inquiry into the use of force against detainees following an 
incident at a juvenile detention centre in January 1995). 
n' Idem, para 48. See, similarly, Iceland II, para 43. 
m See Slovenia I, para 55. 
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disturbance in a place of detention, it has proclaimed that "[s]uch techniques do not 
include meeting violence with violence". 73 
The position of the CPT in this regard reflects that of the European Prison 
Rules, Rule 63.1 of which provides, inter alia, that "staff who have recourse to force 
must use no more than is strictly necessary... " 
The application of instruments of restraint as a punishment 
The CPT, as we have seen, acknowledges that following a serious act of violence by a 
detainee, especially one in which members of custodial staff have been injured, the 
temptation to exact "summary retribution" may be "great". At the same time, 
however, it considers that the ability to resist such retribution is "precisely one of the 
hallmarks of a properly-trained and professional prison officer" 274 Reinforcing such 
antipathy towards retribution, and in the specific context of the application of restraint 
techniques, the Committee has stated, on numerous occasions, that: 
"... instruments of restraint... should never be applied, or their application 
prolonged, as a punishment". 275 
In fact, it is to the credit of a number of States parties that this precept already exists 
in their regulatory frameworks. 276 
Length of application of restraint measures 
Rule 40, EPR stipulates, inter alia, that: 
273 See Netherlands (NA) II, para 17. 
274 See above, pp 302-3. 
275 See, e. g., 2 GR, para 53; Spain I, para 98 (4th indent); and, in respect of the restraint of psychiatric 
patients in particular, 3'5 GR, para 44; and 8`h GR, para 48. The Committee has formulated an 
analogous precept in respect of the (prolonged) isolation/discipline of detainees: see below, p 454. 276 See, e. g., Denmark I, para 32; UK I, para 93; Norway I, pars 114; and Malta II, para 77. In the same 
connection, see also Rule 39, EPR, cited above, at pp 278-9. 
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"... instruments [of restraint] must not be applied for any longer time than is 
strictly necessary". 
The CPT, for its part, is of the same view, averring that, once applied: 
"... instruments of restraint should be removed at the earliest possible 
opportunity" 2n 
While this expression leaves no room for doubt as to the Committee's feelings on the 
matter, what it does not make clear is what the Committee regards as too great a 
duration. To a large extent, of course, circumstances determine duration; for, if a 
detainee continues to show signs of agitation even after restraint measures have been 
applied, then their continued application would seem, prima facie, justified. However, 
in the light of the anecdotal evidence available in its published work, we may be fairly 
sure that the CPT considers that there exists a point beyond which to continue to 
restrain a person becomes an inhuman and degrading act 
- 
or worse 
- 
regardless of his 
state of mind. For instance, visiting the prison of Puerto de Santa Maria I, Spain, in 
1991, the Committee learned of one prisoner who, prior to its visit, had been isolated 
and handcuffed for some 29 hours, save for "brief periods" for feeding and complying 
with the needs of nature, because of his perceived aggressiveness. He committed 
suicide the following day. 278 In its subsequent report, the CPT averred that the 
application of restraint measures for such a length of time is "totally unacceptable", 279 
and, in a gesture from which its views on the significance of the incident may be 
clearly inferred, recommended that the provisions of Article 5 of the country's Prison 
Rules 
- 
which stipulates that "[n]o prisoner shall be subjected to torture or ill- 
2" See, e. g., 2nd GR, pars 53; 3" GR, para44; 8th GR, para 48; and UK IN, para 310. 278 See Spain I, para 97. 
2" Ibid. 
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treatment... or be the subject of unnecessary harshness in the application of the 
rules"280 
- 
be "fully complied with". 281 
Elsewhere, the Committee has observed that "cases where means of physical 
restraint need to be applied to a prisoner for more than twenty-four hours will be 
rares282 and that the application of instruments of restraint "for some fifteen hours 
overnight" may be considered "prolonged". 283 Visiting Germany in April 1996, it 
noted that, under Federal law, 284 the application of such instruments in the country's 
prisons for periods in excess of three days "must be notified to a superior 
authority"285 To the CPT, "[t]his would appear to suggest that instruments of 
restraint could legally be applied for a period of days at a time"286 Consequently, it 
sought to emphasise that: 
"... in its view, the application of instruments of restraint for a period of days 
can never be justified". 287 
Accordingly, it recommended that the German authorities "take steps to ensure that 
such a situation cannot occur". 288 In the same way, the Committee has "on occasion 
encountered psychiatric patients to whom instruments of physical restraint have been 
applied for a period of days... " In the light of such findings, it has proclaimed 
280 Idem, App II, para 4. 
281 Idem, Para 98. 
282 See Iceland I, para 128. Icelandic law provides that restraint measures may be applied to remand 
prisoners for a maximum of 24 hours, unless the Prison Administration authorises a longer period. See, 
in the same connection, Italy I, para 117 (regarding the application of restraint measures "throughout 
the night" at the maison d'arret San Vittore, Italy, in March 1992). 
283 See Spain VI, para 53 (regarding the handcuffing to beds 
- 
without mattresses - of occupants of the 
segregation unit at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria Prison in 1998). Interestingly, later in the report, the 
CPT characterised such duration as "excessive": idem, para 60. 284 Specifically, a Federal Instruction issued under Section 88 of the country's Prison Law. 283 See Germany II, para 162. 296 Ibid. (See, similarly, Greece I, para 185: restraint "for several days" possible in certain isolation 
cells visited in March 1993). Notwithstanding German law, the visiting delegation found that, in 
ractice, "in most cases", measures of restraint might be applied "for a maximum of a few hours". 1Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 
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emphatically that "such a state of affairs cannot have any therapeutic justification and 
amounts, in its view, to ill-treatments289 
Authorising the use offorce or instruments ofphysical restraint 
In the authorisation of the use of force or measures of restraint against detainees, it 
seems clear from an examination of the CPT's published work that a distinction 
should be drawn between the kind of authorisation appropriate to the application of 
such measures against mentally-ill detainees and that appropriate to their application 
against other categories of detainee. 
- 
psychiatric patients 
As we have seen, in every Greek psychiatric establishment visited in March 1993, the 
decision to use instruments of physical restraint, the CPT perceived, was left to the 
discretion of an "untrained and numerically inadequate" nursing staff. 290 
Consequently, in an effort to minimise the risk of excessive recourse to restraint 
techniques in such establishments, the CPT recommended, inter alia, that: 
"measures of... physical restraint [should be] applied only on the express 
instruction of a doctor or immediately brought to the attention of a doctor for 
approval". 291 
2" See 8th GR, Para 48; and, similarly, Italy II, Para 142 (following the discovery that a patient at the 
centre d'observation neuropsychiatrique de San Vittore had been restrained for 51 hours shortly before 
a visit in 1995); and Spain VI, Para 89 (regarding the possibility that acutely agitated patients at Las 
Palmas de Gran Canaria Prison could be restrained for up to two days, when visited in 1998). 290 See above, p 334. See, similarly, Luxembourg I, Para 129. A certain confusion as to responsibility, 
inter alia, for the restraint of detainees was also apparent in Belgium in 1993: see Belgium I, Para 199. 291 See Greece I, paras 256 (3rd indent) and 282. See also Belgium I, Para 201 (3`d indent); 
Luxembourg I, Para 130; 3'd GR, Para 44; and now 8th GR, Para 48. 
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This precept, it is worth noting, the Committee holds to be "axiomatic". 292 Further, it 
may be inferred from the Committee's observations elsewhere that the "express 
instruction" or "approval" given by a doctor should be more than merely oral. For 
instance, visiting the Santa Coloma Mental Hospital, Spain, in 1994, a CPT delegation 
found no evidence in the files or nursing notes of two restrained patients seen of a 
specific medical order authorising the measures taken. Indeed, to the Committee's 
evident concern, it appeared generally in the establishment that the responsible doctor 
would give such an order verbally, "usually over the phone". 293 
Without actively encouraging the Spanish authorities to introduce a policy of 
written authorisation, 294 the Committee's observations do suggest, it is submitted, that 
it would much rather a more formal approach have been adopted by staff at Santa 
Coloma than that which appeared to obtain at the time of the visit. Thus, it may be 
stated, in the view of the CPT, the express authorisation 
- 
arguably written in nature - 
of a doctor is a pre-condition of the humane restraint of mentally-ill detainees. 
- 
prisoners 
To the UK authorities, regarding the use of body belts in prisons in England and 
Wales in 1990, the Committee suggested, inter alia, that their issue and use should be 
subject to the express authorisation, not of a doctor, but of the prison Governor or his 
deputy. 295 Similarly, among the range of safeguards relating to the application of 
restraint measures in Norwegian prisons "welcome[d]" by the CPT in the wake of its 
1993 visit, were the requirements, first, that a "placement order" be made by the 
292 See Cyprus I, paras 137 and 172. 
293 See Spain Il, para 203. 
294 In its visit report, the CPT merely reiterated the recommendation just quoted above: idem, paras 204 (2°d indent) and 227. 
295 See above, pp 285-6. 
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prison Director 
- 
or, in emergencies, his representative; and, second, that placements 
on security beds for periods exceeding 24 hours or in security cells for periods 
exceeding three days, be notified to the Central Prison Administration. 296 This 
position of the CPT would seem to accord with the provisions of the European Prison 
Rules, which, as we have seen, stipulate that certain instruments of restraint may be 
used exceptionally, "by order of the director" 
- 
albeit subject to an immediate 
consultation with a medical officer297 
- 
and whose Rule 63.1 provides, inter alia, that 
"[s]taff who have recourse to force... must report the incident immediately to the 
director of the institution". 
The medical examination and supervision of physically restrained detainees 
- 
The importance of medical examinations in the prevention of ill-treatment 
generally 
The inherently greater risk of ill-treatment occasioned by the use of force or 
instruments of restraint in places of detention is an issue which has been considered 
already. 298 What has so far merely been touched on, however, is the role of the 
medical doctor in forestalling such ill-treatment. 299 In the view of the CPT: 
"[t]he potential importance of the role which could be played by doctors 
appointed to carry out forensic tasks should... be emphasised. The findings of 
such doctors will carry considerable weight in legal and/or disciplinary 
s300 proceedings... 
296 See Norway I, para 115. 
2' See above, p 279. 
21" See above, p 332. 
299 However, see above, p 119 et seq. (regarding the forensic role of doctors in the context of police 
custody). 
300 See Portugal 1I, paras 32 and 171; and Cyprus II, para 17. 
345 
In Portuguese police practice, it would appear, this "potential importance" is 
overlooked. According to both the Director and the Head of the Medico-Legal Clinic 
at the Lisbon Institute of Forensic Medicine when interviewed in May 1995, forensic 
doctors are "only occasionally" called upon to examine persons who allege ill- 
treatment by the Portuguese police. 301 Further, they admitted, there is "often a 
significant time-lag" between the alleged incident of ill-treatment and the issuing of a 
forensic examination order by the competent judge, as a result of which "any 
identifiable marks or injuries which might have been attributable to ill-treatment will 
often have healed". 302 
The Committee subsequently remarked that "it is... essential that [forensic 
doctors] be closely involved in cases of alleged ill-treatment by the police". 303 For 
our purposes, however, their importance in other custodial environments, too, cannot 
be overlooked and must be considered just as important. Indeed, actuated by 
considerations of this kind, it would appear, later in the same visit report the 
Committee observed that: 
"[p]rison health care services can make a significant contribution to the 
prevention of ill-treatment of detained persons, through the systematic 
recording of injuries and, when appropriate, the provision of general 
information to the relevant authorities... 004 
It added that: 
301 Ibid. Apparently, there had been only six instances of such intervention in the year prior to the 
Committee's visit. 
302 ibid. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ideen, pars 118. See also 3M GR, Para 60; Germany II, Para 138; Spain VI, Para 91; and, regarding 
the role of prison health care services in detecting (and preventing) the ill-treatment of persons 
formerly held in police custody, Austria II, Para 27; and Poland I, Para 22. 
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"[i]nformation could also be forwarded on specific cases, though as a rule 
such action should only be undertaken with the consent of the prisoner 
concerned". 305 
Of course, in substantiating a claim of ill-treatment 
- 
including the disproportionate 
use of force or instruments of physical restraint 
-a detainee will inevitably encounter 
difficulties if the recording of injuries by health care staff is anything but "systematic" 
and the forwarding of information to the relevant authorities inadequate. In Austria, 
in 1994, for instance, a delegation encountered one detainee at the Wien-Josefstadt 
Prison who claimed that in the course of his initial medical examination he had made 
allegations of police ill-treatment. It was observed, however, that although injuries 
had been recorded in his medical file, no mention had been made of his claims. 306 
Similarly, at a Viennese police establishment, a delegation noted from records kept 
that for the few weeks prior to and during its visit, out of thirteen persons whose 
medical examinations had yielded evidence of lesions "and other medical symptoms 
(sometimes... serious)", in only one case had the cause of such injuries been 
recorded. 307 Further, in the case of another Austrian detainee, the delegation learned 
that although injuries observed during his medical examination on admission to prison 
- 
allegedly caused by police officers at the time of his arrest308 
- 
had been recorded in 
the relevant file, no transmission of his case to the relevant authorities seemed to have 
taken place. 309 
303 Ibid. See, similarly, Belgium II, para 177. 
306 See Austria II, para 27. See, similarly, Germany II, pars 138 (regarding the recording of inmates' 
claims at Butzow Prison, April 1996). 
307 Ibid. At Hamburg Remand Prison, Germany (April 1996), not only the causes, but even the injuries 
themselves, it would appear, were not recorded systematically: see Germany II, para 138 (and, 
similarly, Netherlands I, pars 122). 
308 Idem, para 17. 
309 Idem, pars 27. 
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It is possible to say that, in the light of experience, the CPT has formulated the 
following precepts on the role of (forensic) doctors in the prevention of ill-treatment 
in places of detention, which precepts, although pertaining to particular custodial 
situations, have the potential, it is submitted, to be more broadly applied: 
(a) that, "whenever a public prosecutor or investigating judge receives a complaint of 
ill-treatment... or observes that someone brought before him could have been a victim 
of ill-treatment, he should immediately request a forensic medical examination of the 
person concerned and bring the matter to the attention of the relevant public 
prosecutor". 310 
Interestingly, the Committee has recently appeared to formulate a reciprocal 
obligation on the part of doctors, who, it has recommended, "should inform the 
competent prosecutor [or, presumably, investigating judge] on each occasion that they 
find signs of violence suggestive of ill-treatment during the medical examination of a 
detainee". 31 The transmission of such information, it believes, axiomatically, should 
be done "with [the] utmost urgency, to ensure that the [judicial authorities] are in 
possession of all relevant information". 312 
(b) that "persons taken into police custody who are subsequently released without 
being brought before a public prosecutor or judge should be able independently to 
solicit a medical examination/certificate from the relevant forensic 
doctor/institute"; 313 
310 See Cyprus II, paras 17 (1` and 2nd indents) and 101; and, similarly, Portugal IT, paras, 33 and 171; 
and Poland I, pars 23. 
311 See Romania I, para 41; and, similarly, Italy II, para 26 (2°d indent). 312 See Spain VI, Para 92. 313 See Cyprus 11, paras 17 (1t and 2"d indents) and 101; and Portugal II, pares 33 and 171. 
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(c) that the medical certificate drawn up after each forensic examination 
- 
or, the CPT 
has also asserted, following the admission or return of every detainee to prison 
- 
should contain: 
i. an account of statements made by the detainee which are relevant to 
the medical examination (including his own description of his state of 
health and any allegations of ill-treatment); 
ii. an account of objective medical findings based on a thorough 
examination; 314 and 
iii. the doctor's conclusions in the light of i. and ii. 315 
"It is axiomatic", the Committee has stated, that "the same approach should be 
followed whenever a prisoner is medically examined following a violent episode in 
prison [whatever its origin]"316 
- 
which episodes include, clearly, incidents in which 
force or instruments of restraint are applied to an agitated detainee. 317 "In addition", it 
has remarked, "the detainee must be able to obtain on demand a medical certificate 
describing [any] injuries recorded". 318 In other instances, this duty to furnish the 
detainee (and his lawyer) with a medical certificate has been characterised as 
absolute; no request from the detainee is required. Any certificate drawn up in the 
wake of an examination must be made available to him as a matter of policy. 319 
3u The taking of photographs of the relevant parts of the detainee's body may also be appropriate: see 
Netherlands (NA) III, para 15. 
315 See, e. g., Cyprus II, para 17 (3'd indent); Austria II, para 27; and Germany II, paras 139 and 193. 
This precept, it should be noted, unsurprisingly reflects that formulated by the CPT in respect of the 
medical examination of persons detained by the police: see above, p 110. 316 See Germany II, paras 139 and 193; and, similarly, Yd GR, para 6; Poland I, para 126; and Belgium 
II, para 179. 
317 See, e. g., Netherlands I, para 122. 
318 See Belgium II, para 179. 
319 See, e. g., France III, para 25. 
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- 
The medical examination of detainees against whom force or measures of 
restraint have been used 
Regarding, specifically, the use of force and/or instruments of physical restraint in 
places of detention, the CPT is of the view that: 
"[a] prisoner against whom any means of force have been used should have 
the right to be immediately examined and, if necessary, treated by a medical 
doctor. This examination should be conducted out of the hearing and 
preferabl y 320 out of the sight of non-medical staff, and the results of the 
examination (including any relevant statements by the prisoner and the 
doctor's conclusions) should be formally recorded and made available to the 
prisoner [and his lawyer] ". 321 
These provisions need little, if any, explanation (they are, of course, reminiscent of 
the Committee's views on the right of persons in police custody to secure a medical 
examination322). It should be added, however, that the Committee does not consider 
a medical examination to have been immediate if it takes place two days or a fortiori 
six days after the incident giving rise to it. 323 
A detainee's entitlement to a medical examination becomes particularly 
relevant, of course, once measures of force or restraint cease to be applied. As to his 
entitlement during such application, the CPT considers that: 
320 I. e. unless the doctor requests otherwise: see, e. g. Norway I, para 120 (2"d indent). 321 See, inter alia, 2"a GR, para 53; and UK III, para 310. 322 See above, pp 96-7. 
323 See Cyprus II, paras 54 and 56. See, similarly, Spain I, para 101 (examination "several days" after 
alleged ill-treatment); and Slovenia I, para 55 (domestic inquiry found it "astonishing" that a medical 
examination had taken place the day after an incident involving the use of force). Cf Denmark I. para 
36 (it is "compulsory" under Danish law to call a doctor immediately after use of force/restraint); and 
Sweden I, para 127 and Iceland I, para 129 (Swedish and Icelandic law oblige a doctor to examine a 
prisoner to whom a physical restraint has been applied "as soon as possible" after such application). 
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"a prisoner to whom an instrument of restraint is applied should be kept under 
constant and adequate custodial surveillance or medical supervision, as the 
case may be". 
324 
It would appear, therefore, that, for so long as force and/or restraint are applied to a 
detainee, the CPT is content to see supervision undertaken either by medical staff or 
- 
presumably, medically unqualified 
- 
custodial staff, provided, in either case, that such 
supervision is "constant and adequate". However, such a view would appear to be 
inconsistent with that which the Committee has elaborated on the slightly different 
question of who determines when force or restraint is to be applied. In that regard, as 
we have seen, it considers that leaving it to the discretion, inter alia, of untrained staff 
may lead to the application of force or instruments of restraint "in excess of 
requirements". 325 Clearly, if there is a danger of excessive reliance on force/restraint 
when the decision to apply such measures rests with unqualified staff, then, it must 
also be the case that that same danger exists when the supervision of restrained 
persons is left to such persons. 
As to the regularity with which medical checks ought, in the view of the CPT, 
to be made on physically restrained detainees in order that they may be considered 
"constant and adequate", it has remained largely silent. However, there is arguably a 
hint of a precept in its first Norwegian visit report. In Norwegian prisons, the CPT 
observed in 1993, one of a "series" of safeguards to which the application of restraint 
measures was subject was a medical examination every 24 hours. 326 Given that the 
Committee "welcome[d]" en bloc the various guarantees elaborated by the Norwegian 
324 See, e. g., Sweden I, para 130 (6`h indent); Spain I, para 98 (2" indent); and, similarly, Denmark I, 
paras 38 and 136 (requirement of the "strictest possible" medical supervision or custodial 
surveillance). 
325 See above, p 334. 
326 See Norway I, para 115. 
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authorities in this area, we may conclude that it was quite content with such an 
arrangement. It is surprising, however, that the CPT was not more critical of the 
arrangement, for, it will be recalled that its precepts on the duration of physical 
restraint measures do not readily accommodate its application for a period of 24 hours 
or more. 327 
The general supervision of physically restrained detainees 
Beyond the question of the medical supervision of physically restrained detainees 
there lies that of their supervision in a custodial sense 
- 
though, as might be expected 
(and as we have already seen), there is some overlap between the two practices. The 
practical consequences of an absence of effective supervision by custodial staff may 
be seen in the allegations of prisoners interviewed in Denmark in December 1990. 
These prisoners had had direct experience of the country's system of "special security 
cells" (cells furnished only with a bed, to which prisoners might be strapped). 328 
They alleged, "in particular", that occupants of such cells could be "left alone 
strapped to the bed for long periods, sometimes a whole night, despite calls for 
assistance". 329 As a result, the Committee heard 
- 
"several times" 
- 
"prisoners had 
[had] no other choice but to comply with the needs of nature in... bed". 330 
The starting-point for any examination of CPT precepts in this area, it is 
submitted, is the statement in its 2°d General Report that: 
327 See above, pp 340-3. 
328 See Denmark I, para 31. 
329 Ideen, para 33. 
330 Ibid. 
352 
"[i]n those rare cases when resort to instruments of physical restraint is 
required, the prisoner concerned should be kept under constant and adequate 
supervision". 331 
The rationale for such rigorous supervision is axiomatic: if supervision is "constant 
and adequate", the CPT considers, custodial staff are better able to "anticipate 
crises"332 and thereby minimise the risk of causing unnecessary harm to persons 
subject to measures of restraint. 
The Committee's basic precept has been expounded in other published reports. 
In this regard, as we have seen, the CPT considers that the supervision to which 
restrained prisoners should, in its view, be subject, may be either custodial or medical, 
as the case may be; 333 it need not be both, it seems. Further, from remarks made to 
the Icelandic authorities in the wake of its visit in July 1993, it may be inferred that 
the Committee considers that adequate supervision also requires not only the 
monitoring of restrained detainees, but the provision of "support", where necessary. 334 
The nature of such support, however, it did not specify. 
Among the range of safeguards enshrined in Norwegian law on the use of 
restraint in prisons and "welcome[d]" by the CPT following its visit in 1993 were two 
of relevance in the present connection. The first provided for the making of "at least 
hourly visual checks" on prisoners held in security cells; and the second for "constant 
staff attendance" following a detainee's confinement to a security bed. 335 The CPT 
was particularly struck by the second of the two safeguards, a reaction that may 
331 See god GR, pars 53. See also UK III, pars 310; and, similarly, Sweden I, para 130 (46' indent) (requirement of "close supervision"); Germany II, para 161 ("appropriate supervision); and Iceland I, 
L ara 128 ("staff should be permanently present"). 
2 See, Italy I, pars 172. 333 See above, p 351. 334 See Iceland I, para 128. 
335 See Norway I, pare 115. 
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connote endorsement (though, as a potential standard, it adds little to the basic precept 
elaborated above). As to the first, it offered the view that "more frequent" visual 
checks on prisoners confined to a security cell would be appropriate. 336 
Thus, we may be sure that in developing its basic precept in this area, the CPT 
considers that any visual checks carried out on restrained detainees ought to be 
conducted more frequently than once every hour (though how more frequently it is 
not clear). In its first Danish visit report, however, it cited, with approval, a 
suggestion made by a Ministry of Justice working party on the use of the country's 
"special security cells" that observations made of restrained detainees should be 
recorded in detail every quarter of an hour. 337 It may very well be, therefore, that the 
CPT would consider the carrying out of visual checks on physically restrained 
detainees at least once every 15 minutes as a most appropriate gesture. 
The frequency with which custodial staff are able to monitor restrained 
detainees may be considered particularly important when the location of restraint or 
security cells is in issue. We shall shortly see how detrimental to the supervision of 
detainees it is in the view of the CPT to locate such cells away from staff quarters or 
surveillance points. Little need be said in the present connection, therefore, other 
than to emphasise just how difficult is the task of monitoring physically restrained 
detainees "constant[ly] and adequate[ly]" when staff must travel some distance to 
discharge their duties. 
It should be evident from the preceding paragraphs that the nature of the 
surveillance sought by the CPT in safeguarding the well-being of restrained detainees 
is not at all clear in its published 
-work. It perhaps came closest to a definitive 
statement on the matter in its first Danish visit report wherein, as we have seen, it 
336 Ibid. 
337 See Denmark I, paras 37 (sub-para (i)) and para 38. 
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considered "some important suggestions" made by a Ministry of Justice working 
party. One such suggestion 
- 
which, it would appear, the Danish authorities had not 
acted on at the time of the visit in 1990 
- 
sought: 
"... the continued surveillance... of the [restrained] prisoner by an 
appropriately trained prison officer exclusively assigned to the task either from 
outside the cell or inside". 338 
For its part, the CPT recommended that the working party's proposal "be 
implemented". 339 
The supervisory practice operating at the Rheinau psychiatric clinic, 
Switzerland, in July 1991, may also be worth mentioning, in passing, as an example 
of good practice in the supervision of restrained detainees. There, a delegation 
observed, each day's work and measures taken in relation to inmates (including 
recourse or threat of recourse to force and measures of restraint) were "made the 
subject of a meeting of medical staff at which all 
... 
questions were discussed and steps 
to be taken determined". 0 
Recording incidents involving the use offorce or instruments of physical restraint 
We have already considered the recording of the application of force or measures of 
physical restraint against detainees in the context of their medical supervision. 341 
What we have not done so far, however, is to examine the question more broadly, as a 
matter of custodial record. 
The consequences of a failure adequately to record details of recourse to force 
and/or instruments of restraint have been highlighted by the CPT in a number of visit 
338 See Denmark I, pars 37 (sub-para (i)). 
339 Ideen, paras 38 and 136. 
340 See Switzerland I, pars 134. 
341 See above, pp 349 and 350. 
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reports. To the German authorities, for example, following a visit to the solitary 
confinement section in Tegel Prison's Psycho-Neurological Unit in December 1991, 
the Committee remarked, that "it [had] not [been] possible to establish from the 
records [kept]... how often use was made of instruments of physical restraint" 
. 
3a2 
Similarly, having visited the Lisbon Judicial Police Group Prison, Portugal, in May 
1995, the CPT observed that staff interviewed had admitted that inmates could 
occasionally be transferred to reception cells at night to "cool off' without any record 
being made of the fact and that if they were returned to a normal cell or dormitory 
before the following morning, senior staff "would not even be informed orally" 
. 
343 
"Clearly", the CPT averred, "such a situation is open to abuse". 344 The practice, it 
stated, significantly, "indicat[ed]... the existence of unofficial quasi-disciplinary 
practices" at the establishment. 345 
Other recording omissions deemed worthy of comment by the CPT have 
included failures to record details of an individual's state of health or of any medical 
treatment administered as a result of his restraint; 346 a failure to provide any clear 
indication as to the frequency of observations made during the application of restraint 
measures; 347 failures to indicate "with precision" the duration of an individual's 
restraint; 348 and a failure to stipulate that prior medical authorisation to a measure has 
been obtained. 349 
Findings like these have prompted the CPT to observe that: 
342 See Germany I, para 142. See, similarly, Bulgaria I, pars 213 (regarding the perceived 
consequences of recording practice at the Radnevo Psychiatric Hospital in 1995). 
343 See Portugal II, para 72. 
344 mid. 
345 Ideen, para 176. 
346 See Netherlands I, paras 63 and 122. 
347 See Spain II, para 203. 
"a See Belgium I, para 199; and, similarly, Bulgaria I, para 213. 349 See Spain II, para 203. 
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"[i]t goes without saying that the scrupulous recording of any use 
of... instruments of physical restraint is a fundamental safeguard against 
possible abuse and, more generally, represents an essential tool of good 
management". 350 
Accordingly, it has recommended that custodial authorities: 
"... take appropriate steps to ensure that... any use of instruments of physical 
restraint, whether or not this is in a medical context, is duly recorded, with a 
reference to the grounds and the length of time involved". 351 
This formulation may be taken to represent the CPT's fundamental understanding of 
the recording duties of custodial authorities when using force and/or measures of 
restraint against detainees. In this respect, it helpfully develops its rather spare 
original formulation, which suggested, simply, that: 
"... a record should be kept of every instance of the use of force against 
prisoners". 352 
The rationale for such scrupulous record-keeping is simple: not only is full recording 
necessary, the CPT considers, "[i]n view of the enhanced risk of ill-treatment in 
situations involving the use of instruments of physical restraint"; 353 but it also "greatly 
facilitate[s] both the management of... incidents [in which such measures are applied] 
and the insight into the extent of their occurrence". 354 Further, it considers, "[t]he 
proper recording and monitoring of potentially hazardous treatments... is [the] 
only... way that undesirable practices can be clearly identified by hospital 
350 See Germany I, para 143. The Committee has justified the assiduous recording of recourse to 
measures of solitary confinement in exactly the same way: see below, p 462. 351 Ibid. See also para 199 of the report 352 See, e. g., 2" GR, pars 53; and UK III, para 310. 353 See, e. g., Spain II, paras 204 and 227. 
354 See Bulgaria I, para 219; and 8t' GR, para 50. 
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management and discussed with staff, who may possibly be out of step because of 
misunderstandings, etc". 355 Thus, assiduous recording-keeping would have obviated 
the kind of confusion observed at Hamburg Prison, Germany, in April 1996, where a 
record purporting to relate to an inmate's detention in a soundproofed 
"immobilisation" cell failed to disclose whether or not means of restraint had been 
applied to him and, if so, for how long. Staff interviewed by the CPT "could not 
remember the details of the case" and the inmate himself was not available for 
comment, having been transferred to another prison. 356 
What the Committee considers is required of custodial authorities in the 
recording of recourse to various security measures is, it seems, the following: 
(i) that in each establishment in which recourse to force and/or instruments of 
physical restraint is possible a "central register" containing "full particulars of each 
case in which [such measures] have been used" should be opened. 357 This register, 
the CPT has suggested, should be used exclusively to record these particulars and for 
no other purpose. Accordingly, it should offer a complete record, which exists in 
addition to and independently of that contained in a detainee's own medical file and 
any other relevant document, such as a general medical register. 358 Indeed, the CPT 
has often remarked that: 
355 See Turkey I, Para 181. 
356 See Germany II, Para 163. 
357 See Norway I, Para 120 (4s` indent). In Norwegian law, seemingly, prison authorities are duty-bound 
to record the use of security cells and means of restraint in a "special register": idem, Para 115. See, 
similarly, Spain I, Para 106, Spain II, paras 106 and 217 and now Spain VI, Para 58 (wherein the 
Committee noted that, while the Spanish authorities had, as a result of its intervention, ordered the 
creation of central registers in prison establishments, when visited in 1998, no such establishment had 
'ut the order into practice); and Sweden I, Para 130 (9`h indent). S8 See Bulgaria I, paras 219 and 251 (regarding the poor recording practices highlighted at paras 213- 
215 of the report); and similarly, Slovakia, Para 154. 
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"... every instance of resort to [security] measures [should] be entered in a 
register specifically established for that purpose". 359 
In respect of the restraint of mentally disturbed detainees, it has recommended, more 
precisely, that: 
"... any use of... physical restraint in respect of a patient should be recorded in 
both the patient's file and in an appropriate register... 060 
(ii) that entries made in any register created in order to record recourse to measures of 
force/restraint should include the times at which such measures are applied and 
removed, the circumstances in which they are applied, the reasons for resorting to 
them, the name of the doctor who orders or approves them, the outcome of their 
application and an account of any injuries sustained by detainees and/or staff 361 In 
respect specifically of the application of ECT, this record, the CPT has stated, should 
indicate, in addition, the amount of electricity and drugs administered to the patient 
concerned. 362 
(iii) (possibly) that every quarter of an hour details of visual checks made on 
restrained detainees should be recorded. 363 
359 See, e. g., Germany II, para 58 (emphasis added) and, similarly, para 182. At the Kopenick 
Detention Centre for Foreigners in 1996, the CPT established that "[t]he application of security 
measures vis-ä-vis detainees was [merely] noted in a report which was entered in the centre's incident 
register". See, similarly, Iceland I, para 133 (regarding the complete absence of registers at Litla- 
Hraun and Sioumuli Prisons, when visited in July 1993). 
360 See, e. g., Cyprus I, paras 137 and 172 (and Cyprus II, para 94) (emphasis added). Cfpractice at the 
Athalassa Psychiatric Hospital in 1992, where incidents involving recourse to physical restraint "were 
not specially recorded, other than by an entry in the daily nursing report". By 1996, a register had been 
devised to record the use of `loose canvas restraint jackets" 
- 
though not, it seems, the use of seclusion. 
See also 3'" GR, para 44; and, similarly, 8t' GR, para 50. 361 See Bulgaria I, para 219; Germany II, para 164; Belgium II, para 169; and, more generally, 31d GR, 
para 44; and 8's GR, para 50. 
2 See Turkey I, para 181. 
363 See above, p 354 and Denmark I, paras 37 (sub-para (i)) and 38. 
359 
Staffing matters 
In the application of security measures against detainees, the role of custodial staff is, 
axiomatically, of crucial importance. Among the most significant features of their 
role in this respect are the following: the nature and extent of training provided in the 
use of security measures; the numbers and quality of staff entrusted with their 
application and supervision; the nature of staff-inmate relations; staff perceptions of 
the management of establishments; and the role of superior officers. It is worth 
considering each of these features in turn. 
- 
Training in the use of force and restraint techniques 
The CPT's response to findings 
- 
sometimes, even, merely allegations 
- 
of ill- 
treatment in the course of its work is, invariably, to emphasise to States parties the 
importance of a properly trained and equipped custodial staff. For, while the creation 
of a thoroughgoing legal regime offering detainees a range of safeguards against 
abuse is, it considers, "important" in the struggle to eliminate ill-treatment in places of 
detention, "[it] will never be sufficient": 
"... the best possible guarantee against ill-treatment is for its use to be 
unequivocally rejected by 
... 
officers. It follows that the provision of suitable 
education on human rights questions and of adequate professional training is 
an absolutely essential component of any strategy for the prevention of ill- 
treatment". 364 
Such training, the Committee considers: 
364 See, e. g., Poland I, para 19; Belgium II, para 17; and, similarly, Ireland II, para 41 (wherein the CPT 
remarked that "[t]here is arguably no better guarantee against ill-treatment than a properly trained 
prison officer, capable of adopting an appropriate attitude in his relations with inmates"). 
360 
... 
should be pursued at all levels36s and be ongoing. It should seek to put 
across and develop two points. First, that all forms of ill-treatment are an 
affront to human dignity and as such are incompatible with both [the 
domestic] law [of States parties] and with the values enshrined in many 
international instruments ratified and binding upon [such Parties]. Second, 
that the resort to ill-treatment is a fundamentally flawed method of obtaining 
reliable evidence for combatting crime. Further, particular attention should be 
given to training in the art of handling, and more especially speaking to, 
"366 persons... i. e. interpersonal communication skill... 
Visiting Denmark in 1990, the CPT heard from a number of sources of two instances 
in which, it was claimed, two individuals of African origin had been seriously ill- 
treated while detained in the Police Headquarters Prison and, in one instance, the 
Western Prison, Copenhagen. Specifically, it was alleged that certain warders at the 
Police Headquarters Prison, "before beating [a] young man, [had] covered his face 
with a garment" and that another individual had been "severely beaten with 
truncheons... and subsequently strapped to a cell bed". In both instances, the Danish 
Ministry of Justice had initiated judicial investigations. 367 The CPT was "struck by 
the similarity" of these allegations. "They suggest", it stated in its subsequent visit 
report, "that there might be a problem of communication with nationals of states 
whose languages are little known or not known at all, especially when the behaviour 
365 I. e. it should be provided for "all ranks and categories" of officer: see Ireland I, para 76 (1" indent). 366 See Poland I, para 19; and Belgium I, para 17. See, similarly, France III, para 19 (in the light of 
very serious allegations and findings of ill-treatment in police establishments in the country in 1996); 
and Romania I, para 23 (regarding findings of serious ill-treatment, even torture, in police 
establishments in 1995). 
367 See Denmark I, paras 19-20. 
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of the individuals concerned, for a variety of reasons 
- 
for example, a failure to 
understand the reasons for their detention 
- 
is disturbed". 368 
The Committee acknowledged that Danish prison staff are provided with 
training courses, run "in consultation with the Danish Red Cross and other bodies 
dealing with refugees and asylum seekers". Nevertheless, it "share[d] and 
support[ed]" and sought practical expression of the view of the Governor of 
Copenhagen Prisons that: 
"... specific training courses should be made available for... staff... designed to 
enable them to deal with emergency situations and provide desperate or 
emotionally highly disturbed individuals with the necessary help". 369 
This view also finds expression in Rule 63.2, EPR, which provides that: 
"[s]taff shall as appropriate be given special technical training to enable them 
to restrain aggressive prisoners". 
The consequences of a failure adequately to train custodial staff in techniques of 
restraint and control may be readily predicted. Visiting the Unite pour Malades 
Difficiles at the Centre Hospitalier Specialise de Montfavet, France, in 1991, for 
example, the CPT learned that techniques in the prevention and management of 
violence "did not appear to be taught to nurses" working there. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that when asked about the management of agitated patients, one such nurse 
remarked that "[i]f I were to find myself face to face with a violent patient, I would 
react just as I would in the street". Consistent with this candour, visiting Committee 
361 Idem, pars 21. 
369 Ibid. The use of outside experts in the provision of such training is important to the CPT: see 
Ireland I, para 76 (1" indent) and now Ireland II, para 41 (2"d indent). 
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members heard "several" allegations of "impulsive reactions (slaps, etc. )" on the part 
of staf. 370 
Another predictable consequence of the provision of inadequate or unsuitable 
training in the art of handling violent or agitated detainees is a problem which has 
been identified already in another context, namely, the creation of "a serious risk of 
physical restraint being used in excess of requirements". 371 For example, at the Attica 
State Mental Hospital for children, Greece, in March 1993, where gauze ligatures 
attaching one patient to a bed were found to be "obviously too tight" and to have 
caused circulatory disorders, staff alerted to the problem were said to have been 
"unaware of the ill-effects which could result from partial obstruction of blood 
circulation". 372 Consistent with this level of ignorance, in no Greek mental health 
establishment visited in 1993, it appears, was there any evidence of instructions issued 
on the use of instruments of physical restraint or guidance given "regarding the 
therapeutic expediency of such a measure". 373 
A similar ignorance appears to have lain behind staff behaviour manifested 
during an incident at Radece Re-education Centre for Young Persons, Slovenia, in 
January 1995, in which, according to the authorities, when interviewed one month 
later, prison officers had met the disruptive behaviour of certain inmates with repeated 
baton blows. 374 Further, an internal inquiry had concluded that: 
"... force had been used prematurely and... the means 
employed... disproportionate... [O]n occasion, the use of force had been 
completely without justification... one young person [had] received two blows 
370 See France I, pars 200. 
371 See Greece I, pars 255. 
372 Idem, para 253. 
373 Idem, pars 255. 
314 See Slovenia I, paras 52-3 and 99. According to medical information seen by the visiting delegation, six young persons had displayed injuries consistent with the infliction of multiple baton blows: idem, pars 54. 
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from officers using batons after he had been brought under control; a 
second... [had been] hit with a baton while being searched although, 
apparently, `he did not resist the search'; and a third... `against whom means 
of coercion had already been used' and who [had] refused to get up the 
following morning, [had been] `dragged out of bed' and `struck twice with a 
baton' ". 375 
Intimating how appropriately trained prison officers would have behaved in the same 
circumstances, the inquiry had asserted that: 
"[i]t would have been more appropriate if staff working with the young 
persons had attempted to convince them [to desist] before the 
intervention... [the young persons concerned] could have been restrained by 
using physical force only, [although]... more time and effort would have been 
required". 376 
It should be noted in this connection that the CPT considers that: 
"[a]n aptitude for interpersonal communication should be a major factor in the 
process of recruiting [inter alia] prison officers and that, during the induction 
and in-service training of such officers, considerable emphasis should be 
placed on acquiring and developing interpersonal communication skills". 377 
"The possession of such skills", it maintains, "will often enable a prison officer to 
defuse a tense situation and thereby avoid the need to have recourse to physical 
force". Interestingly, notwithstanding the Slovenian inquiry's findings, prison 
officers interviewed by the visiting delegation stated that "in-service training 
375 Idem, para 55 (and, similarly, pars 99). 
376 Ibid. 
377 See, inter a11a, Slovenia I, pars 59; Spain I, para, 104; and France III, pars 19 (2"d indent). 
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during the last few years had led to a decrease in the use of batons and other similar 
instruments of restraint; more particularly, training in control and restraint techniques 
(i. e. physical force as opposed to handcuffs, batons and tear gas) had apparently led to 
a decrease in an unruly manner". 378 
The CPT has stated further in this connection that: 
"[u]n enseignement des techniques de control physique des patients violents 
permettrait de reduire sensiblement le risque d'emploi abusif de la force, et le 
danger pour toutes les personnes impliquees. 
"L'existence d'un manuel d'instruction et un entrainment approprie 
accompagnes de discussion [in addition to any existing internal 
regulation] 
... 
apporteraient au personnel un sentiment de securite 
psychologique en presence de situations difficiles ou d'incidents serieux ainsi 
qu'une liberte plus grande de choisir entre diverses reactions modulees". 379 
In this way the Committee offered its perspicuous vision of the value of education in 
ensuring the appropriate application of security measures. 38° Of course, as we have 
seen, the value of suitable instruction may manifest itself in other ways, too, in the 
view of the CPT. We know, for instance, that it considers that "one of the hallmarks 
of a properly-trained and professional prison officer" is the ability to resist the 
temptation to exact summary retribution against detainees after serious acts of 
violence, especially those in which prison officers are injured. 381 
As to the contents of any training regime created with a view to equipping 
custodial staff with the skills necessary to manage agitated or violent detainees, the 
376 See Slovenia I, pars 57. 
379 See France I, para 200 and also para 204 (4th indent). 
390 See also in this connection 
- 
though much less comprehensively 
- 
Luxembourg I, para 131. 
331 See above, pp 302-3. 
365 
CPT has suggested that they should comprise "both non-physical and manual" control 
techniques. 382 In an echo of its remarks to the French authorities quoted above, it has 
sought to justify this approach by proclaiming that: 
"[t]he possession of such skills will give staff a greater freedom of choice 
between various levels of response when confronted by difficult situations. 
As a result, the risk of injuries to [detainees] or staff will be reduced" 
, 
383 
This, in turn, the CPT's reasoning runs, is likely to lead to a decrease in the number of 
complaints of ill-treatment lodged by detainees. 384 As to the control techniques 
themselves, the CPT has sought to emphasise that these should be such as to: 
"... enable a violent prisoner to be controlled rapidly but which at the same 
time limit injuries on all sides. 385 
In this connection, it has promoted the acquisition of two skills in particular: namely, 
"verbal communication techniques [and] postural techniques". 386 To these two it has 
added others 
- 
albeit tangentially 
- 
in other visit reports. For instance, it has, on 
occasion, called for the study of "behavioural management techniques" among 
387 custodial personnel. 
The production of instruction manuals on the use of control and restraint 
techniques and the training of prison officers as so-called Control and Restraint 
Instructors are measures taken by national authorities which have been welcomed by 
382 See, e. g., Bulgaria I, para 218; Finland II, para 136; and, more generally, 8th GR, para 47. 
Elsewhere, the Committee has referred 
- 
presumably synonymously 
- 
to "modem intervention 
techniques", which techniques, as might be expected, do not include "meeting violence with violence": 
see Netherlands (NA) 11, para 17 and now Netherlands (NA) III, para 20. 383 Ibid. See, similarly, Romania I, para 191. 
384 See Spain VI, para 59. 
385 See Spain I, para 203. The Committee went on to recommend that Spanish prison officers be given 
"special technical training" in restraint methods. 
36 See, e. g., Belgium I, para 201 (1" indent) 
- 
and now Belgium II, para 170; Greece 1, para 256 (5`h 
indent); and Luxembourg I, para 131. 
39' See, e. g., Germany II, Para 50. 
366 
the CPT as positive developments in promoting the appropriate handling of disturbed 
detainees. Such measures, it has stated, "have an important part to play in 
minimising the risk of injury to prisoners, in particular in situations where it may be 
necessary for inmates to be moved by force from one area of an establishment to 
ass 
another" 
- 
Staff inmate ratios 
While visiting the UK in 1990, the CPT heard a number of allegations from prisoners 
that prison officers used excessive force when dealing, inter alia, with disputes 
between inmates or "suspected irregularit[ies]" during visits. 389 "More specifically", 
it was alleged, prisoners could be physically assaulted by staff while being moved 
from the scene of an incident to a segregation unit and even once in the unit itself. 390 
Commenting on such allegations, the CPT stated that it was "not convinced" that 
there was a "systematic over-reaction" on the part of prison officers handling such 
incidents. "However", it suggested, "there might on occasion be a greater use of 
force than was reasonably required by the circumstances". 391 Significantly, it went on 
to suggest that: 
"[s]taffing levels are an important factor in this context. A very low 
staff/inmate ratio will inevitably lead to prison officers being extremely 
concerned about the possibility of losing overall control. Under such 
circumstances, when an incident arises staff will be anxious to subdue it as 
rapidly as possible, in order to avoid the danger of it spreading; consequently, 
there will be a significant risk of excessive use of force. When, on the other 
388 See Ireland I, para 75. 399 See UK 1, paras 86 and 228 
39° Ibid. 
391 Ibid. 
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hand, there is a reasonably good staff/inmate ratio, officers will feel more 
confident about taking a less hurried approach and attempting to talk out the 
incident", 392 
It is clear, therefore, that the CPT considers that staff: inmate ratios should be 
sufficiently high, first, to minimise the risk of excessive use of force in the 
suppression of a violent incident or disturbance and, second, to facilitate a measured, 
negotiated outcome. 
- 
Staff-inmate relations 
The CPT has sought to emphasise that in the course of a visit it "observes carefully 
the prevailing climate within an establishment". 393 Accordingly, it holds as a general 
tenet of its corpus of standards on the treatment of detainees that: 
"[t]he fostering of constructive as opposed to confrontational relations 
between prison staff and inmates will serve to lower the tension inherent in 
any prison environment and by the same token significantly reduce the 
. 
likelihood of violent incidents and associated ill-treatment "394 
The consequences for the management and control of potentially disruptive detainees 
of poor staff-inmate relations has been made plain by the CPT. It felt compelled, for 
example, to "express serious concern" about the "considerable tension" perceptible in 
the prison of Puerto de Santa Maria 1, Spain, when visited in April 1991. 
Acknowledging that "the development of constructive prison staff-inmate relations 
will be extremely difficult in an establishment that is used to accommodate prisoners 
392 Ideen, para 87. See also in this regard Greece I, para 255 (where nursing staff in a psychiatric 
establishment is, inter alia, "numerically inadequate having regard to the number of patients in its 
care", there exists a "serious risk of physical restraint being used in excess of requirements"). 393 See 2°d GR, para 45. 
394 Ibid. See also Spain I, para 104. 
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considered as dangerous", it nevertheless felt that: 
"such relations are all the more important in such an establishment in view of 
the fact that a good internal climate is a necessary prerequisite for the 
maintenance of effective control and security". 395 
"In short", therefore, "the CPT wishes to see a spirit of communication and care 
accompany measures of control and containment [in places of detention]. Such an 
approach", it considers, "far from undermining security in the establishment, might 
well enhance it". 396 The creation of such a balance, however, may require patience. 
In Butzow Prison, Germany, for example 
- 
where, in April 1996, inmates alleged that 
some months before the CPT's visit, prisoners had been struck by prison officers, 
including with truncheons, while handcuffed to a bed 
- 
the Governor readily admitted 
that "staff recruited a long time ago had not yet entirely assimilated the changes which 
have taken place in the prison system since reunification" and that "[m]ore 
efforts 
... 
had to be made in the area of vocational training and education". "Now", he 
said, "it was necessary to create a good climate in the establishment and to motivate 
staff to establish positive relations with prisoners". 397 In its subsequent visit report, 
the CPT, for its part, asserted that "[t]he delegation's on-site observations [had] 
confirmed the accuracy of this analysis". 398 
The Committee is also of the view that very careful thought is required in the 
formulation of "rules and practices capable of generating a climate of tension between 
staff and [detainees]... " In this regard, it has stated, "[t]he imposition of fines on staff 
395 See Spain I, para 195. Relations between staff and management in the establishment were also 
found to be tense, the "[u]nderlying" cause of which, the CPT surmised, was the "fundamental issue" 
of the prison regime. 
396 See 2°d GR, para 45. 
397 See Germany IL paras 80-81. 
398 Ibid. 
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in the event of an escape by a [detainee] is precisely the kind of measure which can 
have a negative effect on the ethos within [an]... establishment". 399 
- 
The creation of suitable staff support structures 
Following the much-criticised events at the Radece Re-education Centre for Young 
Persons, Slovenia, just prior to the CPT's visit in February 1995,400 the country's 
Minister of Justice determined, inter alia, to replace the establishment's Director and 
certain senior members of staff, "with the stated objective of enabling newly 
appointed staff to manage the establishment in a sensitive and humane manner, and to 
assist other members of staff in developing their full potential in the performance of 
their duties"401 While "welcom[ing] this decisive response" on the part of the 
authorities, the CPT was concerned that staff at the Centre felt, "on occasion not [to 
be] fully supported by the authorities responsible... at the Ministry of Justice". 
Indeed, they appeared to "doubt... whether their concerns would be taken into account 
in the reorganisation of the establishment" 402 Accordingly, the Committee 
encouraged the Slovenian Government to: 
"[find] effective means... to ensure that the concerns of staff of all grades are 
taken into account by the new management of the establishment and by the 
relevant authorities at the Ministry of Justice" 403 
Clearly, in minimising the risk of the ill-treatment of detainees 
- 
especially in the 
application of force or instruments of physical restraint following a violent incident or 
disruption, as at Radece 
- 
the CPT is certain that a willingness on the part of senior 
management to listen to and respect the concerns of custodial staff is essential. 
399 See 8`h GR, para 31. 
, 0° See above, pp 363-4. 
401 See Slovenia 1, para 56. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Idem, paras 60 and 99. 
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An absence of appropriate support for custodial staff required to work in 
environments in which they are likely, even expected, on occasion, to use force and/or 
instruments of restraint, may have profound consequences. In the view of the CPT: 
"... 1'exposition permanente a des situations de tension, voire de violence, peut 
entrainer des reactions psychologiques et comportementales disproportionnees 
pour les membres des forces de Fordre". 404 
Lastly in the present connection, in the interest of completeness, it should be recalled 
that the CPT has stated on a number of occasions that persons in positions of authority 
(i. e. prison governors, officials at the Ministry of Justice, etc. ) should: 
"... deliver the clear message [to custodial staff] that the ill-treatment of 
prisoners is unacceptable and will be severely punished" 405 
- 
The calibre of staf working with potentially violent or agitated detainees 
One reason why custodial staff may too readily resort to force or instruments of 
physical restraint when faced with disruptive detainees is the simple one of their being 
ill-suited to the task. The provision of appropriate training may, of course, go a long 
way towards equipping staff with the necessary expertise. However, such training 
can never entirely disguise human flaws of character and insensitivity. Visiting 
Bulgaria in 1995, for instance, a delegation heard allegations of the ill-treatment of 
patients by staff, especially orderlies, at Radnevo Psychiatric Hospital. Such acts - 
"notably slaps" 
- 
could occur, it was claimed, when patients failed to take prescribed 
medication or were disobedient. In a linked contention, several members of staff 
"expressed concern about both the low calibre of persons recruited as orderlies and 
404 See France III, pars 23. 
11 See, generally, above p 336. 
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the practice of using patients to fill vacant orderly posts" 406 Notwithstanding such 
questionable recruitment practices, the visiting delegation heard "relatively few" 
allegations of ill-treatment and noted that staff-patient relations at the hospital 
"seemed on the whole to be good". Further, "effective action" 
- 
i. e. dismissal 
- 
had 
been taken in one recent case of physical ill-treatment. It may have been for such 
reasons that the Committee refrained from making a "specific" recommendation on 
the matter. 
However, it did feel that "certain remarks of relevance to the issue of 
preventing physical ill-treatment at Radnevo" were necessary. 407 In this regard, it 
stated that it "shared" the concern of hospital staff regarding the calibre of persons 
recruited as orderlies, "in particular bearing in mind that it was the practice for two 
interlinked wards (often accommodating a total patient population in excess of 100) to 
be staffed at night by 1 nurse and 2 orderlies (one on each ward)". Under such 
circumstances, the Committee insisted, "[e]ffective supervision of the orderlies' 
activities is clearly not possible... "408 Consequently, it recommended that: 
"... steps be taken to ensure... that candidates for posts of orderlies... are 
properly screened prior to their recruitment... [and] that orderlies receive 
adequate training before being assigned to ward duties, in particular at 
night» 409 
It expressed further "misgivings" about the practice 
- 
mirrored, incidentally, in the 
psychiatric section of Lovetch Prison Hospital 
- 
of using "healthy" patients to fill 
vacant orderly posts. In this regard, it recommended that: 
'06 See Bulgaria I, para 183. 
407 Ibid. 
408 Idem, pars 210. 
409 Ibid. 
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"... the appointment of patients or prisoners as orderlies in a health 
establishment [should] be seen as a measure of last resort 
... 
if such 
appointments are inevitable, the activities of such orderlies should be 
supervised on an on-going basis by qualified health-care staff'. 410 
Similarly, the Committee had "strong doubts" about the "advisability" of the 
arrangement at Radnevo whereby staff could "call for the support of a group of 
patients from the alcoholics' ward in the event of acutely disturbed behaviour 
occurring during periods of low staff attendance in the wards (i. e. between 1.30 pm 
and 7.20 am)". In the Committee's view, "[t]he existence of such a system [was] a 
clear indication that staffing levels in the hospital [were] insufficient". Consequently, 
it recommended that: 
"... resolving episodes of acutely disturbed behaviour [should] be the 
responsibility of qualified health-care staff, not fellow patients" 411 
Such an approach 
- 
or, at least, one resembling it 
- 
appeared to have been given 
practical effect by the UK authorities when the country was visited in 1990. 
Witnessing the removal of prisoners under force to segregation units at both 
Wandsworth and Brixton Prisons, a CPT delegation saw how, in both instances, the 
segregation unit staff "immediately took... charge of the prisoner[s] from the wing 
staff who had brought [them] to the unit[s]". This, the Committee subsequently 
observed, was a "sensible approach" 
- 
although, in practice, its delegation learned, it 
was "not always possible to adhere strictly to th[e] procedure", with the result that 
wing officers could become involved in the "location and settling down 
ago Idem, para 211. 
411 Ideen, para 212. 
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procedures" 412 Nevertheless, the CPT's expression of approbation here is sufficient, 
it is submitted, to permit the identification of the essence of what is, potentially, one 
of its most fundamental precepts in this area: namely, that violent or agitated 
detainees should be placed in the hands of specially-designated 
- 
and, necessarily 
therefore, specially-trained 
- 
members of custodial staff as soon as circumstances 
permit after the violence or agitation erupts; reliance on staff not so designated should 
be minimised 
- 
and should be resorted to, presumably, only in extremis. 
Miscellaneous matters 
To end the present analysis of CPT standards on the use of security measures against 
detainees, we shall consider several precepts 
- 
or, at least, incipient precepts 
- 
which 
do not fit easily into any of the categories already elaborated. 
- 
Access to official complaints mechanisms 
Although a rather self-evident extension of its views on complaints mechanisms in 
places of detention generally, it is worth noting that the CPT is particularly concerned 
to encourage the creation of and appropriate access to "effective" avenues of 
complaint for prisoners against whom means of coercion have been used 413 
- 
Before taking the decision to use force or instruments of physical restraint, the 
custodial authorities should take account of a detainee's medical condition 
It ought to be the case that if all the procedural guarantees identified above - in 
particular, that of obtaining medical authorisation 
- 
are adhered to when security 
measures are in the contemplation of custodial authorities, the medical condition of 
the detainee to whom they are to be applied becomes a material, even determinative, 
412 See UK I, Para 89. 
413 See, e. g., Czech Republic I, Para 79. 
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consideration. The following instance, however, demonstrates the need to reinforce 
the principle, it is submitted. At the Prison of Puerto de Santa Maria II, Spain, in 
April 1991, a CPT delegation was struck by the treatment of one inmate who, despite 
having been diagnosed as an epileptic, had been placed in-an isolation cell following 
an outburst of aggressive behaviour and handcuffed by his hands and feet to the cell 
bed 
- 
"the latter action being taken with the consent of a prison doctor". In the 
Committee's view, "[t]his was a procedure that carrie[d] great risks for a person with 
such a medical condition". 414 
- 
Post-disturbance procedure 
While visiting HM Young Offender Institution and Remand Centre, Feltham, 
England, in May 1994, the CPT learned of a past dispute between inmates which had 
culminated in the application of control and restraint measures. One of the inmates 
concerned, it appears, had received injuries while being overpowered 415 However, 
while such an outcome is regrettable, it is what happened subsequently which is of 
greater interest in the present connection, for, "[t]he delegation received a positive 
impression of the manner in which [it had been] subsequently handled, from both the 
administrative and... medical points of view". Of "particular" interest in this regard, 
the CPT remarked in its third UK visit report, was the institution of "an 
inquiry 
... 
undertaken by the Governor and the local police" 416 
It would appear, therefore, that the Committee favours the establishment of 
some means of inquiry following incidents in which the application of force and/or 
measures of restraint has been deemed necessary by the authorities, particularly if 
such application has occasioned injury. As to the nature of such inquiry, the CPT has 
414SeeSpain I, para97. 
415 See UK III, para 130. 
416 Ibid. 
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said little. Clearly, it did not object to the character of that which had been 
established at Feltham, involving the Governor and the local police. However, from 
observations made following its visit to Denmark in 1996, it would appear that its 
preference is for an external investigation (in which, presumably, a considerable 
degree of independence is manifest). In Denmark, it will be recalled, the visiting 
delegation met a detainee who claimed to have been ill-treated 
- 
and, indeed, injured 
- 
by prison officers at the Sandholm Institution some months before the visit. An 
"internal management investigation" had concluded that the force used by the 
officers, while regrettable, had been reasonable in the circumstances and applied 
correctly. 417 For its part, the CPT remained "unconvinced by this response to the... 
incident". It considered it "regrettable that only an internal investigation [had been] 
conducted into the events". 18 Consequently, it recommended that the Danish 
authorities commission an external inquiry. 419 
- 
Management of restraintlsecurity cells 
It goes without saying that in order truly to be effective and to minimise the risk of 
excessive recourse to force and/or instruments of restraint, it should be clear to all 
concerned just who is responsible for the management of cells in which persons may 
be restrained. The consequences of a failure sufficiently to identify those so 
responsible may occasion unnecessary confusion 
- 
or, worse, provide the obscurity 
necessary to shield the perpetrators of ill-treatment from detection. The risk to the 
welfare of detainees to which such possibilities give rise can be easily imagined. For 
instance, visiting the "cellule psychiatrique" (known as "ISO. C") in the Centre 
medico-chirurgical ("CMC") at the prison de St-Gilles, Belgium, in November 1993, 
417 See above, pp 312-13. 
418 See Denmark II, para 48. 
419 Idem, para 49. 
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the CPT found that the arrangements made as to the responsibility for the premises 
and the placement therein of patients were "ambiguous": "[a]pparently, the cell could 
be used for the placement both of detainees from the prison de St-Gilles and patients 
from the CMC, in both instances under the responsibility of the respectively 
competent doctor" 420 As a result, in the case of one restrained person seen, medical 
staff were unable to indicate the precise reasons for and start-time both of his original 
placement and of the subsequent application of measures of restraint 421 With regard 
to the prevention of ill-treatment and the preservation of his dignity, therefore, it 
remained uncertain precisely how long he had been held thus. 
Conclusion 
Recourse to force and/or measures of restraint may be necessary in every kind of 
custodial environment. Further, this need may manifest itself in many different ways. 
The first part of this chapter was devoted to the various restraint techniques deployed 
by custodial authorities in order to subdue agitated or violent detainees or to quell 
disturbances, of which some, like the appropriate application of handcuffs, the CPT 
approves, while others, like the 
- 
rare 
- 
use of electric shock batons (for instance, in 
some Spanish and Cypriot prisons visited, it seems), or irons and shackles (found to 
be used, inter alia, in certain German prisons and Belgian and Bulgarian psychiatric 
establishments), it clearly abhors. Subsequently, the use of force/restraint in 
particular circumstances was considered and detailed CPT precepts were identified in 
respect of the following: 
- 
the use of force by police officers in the course of apprehending persons and, 
thereafter, in the event of violence or agitation on police premises (following 
420 See Belgium I, Para 199. 
421 Ibid. 
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allegations and findings of ill-treatment, inter alia, in Hungary and Slovakia, and 
indeed torture, inter alia, in Austria, Spain, Portugal and Turkey); 
- 
recourse to force in prison establishments (on which CPT standards are very much 
consistent with those elaborated on the use of force by the police; indeed, they emerge 
from similar allegations and findings 
- 
most notably the use of outside intervention 
forces to subdue prison disturbances in Portugal and the Netherlands Antilles); 
- 
the restraint of mentally disturbed persons (concerning, inter alia, the balance to be 
struck between the therapeutic and custodial roles of staff in psychiatric 
establishments, the environment in which restraint techniques may be applied (as 
elaborated inter alia in Greek and Italian reports), the crucial role of medical staff in 
the application of such techniques (Denmark), the importance of sedation in 
controlling disturbed psychiatric patients (Iceland; Germany) and the need to provide 
appropriate training for staff who work in such environments (Spain; the UK)); 
- 
the medical treatment of detainees without consent (on which, it must be stated, the 
CPT offers very thorough analysis indeed following findings, inter alia, in Germany); 
- 
the restraint of hospitalised detainees (regarding, inter alia, the restraint of expectant 
mothers (France), the medical examination of restrained detainees (the Netherlands) 
and ways of guaranteeing the security of the environment in which the medical 
examination and treatment of detainees takes place (Luxembourg; Romania)); 
- 
the restraint of administratively detained foreign nationals (concerning, notably, 
procedure on and safeguards attending, the expulsion of such persons, developed in 
the wake of visits inter alia to Austria, Belgium, France and Germany); and 
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- 
the physical chastisement of juveniles (concerning, most notably, the Committee's 
proclaimed preference for the complete prohibition of such measures (Portugal)). 
In examining safeguards attending the use of force and instruments of 
restraint, we considered, inter alia, the need for formal regulation (Denmark; Greece), 
as well as the contents of policies formulated thereunder; the exceptional nature of 
such measures (in this regard Swedish prison practice has been particularly 
commended by the CPT); the requirement of proportionality in their application 
(Germany; the Netherlands); the prohibition of their use as a punishment (a principle 
given expression, inter alia, in Danish and Norwegian law); the duration of their 
application; the need for (medical) authorisation (Greece; Belgium; the UK); the need 
to monitor restrained detainees, both in a medical and in a general custodial sense 
(Sweden; Spain; Iceland); the particular recording requirements when force/restraint 
is applied; and a number of staffing matters (notably the provision of training in the 
use of restraint techniques, staff-inmate relations and staff support structures). 
The study was completed with a brief look at a number of miscellaneous 
precepts which supplement the body of standards elaborated by the CPT generally in 
this area. Clearly, the Committee has devoted much effort to formulating detailed and 
sensitive precepts on force/restraint techniques, many of which have emerged from its 
analysis of particular circumstances encountered in the course of visits. These 
precepts are, as a consequence, reflective and judicious. Their reach is broad and 
thoroughgoing and is difficult to criticise (a general failure to state how often 
examinations, both medical and general, should be made of restrained persons, hardly 
amounts to a significant lacuna). In sum, there is much to commend in the CPT's 
work in this area; it may be said to have developed a thoughtful and well-crafted 
corpus of standards. 
379 
17 
The Application of Solitary Confinement (and Related 
Security) Measures in Places of Detention 
Introduction: grounds on which solitary confinement may be sought or 
imposed 
The separation of individual detainees from their fellow captives is a measure to 
which custodial authorities 
- 
whether in prisons, police stations, psychiatric 
establishments, juvenile detention centres, etc. 
- 
may resort for any one of a number 
of reasons. Most obviously, it may be imposed as a means of discipline. In the 
experience of visiting CPT delegations, however, it has taken, in addition, numerous 
other forms: 
(i) The imposition on remand prisoners of restrictions on contact with other detainees 
and/or the outside world (affecting, inter alia, family visits, correspondence, 
detainees' supervision and access to newspapers, radio and television) has been 
legitimised by some Parties "in the interests of [a criminal] investigation" or - 
presumably synonymously 
- 
"to the extent that the investigation of the case would be 
served thereby". Thus, restrictions may be used as a means, inter alia, of forestalling 
collusion with and/or efforts to exert influence over, other persons connected with an 
investigation. ' 
In some States parties, the solitary confinement of remand prisoners is - or, at 
least, has been, until recently 
- 
"systematic"2 or "routine". 3 The CPT, for its part, 
See, e. g., Denmark I, App 2, pars 11; and Norway I, para 58. See further below, pp 386 et seq and pp 
464-5. The related question of the incommunicado detention of criminal suspects held in police 
custody is dealt with above, in Chapter 6. 2 See Iceland 1, para 60 (though cf paras 61 and 167); and now Iceland II, para 49 (at Litla-Hraun State 
Prison in 1998 "nearly all remand prisoners were still being placed in solitary confinement for 
investigation purposes"). 
3 See Norway I, para 59. 
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while accepting that "it might be necessary, in certain cases, to impose restrictions on 
remand prisoners' contacts with others in order to safeguard the interests of justice", 4 
regards such systematic imposition as exceptionable. 5 Such practice, it may be 
argued, betrays an absence of thought on the part of the custodial authorities, who 
appear mechanically to assume that the interests of the investigation automatically 
demand such measures. 
(ii) Removal from association may also be authorised for a person's own protection: 
where, for example, he is or fears becoming, the victim of intimidation or violence6 or 
is subject to the control or excessive influence of other detainees. In this connection, 
at the Western and Horsens State Prisons, Denmark, in late 1996, the CPT was told 
that incidents of "inter-prisoner intimidation/violence" were a "feature of life". The 
Governor of the former admitted that the prison had "recently been plagued by a 
series of [such] attacks on a scale, and of a ferocity, which he had never previously 
encountered". 8 In both prisons, the visiting delegation observed, approximately 30% 
of the inmate population was either being held in voluntary solitary confinement or 
had requested to be so held. Although such inmates' regimes were "much more 
restrictive" than those enjoyed by prisoners held on "normal" location, interviews 
with staff and inmates indicated that, "for a variety of reasons (including fear of 
`strong' inmates and/or inability to pay drug-related debts), this was considered to be 
4Idem, para 65. See also Norway II, para 19. 
s Ibid. 
6 See, e. g., UK I, para 26; and, similarly, Finland I, para 68. Interestingly, Finnish prison regulations 
provide that where a sentenced prisoner is segregated for his own protection, the authorities must 
attempt to place him in an environment other than an isolation unit. 
'See, e. g., Italy I, para 143 (3rd indent). 
' See Denmark 11, para 51. 
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an attractive option by almost one third of inmates at each prison. Indeed, at 
Horsens... there was a `waiting-list' of inmates who had made such requests". 9 
Similarly, the CPT considered that the "frequent and severe acts of violence" 
between inmates 
- 
e. g. beatings and, occasionally, slashing of the face or body with a 
knife, often in connection with drug-related debts 
- 
alleged to occur at Helsinki 
Central Prison, Finland, when visited in May 1992, could conceivably account for the 
"high number" of prisoners (about 15% of the total population, according to staff) 
seeking voluntary segregation there at any one time. The fact that this violence, the 
Committee claimed, "sometimes went undetected, " that even if it was discovered, 
"little effective action" was taken, that there existed "a low level of [staff] 
supervision" of activities and that some staff "openly admitted" that they had not 
received even basic training in the tasks which they were expected to perform, 
undoubtedly compounded the palpable fear of these "pelkolas" ("the fearful ones"). 10 
(iii) Segregation may be resorted to when "it appears desirable, for the maintenance of 
good order or discipline"; " for example, where, in the absence of proof that a formal 
disciplinary offence has been committed by a detainee, the detaining authorities 
"possess... knowledge... that he has caused, is causing or is likely to cause, trouble or 
subversions12 or is acting as a "bad influence" on fellow detainees. 13 
9 Ibid. See, in the same connection, Iceland II, para 95 (regarding the consequences of inter-prisoner 
violence at Litla Hraun State Prison, March/April 1998). 
on in the 'o See Finland I, paras 60-1. By June 1998, the number of persons seeking voluntary segregati 
establishment had risen to 20%. Further, at Riihimaki Central Prison, the figure was 25% and 
comprised both "fearful ones" and "most fearful ones": see Finland H, paras 57 and 58. 
" See UK I, pars 26. See, similarly, Germany I, App 111, para 14. 12 Idem, para 188. See, similarly, UK III, pars 317 (a "disruptive" 
- 
and, therefore, segregated - 
prisoner is one `who is considered to pose a serious threat to the management or stability of a prison 
through subversion and/or disruption and is substantiated by a record of appropriate intelligence and 
information'); and Netherlands I, para 66. 
13 See Germany 1, App III, para 14; and, similarly, Norway I, para 69 (sub-para c). 
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(iv) It may be sought or imposed not only when a detainee is considered to represent a 
danger to himself or others, 14 but also when his conduct is thought to represent a 
danger to "objects"15 
- 
particularly if such conduct is recurrent or repetitive. 16 
(v) Further, seclusion may be resorted to when it is considered necessary to prevent 
escape'7 or the commission of (serious) criminal acts18 
- 
especially if drug-related; 19 
on grounds of national security20 (inter alia, where "escape would be highly 
dangerous to the public or to the police or to the security of the State"21); temporarily, 
when a detainee becomes, inter alia, intoxicated22 or is affected by withdrawal 
symptoms or so-called "body-pack syndrome" (i. e. when he has concealed drugs 
within his body by means of the ingestion of sachets); 23 pending a disciplinary 
hearing (when it is considered necessary in order to avoid jeopardising the 
investigation); 24 for "observation purposes" on a detainee's arrival in an 
establishment; 25 in the aftermath of a disturbance or riot; 26 following a detainee's 
transfer from another establishment (which transfer is made, inter alia, in the interests 
of good order and discipline); 27 and when other disciplinary sanctions have proved 
ineffective. 28 
'4 See, e. g., Sweden I, App III, para 16. 
13 See Portugal I, App 3, para 11 and main text, para 64. 16 See, e. g., Norway I, pars 69; Belgium I, para 101(3rd indent); and Spain I, App II, para 19. 
" See, e. g., Sweden I, App III, para 16 and main text, para 86; and Portugal I, App 3, para 11 and 
main text, para 64. 
'g See Sweden 1, App III, para 16; and Bulgaria I, pars 167. 19 See, e. g., Norway I, para 69 (sub-para b). 20 See Iceland I, para 123. 
21 See UK III, Para 111. 
22 See Sweden I, App III, para 16; and, in the same connection, Finland I, para 68. 2' See Greece I, para 182. 24 See Sweden I, App III, para 16; and, in the same connection, UK III, para 352. 25 See Netherlands I, pars 135 (2°d indent). 26 See, e. g., Belgium I, para 101 (3d indent). 21 See UK III, para111. 2s See Belgium I, para 228. 
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It is worth noting that consistent with a number of these grounds, in its 2nd 
General Report the CPT accepted as legitimate grounds for solitary confinement, in 
addition to that of discipline: 
"discipline-related/security reasons (eg... the interests of "good order" within 
an establishment)... `dangerousness' or... 'troublesome' behaviour... the 
interests of a criminal investigation; at [a prisoner's] own request... "29 
(vi) Grounds much less commonly encountered by the CPT include, in German law, 
"reasons inherent in the prisoner's person"; 30 in Bulgarian law, following the 
imposition of (and subsequent moratorium on) a death sentence; 31 and, in Slovakian 
law 
- 
in respect of juvenile detainees who, inter alia, exhibit aggressive behaviour, 
attempt escape or use alcohol 
- 
"educational" purposes. 32 
(vii) Moreover, segregation has been considered necessary 
- 
particularly in prison 
establishments 
- 
in circumstances in which a person's behaviour prior to his detention 
has given rise to particular concern. For example, where he is convicted of a crime of 
a "caractere exceptionellement violent... [ou] 
... 
ayant cause une grande inquietude 
dans la Societe". 33 Some authorities, indeed, have gone so far as to create small 
detention units within existing establishments specifically designed to accommodate 
detainees "who present an extreme risk for society and/or the penal environment, and 
for whom existing security measures do not seem sufficient". 34 
29 See 2d GR, paras 55-6. 
30 See Germany I, para 81 (2°d indent). The CPT's request for "clarification" of this provision would 
suggest that it is puzzled and not a little troubled by it. 31 See Bulgaria I, paras 111-12 and 167. 
32 See Slovakia I, para 156. As encountered in 1995, however, the educational quotient of such 
isolation was questionable: idem, para 159. 33 See Belgium I, para 101 (1's indent). See, in the same connection, Italy I, para 144; and Italy II, para 
77 (regarding the practice of segregating detainees on account of suspected links with organised crime). 34 Iden 
, 
para 102 (regarding the "Quartiers de Securite Renforcee" established in Belgian prisons). 
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(viii) Unique to the Northern Irish prison estate 
- 
which, in July 1993, was 
accommodating large numbers of persons convicted of terrorist-related offences, in 
addition to "ordinary" convicted criminals 
- 
is a ground of isolation which has 
evolved directly out of the exigencies of the "Troubles". In Northern Irish gaols, the 
visiting delegation observed, convicted terrorist offenders could benefit from the same 
regime 
- 
characterised as "reasonable" by the CPT35 
- 
as ordinary criminal offenders 
provided that they agreed to serve their sentences in establishments "free from 
paramilitary influence". 36 If they insisted on serving their sentences in the so-called 
"Maze" Prison, where, at the time, such influence was rife, even, arguably, 
institutionalised, they could spend up to 28 days in the assessment unit "locked in 
their cells for 23 hours a day or more, being released only to slop out and wash". 37 
Prisoners might be subjected to this "very restricted" regime, interviewees stated, in 
order to "persuade" them to choose to serve their sentences in a prison other than the 
Maze. The authorities admitted, however, that it was "relatively uncommon" for 
persons convicted of terrorist offences to make such a choice: in the six weeks 
preceding the CPT's visit, only two prisoners had done so; and it was estimated that in 
an average year, only about 10% of "loyalist" and 2% of "republican" prisoners 
would follow suit. 38 These same interlocutors sought to rationalise recourse to the 
restrictive measures by reference to the length of sentence which might be served by 
convicted terrorists: "the benefit to each individual prisoner who did choose not to go 
to the Maze Prison", they claimed, "justified the restrictions placed upon certain other 
prisoners... for two to four weeks". 39 
35 See UK II, para 130. 36 Idem, para 131. 37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. As to the meaning of the terms "loyalist" and `republican", as applied in the context of Northern Ireland's recent tribulations, see, inter alia, para 9 of the report. 39 Ibid. 
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(ix) Another 
- 
potentially controversial 
- 
ground of segregation encountered by the 
CPT is that of ill health. In Greek law, for instance, a prison director is authorised to 
order that a prisoner suffering from an infectious disease may be confined in a 
"special cell" until the infection abates. If he fails to recover, "transfer... to a 
specialist state hospital for treatment" may be deemed necessary 4° 
(x) Regarding, specifically, mentally disordered detainees, recourse to measures of 
isolation have been authorised, inter alia, in the event of "une agitation majeure" or 
"une serieuse depression". a' 
Use of restrictions/solitary confinement by police officers in order to 
advance a criminal investigation 
One of the grounds of isolation invoked by States parties which has been expressly 
deprecated by the CPT in its published work and which may, accordingly, be worth 
examining in detail, is that of advancing a criminal investigation. Such a possibility 
exercised CPT delegations to Norway in both 1993 and 1997. As we have seen, 
Norwegian courts may, "to the extent that the investigation of the case would be 
served thereby", rule that a person remanded in custody in connection with a criminal 
offence be subject to any one of a number of specified restrictions. 2 However, the 
"general impression" gained by the CPT delegation which visited in 1993 was that 
"the imposition of restrictions lay, in reality, in the hands of the police [and not the 
courts] and that they made liberal use of this possibility". 3 In the view of "[m]any" 
prisoners interviewed 
- 
as well as "certain" prison officers and health workers 
- 
the 
40 See Greece I, pars 132 (note 4). See also in this connection Italy I, p 48 (note 9). 
41 See France I, pars 170 (regarding the treatment of persons in the Service Medico-Psychologique 
Regional at the maison d'arret de Marseille-Baumettes, October/November 1991). 
42 See above, p 380. 
43 See Norway I, pars 60. 
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regime to which solitarily confined remand prisoners were subject was 
"psychologically oppressive": "[s]everal" persons met suggested that the police 
"tended not only to use restrictions to safeguard the interests of justice", as the 
relevant legislation permits, "but also exploited them as a means of exerting pressure 
on detainees with the aim of advancing their enquiries". "In particular, " it was 
alleged, "police officers in charge of... investigations had explicitly stated 
that... measures would be eased or lifted if [detainees] co-operated with the police". 
Noting that "the use of threats, pressure, false information and promises is 
expressly forbidden by [Norway's] Prosecution Instructions", 45 and, as we have seen, 
accepting that "it may be necessary, in certain cases, to impose restrictions on remand 
prisoners' contacts with others in order to safeguard the interests of justice", 46 the 
CPT nevertheless ought to impress on the authorities its view that: 
"... under no circumstances would it be acceptable to apply restrictive 
measures of this kind in order to exert psychological pressure on a detainee" 47 
However, visiting Norway for a second time in March 1997, with the express 
intention of examining, inter alia, the solitary confinement of remand prisoners by 
court order, 48 the Committee met "many" detainees who, like their predecessors, 
"expressed the belief that the purpose of restrictions was to exert psychological 
pressure on them, that restrictions were most common when the police had a weak 
case and that, even if it had not been explicitly stated by the police, restrictions would 
be eased or lifted in response to co-operation with the[m]". 9 
44 Ibid. 
4s Ibid. 
46 Ideen, para 65. See also Norway II, para 19. 47 Ibid. 
48 See Norway II, pars 1. The visit was an ad hoc one, whose "primary aim" was to "verify on the spot 
the situation of detained persons in Norway", especially in the light of the Government's failure "to dispel all the CPT's concerns... in this area" (pars 20). 49 Ideen, para 34. 
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In its first visit report, the CPT asked the Norwegian authorities whether 
police exploitation of the procedure for the solitary confinement of remand prisoners 
"as a means of exerting pressure... with the aim of advancing their enquiries", would 
constitute a breach of the relevant provisions in the Prosecution Instructions. 50 In 
their reply, the CPT observed in its second visit report, the authorities stated that: 
"an investigator may advise suspects that if they continue to refuse to make a 
statement then the police will petition for a ban on or surveillance of 
correspondence and visits or an extension thereof. The investigator may 
inform suspects of the prosecutal (sic) consequences that will result from their 
stand. Suspects may also be informed that the restriction will be loosened if 
they co-operate". 51 
According to a "senior police official" interviewed during the Committee's second 
visit, this statement of position accurately represented police practice in this area. He 
added that adherence to section 92 of the country's Code of Criminal Procedure - 
which forbids the making of promises to or the coercion of, detainees - does not mean 
that it is unlawful for police officers to offer to relax or lift restrictions in response to 
co-operation with them. 52 However, the Norwegian authorities did acknowledge that 
the exploitation of "information on the use on or surveillance of correspondence and 
visits would constitute a violation of the Prosecution Instructions when used without 
`procedural basis' for petitioning for or repealing such a ban or surveillance". 53 
Further, they declared, it was "unacceptable to use restrictive measures to create 
30 See Norway I, pars 60 (and, subsequently, Norway II, para 34). 51 See Norway II, para 34 
- 
quoting directly from Norway Response I, CPT/Inf (94) 12, p 16 (original 
emphasis). 
32 Ibid. 
53 Ibid (quoting from Norway Response I, op cit, n 51 above, at p 17). 
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psychological pressure on persons charged with an offence" 
-a gesture "welcome[d]" 
by the CPT. M "Nevertheless, " the Committee maintained: 
"[it had] misgivings as regards [the authorities'] opinion... that the police may 
legitimately invoke the possibility of imposing, relaxing or lifting restrictions 
when questioning suspects... To advise someone that a failure to co-operate 
will lead to the imposition (or continuation) of restrictions or, conversely, that 
willingness to co-operate will lead to the relaxation or lifting of restrictions, 
would appear 
- 
at first sight at least 
- 
to correspond closely to the concepts of 
`coercion' or `promises' [prohibited by Section 92 of the CCP]". ss 
"Further, " it continued: 
"the distinction which the Norwegian authorities seek to make between 
information on the use of restrictions which is provided with 
- 
as opposed to 
information which is provided without 
- 
`procedural basis, ' opens the door to 
abuse. This approach could clearly encourage the police to seek to justify the 
imposition (or the continuation) of restrictions even in cases when they know 
56 that due consideration for the investigation does not require such a measure". 
"[I]n the light of these observations, " the CPT concluded, the Norwegian authorities 
ought to "review" the substance of the Prosecution Instructions. " Clearly, therefore, 
the Committee considers that recourse or the threat of recourse inter alia to solitary 
confinement by the police as a means of exerting a certain psychological pressure on 
detainees in order to advance their inquiries is unacceptable. 58 This view would 
54 Idem, para 37 (quoting from Norway Response I, op cit, n 51 above, at p 16). 55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See, in the same connection, Italy II, para 93 (regarding the CPT's suspicion in 1995 that segregation 
was being used by the authorities "as a means of psychological pressure with a view to prompting [a detainee's] dissociation [from organised crime] or collaboration [with the police]"). 
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appear to reflect the purport of the European Prison Rules in this area, Rule 91 of 
which provides that: 
"Without prejudice to legal rules for the protection of individual liberty or 
prescribing the procedure to be observed in respect of untried prisoners, these 
prisoners, who are presumed to be innocent until they are found guilty, shall 
be... treated without restrictions other than those necessary for the penal 
procedure and the security of the institution". 59 
Disciplinary and non-disciplinary segregation 
It is worth noting, in passing, that in some States parties, the practice of punishing 
detainees for a breach of discipline by means of their solitary confinement has been 
discontinued60 
- 
although the discretion to separate them for reasons related, inter 
alia, to good order and discipline has been retained. 61 The CPT, for its part, has 
expressed no opinion as to the merit of such desuetude. By contrast, however, 
contemplating the use of segregation beyond the disciplinary (and security) sphere, it 
has observed that: 
". 
- -the placement of prisoners in non-voluntary solitary confinement for other 
than disciplinary or security reasons is a questionable practice, even when it is 
said that that measure is being effected for the long term good of the prisoner 
concerned". 62 
59 Emphasis added. 
60 See, e. g., Sweden I, App III, Para 17. 61 Idem, Para 131. 
62 See UK 11, Para 132. The Committee offered this opinion in the light of its delegation's findings in 
1993 that segregation was being used by the authorities in order to "persuade" convicted terrorist 
offenders to choose to serve their sentences in an establishment "free from paramilitary influence": see, 
generally, above, p 385. 
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Possible effects of isolation 
The imposition of restrictions on a detainee 
- 
in particular, his solitary confinement 
- 
occasions certain dangers, especially in respect of his personality. Such dangers were 
highlighted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 
Recommendation No. R (82) 17 on the custody and treatment of dangerous 
prisoners. 63 Therein, the possible "deleterious effects" of isolation are listed as: 
"... decreased mental efficiency, depression, anxiety, aggressiveness, neurosis, 
negative values, altered biorhythms". TM 
Further, the Recommendation suggests: 
"[i]n the most serious instances prisoners [may] regress to a merely vegetative 
life". 65 
As for the prognosis of a detainee exposed to such dangers, "[g]enerally", the 
Recommendation states: 
"the impairment may be reversible but if imprisonment, especially in 
maximum security, is prolonged, perception of time and space and self can be 
permanently and seriously impaired 
- 
[which condition might be characterised 
as] `annihilation of personality"'. 66 
This view seems to have been shared by specialists in the field of psychiatry and 
psychology encountered by visiting CPT delegations. For example, in Iceland in 
1993, one delegation learned, the (now discontinued) practice of systematically 
isolating remand prisoners for "extended" periods 
- 
"often several months and in rare 
63 The recommendation was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 24`h September 1982 at the 
350`h meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. 
64 See para 43 of the Recommendation, quoted by the CPT in Spain I, para 109 and Switzerland I, pars 
50. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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cases more than a year"67 
- 
had been criticised previously by a domestic committee 
established in order to examine prisons, prison policy and future developments. This 
committee had concluded in respect of segregation practice in one establishment in 
particular, namely Sioumuli Prison, inter alia, that: 
"psychiatrists, psychologists and other specialists have stressed that solitary 
confinement... has a harmful effect on prisoner's mental and physical health, 
particularly in the case of those detained for long periods". 68 
The results of similar research carried out in Denmark in the early 1990s were 
published in May 1994. Among them was the claim that: 
"... remand in custody in solitary confinement versus non-solitary confinement 
involves the risk of harmful effects on mental health... there is a greater 
probability that those in solitary confinement develop mental problems and are 
transferred to prison hospitals for mental reasons than those who are not 
placed in solitary confinement". 69 
Interestingly, however, the same study found "no proven link between the length of 
judicially-ordered solitary confinement and prisoners' mental health". 70 Rather, it 
concluded: 
"... the harmful effects of solitary confinement are not in general such as to 
result in abnormalities in the cognitive functions, e. g. concentration and 
memory". 71 
67 See Iceland I, pars 60. 
68 Ibid (note 3). 
69 See Denmark II, para 55. See also "Supplementary information provided by the Danish authorities in 
response to the letters of the President of the CPT", in Denmark Responses I, CPT/Inf (96) 14, pp 161- 
190 at 164. 
70 Ibid (emphasis added). 
" Ibid. See also Denmark Responses I, op cit, n 69 above, at p 165. The issue of the duration of 
solitary confinement measures is considered in detail below, at p 455. 
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The CPT, for its part, welcomed the Danish study's commission. 72 However, in the 
course of its second visit, in 1996, a "considerable" number of doctors, lawyers, 
prison staff and other persons who enjoyed "frequent contact" with solitarily-confined 
remand prisoners "expressed considerable surprise at the study's principal 
conclusion". "In their experience", they observed, segregated prisoners "frequently 
exhibited lapses in concentration, memory loss and impaired social skills". 73 These 
observations, the Committee suggested, were "borne out by [its] own findings": 
"[m]any prisoners subject to judicially-ordered solitary confinement 
complained of symptoms including anxiety, depression, inability to 
concentrate, irregular sleeping patterns, nausea and persistent headaches". 74 
"In one particular case, " it observed: 
"... the delegation's psychiatric expert was of the opinion that symptoms such 
as impairment of concentration, depressive mood and suicidal thoughts could 
be attributed to the inmate's lengthy placement in solitary confinement". 75 
Consequently, it concluded that, "notwithstanding the [Danish study's] principal 
conclusion": 
"there remain serious grounds for concern about the effects upon remand 
prisoners' mental health of [placement] in judicially-ordered solitary 
confinement for prolonged periods". 76 
Further illustrations of the effects on the human psyche which may be induced - or, 
where apparent already 
- 
aggravated by the (prolonged) application of solitary 
n Ideen, para 56. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
7s Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
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confinement-type measures may be found, inter alia, in the CPT's first Swedish visit 
report wherein, the Committee conjectured, the isolation of inmates encountered at 
Kronoberg Remand Prison in August 1994 had "either provoked or aggravated" 
"symptoms of psychiatric disturbance, including anxiety and self-injury; self- 
destructiveness and possible psychosis". 77 However, perhaps the most profound 
effects of solitary confinement thus far witnessed by visiting delegations were found 
among isolated remand prisoners in Norway in the course of visits in 1993 and 1997. 
Several striking cases of physical and psychological distress were apparent in the 
groups concerned. "In at least two" cases in 1993, for example, the visiting 
delegation's psychiatric expert identified "serious medical implications" arising from 
the judicially-ordered confinement of persons subject to a criminal investigation. The 
first concerned a foreign detainee who had been held in Oslo Prison for almost four 
weeks and who claimed to be "under considerable pressure from the police to 
corroborate certain statements". Having been completely denied contact with others 
since his arrest, the prisoner "manifested a state of despair and a strong suicidal 
inclination". He also evinced "clear symptoms of psychosomatic disorders (severe 
occipital pains, vomiting, insomnia, fear of not waking in the morning, etc)". Further, 
he was found to be "severely depressed and... receiving counselling and psychiatric 
attention with appropriate medication". 78 In the expert's view, "the prisoner's state of 
mental health [was] seriously affected by the complete isolation imposed on him, and 
specifically by lack of contact with his family". "[A]ggravating" his condition, he 
suggested, was the prisoner's "uncertainty" as to the duration of his isolation. 79 
Moreover, he stated, "[his] depressive state could not be attributed simply to the fact 
" See Sweden I, Para 38. 78 See Norway I, Para 64. 79 As to the possible procedural requirement of certainty of duration of segregation measures, see 
below, p 455. 
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that it was the first time that [he] had been imprisoned". As it happens, these views 
were "fully supported by the prison doctor's opinion on the person concerned". 80 
A second instance concerned a "seriously depressed" detainee who had been 
remanded to Ila Prison and who had "developed a psychosis" after six weeks of 
judicially-ordered isolation. In the prison doctor's view, the risk of the prisoner's 
suicide had been "so great" that he had "judged it necessary to contact [his] lawyer 
and the investigating police officer". 81 As a result, the prisoner had been "promptly 
transferred" to a specialised psychiatric clinic, albeit "after a final police 
interrogation". 82 
In the course of its second (ad hoc) visit to Norway, in March 1997, the CPT 
encountered a number of remand prisoners at Bergen Prison who were the subject of 
various kinds of restriction (e. g. surveillance of or, indeed, a complete ban on, mail 
and visits; "total... isolat[ion]" from other prisoners in the establishment; confinement 
to cells for 23 hours a day, with outdoor exercise, taken alone, being the only out-of- 
cell activity). 83 Some prisoners seen had been subject to these kinds of restriction for 
"prolonged" periods. " Although interviewed separately, when asked about the 
effects on them of the various restrictions applied, "many" of the detainees described 
"similar" experiences, namely: 
"fatigue, insomnia, loss of appetite, nausea, headaches, crying fits and bouts of 
depression becoming more acute as the solitary confinement continued. 
Some... mentioned suicidal thoughts; almost all referred to the distress 
consequent upon not being allowed contacts with family and friends. Foreign 
80 See Norway I, Para 64. 
81 Apparently, under Norwegian Prison Regulations, it is for the police to decide whether to act on a 
medical opinion that a particular restriction should be modified on the basis of its effect on a person's 
physical or psychological health. 2 Norway I, Para 64. 
's See Norway II, Para 22. 84 On the possible meaning of the term "prolonged" as used by the CPT, see below, p 455. 
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detainees who could not speak Norwegian or English were disturbed by the 
fact that their communication problems exacerbated their difficulties". 85 
These descriptions, the CPT stated, were "corroborated" by prison staff in daily 
contact with the detainees concerned, by social workers and by medical personnel. 86 
At Oslo Prison 
- 
where the regime of prisoners subject to restrictions was 
found to be "identical" to that at Bergen, albeit, supplemented by a weekly half hour 
visit to the prison library87 
- 
the "vast majority" of persons interviewed described 
experiences "similar" to those identified above. 88 The case of one such detainee was 
highlighted by the CPT. He was elderly and "of Turkish origin, " and had been the 
subject of restrictions for over six months by the time he met the delegation. His 
situation was rendered "all the more difficult", it was observed, by problems of 
communication with staff. In his report, written after some four months of such 
isolation, the prison doctor had recorded that: 
"patient suffers... constant headaches (tension headaches), sleeps badly (is 
constantly waking up), has lost many kilos (more than 10), has poor appetite. 
He is encountering increasing concentration problems, due to isolation. His 
symptoms are on the increase and can be seen as a consequence of his 
protracted isolation. If he continues to stay in isolation, there will be a risk of 
permanent health damage". 89 
Perusing the medical files of other prisoners subject to restrictions at Oslo, the visiting 
`s Norway If, para 23. See, similarly, Netherlands II, para 68 (consequences of exposure to the regime 
in the country's special security units (November 1997) included "feelings of 
helplessness... disturbance of normal identity 
... 
powerlessness... leading to regression... anger... directed 
against self... communication difficulties... depersonalisation symptoms"). 8 Ibid. 
81 Idem, pars 27. 
88 Idem, para 28. 
89 Ibid. 
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delegation found "[further] evidence of harm being caused" by their application. In 
one case, the prison doctor had recorded that a detainee had become "obliged to take 
regular daily doses of medicine (neuroleptic drugs and anti-depressants) in order to 
bear up under the restrictions". Nevertheless, he had still had trouble sleeping 
"despite this medication" and had required sleeping medicine in addition. 
Accordingly, the doctor had considered his treatment to be a "disproportionate 
measure against [him]". 90 Indeed, "[c]ontrary to the situation at Bergen", the Oslo 
Prison doctor had "had no hesitation in informing the police/judicial authorities about 
the situation of some of the most vulnerable prisoners". "In certain cases", the CPT 
noted, "he had written to the... authorities informing them that the condition of the 
prisoner [concerned] could be considered to result from placing him in prolonged 
solitary confinement and that if this were to continue, it could pose a serious risk of 
irreparable damage to the prisoner's health". 91 The visiting delegation, for its part, 
had been: 
"left in no doubt that in some cases, illness [had been] a direct consequence of 
prolonged isolation by court order". 92 
Accordingly, referring to the "significant number" of remand prisoners subject to 
restrictions encountered in both 1993 and 1997, the Committee observed in its second 
report to the Norwegian authorities that its findings had "shown that such restrictions 
can provoke in certain... persons... suffering and sometimes damage to health". 93 
Significantly, it added that this state of affairs had not been disputed by those with 
90 Idem, para 29. As to the issue of proportionality in the application of measures of isolation, see 
further below, pp 453-4. 91 Idem, para 30. 
92 Idem, para 29. 
93 Ideen, para 35. 
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whom the delegation had spoken in 1997, "be they judges, police and prison officers 
or medical staff'. 94 
The CPT, it should also be noted, is aware that the effects of isolation may be 
felt by a greater number of detainees than those directly affected by it. For: 
"... when a sizeable proportion of the inmates of an establishment are not 
allowed to have contact with other prisoners, the enforcement of this rule can 
have a knock-on effect of a negative nature on all the prisoners" 
. 
95 
For instance, at Stockholm Remand Prison, Sweden, where, in May 1991,50% of 
persons held on remand were subject to restrictions "of one kind or another", 96 "all 
prisoners were prohibited from speaking with others during outdoor exercise and 
all... had their cell door flaps closed, in order to avoid prisoners subject to restrictions 
from entering into contact with other inmates". 97 The effects on the establishment 
generally of this arrangement, given the high proportion of the prison population 
involved, are not hard to imagine. 98 
Fundamental principles 
The CPT's fundamental position on the isolation of detainees has been simply stated 
on numerous occasions. In examining the application of restrictions to detainees, it 
has proclaimed: 
"... [it] pays particular attention to prisoners held, for whatever reason... under 
conditions akin to solitary confinement... [for] the application of a solitary 
94 Ibid. 
95 See Sweden I, para 65. 
96 Idem, para 63. 
97 Idem, para 65. 
98 It is worth noting that over three years later, a similar proportion (45%) of the prison population at 
Kronoberg were subject to restrictions. According to the Director of the establishment, the figure 
"fluctuate[d] between 45 and 50%": see Sweden II, para 22. 
398 
confinement-type regime... is a step that can have very harmful consequences 
for the person concerned. Solitary confinement can, in certain circumstances, 
"99 
amount to inhuman and degrading treatment... 
The Committee has developed this fundamental position elsewhere. To the Dutch 
authorities, for example, it has averred that: 
"[i]n every country there will be a certain number of so-called `dangerous' 
prisoners (a notion which covers a variety of individuals10°) in respect of 
whom special conditions of custody are required. This group of prisoners will 
(or at least should, if the classification system is operating satisfactorily) 
represent a very small proportion of the overall prison population... However, 
it is a group that is of particular concern to the CPT, in view of the fact that the 
need to take exceptional measures concerning such prisoners brings with it a 
greater risk of inhuman treatment than is the case with the average 
prisoner". '0' 
It continued: 
"[s]taff who work with such prisoners have the difficult task of reconciling the 
often conflicting demands which their presence can place upon a prison 
establishment. This is well described in the following extract from the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation (No. R (82) 17) on the 
custody and treatment of dangerous prisoners adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on 24 September 1982: 
99 See 2°6 GR, pars 56; and, similarly, France I, para 140; and Portugal I, pars 63. 100 For present purposes, the notion should be understood to comprehend persons segregated on most, 
if not all, of the grounds elaborated above. 
`01 See Netherlands I, Para 89. See also Spain I, pars 109; Switzerland I, pars 50; and Turkey I, Para 
81. 
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'40. Control and custody have to be acknowledged but, simultaneously, 
human dignity and acceptability of conditions and social positiveness have 
also to be recognised. Control of something that potentially imperils both the 
internal prison community and the larger external community interfaces with 
moderation to be exercised over incidence and duration as well as level of 
maximised custody"'. 102 
This rather inelegant provision may be said to represent, in its rather sententious way, 
the CPT's understanding of the fundamental duty of custody and care owed by 
detaining authorities to persons whom they have solitarily confined. A less 
unintelligible expression of the content of this duty is to be found at paragraph 43 of 
the Explanatory Memorandum, wherein it is proclaimed that: 
"[h]uman dignity is to be respected notwithstanding criminality or 
dangerousness and if human persons have to be imprisoned in circumstances 
of greater severity than the conventional, every effort should be made, subject 
to the requirements of safe custody, good order and security and the 
requirements of community well-being, to ensure that the living environment 
and conditions offset the deleterious effects... of the severer custodial 
situation". 103 
For its part, the CPT has asserted that: 
"... the placement [in isolation] of [detainees] without their consent carries 
with it the responsibility of ensuring their physical, mental and social well- 
being"'. 
102 mid. 
toi Quoted in Spain I, para 109 and Switzerland I, para 50. 104 See Greece I, paras 203 and 284. The observation in fact related to a number of visits to psychiatric 
establishments in March 1993. Its import, however, is much broader, it is submitted. Further, it may 
be said to be just as applicable to persons whose separation is voluntary (although it should be recalled 
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Further, echoing the tenor of paragraph 43, it has proclaimed that: 
"... il est important que les autorites fassent tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour 
contrecarrer les possibles effets negatifs, pour la personnalite, d'une detention 
a long terme dans une unite de securite maximale. Un effort continu de 
soutien et de motivation devrait eire entrepris, meme envers des [detenus] 
manifestant de prime abord, la volonte de ne pas cooperer". '°5 
Particular responsibilities of the authorities towards segregated 
detainees 
In the last section the fundamental duty of custody and care, which, in the view of the 
CPT, should be owed by detaining authorities to persons isolated on their authority 
(with or without the latter's' consent) was identified. However, the Committee's 
belief in the existence of other, related responsibilities is also evident in its published 
work. They are examined, briefly, here. 
The decision to segregate should be based on an assessment of each individual case 
At the Mount Carmel (psychiatric) Hospital, Malta, in July 1995, a delegation found 
that "certain categories" of patient would be "systematically" segregated. These 
categories included persons referred to the establishment from the Corradino 
Correctional Facility (the island's only civil prison) and those referred by the courts 
for psychiatric assessment. Notwithstanding the "close... supervis[ion]" of such 
persons by hospital staff, the CPT remarked: 
that the detention of such persons falls outside the scope of the CPT's mandate). In the context of its 
first 
-visit to Greece, the CPT felt that despite recent efforts "in partnership with the European 
Community, " the authorities were "Sot yet in a position to meet this responsibility vis-A-vis a large 
Proportion of psychiatric patients". 
oý See Italy I, Para 106. 
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"... [it] had reservations about whether it is appropriate to seclude patients on 
the basis that they fall into a particular category, rather than on the merits of 
each individual case". 106 
Clearly, the Committee would prefer to see the development of procedures informed 
by the latter precept than by the more rigid former one. 
The accommodation together of different categories of isolated detainee should be 
avoided as far as possible 
While visiting Hamburg Remand Prison in April 1996, a CPT delegation observed 
that one particular detention unit was being used to accommodate a variety of 
segregated prisoners: namely, persons considered by the police to be alcoholics or 
drug addicts (of whom there were eight at the time of the visit); persons identified as 
at risk of committing suicide or causing self-injury (numbering six); prisoners who 
had been involved in violent incidents or who had behaved threateningly (numbering 
two); and a "small number" of prisoners subject to judicial restrictions. 107 The Unit's 
regime was extremely poor: occupants were afforded no purposeful activities, were 
denied human contact and, with the exception of persons in the last category, were 
forced to spend 24 hours a day in their cells "with little or nothing to occupy them". 108 
In the light of such findings, the CPT suggested, rather moderately, that: 
"[t]he provision of appropriate activities [had] undoubtedly [been] hampered 
by the heterogeneous nature of the persons held in the Unit". 109 
It illustrated its view in the following way: its delegation, it stated, had found 
suspected alcoholics and drug addicts held in secure conditions "which were not 
106 See Malta II, para 105. 
107 See Germany II, para 147. 
101 Idem, para 148. 
109 Ideen, pare 149. 
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proportionate to the risk presented by the withdrawal symptoms from which they were 
suffering"; a "tendency" which had manifested itself, inter alia, in their being denied 
outdoor exercise. llo "Similarly, " it continued, "prisoners involved in violent incidents 
or threatening behaviour could find themselves placed under a special observation 
regime rather than subjected to formal disciplinary procedures (with their attendant 
safeguards)". "' "In short", it concluded: 
"the treatment of persons detained in [the] unit... seemed to be premised upon 
a combination of medical and security imperatives... the poverty of the regime 
offered to inmates was largely the result of an unsatisfactory compromise 
between those competing claims". 112 
Clearly, the CPT was troubled by the inflexible application of the same impoverished 
regime to every detainee accommodated in the unit. Such an approach, it is 
submitted, does not permit any account to be taken of the individual requirements of 
detainees and reflects a failure to consider the merits of each case discretely. The 
inference to be drawn from the Committee's remarks is clear: custodial authorities 
should avoid accommodating many different types of segregated detainee together (so 
far as possible), lest the regime to which they are subject is compromised thereby. 113 
Freedom to discriminate between different categories of segregated detainee 
Linked to the question of the particular responsibilities owed by custodial authorities 
to isolated persons in their charge is the question whether and, if so, to what extent, 
they may distinguish between various categories of secluded detainee in respect of the 
uo Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
112Idem, para 150. 
113 See, in the same connection, Netherlands II, para 48 (wherein the CPT proclaimed that "It is far from clear... that the accommodation of... widely-differing categories of prisoners is consistent with the 
stated purpose of [a] Unit [for prisoners deemed to represent control and management difficulties"). 
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treatment to which such persons are entitled. From a perusal of published visit 
reports, it would seem that there exist two distinct precepts in this area: 
(i) that no distinction is to be drawn between segregated detainees as to the rights and 
safeguards (and notwithstanding point (ii) below, in certain circumstances, material 
conditions and regime activities) to which such detainees are entitled, regardless of 
the reason for their segregation. 
Of course, certain procedural safeguards, like the rights to a formal hearing and to 
contest a segregation measure cannot be regarded as necessary when the isolation is 
requested by the detainee. 
(ii) that, insofar as material conditions and regime activities are concerned, it may be 
acceptable to discriminate between persons segregated for punishment purposes and 
those segregated for other reasons. 
As to the first point, while examining the Finnish prison estate in May 1992, the 
Committee encountered a small number of prisoners "subject to the terms of the 
Dangerous Recidivists Act". 14 These prisoners, convicted of serious, often violent, 
offences, were serving "indeterminate" sentences in "preventive" detention, 15 and 
were often subject to a solitary confinement-type regime "for very long periods". 116 
In its subsequent visit report, the Committee sought to "emphasise" that its 
observations on the solitary confinement of detainees generally in Finland (which 
observations concerned, inter alia, material conditions of detention, regime activities, 
legal safeguards and medical supervision), should "apply equally to prisoners 
classified under the Dangerous Recidivists Act who are held in solitary 
"4 See Finland I, para 77. 
"5 Ibid. 
116 Ideen, para 78. 
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confinement". 117 The Committee's inference here is clear, it is submitted: to 
discriminate between the entitlements of two different categories of segregated 
detainee cannot, without difficulty, be justified. "" 
Similarly, the CPT questioned the practice of differentiating between the 
nature (and quality) of regime activities offered detainees occupying the maximum 
security unit at the Rebibbia maison d'arret pour femmes, Italy, in March 1992. Most 
detainees there had been convicted of offences related to terrorism and were serving 
long sentences. 119 They had been separated into two distinct "zones": the first 
accommodating detainees who had "renounced the armed struggle" (characterised as 
"dissociees"); the second those who had refused to do so ("irreductibles"), together 
with others charged with similar offences and awaiting judgment. While material 
conditions in the two zones were "identical", the visiting delegation noted, the 
regimes of the two sets of detainees differed markedly: the first group enjoyed 
complete freedom of movement throughout their "zone" between 8 am and 8 pm 
daily, could mix in a "well-equipped" association room, undertake paid work or 
English language courses, make (exclusive) use of a small gymnasium and cultivate a 
garden. 120 The second group, by contrast, did not benefit from an "open door" regime 
and their activities were "limited" to outdoor exercise and association for a maximum 
of 5 hours a day. 121 Unclear as to the reasons which lay behind discrimination of this 
kind between detainees accommodated in the same maximum security unit, the CPT 
sought from the Italian authorities a "detailed" explanation. '22 
117 Ibid. 
"= See, similarly, Luxembourg I, paras 55-6 (regarding the apparent distinction drawn in national law 
as to (i) the formal guarantees available to detainees isolated on grounds of discipline and those isolated 
because ` reputed to be dangerous"; and (ii) the medical supervision available to detainees placed in a 
punishment cell and those subject to a "regime cellulaire strict'). 19 See Italy I, para 103. 
lm Idem, para 104. 
121 Ideen, para 105. 
122 Ibid. 
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As to the second point, it is evident from remarks made in several visit reports 
that the CPT is prepared to countenance greater austerity in material conditions and 
regime in respect of persons segregated as a punishment than in respect of persons 
segregated on other grounds. For example, in the course of a number of visits to 
Spain, it has encountered a so-called "prisoner grading system" under which prisoners 
may be allocated different types of regime on the basis of their perceived 
compatibility with good order and discipline in an establishment. Those prisoners 
regarded as dangerous or unadapted to an ordinary prison regime are placed in Grade 
1, a category which is itself sub-divided into three parts. The most restrictive regime 
is that of prisoners placed in Grade 1(1) who are obliged to spend 22 hours a day, 
alone in their cells, forbidden to associate with other prisoners when out of their cells, 
only permitted to work or study in-cell and subject to a restricted visit entitlement. 
The regime of prisoners categorised as Grade 1(2) is "relaxed somewhat", out-of-cell 
time being extended to four hours; while Grade 1(3) prisoners enjoy a regime "much 
closer to that of an ordinary prisoner" 
- 
rather unsurprisingly, given its perceived 
status as a "stepping stone" to Grade 2 status. 123 
Visiting various Spanish prison establishments in April 1991, the CPT 
observed that the conditions of prisoners subject to Grade 1(1) and (2) regimes 
"varied from establishment to establishment, and on occasion from prisoner to 
prisoner in the same establishment" 
-a point "underlined", it remarked subsequently, 
by certain prisoners interviewed. 124 Regarding one such prisoner, "[i]nterestingly, " 
the CPT averred, his Governor "took pains to point out that [he] was not undergoing 
punishment. " "This explanation, " it continued, "was necessary as the difference 
between the prisoner's situation and that of a prisoner placed in solitary confinement 
123 See Spain I, para110. 
124 Ideen, pars 111. 
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as a punishment was not immediately evident": both were held in the same section of 
the prison and were therefore obliged to endure "comparable" material conditions. 
Their regimes could be distinguished only insofar as out-of-cell time was more 
generous for the Grade 1(1) prisoner 
- 
two hours daily, as opposed to the punished 
prisoner's one. '25 
A "common feature" of every establishment visited, the CPT noted, was the 
"penury" of regime activities afforded Grade 1(1) and (2) prisoners. "[P]ractically 
all" such prisoners met, it stated in its visit report, possessed "only borrowed books 
and on occasion a radio as sources of diversion". Indeed, in one prison, such was the 
extent of this "enforced idleness", it remarked, that Grade 1 prisoners interviewed 
there "expressed a feeling of having been abandoned". 126 This situation, it observed, 
was "all the more serious" given the length of time that prisoners might be classified 
as Grade 1(1) or (2) (a "significant proportion" of such prisoners interviewed had 
been so classified for over a year, "and some for considerably longer). 127 In 
summarising its findings, the CPT suggested, disapprovingly, that: 
"[t]he strictest forms of Grade 1 regime observed by the delegation [were] 
scarcely distinguishable from solitary confinement as a punishment; moreover, 
unlike the latter, they [were] not subject to a maximum time limit". 128 
It continued: 
"[t]he delegation met certain Grade 1 prisoners who had for very long periods 
been subject to a regime of isolation and were held under austere material 
'25 Ibid. 
126 Ideen, para 112. 
'27 Ibid. 
128 Ideen, para 113. See also Spain II, para 222. 
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conditions of detention with little or nothing by way of activity; in the CPT's 
view, this constitutes inhuman treatment". 129 
Accordingly, it sought to stress: 
"... the generally recognised principle that people are sent to prison as a 
punishment, not for punishment". 130 
Further, it recommended that steps be taken by the Spanish authorities, "as a matter of 
urgency", to ensure, inter alia, that: 
"... the material conditions of detention of a prisoner held in isolation as a 
result of his Grade 1 status are clearly better than those of a prisoner 
undergoing solitary confinement as a punishment". 131 
Similarly, having visited the segregation unit of Korydallos Men's Prison, Greece, in 
March 1993 
- 
each 7 sq. m. cell of which was furnished only with a bed, an Asian 
toilet and, occasionally, a washbasin132 
- 
the CPT offered the view that conditions of 
detention therein were "on the whole acceptable for prisoners undergoing the 
disciplinary sanction of confinement in a special cell". 133 They were "far less 
suitable", however, it stated, "for prisoners subject to segregation for non-disciplinary 
reasons" 
- 
especially when so segregated for any length of 134 
Lastly in this connection, it is worth noting that the CPT has observed, 
emphatically, that: 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. See also Spain 1I, para 222. 
131 Ibid (emphasis added). See now Spain IV, para 39. 132 See Greece I, para 133. 133 Ideen, para 135. 
134 Idem, para 136. At the time of the visit, the unit was being used to accommodate persons segregated for both disciplinary and non-disciplinary reasons (pars 133). See also para 139 of the report (regarding 
the similarly furnished and unsatisfactorily lit segregation unit at Larissa Pri son: "... adequate for 
persons undergoing cellular confinement as a punishment... "). 
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"... il est import de souligner que la sanction du placement en regime cellulaire 
strict est tout a fait distincte du placement en cellule de punition". 135 
Material conditions of detention in segregation cells 
Introduction 
The issue of the material conditions of detention in which, in the view of the CPT, 
segregated persons ought to be accommodated may be seen, in many respects, to be 
an adjunct of its corps of precepts on material conditions in places of detention 
generally, since many of the same standards self-evidently apply. 136 Unfortunately, 
space constraints do not permit a detailed examination of general material conditions 
of detention in the present work. Consequently, neither do they permit a thorough 
examination of the conditions in which, in the view of the CPT, segregated detainees 
should be held. At the same time, however, because the solitary confinement of 
detainees lends itself to different 
- 
or, at least, modified 
- 
standards, it may be worth 
taking the time to consider some of the CPT's more salient precepts. 
It should also be pointed out, even if it is something of an axiom, that the 
precepts identified here also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the detention of persons in 
punishment cells. For, although the question of discipline may be seen, in many 
respects, to warrant quite separate- treatment, insofar as the physical environment in 
which punished detainees may be held is concerned, there seems little need, it is 
submitted, to consider the question afresh, so marked is the overlap with solitary 
confinement generally. All the same, it may be useful to sub-divide the present study 
135 See Luxembourg I, pars 47. 
136 For example, all cells used for the seclusion of detainees, for whatever reason, the CPT believes, 
should be furnished with a bed/means of rest and their occupants should be able to gain access to a 
toilet on demand: see, e. g, Romania I, para 190 (2'6 indent). 
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into sections devoted, inter alia, to the accommodation of those persons segregated on 
grounds of discipline and those segregated for other reasons since, as we have already 
seen to a certain extent and as we shall see further, the CPT does seek to distinguish 
the two categories in one fundamental respect. We shall begin, however, by 
considering a range of principles that may be considered to apply regardless of the 
ground(s) on which a detainee's isolation is sought or imposed. 
Material conditions of detention generally 
The starting-point for any analysis of the Committee's views on the physical 
environment in which, it considers, secluded persons should be held is to recognise 
that its approval or disapproval do not turn merely on the quality of material 
conditions per se; they also turn, crucially, on the length of time for which persons 
may be held in such conditions. Thus, having visited segregation units at Leeds, 
Liverpool and Wandsworth Prisons, England, in May 1994, it drew subtle distinctions 
as to the suitability of placement therein based on a combination of the quality of the 
physical environment (and, where appropriate, regime) available to inmates and the 
possible lengths of time for which they might be held there. In all three prisons, the 
Committee observed, the material conditions and regime seen in the units were such 
as to "render them quite unsuitable for lengthy periods of detention". 137 More 
precisely, it suggested that the units' "very restrictive" living conditions could be 
considered "inadequate" for placements of "several weeks" under Rule 43 of England 
and Wales' Prison Rules; 138 "seriously deficient" for prisoners spending a month on 
137 See UK III, pars119. 
138 Rule 43 provides for the non-voluntary removal from association of detainees either for the 
maintenance of good order and discipline or in the interests of the prisoner concerned. 
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transfer from other prisons; and "wholly unacceptable" for the "medium term" 
detention of high security prisoners. 139 
It would seem, therefore, that, to the CPT, the suitability of any environment 
used for segregation purposes may be determined, to a certain 
- 
perhaps even 
significant 
- 
extent, by the length of time for which persons may be placed therein. In 
creating such environments, it may be inferred, the authorities should take account 
- 
to a degree which, it may be argued, they have hitherto failed to do 
- 
of the 
anticipated duration of placements. 
Turning to specific aspects of the physical environment, it is possible to 
identify certain features which, if not, strictly speaking, particular to the solitary 
confinement of detainees, are at least accorded a significance above and beyond that 
which is accorded them in respect of detention on ordinary location. 
Material hazards to health 
The CPT has stated that the presence in isolation rooms of fittings that "could easily 
be used by a disturbed [detainee] to hurt him/herself' may render the rooms "hardly 
suitable for accommodating disruptive detainees". 140 Accordingly, having visited the 
security cell in Litla-Hraun Prison, Iceland, in July 1993, whose broken window, the 
Committee stated, "represented a potential hazard", it sought to "underline the 
importance of avoiding such material hazards, in particular in a security cell". 14' 
Similarly, each of the isolation rooms of pavilion Z at the Attica State Mental 
Hospital for children, Greece (March 1993) 
- 
to which the CPT sought to draw 
"[s]pecial attention" in its first visit report 
- 
were found to possess, inter alia, barred 
139UKIII, 
para119. 
140 See Cyprus II, para 91. 
141 See Iceland I, para 131 (emphasis added). 
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windows, metal doors (the lower part being solid, the upper part fitted with bars) and 
"unprotected" radiators. In its view, "[t]he risk of injury to patients confined there[in] 
was very high". 142 Consequently, it recommended that "the requisite physical 
improvements" be made to the rooms "without delay... to ensure that isolation of 
patients is carried out under acceptable material conditions" and 
- 
more significantly 
for present purposes 
- 
"in conformity with suitable safety standards". 141 
At Rampton Special Hospital, England, in May 1994, one seclusion room 
visited was found to possess bars on its windows and an "over-soft" plastic mattress. 
It also lacked any call system. To the CPT, these "poor" conditions "posed a threat to 
the physical integrity of patients at risk (for example, a danger of suffocation from the 
over-soft mattress)". 144 
In an effort to avoid furnishing isolation cells in such a way as to create 
material hazards to health, the authorities at Leeds, Wandsworth and Liverpool 
Prisons, England, all visited at the same time as Rampton, had 
- 
with the apparent 
approval of the CPT 
- 
equipped their segregation/disciplinary cells, inter alia, with 
cardboard tables and chairs. '45 In the view of the CPT, this positive state of affairs 
contrasted sharply with that obtaining in two other cells (used to hold violent or 
disturbed prisoners) in the segregation unit at Leeds. These cells each contained "a 
hefty wooden block... bound with iron bands", which, staff claimed, was used as 
seating. 146 To the Committee, such blocks represented a "potential danger to disturbed 
prisoners who may be intent on self-injury". Further, it suggested, their presence in 
142 See Greece I, para 251. 
143 Idem, para 256 (1" indent). 
144 See UK III, para 268. 
145 Idem, paras 108 and 109. 
146 Idem, para 108. 
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the cells was "all the more surprising" given the existence of the 
- 
clearly preferable 
- 
cardboard furniture in neighbouring cells. '47 
Similarly, the use of "toughened glass screens" in the "special management 
division" of Corradino Correctional Facility, Malta, in July 1995,148 while not the 
subject of CPT comment, may be considered much safer than ordinary glass in the 
detention, inter alia, of disciplined prisoners, prisoners considered to represent -a 
threat to the safety or security of the establishment and prisoners segregated for their 
own protection. 
Elsewhere, the presence in seclusion cells of "numerous sharp comers" and 
"breakable ceramic" toilet bowls149 and protruding radiators150 has given rise to CPT 
concern. 
Call systems 
The absence of call systems in rooms used for the seclusion of detainees is another 
issue of acute significance in the segregation of disturbed, disruptive and/or violent 
detainees. The need for rapid means of communication with staff is particularly 
important in circumstances in which contact with others is restricted or even denied. 
In this respect, having visited disciplinary quarters "in a state of advanced 
construction" at the prison de St-Gilles, Belgium, in November 1993, where, inter 
alia, "no trace" of the installation of any call system was apparent, the CPT sought to 
impress on the Belgian authorities the need for such a facility in this kind of 
'47 Ibid. 
las See Malta II4 para 65. 
"' See Iceland II, para 125. The potential problems caused by such features were exacerbated at the 
time of the CPT's visit, in 1998, it seems, by the prohibition on the use of restraint in the establishment 
concerned, which prohibition, the Committee stated, rendered it "difficult to prevent a juvenile from 
harming him 
- 
or herself... " 
"° See Belgium II, pars 168. 
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environment. '5' Similarly, examining segregation arrangements at the Turku Prison 
Mental Hospital, Finland, in May 1992, the CPT was concerned to find that although 
all four of the establishment's isolation rooms had been fitted with call systems, none 
was working. 152 It recommended that they be rendered operative "as a matter of 
urgency". 153 
It is worth noting, however, that the CPT has demonstrated a certain flexibility 
on the matter. Visiting Martinique, in July 1994, for example, it noted that none of 
the four cells which together comprised the disciplinary area of the centre 
penitentiaire de Fort-de-France possessed call systems. However, there was a 
constant staff presence in the area, which, it seems, the Committee was prepared to 
accept as an appropriate alternative arrangement. '54 
Ease of surveillance and access 
Closely linked to the issue of the presence or absence of call systems in cells or rooms 
used for the seclusion of detainees is that of the ease with which members of staff 
responding to a call may reach the rooms concerned. The question calls for 
consideration, inter alia, of the location of isolation rooms vis-a-vis staff quarters, 
surveillance points and/or medical facilities. The importance of location was 
demonstrated by the CPT in its first Cypriot visit report, wherein it remarked that in 
1992, rooms used inter alia to accommodate disruptive patients at Athalassa 
Psychiatric Hospital had not been equipped with call systems and had been "located a 
long way from the staff quarters". '55 As a result, it suggested, "given their location 
151 See Belgium I, para 235 (and now Belgium II, para 192). See, similarly, Hungary I, paras 132 and 
133 (2" indent) (regarding the equipping of the disciplinary cells seen at Tokol Prison and Remand 
Centre for Adolescents, in November 1994). 
u2 See Finland I, para 120. 
153 Idem, para 122 (1" indent). 
"4 See France (Martinique) I, para 81. However, cfbelow, p 415. iss See Cyprus I, para 131. 
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and their state of... equipment... the rooms... [had been] hardly suitable for 
accommodating disruptive patients". 156 
Similarly, having reviewed segregation facilities in a number of adult prisons 
in Greece in March 1993, the CPT offered the general view that: 
"... all cells in segregation units [should] be equipped with a call bell and... a 
member of staff [should] always be present in such units when they hold 
prisoners". '57 
Regarding the proximity of disciplinary/isolation cells to other detention areas in an 
establishment, the Committee has considered worthy of note the fact that Belgium's 
St-Andries men's prison disciplinary area, when visited in November 1993, was 
situated "far from other men's detention units" (although it was close to the 
establishment's "Quartier de Securite Renforcee", which accommodated prisoners 
considered dangerous). "' Its remote location undeniably rendered all the more 
significant the complete absence of call systems in the area. 159 At the St-Andries 
women's prison, five isolation/disciplinary cells were found to be similarly located: 
i. e. "far from the women's detention units, " in the basement of the establishment. 160 
However, more positively, unlike the cells for men, each such cell possessed an 
"interphone... fixed to the ceiling". 161 
Elsewhere, "noteworthy also, " the CPT has remarked, is the fact that in the 
Unite pour Malades Difficiles at the Centre Hospitalier Specialise de Montfavet, 
156 Ibid. 
's' See Greece I, Para 140 (emphasis added). 
'58 See Belgium I, Para 233. 
159 Ibid. See, similarly, Para 230 of the report and now Belgium II, Para 191 (regarding certain 
punishment cells viewed at Lantin Prison). 6o Idem, Para 234. 
161 Ibid. 
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France, in October/November 1991, men's isolation cells were not "a proximite 
immediate du local de l'infirmier de permanence". 162 
Generally, facilitating access to isolation cells is not an issue that the CPT has 
considered in any depth. However 
- 
disregarding the vexed question of intrusion and 
personal privacy 
- 
it cannot be doubted that the installation of closed circuit television 
cameras and monitors in the communal areas of segregation units and the fitting of 
electrically-operated cell doors163 are measures capable of rendering the surveillance 
of segregation cells much easier, regardless of their location. Where such facilities 
are not installed 
- 
and even where they are, it may be argued 
- 
it is necessary, the 
CPT considers, to ensure that, for observation purposes, all parts of a seclusion room 
are visible from the outside. 164 
An appropriate means of rest 
Given the increased amount of time likely to be spent in-cell each day by segregated 
detainees, 165 the question whether or not isolation cells are furnished with an 
appropriate means of rest may be said to possess particular significance. In this 
respect, the Committee has observed, rather quizzically, that in Dob Prison, Slovenia, 
in February 1995, inmates undergoing solitary confinement as a punishment were 
forbidden to lie down on their beds during the day. 166 (A similar prohibition had 
apparently been in force in the past at Ljubljana Prison, but had been discontinued by 
the time of the CPT visit. ) 
162 See France I, para 198 (emphasis added). 163 See Malta II, para 65 (regarding the "special management division" at Corradino Correctional 
Facility, newly-renovated at the time of the CPT's visit in July 1995). 164 See Finland II, para 134 (regarding isolation rooms seen at Muurola Psychiatric Hospital in June 
1998). 
165 See, further, below, p 428. 
166 See Slovenia I, para 83. 
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Visited in November 1994, the disciplinary cells in Budapest Remand Prison, 
Hungary, were found to be equipped, inter alia, with folding wooden beds. 167 
However, the Prison's disciplinary regime demanded that the beds be unclipped from 
the wall only between the hours of 8 pm and 4 am (when the day began). 168 While 
not addressing the question directly, implicit in the CPT's subsequent invitation to the 
Hungarian authorities "to explore the possibility of attenuating the rigour" of the 
disciplinary regime obtaining in the establishment, 169 it may be argued, was a concern 
to see the adoption of a more flexible approach as to use of the beds. 
It need hardly be stated, of course, that seclusion cells used for the overnight 
accommodation of detainees should, the CPT considers, be furnished with mattresses 
and blankets. 170 
Cell design 
Although the design of cells used for the seclusion of detainees cannot be said, on the 
evidence of published visit reports, particularly to preoccupy the CPT, it is worth 
noting, in passing, just how "very impressed" it was with improvement work being 
carried out in the Division d'Attente at the Penitencier du Bochuz, Switzerland, in 
February 1996. There, much to its approval, it seems, each detainee subject to a 
regime "de securite renforcee" was placed, "in effect, " in a double cell, one part of 
which he used as his bedroom, the other as a room in which he engaged in regime 
activities. 171 
Cells possessed of these characteristics may be said to represent something of 
167 See Hungary I, para 132. 
168 Idem, para 134. 
169 Ibid. 
170 See, e. g., Poland I, para 165,2"' indent (regarding the provision of bedding in the "transit" cells at 
the Correctional establishment and Home for detained juveniles in Swidnica in 1996). 171 See Switzerland II, para 83. 
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an ideal to the CPT. Where practicable, one feels, it would encourage their 
construction. After all, double cells offer an environment in which a range of work, 
educational and leisure activities may be undertaken without materially compromising 
that seclusion which constitutes the essence of a regime of isolation. 
Cell size 
The CPT has characterised as "adequate" or "acceptable" for individual occupancy 
living space in isolation cells of between 6.5172 and 9.5173 sq. m; as less satisfactory, 
living space of approximately 5 sq. m; 174 and as "not acceptable for use [even] as 
overnight accommodation", isolation rooms measuring "a mere" 3.6 sq. m. 175 Cells 
measuring 4.2 sq. m. and described as "very small" have been said by the CPT to be 
"not suitable" for the accommodation of prisoners placed in solitary confinement for 
non-disciplinary reasons and "unsuitable" 
- 
"for other than short periods of time"176 - 
for the detention, even, of disciplined prisoners. 177 
Maintaining human dignity 
Although it is axiomatic that material conditions of detention in isolation cells ought, 
in the view of the CPT, to be such as to ensure that the dignity of the person placed 
therein remains unaffected, it is worth pointing out that, as recently as 1998, it had 
cause to deprecate the practice of stripping a prisoner naked before segregating him in 
a bare cell, even though the authorities may have acted from the most humanitarian of 
In See Slovakia I, pare 135. 
173 Idem, para 132. 
"'Ibid. See, similarly, Germany II, pare 96 (regarding isolation cells measuring "only" 5.5 sq. m). 175 Idem, pare 157 (and, similarly, para 196). 176 By which the CPT may mean periods of 1-2 days: see Iceland II, pare 56. 17 See Finland I, pare 128. 
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motives. Even persons at risk of self-injury or suicide, it considers, ought at least to 
be provided with tear-proof clothing and bedding. 17$ 
Elsewhere, the Committee has described itself as "not at all convinced by the 
practice of placing... [juvenile detainees] in isolation rooms in underclothes... or... 
"179 pyjamas... 
Appropriate material conditions of detention in cells used for the segregation of 
persons on non-disciplinary grounds 
It is clear from a perusal of published visit reports that what the CPT regards as an 
"acceptable" physical environment in which to accommodate segregated detainees 
may differ according to whether the segregation is actuated by disciplinary or non- 
disciplinary motives. Clearly, it may be inferred, persons segregated other than as a 
punishment are, in its view, entitled to expect a better quality of environment than 
those undergoing the disciplinary sanction of isolation. Given this distinction, it may 
be useful to consider, here, the kind of environment to which, the CPT believes, 
detainees isolated on non-disciplinary grounds should be entitled. It is a belief that is, 
perhaps, best illustrated by way of example. 
Visiting Finland in May 1992, a delegation examined the isolation unit of 
Helsinki Central Prison, about whose material conditions (and regime) the Committee 
later stated it had "serious reservations". 180 "Most" of the unit's cells "contained only 
a platform bed and a lavatory 
- 
both made of concrete". Further, though four of the 
cells had been converted in order to accommodate prisoners "thought to be especially 
dangerous and likely to be held in solitary confinement for extended periods" - with 
178 See Finland II, para 102 (regarding the practice of stripping naked suicidal or self-mutilating 
prisoners and placing them in an "observation cell" at Riihimald Central Prison, June 1998). 
" See Luxembourg II, para 33. Staff interviewed in 1997 claimed that the practice was premised on 
security considerations, 
'80 See Finland I, para 69. 
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the result that conditions of detention therein were of a "slightly higher" standard 
- 
no 
cell in the unit possessed any storage space. Consequently, the "limited range" of 
personal possessions which inmates were permitted to keep "tended to be left strewn 
on the floor". '8' 
Hygiene in "[m]any" of the cells was poor and some were "extremely dirty. " 
The condition of in-cell lavatories, in particular, "left a great deal to be desired". 
They could only be flushed from outside the cell, it appears; and prisoners 
interviewed alleged that requests for this to be done were "frequently ignored" by 
staff. 182 "In short, " the CPT concluded, material conditions of detention in the unit 
were "poor". 183 Consequently, it suggested that: 
"... those prisoners not undergoing cellular confinement as a disciplinary 
punishment [should] be accommodated in cells which contain the same 
equipment as that found in ordinary cells... "1 
Suitable "ordinary" cells, the CPT suggested, existed elsewhere in the establishment: 
"[m]ost of the cells [on normal location were] of a reasonable size (up to 9 
sq. m. ), acceptably furnished (bed, table, chair, wardrobe and bookshelf) and 
benefited from adequate lighting and sanitation, [though] it would be 
preferable for sanitation facilities to be partitioned off from the living areas in 
the cells". '55 
181 Idem, para 70. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Idem, para 71. 
184 Ibid, 2nd indent (emphasis added). See, similarly, Greece I, para 136,1" indent (regarding cells seen 
in the segregation unit of Korydallos Men's Prison in March 1993). 
185 Idem, para 80. 
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Detainees isolated on non-disciplinary grounds, therefore, are, in the view of the CPT, 
entitled to the same standard of material environment as detainees held on normal 
location. 's6 
There would appear, however, to be one exception to this general principle: at 
Linho Prison, Portugal, in January 1992, while material conditions observed in "most" 
cells in the Discipline Unit were "little different" from those found in the main 
accommodation blocks, the standard of accommodation afforded by four "bar- 
fronted" segregation cells, a visiting delegation observed, was "distinctly lower". 
These cells were "very small (scarcely 4 sq. m. )" and their fittings "spartan... only... a 
bed and slopping-out bucket". 187 Due to their bar-fronted design, the CPT suggested 
subsequently, prisoners held in the cells might be "observed continuously in safety". 
Consequently, they were probably "suitable for use as a temporary holding area for 
prisoners exhibiting violent behaviour". However, it added, "they represent[ed] an 
unduly harsh environment in which to place those undergoing disciplinary sanctions". 
It recommended, therefore, that their use for this last purpose be avoided. 189 
This is the one instance in which, thus far in its work, the CPT has been 
prepared to countenance more austere conditions of detention in respect of persons 
segregated on non-disciplinary grounds (in this case, good order) than in respect of 
persons segregated for reasons of discipline. It is, of course, an instance that is very 
precisely circumscribed, requiring, inter alia, cells of a particular (and, nowadays, 
uncommon) design and detention of short duration only. Indeed, had it not been for 
the cells' design, one may speculate, the CPT might not have been so 
186 By 1998, it should be noted, the deficiencies identified in the unit at Helsinki appeared to have been 
rectified: see Finland II, para 63. 
'81 See Portugal I, para 136. 
188 Ibid. Visiting the establishment for a second time, in May 1995, the CPT observed, again with 
disapproval, that the four cells were still being used to accommodate disciplined prisoners: see Portugal 
II, pars 139. 
421 
accommodating; it is precisely because the cells facilitated continuous and safe 
observation that their other material deficiencies were, to a certain extent, 
overlooked. '89 
Appropriate material conditions of detention in cells used for the solitary 
confinement of disciplined detainees 
Having viewed units used to accommodate persons segregated for punishment 
purposes in the various Spanish prisons visited in April 1991, the CPT observed that: 
"[t]he general atmosphere and conditions were 
- 
as one would expect - more 
austere than in the normal units, but were not unacceptable as a punishment 
regime" 190 
This observation, it is submitted, conveys the essence of the CPT's position as to the 
quality of material environment which it considers appropriate for the detention of 
persons segregated on disciplinary grounds. Thus, provided they are not 
"unacceptable" 
- 
as measured against its own criteria 
- 
material conditions in 
disciplinary cells, it believes, may be "more austere" than those in "normal" units 
(which means, in practice, therefore, "more austere" than cells used for segregation on 
non-disciplinary grounds). 
Interestingly, in its early working life, the Committee appeared prepared to 
accept greater austerity of conditions in all segregation cells, not simply, as it appears 
to do now, in those used to accommodate punished detainees. Visiting segregation 
units at Brixton, Leeds and Wandsworth Prisons, England, in 1990, for instance, it 
found the obtaining atmosphere and physical environment, "as one would 
189 However, cf Greece I, para 139 (austere conditions in otherwise conventionally designed isolation 
cells regarded as adequate, both for the solitary confinement of punished prisoners and for the 
"temporary" holding of prisoners representing a "control problem"). 190 See Spain I, pare 194 (emphasis added. ) 
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expect... more austere than on the wings, but not unacceptable". 191 In offering this 
judgment, the Committee seemed to draw no distinction between cells used for the 
segregation of prisoners as a punishment and those used for segregation on non- 
disciplinary grounds 
- 
other than to mention, in passing, that "[t]he precise conditions 
of detention of each prisoner [seen] varied according to his status (removal from 
association; cellular confinement as a punishment)". 192 It did conclude, however, that 
"[i]n no case did [conditions] appear to the delegation to be excessively harsh". 193 
We are forced to conclude, therefore, that at this early juncture, the CPT felt 
no need to distinguish punishment from non-punishment cells in material terms: it 
was simply expected that all segregation cells might reasonably be more austere than 
ordinary cells. Only later in its work did the CPT begin to draw the kind of subtle 
distinctions identified above. 
The question remains, however, what standard of material environment does 
the CPT regard as acceptable in respect of punishment cells? The following example 
may offer some guidance. At the end of its visit to Switzerland in July 1991, a CPT 
delegation issued an Article 8(5) observation regarding, inter alia, the conditions of 
detention observed in two security cells visited in the basement of Berne regional 
prison. Although of quite adequate size for individual occupancy (8.75 and 14.29 
sq. m. ), the cells were furnished merely with a "concrete plinth" (on which had been 
placed an uncovered foam mattress) and a toilet. Natural light filtered into the cells 
"very insufficiently" through observation holes. Their security had been reinforced 
via the installation of a grill behind their doors and the surveillance of occupants 
facilitated by the presence of a camera. Both occupants of the cells at the time of the 
191 See UK I, Para 91 (emphasis added). 192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid 
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visit were naked and, according to the delegation, "in a state of advanced excitation 
and disturbance". 194 
Much to the approbation of the CPT, the Swiss authorities reacted 
"immediately" to the observation, commencing an inspection of the premises the day 
after the CPT's departure and transmitting to the Head of the delegation, a month 
later, its findings, along with preliminary proposals for change. 195 These proposals 
were followed within weeks by a "complementary report", which elaborated on the 
renovation work underway. The CPT, for its part, welcomed the authorities' intention 
to replace the cells' frosted windows with ones made from reinforced, but transparent, 
glass. Nevertheless, it suggested, the cells' general condition 
- 
even taking account of 
their renovation, it seems 
- 
could not be considered good enough to render them 
suitable for anything other than the discipline of detainees (and even then, "for short 
periods" only). 196 
Thus, we are afforded an insight into the kind of austerity regarded as 
acceptable by the CPT in respect of the (short-term) detention of detainees solitarily 
confined on disciplinary grounds. It should be made clear, of course, that disciplinary 
cells, just like any other, ought, in its view, to be of "appropriate" dimensions and 
possess "adequate" lighting, heating and ventilation. 197 
If anything, conditions of detention in the eight punishment cells located in 
two basements at Lantin Prison, Belgium, when visited in November 1993, were 
worse than those at Berne. Dismissed as "unacceptable" by the CPT, the only 
satisfactory feature of the first set was their size (at "a little less than" 10 sq. m). 
194 See Switzerland I, para 17. 
195 Idem, para 18. 
196 Idem, para 20. See also para 146 of the report. 197 See, e. g., Bulgaria I, Para 165. It is worth recalling in this connection that Rule 37, EPR provides, 
inter alta, that "... punishment by placing in a dark cell... shall be completely prohibited as [a] 
punishment... for disciplinary offences". 
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These cells were furnished "very spartanly, " possessing only a concrete plinth and a 
toilet. A tiny, sealed window was "supposed" to allow natural light and fresh air to 
enter and the artificial light provided was "mediocre. " As a result, they were "almost 
dark" 
- 
all light in one, indeed, was entirely absent. Central heating was unavailable 
in three of the cells and in "several", the toilets did not work. No cell possessed a call 
system 
- 
"a lacuna, " the CPT remarked subsequently, "all the more significant given 
that these cells were far from any surveillance post". "Finally, " it observed, "all cells, 
like mattresses and covers, were in a state of repellent filthiness". 198 Cells in the 
second basement were of "more restricted" dimensions (about 6 sq. m. ) Levels of 
both natural and artificial light, as well as fittings, were "identical" to those in the first 
basement. Again, no call system existed and the cells' state of filthiness was "just as 
offensive". "Further, [they] emitted an obnoxious odour". 199 
Unsurprisingly, the Committee considered that "significant improvements" 
were necessary and that, until effected, the cells should not be used at all. 
Specifically, it declared: 
"[i]t would be desirable that such improvements include the installation of a 
table and chair, if necessary, permanently fixed [to the floor]". 200 
Among the range of CPT precepts on material conditions of detention in prison (and 
other) establishments identifiable in its published work, this particular one, it may be 
stated, is unique to punishment cells. It represents a development, in the most 
incremental way, of the CPT's basic view that lower material standards may be 
expected of this category of cell. 201 It is worth noting, however, that the Committee 
198 See Belgium I, para 230. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. See now Belgium II, para 191. By 1997, some of the offending cells had been 
decommissioned, and others improved 
- 
though not entirely satisfactorily. 
m' See, in the same connection, inter alia, idem, paras 233-5 (regarding disciplinary/reflection cells 
viewed in both the men's and women's prisons at St-Andries, each of which, in 1995, contained 
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does not regard the precept as applying, for obvious reasons, to padded isolation 
cells202 Indeed, it has conscientiously sought to distinguish the requirements of 
security and disciplinary cells in this regard. To the Luxembourg authorities, for 
example, it suggested that their continuing refusal, in 1997, to equip disciplinary cells 
at the Centre Penitentiaire with tables and chairs on the ground that "such 
equipment... can be dangerous for the detainee and for staff' was "hardly 
convincing". While such an approach, the Committee stated, may be appropriate in a 
security cell, "specially equipped to accommodate a disturbed or depressive detainee 
for a very short period", it cannot, it insisted, be justified in respect of punishment 
cells, in which a detainee may spend long periods of time. 203 
Where detainees have been secluded in nothing more than a "bare room" (i. e. 
one furnished only with a mattress and chamber pot), the CPT has been prepared, 
understandably, to broaden its basic precept in this area, and to demand a "suitably 
equipped" environment, possessing "at least" a bed (in addition to a table and 
chair). 204 Further, it should be noted that the Committee considers that detainees 
undergoing cellular confinement as a punishment are no less entitled to mattresses, at 
least at night, than any other category of detainee. 05 
From observations made in other published reports, it may be possible to infer 
the existence of other CPT standards on the nature of the material environment 
afforded in punishment cells. In its first Belgian visit report, for instance, the 
nothing more than a concrete block with 4 metal bars to which shackles might be attached, and a 
toilet); France (Martinique) I, paras 81-3 (regarding disciplinary cells viewed at the centre penitentiaire 
de Fort-de-France in July 1994, seemingly furnished with nothing more than an Asian-style toilet and, 
at night, a mattress); and Bulgaria I, paras 164-5 (regarding cells seen in the "totally unacceptable" 
disciplinary unit of Stara Zagora Prison, in March/April 1995). 
202 See Ireland I, para 153. 
203 See Luxembourg II, para 53. 204 See Portugal II, paras 162,164 (2" indent) and 186; and, similarly, Norway I, para 123; and Ireland 
I, paras 151 and 153. 
209 See, e. g., Hungary I, paras 132 and 133 (1" indent); and Bulgaria 1, paras 163-5. 
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Committee wrote of its delegation's encounter, in November 1993, with a detainee 
sentenced to three days' isolation in one (of two) punishment cells located in the 
maison d'arret at Lantin Prison, which measure had been immediately preceded by his 
placement for some five days in a so-called "bare" cell. Of particular concern to the 
delegation, it seems, was the detainee's complaint that on being placed in the isolation 
cell, he had not been furnished with a clean cover. 206 His further complaints that he 
had been obliged to wear the same prison clothes since first being placed in the bare 
cell and of his being denied a shower for a week were also considered noteworthy. 207 
The visiting delegation itself observed that he was "forced to eat in conditions 
of extreme insalubrity", that he had been provided with no toothbrush, and that, for 
the purposes of washing, he had been furnished merely with a small basin of cold 
water. 208 It was directly from this environment, it discovered, that the detainee had 
been transferred to the Palais de Justice to appear before the juge d'instruction. 209 
Commenting on its delegations' findings, the CPT remarked that: 
"... to detain a person in such conditions and, in addition, not to allow him to 
present himself suitably to a magistrate, constitutes degrading treatment"210 
It went on to request that the Belgian authorities "see to it" that the detainee's 
experience is not repeated. 211 In the identification of CPT standards on the 
segregation of detainees for punishment purposes, therefore, it may be argued that the 
various features of detention about which the detainee at Lantin complained or which 
206 See Belgium I, para 232. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
210 Ibid. According to the CPT, Belgian law provides that detainees required to appear before a judge 
may wear their own clothes or, if this is not appropriate, "decent" clothing furnished by the 
establishment in which they are detained. 
2" Ibid. The (alleged) practice of placing detainees for several days in "bare" - or "reflection" - cells 
prior to their placement in a punishment cell was also raised by the CPT with the Belgian authorities: 
idem, para 237. 
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were observed directly by the visiting delegation in 1993 ought not to obtain, in its 
view, in cells used for punishment purposes. 
The segregation regime 
Introduction 
The CPT, as we have seen, is prepared to countenance a lower quality of regime in 
respect of detainees segregated for disciplinary reasons than in respect of detainees 
segregated on other grounds. 212 More generally, however, its precepts on isolation 
regimes may be said to be predicated on the principle that, as distinct from the issue 
of material conditions of detention: 
"... in reality 
... 
the very sense of isolation will inevitably limit, if not exclude, 
the participation of [isolated] detainees in ordinary regime activities". 213 
This view was proffered to the French authorities in an effort, it seems, to temper their 
laudable ambition 
- 
as expressed, inter alia, in the country's Code de Procedure 
Penale 
- 
that persons segregated in French prisons ought to benefit from an 
"ordinary" prison regime. 214 Indeed, the CPT's own observations in the country in 
late 1991, it remarked, had merely "confirmed" the impracticable nature of this 
particular provision. 
At the other extreme, equally unsustainable is a regime whose practical 
application results in an almost complete denial of activities for segregated detainees. 
In Switzerland, in February 1996 (as in 1991), for example, a delegation found that 
regime activities for isolated inmates at the Berne regional prison were so 
impoverished that the "large majority" of them were compelled to remain confined to 
212 See above, pp 406-9. 
213 See France I, para 142 (emphasis added). 214 Ibid. 
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cells for weeks, even months. 215 Acknowledging that the prison's physical 
configuration was such as to limit the development of sophisticated activities for 
prisoners, the CPT was, "[n]evertheless, " emphatically of the view that: 
"... security considerations do not constitute a sufficient reason to deprive 
detainees of any form of activityi216 
As to the balance to be struck between the positions adopted by the Committee in its 
French and Swiss visit reports, it has recommended on one occasion that, in imposing 
restrictions on detainees, the competent authority should: 
"... make every effort to specify as precisely as possible the scope of the 
restrictions imposed (they should be tailored to the circumstances of each 
particular case)... "217 
It is important, for example, that in restricting a detainee's contact with others, the 
persons with whom the detainee may not communicate are clearly specified. If this is 
not done, the Committee has pointed out, then the detainee may be rendered, to all 
intents and purposes, subject to an (unnecessary) total communication ban 218 
Types of restriction 
Although we are principally concerned with the question of the solitary confinement 
of detainees, it is worth noting that recourse to isolation represents just one 
- 
albeit 
the most extreme 
- 
restrictive measure among a number which may be applied to 
detainees, with or without their consent. Other restrictions to which, in the experience 
of the CPT, detainees may be subject, include the prohibition 
- 
or, at least, the 
213 See Switzerland II, para 61. 216 Ibid. 
217 See Norway II, para 36 (2°d indent). 
21' Ideen, pars 33. 
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supervision 
- 
of visits, correspondence and telephone calls, save for visits, 
correspondence and telephone calls involving a "public authority" or (public) defence 
lawyer. In addition, they may be denied access to newspapers, radio and television 
and may have conditions attached to their association entitlements (such as requiring 
the prior consent of the authorities). Further, all such restrictions may be regarded as 
applying to particular segregated persons (such as remand prisoners) or segregated 
persons in general 219 As to restrictions on particular regime activities, in addition to 
the curbing 
- 
or even complete denial 
- 
of opportunities for association, custodial 
authorities may seek, inter alia, to limit participation in group work or leisure 
activities or to restrict or suspend outdoor exercise entitlement. 220 
While stipulating the kinds of restriction which may legitimately be applied to 
persons deprived of their liberty, domestic legislation may also circumscribe the 
extent to which the detaining authorities are free to impose them. One such limitation 
we have already met: namely, the duty not to impede written and oral communication 
between a detainee and, inter alia, his lawyer. 221 Others referred to in CPT visit 
reports include prohibitions against restricting detainees' hygiene, health, food and 
clothing requirements, access to personal effects 
- 
provided that security is not 
compromised thereby 
- 
books, periodicals and radios, religious freedom and 
entitlements to outdoor exercise and close family visits 222 
Tailoring the restriction to the detainee 
Some national authorities have determined that in the application of restrictions, 
219 See, e. g., Norway I, para 58 (and, similarly, Norway II, paras 22 and 31); Sweden I, App III, para 
12 and main report, para 63; and Denmark I, App 2, para 11. 
° See, e. g., Germany I, App III, para 14. 22' See above, pp 78 and 82. 222 See Italy I, para 146. These limitations, as provided for in Italian law in 1992, were "welcome[d]" 
by the CPT. 
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account should be taken of the category of detainee to which they are to be applied. 
They consider that it may be inappropriate to impose certain restrictions on certain 
types of detainee. In 1990, in the Netherlands, for example, a number of "reinforced 
security units" (or "EBIs") was established, each intended to accommodate a small 
number of prisoners considered to represent an "extremely high escape risk" or 
"pronounced management and control problems". At the same time, a so-called 
"carrousel system" was introduced, under which occupants of the units were 
transferred from one EBI to another every six months. The regime applicable in all 
such units was said to be a "normal restricted group" regime. 23 
One year later, however, the Dutch prison authorities determined that it was 
"unwise to hold prisoners with such widely different characteristics in the same units" 
since the approach required in respect of prisoners representing an extremely high 
escape risk "could not be identical to that required for hard-to-control prisoners, who 
needed more individualised treatment". Consequently, "different, smaller units, in 
theory subject to an individualised, highly structured, restricted group regime" were 
established in order to accommodate the latter category of detainee. 224 
Restrictions designed to act as incentives to good behaviour 
One of the most interesting systems of restrictions thus far examined by the CPT was 
that operating at HM Young Offender Institution and Remand Centre, Feltham, 
England, when visited in May 1994. Although characterised by the authorities as a 
"(g)eneralised incentive scheme", the establishment's so-called "points and levels" 
system was, it appears, little more than a highly intricate disciplinary regime. Having 
m See Netherlands I, para 66. 224 Idem, para 67. 
431 
heard concerns about its operation "from a number of sources", the visiting delegation 
was minded to examine it "particularly closely" ?5 
Inmates subject to the system were classified according to one of five levels, 
each level connoting a different regime. Level 3 represented the "starting" 
- 
or 
"observation" 
- 
level, applicable to all newly arrived inmates. Under it, detainees 
were entitled to two hours out-of-cell time a day, "for recreation, sport, etc". 226 
Promotion to a higher level depended on the acquisition of a certain number of points 
(awarded for satisfactory behaviour) in any one week; poor conduct resulted in 
demotion to a lower level. The number of points awarded was "based entirely on the 
judgement of the staff in each unit, who were responsible for assessing inmates' 
conduct". 227 
The visiting delegation was "particularly concerned" by the regime applicable 
to inmates "downgraded" to level 1, both in the "ordinary" units and in one particular 
unit used to accommodate identified bullies. 228 In the ordinary units, inmates subject 
to a level 1 regime would be: 
"... confined to their cells, alone, for up to 23 hours a day, with only in-cell 
activities [to occupy them]: reading, writing, listening to the radio and 
education (if the individual concerned was still of compulsory school age). 
All forms of group activity, such as sport, recreation and games were 
prohibited. However, the inmates were authorised to receive visits. One hour 
of activity was allowed per day within the unit; this hour had to be devoted to 
cleaning the cell, showering and making authorised telephone calls. The cells 
were inspected daily. 
225 See UK III, pars 132. 
226 Idem, para 133. 
227 Ibid. 
223 Ibid. 
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"This situation... could last for up to three weeks, at the end of which the 
young person was either moved up to a high level or returned to the admission 
unit with a view to being transferred to another unit". 229 
The regime to which identified bullies were subject was very similar. It was "very 
restrictive" and might obtain for a considerable period of time. A stay of five weeks 
was considered to be the minimum period necessary to pass from levels 1 to 3. At the 
time of the visit, one detainee had been subject to such a regime for three months (the 
remaining six detainees, for periods ranging from two months to a few days). Some 
had spent time in the unit previously. 230 
In addition to spending up to 23 hours a day confined to their cells, occupants 
of the unit were obliged to wear prison clothes. Further, those subject to a level 1 
regime were permitted to keep two books in their cell; those at level 2, four books; 
and those at level 3, six. Detainees promoted to level 2 were permitted to keep 
objects like a portable radio and cassettes. At levels 2 and 3, detainees were 
authorised to work in their cells 
- 
"dismantling headphones for an airline" 
- 
or to 
clean and tidy the unit outside the cells. At level 3, sporting activities were possible. 
Basic toiletries, such as soap and shampoo, were rationed according to the level231 
Each inmate in the unit was permitted one hour's activity per day: a compulsory half 
hour for the cleaning of cells (which, as we have seen, were inspected daily) and 
showering; and a half hour's outdoor exercise in a yard "surrounded by a high wall", 
which yard had been designed to accommodate high security prisoners. 232 As for 
opportunities to make contact with other persons, inmates were authorised to receive 
22' Ideen, para 134. 
230 Idem, para 135. 
231 Idem, para 136. 
232 Ibid. 
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visits and make telephone calls, "subject to prior approval". Otherwise, human 
contacts were "very limited. Although each inmate was allocated a prison officer to 
advise him, the latter only intervened when requested to do so by the inmate. As a 
result, human contacts were mainly confined to contacts with the unit's staff, when 
cells were being inspected or inmates were taken out of their cells". 233 
Life for identified bullies, the CPT concluded, was "very militaristic" 234 
Indeed, it suggested, each one of them (like persons held at level 1 in the ordinary 
units) was subject to a regime "akin to... solitary confinement". 235 Any detainee 
forced to submit to such a regime for any length of time (i. e. from "several 
weeks... [to] several months"), it insisted, could not be said to have obtained 
"appropriate" mental and physical stimulation. 236 
Commenting generally on the provision of "generalised incentive schemes" in 
juvenile detention centres like that operating at Feltham, the Committee has 
proceeded cautiously, averring, without indicating approval or disapproval, that: 
"[i]t is not for the CPT to express a view on the socio-educative value of such 
schemes. However, it pays particularly close attention to the content of the 
base-level regime being offered to juveniles subject to such schemes, and to 
whether the manner in which they may progress (and regress) within a given 
scheme includes adequate safeguards against arbitrary decision-making by 
staff' 237 
The CPT's prevarication on the value of rewards-based schemes is surprising. For, it 
is very unlikely to consider that they should be premised exclusively on the need to 
233 Idem, pars 137. 
234 Ibid. 
p5 Idem pars 138. 236 Ibid. On the desirability of such stimulation in the CPT's recommended segregation regime, see 
below, p 440. 
237 See 9`s GR, para 32. 
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provide incentives to good behaviour and to punish poor behaviour. It may be that it 
considers that they should possess some other, objectively justifiable merit, like an 
educative or re-socialising purpose, something which is hinted at, but left 
undeveloped in the remarks just quoted. 
State party efforts to justify the imposition of restrictions 
The rationale behind the application of restrictive regimes was succinctly summarised 
in the provisions of a circular in force at Peterhead Prison, Scotland, when visited, 
like Feltham, in May 1994. Circular 79/1993 (pertaining to the different entitlements 
of various categories of segregated detainee) provides that: 
"the `quality of life' within [Peterhead's disruptive/dangerous prisoners unit] 
will be positioned so as to be more attractive than [its] separate [punishment] 
cells unit, but less than mainstream prisons so as not to provide a disincentive 
for return". 238 
Like the application of the "points and levels" system at Feltham, therefore, this 
provision suggests that some prison authorities view a restricted prison regime as just 
one 
- 
carefully conceived 
- 
part of a "quality of life" continuum. At its most austere, 
the continuum may be represented by the spartan lifestyle applied, inter alia, to 
punished prisoners; at its most congenial, by the basic (or optimum) conditions 
provided for on "normal" location. Progression along the continuum may be 
considered to be a matter of incentive, a desire to escape austerity for relative 
comfort. 239 
238 See UK III, para 326. 
239 See, in the same connection, Iceland II, paras 60-3 (regarding the regime obtaining in the `drug-free 
unit' at Litla Hraun State Prison in 1998. Interestingly, the CPT called for the establishment of a "clear 
and formal procedure" to guide the movement of prisoners between categories of regime); and para 128 (regarding the "grading system" in operation at the Studlar Diagnostic and Treatment Centre for 
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Consequences of exposure to a solitary confinement-type regime 
- 
Effects on detainees generally 
The possible and perceived effects on detainees of placement in conditions akin to 
solitary confinement have already been considered in some detail. 40 In addition, it 
may be worth considering, more specifically, the possible effects of particular 
segregation regimes (rather than, say, material conditions of detention or lengths of 
isolation). A most striking illustration of such effects may be found in the 
Committee's first Danish visit report. Therein, referring to the judicially-authorised 
practice of isolating persons remanded in custody in the course of a criminal 
investigation, the CPT stated that a "unanimous complaint" of the prisoners met in 
December 1990 concerned the "harshness" of the regime of "total isolation" imposed 
on them. These complaints had been "corroborated by statements from other 
interested circles (doctors, prison nursing staff, other prison staff, lawyers, non- 
governmental organisations etc)". Such a regime, the Committee felt: 
66 
... 
could ultimately lead to the individual's psychological destruction". 241 
A detainee subject to this regime would be "locked up in his cell for up to 23 hours 
out of 24". He would be allowed one hour's open air exercise a day, "still in 
isolation", but, "[n]o form of activity with other prisoners... " Consequently, "[a]part 
from contacts with... prison staff' 
- 
said by members of staff themselves, to be "few 
and far between... because of the pressure of... work" 
- 
and "some" contacts with the 
prison chaplain and "instructor, " an isolated detainee would be effectively "cut off 
from any direct human contact". Even attendance at religious services 
- 
"including at 
Juveniles); and Luxembourg H, Para 20 (regarding the "systeme de cotation" in place in the country's Centres Socio-Educatifs de l'Etat in 1997). 
2'0 See above, p 391 et seg. 241 See Denmark I. Para 24. 
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Christmas time" 
- 
it was alleged, would be forbidden. 242 A detainee's correspondence 
and visits would be "subject to authorisation and supervision by the police 
authorities" (with the exception of visits from his legal advisor) 
- 
restrictions which 
were "apparently very frequently applied... [might] even be continued after the period 
of solitary confinement ha[d] ended" and were said to be "particularly resented" by 
detainees. Authorised visits would take place "either in... prison in the presence of a 
prison warder, or at [a] police station in the presence of a police officer". "[S]everal" 
complaints were heard regarding the "infrequency" of such visits, of which two 
examples were given: one in which just four visits had been authorised over a four 
month period of isolation; and one in which fortnightly half-hour visits over a period 
of five months had been permitted. 243 
Having visited prisoners serving life sentences in the Netherlands Antilles in 
1994, the CPT concluded that such persons were vulnerable to a similar psychological 
effect to that evinced by detainees in Denmark. Under the relevant legislation, life 
sentence prisoners would be "placed in specially designated facilities and... would 
44 have no contact with other prisoners" 2 Although, in material terms, the four 
prisoners subject to such restrictions encountered at Koraal Specht Prison, the 
Committee noted in its visit report, "could be considered to have a privileged status 
within the sentenced prisoners' section", 245 the regime to which they were subject was 
"very restrictive". Their "lack of physical mobility, " it appears, was "particularly 
striking". 246 In this respect, although cell doors in the special unit remained open 
between the hours of 7 am and 6 pm, "in principle, " the Committee stated, the four 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. 
244 See Netherlands (NA) I, para 90 (quoting section 53 of decree No. 18 of 1958). 243 Notwithstanding the fact that their sanitary facilities "left much to be desired". 246 Idem, para 92. 
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prisoners "never left the unit, " other than to take delivery of meals or objects ordered 
from the prison canteen. "On rare occasions", they might leave it and watch 
television in a comer of the courtyard located in the sentenced prisoners' section. 
Their own exercise, however, was taken within their unit in an area "completely 
surrounded by bars". They were offered no work or other form of activity 
- 
though 
the prison management had permitted two of them to begin work in the prison 
kitchen. The remaining two "spent their days reading, listening to the radio or playing 
board games with other inmates of the sentenced prisoners' section, through the bars 
separating the unit from the rest of the section". 47 In the view of the CPT: 
"[h]aving regard, inter alia, to the length and indeterminate nature of their 
sentence, the conditions of detention of the prisoners in the life-sentence unit, 
particularly those who did not work, could be considered to be inhuman; 
they involved an appreciable risk of deterioration of the mental state of those 
prisoners and effects of a psychosomatic nature". 248 
- 
Consequences for the custodial environment 
While the principal concern of the CPT in the present connection is the welfare of the 
detainee subject to restrictions, it has also demonstrated an acute awareness of the 
damage that may be wrought by the application of isolation regimes, both on the 
custodial environment generally and an establishment's internal atmosphere in 
particular. For instance, at the Kopenick Detention Centre for Foreigners, Germany, 
in April 1996, a delegation observed that: 
247 Idem, paras 90-91. 248 Idem, para 92 (original emphasis). Psychosomatic effects were apparent, too, in Portlaoise Prison, 
Ireland, in 1998, where interviews with the six occupants of the special unit revealed "a consistent 
association of psychological symptoms which appeared to have been induced by the regime". The 
"symptom profile" displayed by the prisoners, it was noted in the subsequent visit report, comprised 
"aggressive behaviour directed against self and others, regressive behaviour (withdrawal from social 
interaction), and difficulties in verbal expression (logorrhoea)". Further, two of the inmates manifested 
"depressive tendencies", as well as disturbed concentration and confusion: see Ireland II, para 91. 
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"[t]he high degree of security... justified by concerns about escapes, suicides 
and self-mutilation... had a bearing upon the tense atmosphere observed. 
Security measures had an oppressive effect on daily life: detainees only had 
items which were strictly necessary in their dormitories [with the result that 
items like shoelaces, belts and watches were confiscated] and were obliged to 
ask members of staff to deal with even the simplest requests (e. g. gaining 
access to their personal effects, boiling a kettle, opening a window, lighting a 
cigarette). Inevitably, this situation caused friction: detainees were annoyed 
and frustrated and the staff were irked by incessant requests, feeling that they 
had been relegated to the role of 'dogsbodies"'. 49 
While detainees at Kopenick were not, strictly speaking isolated, the kind of 
restrictions to which they were subject may be considered akin to those which might 
conceivably be applied to anyone so detained. Indeed, the findings of an internal 
study into the Centre's future, carried out prior to the CPT visit, appeared to show that 
the authorities were very much aware of this fact, for the study "warned against the 
dangers of conflating the security measures inherent in all places of detention with 
those required for prisoners considered to be dangerous". 25° 
A quite different effect to that reported at Kopenick appears to have been 
occasioned by the application of restrictions to inmates at Kronoberg Remand Prison, 
Sweden, at the time of the CPT's visit in 1994. There, the 45% of the remand 
population to whom restrictions were applied were said to have enjoyed out-of-cell 
time (excluding outdoor exercise) of no more than three to four hours a week. 
249 See Germany II, paras 53 and 69. 
250 Ibid. 
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Consequently, despite a total prison population of approximately 250, the prison, it 
was observed, remained "eerily silent... at most times of the day". 251 
General principles on isolation regimes 
An oft-cited consideration which may be said to underpin every CPT precept on the 
regime activities to which, in its view, segregated detainees should be entitled is one 
which, it has asserted, is "generally acknowledged, " namely, that: 
"... all forms of solitary confinement without appropriate mental and physical 
stimulation are likely, in the long term, to have damaging effects, resulting in 
deterioration of mental faculties and social abilities". 252 
This principle has been re-stated and refined in the light of experience. To the Polish 
authorities in 1998, for example, the Committee highlighted the "greater risk of 
inhuman treatment than in the case of the average prisoner" which is occasioned by 
the imposition of a solitary confinement-type regime. 253 Accordingly, it counselled 
the taking of "considerable care" in applying restrictions. 254 To the Hungarian 
authorities, it has indicated the "dangers inherent in this area" by reference to 
paragraphs 40 and 43 of the Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R 
(82) 17 of the Committee of Ministers, 255 the contents of which were considered 
earlier. 256 Lastly, to the UK authorities, it has suggested that these dangers are "even 
Actuated by principles like greater in the case of juveniles and young adults"257 
u" See Sweden II, para 19. 
252 See, e. g., Finland I, para 73; and, similarly, Portugal I, para 68; and Slovakia I, para 137. 253 See Poland I, para 145. 
u` See, similarly, UK IV, para 156 (regarding the impoverished regime to which certain prisoners 
segregated for reasons of good order and security were subject in the Isle of Man Prison, when visited 
in 1997; "great care must be taken', the Committee stated, "to counter the negative effects of such a 
situation'). 
us See Hungary I, para 136. 
256 See above, p 391. 
25' See UK III, para 138; and, more generally, below, p 470. 
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these, the CPT has determined that the regime activities to which all segregated 
detainees are, in its view, entitled should comprise, in essence: 
"... purposeful activities and appropriate human contact". 258 
These features are important, it believes: 
"... in order to counteract the effects of being placed in solitary 
confinement" 259 
This skeletal basic precept has been developed over time 
- 
though, not always 
helpfully. To the Norwegian authorities, for example, the Committee has suggested 
that the activities and human contact which it is seeking to foster should be made 
available to prisoners who have been or it is envisaged will be, subject to restrictions 
"for extended periods". 260 Precisely what the CPT means by the term "extended 
periods" and what, if any, kinds of activities and human contact it feels ought to be 
made available to persons subject to restrictions for less than such periods was not 
made clear in its observations. Indeed, it may be significant in this connection that in 
reiterating its recommendation in its second Norwegian visit report, published some 
three years after its first, the Committee made no reference to this temporal 
contingency. 261 
Also to the Norwegian authorities, having learned, in March 1997, that the 
treatment of detainees subject to restrictions at Bergen Prison was neither guided by 
"clear directives or policy" nor co-ordinated by prison management 
- 
with the result 
251 See, e. g., Finland I, paras 112 and 241 and 168 and 244; France I, pars 142; and Switzerland I, paras 
52 (5"' indent) and 148. 
259 See Denmark II, para 61; and, similarly, Germany I, paras 104 and 216 (wherein the CPT noted that 
the isolation regime obtaining in the establishments visited in 1991 "[did] not provide the stimulation 
required to avert damaging changes in [detainees'] social and mental faculties"). ý0 See Norway I, paras 65 (3`f indent) and 143. 261 See Norway H, para 19. Some commentators have suggested that in formulating segregation 
regimes, compensating out-of-cell activities should be provided "in proportion to the level of 
restrictions to which prisoners are subject": see Morgan and Evans (1999), pp 56-7. 
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that the provision of regime activities tended to depend very much on the initiative of 
personnel 
- 
the CPT called for, inter alia, greater co-operation among staff. 262 In this 
way, it clearly hoped, the activities and human contact afforded might be rendered 
more meaningful. 
As to the particularities of the CPT's basic precept, a study of its published 
work to date yields the following efforts at elaboration: 
(i) "purposeful activities" 
It is the Committee's view that: 
"[t]he existence of a satisfactory programme of activities is just as important 
- 
if not more so 
- 
in a [segregation] unit than on normal location. It can do 
much to counter the deleterious effects upon a prisoner's personality of living 
in the bubble-like atmosphere of such a unit". 263 
At the same time, however, it is prepared to accept that "it is far from easy to offer a 
programme of activities to inmates... kept segregated from other inmates"? M 
Attempting to balance these concerns, isolated prisoners, it considers: 
"... should, within the confines of their... detention unit, enjoy a relatively 
relaxed regime... [be] allowed to move without restriction within what is likely 
to be a relatively small physical space; [be] granted a good deal of choice 
about activities, etc. ) by way of compensation for their [more] severe custodial 
. 
situation"265 
262 Idem, paras 24 and 38. As to the significance of a lack of directives or policy in respect of the 
regulation of segregation measures, see below, p 45 1. 
See Poland I, para 145; and, in the same connection, Netherlands II, para 61. The CPT, it should be 
noted, made this observation in the context of its analysis of the detention in both countries of 
"dangerous" prisoners. However, many of the precepts which flow from it may be considered equally 
plicable, it is submitted, in respect of the seclusion of other categories of detainee. See Netherlands II, para 98. 
26' See Poland I, para 145; Netherlands II, para 61; and, similarly, Ireland II, para 89. Again, the Committee's assertion related to the seclusion of "dangerous" prisoners. 
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As far as the activities themselves are concerned, these, the Committee believes, 
should be "as diverse as possible 5266 and 
- 
self-evidently 
- 
"stimulating" 267 They 
should comprise "work, preferably with vocational value; education; sport and 
recreation"268 Where necessary, it maintains, out-of-cell time should be "increased" 
in order to accommodate such variety. 269 Further, such activities, it has stated, should 
be "adapted" where necessary, 270 a feature which, until the Committee offers further 
elaboration, conceivably requires either that the range of activities provided be 
flexible (i. e. be able to accommodate changes in the prison environment) or, perhaps, 
that they be tailored to the particular needs of the individual detainee concerned. 
Where detainees have been segregated on account of their poor behaviour and 
attitude, their programme of activities, the CPT has recommended, should be such as 
to "enabl[e] them to demonstrate the progress required for reintegration into an 
ordinary detention unit-j. 271 
- 
The importance of outdoor exercise 
Of particular importance in any programme of activities afforded persons subject to a 
restricted regime is, the CPT maintains, the provision of appropriate outdoor exercise. 
As early as its 2d General Report, it sought to "emphasise that all prisoners without 
exception (including those undergoing cellular confinement as a punishment) should 
be offered the possibility to take outdoor exercise daily". 272 This entitlement, it 
considers, constitutes "a minimum fundamental guarantee" ; 273 its absence from any 
2" Ibid. See, similarly, UK III, para 356 and Netherlands (NA) I, para 98,2nd indent ("varied"). 267 See Cyprus II, paras 63 and 108. 268 See UK III, para 356; and Netherlands (NA) I, para 98 (2' indent). Interestingly, this precept 
closely resembles that promulgated by the CPT in respect of detainees held on "normal" location: see, 
inter alia, 2°d GR, para 47. 
269 UK III, para 356. 
270 See Italy I, pars 140. 
271 See Slovakia I, paras 101 (2°d indent) and 191. m See 2d GR, para 48 (original emphasis). Provision for "every" prisoner to benefit from outdoor 
exercise is also made in Rule 86, EPR. 273 See Belgium II, pars 188. 
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restricted regime is, accordingly, "unacceptable". 274 The Committee has offered the 
same opinion in a variety of ways on occasions since. 275 
The duration of such daily exercise, it has stated, should be "a minimum of 
one hour"'. 276 and it should take place "in areas sufficiently large to enable [detainees] 
to exert themselves physically". 277 It is worth noting in this last connection that it is 
the general view of the CPT that "[i]t is... axiomatic that outdoor exercise facilities 
should be reasonably spacious and whenever possible offer shelter from inclement 
weather' . 278 
- 
The provision of suitable reading material 
Like the entitlement to outdoor exercise, that of access to suitable reading material is 
regarded by the CPT as crucial to the well-being of segregated persons. All prisoners 
held in seclusion cells, it considers, "[should] have access to reading matter" 279 The 
reading material provided, it has stated, should be "varied". 280 It need hardly be 
stated that the provision of appropriate reading material is particularly important when 
the isolated detainee is a minor. 291 
- 
Work activities 
In a reference to the kind of work activities to which, in its view, prisoners subject to 
274 See Luxembourg II, para 33. 
275 See, e. g., Turkey I, pars 160 (cfTurkish penal practice in 1997). 
276 See Netherlands II, para 98. In 1997, isolated remand prisoners at the King Willem II Detention 
Centre for Foreigners, the CPT learned, enjoyed a mere half hour outdoor exercise daily, the remaining 
23.5 hours being spent in-cell. 
Z" Ibid. At the Detention Centre in 1997, exercise took place in "a small metal cage". See also 
Belgium II, para 202,2°d. indent (regarding the "sometimes sordid" conditions in which segregated 
detainees' outdoor exercise was found to take place at Lantin, Saint-Gilles and Mons Prisons in 1997 
(para 201)); and, similarly, France III, para 155. 
273 See 2" GR, para 48. 
2" See Netherlands (NA) I, para 114 (cf practice in the men's disciplinary unit at Koraal Specht Prison 
in 1994); and now Netherlands (NA) II, para 37. 
280 See Hungary I, para 134. In 1994, the only reading material permitted detainees subject to a 
disciplinary regime at Budapest Remand Prison was the Bible (see similarly Germany I, pars 160). By 
contrast, at Tokol Prison disciplined detainees could borrow books from the prison library. 281 See, e. g., Portugal U, paras 164 and 186; Turkey I, pars 125; and Poland I, 167. 
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a special security regime (i. e. dangerous or violent prisoners) in the Netherlands were 
entitled when visited in 1997, the CPT observed in its second Dutch visit report 
that: 
"... it is clear that security considerations may preclude many types of work 
activities which are found on normal prison location. Nevertheless, this 
should not mean that only work of a tedious nature is provided for 
prisoners... "282 
In this respect, it referred to the terms of paragraph 87 of the Explanatory 
Memorandum to Recommendation No. R (82) 17 of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe, which lists a number of activities that may be considered both 
"uniquely suitable for reinforced security units, and satisfying for prisoners". 
Although more immediately relevant to the regimes considered appropriate for 
dangerous detainees or those considered an escape risk, the Committee's remarks 
deserve to be mentioned here, it is submitted, since the same considerations may be 
held to apply, mutatis mutandis, in the seclusion of other categories of detainee. 
(ii) "human contact' 
In order to be "appropriate", contact with others, it may be inferred from CPT visit 
reports, should comprise more than that which is inherent (and necessary) in every 
custodial environment (i. e. more than just contact with staff 
- 
inter alia, during 
routine inspections, on distributing food and on removal from cells for washing and 
exercise purposes 
- 
and visits from relatives and/or lawyers). 283 Indeed, even 
282 See Netherlands II, para 61. On the regime which obtained at the time of the visit, see para 62 of the 
reort. In the same connection, see Poland I, para 145; and Ireland II, para 89. 28' See Germany I, para 76; Luxembourg I, para 50; and Belgium II, para 201. The provision of 
enhanced human contact is, of course, critically important when the segregation of detainees for 
extended periods is in the contemplation of the authorities, e. g. following the isolation of high security 
or dangerous prisoners or the prolonged detention of persons on remand. 
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detainees who eschew human contact should be encouraged to develop it, it seems. 
Visiting Peterhead Prison, Scotland, in May 1994, for instance, the CPT met one 
prisoner who had been solitarily confined in a unit built specifically for him since 
1978. Without, apparently, showing much regard for his wishes to remain isolated 
and notwithstanding his "very good" material conditions of detention, "interesting" 
regime and apparent "genuine... content[ment]", the CPT said of the fact that his only 
human contact was with the unit's staff that efforts should be made "to provide 
[him]... with an enhanced range of appropriate human contact". 284 
Clearly, in the view of the CPT, every segregated detainee 
- 
including persons 
perceived to be dangerous or deserving of a high security classification 
- 
should, in 
principle, enjoy what it regards as suitable contact with others, even if the detainee 
concerned appears not to be troubled by or even to court isolation. Such contact, the 
Committee believes, may be guaranteed in any one of a number of ways: 
(i) by granting isolated detainees the freedom to associate with other persons held in 
the same segregation unit, 285 by way of inter alia enhanced opportunities for group- 
oriented work and exercise (so far as such opportunities are compatible with the 
increased constraints inevitably occasioned by the act of separation); 286 
(ii) by the deployment of additional personne1287 (by which the CPT means, 
presumably, not merely custodial staff, but also social workers, activities' organisers, 
prison visitors and even medical and psychiatric staff); 
2" See UK III, paras 328 and 332. 
283 Ideen, pare 356. See also Poland I, para 145; and Netherlands II, para 61 (regarding the separation of 
`dangerous' prisoners). 
286 See Switzerland II, pars 84. 
237 See Norway II, pare 24. 
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(iii) (where only a small number of detainees may be isolated at any one time), by 
inviting detainees from elsewhere in the establishment to take part, voluntarily, in 
activities organised for those segregated. 288 
As far as staff-inmate relations in seclusion units are concerned, "[s]pecial 
efforts", the CPT believes, "should be made to develop a good internal 
atmosphere 
... 
The aim should be to build positive relations between staff and 
prisoners. This is in the interests not only of the humane treatment of the unit's 
occupants but also of the maintenance of effective control and security and of staff 
safety". 289 Consequently, in a reflection of its views on the qualities required of staff 
obliged to use force or measures of restraint against detainees, it has suggested that 
"[s]uccess in this area requires that the staff assigned to work in such units must be 
very carefully chosen. They should be appropriately trained, possess highly 
developed communication skills and have a genuine commitment to working in a 
more than usually challenging environments 290 Further, in the development of 
appropriate staff-inmate relations in segregation units, it is important, the CPT 
believes, that there be direct contact between staff and prisoners. Accordingly, it is 
critical of situations in which there is "scarcely any" such contact, particularly where 
what contact there is takes place through screens or grills, or where inmates remain 
strictly separated from staff even during activities such as education and sport. 291 
288 See Norway I, para 73. 
2' See Poland I, para 145; and Netherlands II, para 61. (In this respect, compare findings in the 
Netherlands in 1992, when staff attitudes in one seclusion unit visited were "markedly 
antagonistic... indeed... openly contemptuous" (Netherlands I, pars 85), with those in 1997, when 
relations were "much improved... informal and evidently relaxed... foster[ing] a much more positive 
atmosphere" (Netherlands 11, para 44)). See also Ireland II4 para 89. 290 See Poland I, para 145; and Ireland II, pars 89. 29' See Spain VI, para 68 (regarding the situation observed in the special units at both Jaen and Madrid 
V Prisons in 1998. In addition, it was noted, there was little, if any, direct contact during medical 
consultations, as well as during interviews with the director and other senior staff. However, the 
situation in the establishments' closed units was, it seems, "somewhat better": idem, para 69). 
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The human dimension of solitary confinement has been considered by the 
CPT in other ways, too. For instance, the configuration of cells, it considers, should 
not be such as to limit human contact. In Straubing Prison, Germany, in December 
1991, cells set aside for solitary confinement, a visiting delegation noted, with 
interest, were "so designed that from within... no human contact with other prisoners 
was possible. Once inside... with all the doors closed, prisoners could not hear any of 
the usual prison sounds". 292 Located at the intersection of the wings of a building and 
reached through a door opening on to a corridor (which served as a form of 
antechamber and contained showers), two segregation cells were located in each 
corridor. "In principle, " the CPT observed subsequently, "there were no guards in the 
corridors and the occupants of the cells had no opportunities for visual or other forms 
of sensory contact with other prisoners or prison officers". "Thus", it concluded, 
"apart from intermittent dealings with staff and occasional visits from relatives or 
lawyers, these prisoners were effectively isolated from all forms of human contact". 293 
Clearly, the inappropriate location and design of isolation cells (as well as the 
manner in which they are staffed), are matters of some concern to the CPT since they 
vitiate something which it considers crucial to the humane segregation of detainees: 
that is to say, the need for contact with others. 
General responsibilities of the custodial authorities 
Although all precepts identifiable in the work of the CPT in the present connection by 
definition create responsibilities for detaining authorities, most of them relate to 
specific aspects of the isolation regime. For our purposes, therefore, they maybe 
m see Germany I, para 75. 293 Ibid. 
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dealt with discretely, in sections devoted, inter alia, to the contents of the isolation 
regime, safeguards applicable in its application and ways in which the differing needs 
of segregated detainees may be catered for. At the same time, however, a number of 
general responsibilities may be identified which defy categorisation. By way of 
supplementing the present examination of CPT precepts on the particularities of 
isolation regimes, therefore, we shall briefly consider its views on the role of the 
custodial authorities generally in the segregation of detainees. 
- 
Duty to provide guidance to personnel involved in the isolation of detainees 
To the Danish authorities, regarding the rather controversial practice of (almost 
routinely) segregating remand prisoners for the purposes of a criminal 
investigation, 294 the CPT suggested, in its first visit report, that: 
"... the police be given detailed instructions as regards recourse to 
prohibitions/restrictions concerning prisoners' correspondence and visits... "295 
- 
Contents of segregation regimes to be expressly stated 
If authorities are to furnish staff involved in the isolation of detainees with "detailed 
instructions", then, logically, one of the most important pieces of information that 
may be provided concerns the content of segregation regimes. It may be speculated 
that it was this kind of consideration which prompted the CPT, in the wake of its visit 
to the segregation unit 
- 
"apparently used for both disciplinary confinement and other 
segregation purposes"296 
- 
at Korydallos Men's Prison in 1993, to recommend to the 
Greek authorities that: 
294 See, generally, above, p 380. 295 See Denmark I, pars 29 (4t` indent). 296 See Greece I, para 133. 
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"... the respective regimes applicable... to persons held in the... unit be 
expressly laid down". 297 
- 
Different regimes ought to be conceived for different categories of segregated 
detainee 
One obvious reason why the regimes to which isolated detainees are subject ought, in 
the view of the CPT, to be "expressly laid down" is to avoid confusion 
- 
especially 
where, as at Korydallos, as we have just seen, more than one category of detainee may 
be held in an isolation unit at any one time. 298 When visited, no detainee was being 
held in the establishment's segregation unit as a punishment; however, a number of 
transvestite prisoners, it was observed, had been held there, at their own request, for 
several months; and other prisoners were being held, involuntarily, on other - 
imprecise 
- 
grounds, certain of whom "appeared to have psychological or psychiatric 
problems". 299 In seeking a clear expression of the contents of the segregation regimes 
applicable in the unit, significantly, it is submitted, the CPT sought to draw a 
distinction between: 
"... the... regimes applicable, on the one hand, to persons undergoing 
disciplinary confinement and, on the other hand, to persons held in the 
segregation unit for other reasons... 000 
' Idem, Para 136,2°d indent. 
298 As to the CPT's views on the holding of different categories of detainee in the same segregation 
unit, see above, pp 402-3. 
299 See Greece I, Para 134. As to CPT views on the segregation of mentally disordered persons 
generally, see inter alla below, pp 466-7. 00 Idem, Para 136 (2"d indent). 
450 
Safeguards and procedure in the application of measures of solitary 
confinement 
Procedures applicable to disciplinary and non-disciplinary segregation 
In the application of restrictions 
- 
including the seclusion 
- 
of detainees for breaches 
of discipline, the CPT is of the view that: 
"[i]t is... in the interests of both prisoners and [custodial] staff that 
clear... procedures be both formally established and applied in 
practice... Disciplinary procedures should provide prisoners with a right to be 
heard on the subject of the offences it is alleged they have committed, and to 
appeal to a higher authority against any sanctions imposed". 301 
The importance of establishing and applying appropriate disciplinary procedures has 
not been lost on the CPT: "any grey zones in this area", it considers, "involve the risk 
of seeing unofficial (and uncontrolled) systems developing". 302 
It is also the case, as we have seen and as the CPT acknowledges, that "[o]ther 
procedures often exist, alongside the formal disciplinary procedure, under which a 
prisoner may be involuntarily separated from other inmates for discipline- 
related/security considerations". These procedures, it has stated: 
"... should also be accompanied by effective safeguards. The prisoner should 
be informed of the reasons for the measure taken against him, unless security 
considerations dictate otherwise, be given an opportunity to present his views 
on the matter, and be able to contest the measure before an appropriate 
authority". 303 
301 See 2d GR, para 55. On the procedure recommended for the disciplining of juvenile detainees - 
which procedure does not differ materially from that recommended in respect of other categories of detainee 
- 
see, generally, 9' GR, para 35. 302 Ibid. 
303 Ibid. 
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It is proposed to examine each feature of these recommended procedures in turn. In 
addition, a number of other safeguards, which, the CPT believes, should attend the 
application of measures of solitary confinement (and, where appropriate, other types 
of restriction) will be considered. The first of these latter safeguards we turn to now. 
The need for a detailed policy on recourse to seclusion and related measures 
Visiting Bergen and Oslo Prisons, Norway, in 1997, the CPT learned that there 
existed "no clear directives or policy" on the treatment of detainees subject to 
restrictions. 304 Consequently, it recommended that such treatment "be governed by 
detailed directives". 305 Unfortunately, the Committee offered little guidance as to the 
content of such directives, other than to suggest that they address the provision of 
purposeful activities and appropriate human contact and aim to protect prisoners from 
harm. From other visit reports, however, it would appear that such directives should, 
in addition, make clear the legal bases on which prisoners may be segregated and the 
criteria employed in determining the appropriateness of imposing restrictions. 306 
The Committee has been more forthcoming in the context of the segregation 
of psychiatric patients. On the use of seclusion in psychiatric establishments, it has 
declared: 
"... there must always be a detailed policy... including in particular: the types 
of cases in which it may be used; the objectives sought; its duration and the 
need for regular reviews; special recording and medical supervision 
304 See Norway II, paras 24 and 30. 305 Idem, Para 38. 
306 See Cyprus I, Para 98 and Cyprus II, Para 76; and, similarly, Ireland II, paras 87 and 92 (wherein the 
CPT observed that the "barrier-handling regime" which was operating in the special unit at Porlaoise 
Prison when visited in 1998 
- 
see further above, p 300, n 101 - enjoyed no legal basis; it had 
apparently been introduced after discussions between senior officials at the Ministry of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform and the Prison Officers' Association Immediate steps should be taken, the 
CPT averred, in order to place the regime on a firm legal basis). 
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procedures; the existence of appropriate human contact; the need for staff to 
be especially attentive". 307 
The correspondence of these provisions with those recommended by the CPT in 
respect of policies developed on the use of force/restraint against detainees is worth 
noting. 308 Further, given their uncontroversial content, there seems no reason, it is 
submitted, why the CPT should refrain from promoting policies of this kind in respect 
of other kinds of establishment. It is important, of course, that any policy developed 
should be capable of being effectively implemented in practice. Accordingly, its 
provisions, the Committee considers, should be widely disseminated and not over- 
ambitious in scope. 309 
Proportionality 
"The principle of proportionality", the CPT considers: 
"requires that a balance be struck between the requirements of the case and the 
application of a solitary confinement-type regime, which is a step that can 
have very harmful consequences for the person concerned". 310 
Accordingly, it is inappropriate, it believes, to impose a sanction of isolation on a 
prisoner for a relatively minor breach of prison discipline; 311 while, in seeking to 
apply restrictions on remand prisoners' contact with the outside world, the 
prosecuting authorities, it has stated, should seek to apply only those restrictions 
which are "strictly necessary in the interests of the criminal investigation", and the 
307 See UK III, para 266 (and, similarly, Romania I, para 190 (3'h indent)). See also below, p 466. In 
England and Wales in 1994, the CPT observed, just such a policy existed by virtue of the combination 
of a Code of Practice issued under the Mental Health Act 1983 and a "policy statement" issued by the 
Special Hospitals Services Authority. 
309 See above, p 334. 
309 See UK III, para 267. 310 See 2" GR, para 56; and, similarly, France 111, para 158; and Norway II, pars 18. 311 See Spain VI, pars 94. 
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courts, in considering the appropriateness of such restrictions, should "take due 
account of whether the particular restrictions requested... are proportional to the needs 
of the criminal investigation concerned". 312 Clearly, therefore, in the view of the 
CPT, in the furtherance of a criminal investigation, the authorities should not seek and 
the courts should not impose restrictions systematically. 313 
In some reports, the Committee has sought more than mere respect for the 
principle of proportionality and has insisted that recourse to seclusion and its 
prolongation should be made "only in exceptional circumstances"; 314 in other words, 
only when it is "absolutely essential". 315 
Application of solitary confinement as a punishment 
Rather infrequently in its published work, the CPT has addressed the question 
whether segregation may be applied to a detainee for punitive ends. Encountering 
isolation regimes which appear to have had no other purpose than to punish those to 
whom they were applied, particularly on account of their actual or potential duration, 
it has formulated the following response: 
"... While the application of a segregation regime for a prolonged period could, 
in exceptional cases, be necessary for reasons linked to order and security, the 
application of such a measure as a punishment is not acceptable". 316 
Regarding, specifically, the solitary confinement of psychiatric patients, such 
confinement, the Committee considers, understandably, "should never be used as a 
317 punishment, or [its] use prolonged for that purpose". 
312 See Sweden II, para 27 (1" and 4`h indents) and now Sweden III, para 40. 313 See Denmark II, para 58. 314 See Sweden I, para 68 (ld indent); and, similarly, Germany I, para 81. 315 See Norway II, pars 19. 
316 See Belgium II, para 197; Luxembourg I, para 53; and UK IV, para 156. 317 See, e. g., Greece I, para 256; and below, p 467. 
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Length of seclusion 
The CPT's fundamental position on the duration of solitary confinement is an 
uncomplicated one: "all forms of solitary confinement", it insists, "should be as short 
as possible". 319 It considers, further, at least in respect of the segregation of juvenile 
detainees, that in formulating policy on the application of measures of seclusion, "the 
maximum possible duration... be formally laid down... "319 There seems no reason, it 
is submitted, why the same precept ought not to apply in respect of the isolation of 
other categories of detainee. 
What the CPT regards as lengthy or prolonged segregation can really only be 
determined by reference to its findings in the course of visits. In this connection, it 
has characterised measures of seclusion lasting anywhere between two months and 
one year as "generally"320 or "verys321 long and that lasting "for weeks and, on 
occasion, for months", as "prolonged"322 (a description which it has also used, it is 
worth noting, in respect of the seclusion of juvenile detainees for periods of "ten days 
or more i323). Further, the Committee has called for the substantial reduction of 
periods of segregation lasting up to 56 days. 324 
The provision of information to a detainee 
Rule 36.3, EPR provides, inter alfa, that: 
"No prisoner shall be punished unless informed of the alleged offence... " 
For its part, when it suggests that a person who is the object of a proposed order for 
31' See, e. g., 2d GR, pars 56. 
319 See Poland I, pars 167 (3" indent); and Portugal 11, para 164 (4th indent). 320 See Luxembourg I, pars 48; and, similarly, Italy I, pars 140; and Denmark II, para 58. 321 See Spain VI, para 89. 
322 See Bulgaria I, para 168. 32' See Italy II, para 169 (concerning what was regarded as the sanction of seclusion imposed on self- harming detainees in one establishment visited). 324 See UK IV, para 154. 
455 
seclusion or the renewal of such an order should be informed of the reason(s) for the 
measure (security considerations permitting), the CPT has in mind the provision of 
written reasons; oral notification, it has made clear, is insufficient. 325 Further, as 
might be expected, this information must be provided "in a straightforward 
language"326 and be sufficiently detailed as to be meaningful. Accordingly, to furnish 
the detainee concerned with a one page pre-printed form on which ticks have been 
placed in boxes corresponding to the restrictions which are to be applied is 
unacceptable. 327 Rather, the written information provided, the Committee holds, 
should refer, inter alia, to the ground(s) on which it is proposed to segregate (e. g. the 
breach of discipline which it is alleged the detainee has committed), the sanction 
which is likely to be imposed (or the types of restriction sought by the authorities in 
the context of non-disciplinary segregation), the procedure which is to apply to his 
case and the avenues of appeal open to him in the event that the restrictions are 
ultimately imposed. 328 
Justifying this precept, the CPT has suggested that the provision of appropriate 
information to detainees "will enable them, among other things, to make effective use 
of the remedies available for contesting the decision". 329 As for the security 
requirements 
- 
or, in the case of the proposed segregation of a remand prisoner, the 
requirements of the criminal investigation 
- 
which, it accepts, may legitimately 
preclude the provision of information to a detainee, these, the CPT has stated, must be 
"compelling". 330 
325 See Spain I, paras 115 and 116 (1" indent). See in the same connection Ireland II, para 81 (1* 
indent). In none of the prisons visited in Ireland in 1998, the CPT remarked, were inmates who were 
the subject of a disciplinary charge given advance notice in writing of the charge(s) against them: idem, 
ara 80. 326 
See Denmark II, para 59 (3d indent). 
327 See Sweden II, para 26. 
328 See Italy II, para 152. 
329 See, e. g., Germany I, para 82; and, similarly, Spain I, para 116. 330 Idem, para 83 (1" indent). 
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Entitlement to a hearing 
Rule 36.3, EPR provides, inter alfa, that: 
"No prisoner shall be punished unless... given a proper opportunity of 
presenting a defence". 
It is the view of the CPT, as was adumbrated above, that any detainee against whom 
the imposition or renewal of measures of segregation are being contemplated, 
including in circumstances in which the segregation is for non-disciplinary reasons: 
"... be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the relevant 
authority before any final decision on placement in, or renewal of, solitary 
confinement is taken... "331 
Moreover, in hearing a detainee's views, the relevant authority, it has stated, should 
respect the principles of natural justice. 332 Accordingly: 
(i) in disciplinary matters, a detainee should be given "sufficient" time to prepare 
his defence; 333 
(ii) those officials who are requesting the imposition of restrictions should be "obliged 
to specify the particular restrictions which they intend to apply"; 334 
(iii) the adjudicating authority should be "particularly attentive to the effects of the 
restrictions on the mental and physical health of the [detainee] concerned; where 
331 See, e. g., Germany I, pars 83 (2°d indent). 
332 See UK I, para 234. This precept is of particular relevance, of course, in the disciplining of 
detainees. However, the CPT's remarks to the UK authorities suggest, it is submitted, that it ought to be 
adhered to when segregation for other, albeit discipline-related, reasons is being contemplated. 333 See Ireland II, para 81 (1" indent). This precept inheres in the notion, considered above, that a 
person should be given advance written notice of the charge(s) against him. 34 See Sweden II, para 27 (2id indent). 
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appropriate, [it] should seek a medical opinion before imposing or renewing such 
restrictions"; 335 
(iv) in the disciplining of detainees, "il serait souhaitable que, dans certains cas au 
moins (notamment lorsque les faits reproches revetent un caractere de particuliere 
gravite susceptible d'entrainer les sanctions disciplinaires les plus elevees), le detenu 
puisse etre en droit de beneficier de 1'assistance d'un Conseil au cours de la procedure 
disciplinaire, y compris lors de 1'audition disciplinaire. Par ailleurs, des dispositions 
devraient aussi etre prises pour que des detenus qui le necessitent, puissant beneficier 
de 1'assistance d'un interprete". 336 
On this last point, the CPT has stated, further, that the assistance of an 
interpreter should be available to a detainee not just at the hearing itself, but, like the 
assistance of legal counsel, prior to it, in the preparation of his case. 337 It should also 
be noted in the present connection that Rule 36.4, EPR provides that, "where 
necessary and practicable prisoners shall be allowed to make their defence through an 
interpreter"; 
(v) in disciplinary proceedings, the detainee against whom it is proposed restrictions 
are to be applied or renewed should be permitted to call witnesses on his behalf and 
contest the evidence against him338 (including the possibility of cross-examining 
witnesses called by those bringing the charge(s)339); 
333 See Norway II, para 36 (4th indent). 
336 See Belgium II, para 190; and, similarly, UK IV, para 153.. 337 See France III, pars 151. CfFrench law in 1996. 
338 See Italy II, para 152 (2'' indent). 
339 See Ireland II, para 81 (2"d indent). Cfpractice in the Irish prisons visited in 1998: idem, pars 80. 
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(vi) during adjudications, a detainee should be permitted to remain seated and have 
the facility to take notes. 340 Accordingly, he should not be obliged, inter alia, to 
remain standing between two officers while being questioned by the adjudicating 
authority; 34 l 
(vii) the manner and conduct of the hearing should 
- 
axiomatically 
- 
be appropriate to 
the occasion. Thus, the prevailing atmosphere should be conducive to calm, reasoned 
debate and displays of vindictiveness and mockery towards the detainee should be 
avoided; 342 
(viii) in disciplinary proceedings, if found guilty of a breach of discipline, a detainee 
should be permitted to be heard in mitigation of punishment; 343 
(ix) hearings on disciplinary matters should be held promptly after the alleged breach 
of discipline. The CPT has indicated that by prompt it means within 48 hours of the 
event giving rise to the breach. 344 
Right to appeal against the decision to seclude or to renew seclusion 
There is little to add to the CPT's basic prescription in this regard, other than to 
emphasise its view that the body to which any appeal may be made following the 
imposition of restrictions 
. 
should be entirely independent of the authority which 
initially imposed them. M5 As to the identity of the appellate authority, the CPT has 
recommended in the context of its analysis of disciplinary procedures in juvenile 
detention centres that it should comprise, first, the Director of the Centre, in respect of 
340 Ibid (4'" indent). 
341 Ideen, para 80. 
342 See France III, para 152. 3" See Ireland II, para 81 (3d indent). Cf practice in the prisons visited in 1998. 344 See Austria H, para 142. 
345 See, e. g., Sweden II, para 25. 
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sanctions imposed by "educators" (relating, presumably, to minor infractions of 
discipline), and, second, the competent judge, in respect of sanctions imposed by the 
Director. There seems no reason, it is submitted, why the same principles, creating 
both an internal and external avenue of appeal, should not apply in respect of other 
categories of (disciplined) detainee. 
The European Prison Rules, for their part, offer little guidance on the appeal 
process, stipulating simply that "access to and the authority of the appellate process" 
shall be "provided for and determined by the law or by the regulation of the 
competent authority". 347 
The need for regular reviews of placements in segregation 
In safeguarding the welfare of detainees against whom measures of seclusion have 
been taken, the CPT considers that: 
"... the position of a prisoner held in solitary confinement for an extended 
period should be subject to a full review (including a psychiatric assessment) 
at least every three months". ý8 
A "full" review, it has made clear, connotes more than the mere completion of a 
report by custodial staff for the benefit of senior management in an establishment. 349 
Further, to extend the review period beyond the recommended three months is not 
something which the CPT readily countenances. In its second Swiss visit report, for 
example, it rejected the asseverations of certain cantonal authorities on the matter 
who, in their response to its first visit report, had discountenanced a three month 
346 See Portugal II, para 163 (2"d indent). It may be significant in this connection that when applying 
the sanction of seclusion to juveniles, custodial authorities, the Committee considers, should notify the 
competent judge: idem, para 164 (1" indent). 
347 See Rule 35. d, EPR. 
348 See, e. g., Finland I, para 74 (3rd indent). 
349 See UK III, para139. 
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review period on the basis, inter alia, that Recommendation No. R (82) 17 of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe "ne fixe pas de delai precis en la 
matiere". The Committee, for its part, found this reasoning unpersuasive and 
suggested that a maximum three month review period is important "donne les effets 
nocifs qu'un tel placement pent avoir sur le detenu concerne". 35° 
As for the assessment which, the Committee maintains, should comprise an 
integral part of the review process, this has been described most commonly in visit 
reports as a "medico-social opinion". 351 It amounts, in essence, to a "psychological 
and psychiatric assessment" of the detainee who is the subject of the review. 352 
The medical examination of secluded detainees 
"The mental and physical state of all prisoners placed in solitary confinement", the 
CPT maintains, "must be the subject of special attention". 353 Accordingly, it is an 
"essential safeguard" that such persons be able to request a medical examination. 
Consequently, following the application of any measure of solitary confinement, the 
Committee has stated: 
"... whenever the prisoner concerned, or a prison officer on the prisoner's 
behalf, requests a medical doctor, such a doctor should be called without delay 
with a view to carrying out a medical examination of the prisoner. The results 
of this examination, including an account of the prisoner's physical and mental 
condition as well as, if need be, the foreseeable consequences of continued 
350 See Switzerland Il, Para 87. 
351 See, e. g., France III, Para 162; and Poland I, Para 146. 352 See Slovaida I, Para 145. 353 See Germany I, Para 79. 
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isolation, should be set out in a written statement to be forwarded to the 
competent authorities". 354 
The European Prison Rules, interestingly, provide for medical intervention at two 
significant junctures. First, they stipulate, at Rule 38.1: 
"[p]unishment by disciplinary confinement and any other punishment which 
might have an adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the prisoner 
shall only be imposed if the medical officer after examination certifies in 
writing that the prisoner is fit to sustain it". 
The CPT, for its part, has not, to date, formulated any view on the kind of procedure 
adumbrated by the EPR here. 355 Second, at Rule 38.3, they stipulate that: 
"[t]he medical officer shall visit daily prisoners undergoing [the] punishments 
[referred to at Rule 38.1] and shall advise the director if the termination or 
alteration of the punishment is considered necessary on grounds of physical or 
mental health". 
Again, the CPT has yet to touch on this particular role of prison doctors. 
Recording the application of measures of segregation 
"It is axiomatic", the CPT has proclaimed, "that a scrupulous record of all placements 
in isolation, whatever the reasons for the measure, is a fundamental safeguard against 
any possible abuse and, more generally, an essential tool of good management" 
. 
356 In 
the absence or inadequate completion of segregation records, it has indicated, it will 
354 See 2" GR, para 56; and Germany I, pars 81. As to the entitlement to request a medical 
examination as it is held to apply to segregated juvenile detainees, see 9P GR, para 40. 35' However, the Committee does, it will be recalled, encourage authorities to base their decision to 
continue segregation on a "medico-social" opinion: see above, p 461. 356 See UK III, para 219. 
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be difficult or impossible for the authorities (and, of course, the CPT itself), inter alia, 
to ascertain the grounds on which detainees are isolated, 357 the frequency with and 
lengths of time for which seclusion cells are used, 358 medical information particular to 
the cells' occupants359 and the manner and frequency with which those occupants are 
monitored 
_360 Further, it will be difficult to verify allegations of ill-treatment relating 
to the use of such cells. 36' 
It is important, therefore, in the view of the CPT, that formal registers are 
opened in which are recorded full details of all persons held in segregation cells 
- 
`whether or not this is in a medical context"362 
- 
including the date and time of their 
entering and leaving the cell, the grounds on which they have been secluded, the 
circumstances in which the measure was applied and their destination on leaving the 
cell. 363 The Committee is of the view, further 
- 
albeit in respect of the isolation of 
psychiatric patients only, it seems 
- 
that, as with the application of measures of 
restraint, mention of recourse to a measure of solitary confinement should be noted 
not only in this central register, but also in the detainee's own file. 364 
It is also worth noting in the present connection that the CPT has sought to 
encourage prison authorities to "maintain a consolidated record of all disciplinary 
proceedings and decisions, which can be scrutinised by prison managers, officials of 
the Prison Administration and inspectoral bodies". 365 
357 See Greece I, Para 134. 
331 See UK III, Para 354. 
359 See Greece I, Para 182. 
360 Idem, Para 186. 
361 See Ireland I, Para 84. 
362 See Germany 14 Para 143. 
36' See Greece I, Para 140; and Iceland I, Para 133. See also below, p 467. 36' See Belgium I, Para 201 (4th indent); and Netherlands II, Para 126 (I" indent). 365 See Finland II4 Para 96. 
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The segregation of particular categories of detainee 
- 
Remand prisoners 
Although the imposition of restrictions on criminal suspects (including remand 
prisoners) by prosecuting authorities in the advancement of a criminal investigation 
has already been considered in some depth, 366 and although much of the foregoing 
analysis on safeguards may be held to apply to the isolation of persons detained on 
remand, a perusal of CPT visit reports indicates that a number of other precepts, 
particular to remand detention, may be identified in the present connection. We shall 
consider those precepts here. 
The CPT begins from the premise that "it [pays] particular attention to the 
solitary confinement of remand prisoners by court order, which [is a measure that] can 
continue for extended periods". 367 From this, it has developed its fundamental view, 
which is that: 
"[while] recognis[ing] that, in certain circumstances, it may be necessary to 
impose restrictions on contacts between a remand prisoner and other 
persons... such restrictions must only be for the purpose of protecting the 
interests of justice (in particular, to avoid collusion, threats to others or 
interference with evidence)". 368 
It has also insisted, further, that "it would not be acceptable for inmates to be held, as 
a matter of routine, in solitary confinement during their first four weeks on 
remand". 
369 
3" See above, p 386 et seq. 
36' See Denmark H, para 54. 
36' See Iceland I, para 64. 
369 See Norway I, para 65. Cf Norwegian practice in 1993 (para 59). 
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Regarding the periodic review of restrictions imposed on remand prisoners, 
the Committee has suggested that this be linked to the review of remand in custody 
generally. Thus, it has recommended that: 
"... in the context of each periodic review of the necessity to continue remand 
in custody, the necessity to continue a placement in solitary confinement is 
fully considered as a separate issue, bearing in mind the general principle that 
all placements in solitary confinement should be as short as possible" 
. 
370 
Understandably, the Committee also considers that the question whether or not to 
impose or prolong restrictions should be "carefully scrutinised by the competent court 
immediately after a decision to remand in custody... has been taken". 371 The decision, 
therefore, should rest ultimately with the courts, not with the police or prosecuting 
authorities (which means, in practice, that "prisoners subject to restrictions [should] 
have an effective right of appeal to a Court or another independent body in respect of 
particular restrictions applied by a public prosecutor"372). 
While the duration between reviews is necessarily determined by the length of 
the remand review period 
- 
though anything in excess of three months would not be 
countenanced, it is submitted 
- 
the Committee has expressed the view that, insofar as 
segregated remand prisoners are concerned, "a review... be carried out at least every 
four weeks". 373 
- 
HIV-positive detainees 
The CPT's approach to the isolation of HIV-positive detainees 
- 
as well as, it should 
be noted, persons carrying the hepatitis B virus 
- 
may be simply stated: 
370 See Denmark II, para 59 (4`h indent); and, similarly, Sweden II, para 27 (6's indent). 371 See Norway II, para 36 (1" indent). Cf perceived practice at Bergen and Oslo Prisons in 1997: 
ides pars 33. 
372 See Sweden II, para 27 (5th indent). 
373 See Norway 11, para 36 (3" indent). 
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"Although the CPT recognises the problems of integration of HIV-positive 
prisoners with the rest of the prison population 
- 
arising from a lack of 
experience, insufficient information and fear on the part of other prisoners and 
staff 
- 
it wishes to emphasise that there is no medical justification for the 
segregation of an HIV-positive prisoner who is well" 
, 
374 
Accordingly, it has recommended that prison authorities "actively pursue a policy of 
keeping prisoners who are seropositive (HIV or hepatitis B) on normal prison 
location" 375 
- 
Mentally disturbed detainees 
The CPT has asserted on more than one occasion that, despite its "long history": 
"... there is a clear trend in modem psychiatric practice in favour of avoiding 
the seclusion of violent or otherwise unmanageable [psychiatric] patients". 376 
Indeed, it has been "pleased to note" that such practices are being "phased out in 
many countries"377 and that it is "generally accepted that the long term seclusion of 
patients is highly undesirable". 378 Nevertheless, "for so long as seclusion remains in 
use" in psychiatric establishments, it believes: 
"... it should be the subject of a detailed policy spelling out, in particular: the 
types of cases in which it may be used; the objectives sought; its duration and 
the need for regular reviews; the existence of appropriate human contact; the 
need for staff to be especially attentive". 379 
374 See Poland I, pars 129 in respect of the isolation of persons suffering from "chronic viral 
heatitis", para 131. See also GR, para 56. 
3.1 See Cyprus I, pars 97- 
176 See Malta 11, pars 105; and, similarly, France III, para 187. 
"' See 8" GR, pare 49; and, in the same connection, Turkey I, para 221. 
"' See Spain VI, pars 89. 
s" 8'h GR, para 49. See also Belgium II, para 232; and Ireland II, para 105. 
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Further, "every instance" of such seclusion, like the application of physical restraint 
against psychiatric patients, 380 it has stated: 
"... should be recorded in a specific register established for this purpose (as 
well as in the patient's file). The entry should include the times at which the 
measure began and ended, the circumstances of the case, the reasons for 
resorting to the measure, the name of the doctor who ordered or approved it, 
and an account of any injuries sustained by patients or staff'. 381 
Lastly in the present connection, the CPT has stated emphatically that: 
"... isolation must never be used as a punishment [against psychiatric patients] 
or prolonged to this effect". 392 
Accordingly, it has criticised segregation cells in psychiatric establishments possessed 
of a "distinctly carceral aspect". 383 
- 
Detainees considered a suicide risk 
Persons who have been identified as at risk of self-mutilation or suicide should not, 
the CPT believes, be held in conditions akin to isolation. In particular, they should 
not be confined in cells `with easy access to means of killing themselves (cell window 
bars, broken glass, belts or ties, etc. )". 384 Rather, they should be "subject to special 
precautions... should benefit from counselling, support and appropriate association, 
and should, for as long as necessary, be kept under a special observation scheme". 385 
Further, the environment in which such persons are held should be "salutary". 386 
380 See above, p 359. j" See 8's GR, Para 50; and, similarly, Ireland II, Para 105. 
'n See Belgium II, Para 232; and, in the same connection, Romania I, paras 188 and 190 (1g indent). 
'u See Ireland II, Para 106 (regarding six rooms used for the seclusion of patients at The Central 
Mental Hospital, Dundrum, in 1998). 
3" See Finland I, Para 109. 
311 Ibid. See, similarly, Germany I, Para 141. 
3U See Hungary I, Para 118. 
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Accordingly, it should not be, inter alia, very small and "oppressive", which features, 
the Committee believes, are "hardly conducive to improving the psychological state 
of a desperate person". 387 
The seclusion of suicidal detainees was examined in some depth by the CPT in 
one of its most recently published visit reports. Concerned by the fate of two young 
offenders in the Isle of Man Prison in the course of its visit in 1997, both of whom 
were considered to be at high risk of suicide, and who had been, as a consequence, 
secluded in a so-called "strip cell", 388 the Committee set out the following detailed 
formulation, which, with some justification, it clearly proposed to regard as its 
definitive view on the matter: 
"The appropriate manner in which to manage a prisoner assessed as being 
suicidal will vary according to the particular circumstances of each case. 
However, there is today a widespread consensus that unfurnished 
accommodation should only be used exceptionally. It is hard to imagine a 
measure less likely to have a positive effect on a suicidal person's state of 
mind than to place him on his own in a barren environment. Such a measure 
could only be justified in an emergency situation and should last for as short a 
time as possible". 389 
Regarding the absence of mattresses in the cells concerned 
'390 the CPT averred that: 
"[t]o deprive a suicidal person placed in a strip cell of a mattress can only 
exacerbate the deleterious effects of the measure. The argument that this is 
necessary to prevent suicide is totally unconvincing. There are mattresses 
327Idem, pare 119. 
3' I. e. a cell which is bare of all furnishings, including in this particular instance, mattresses. 339 See UK IV, para 136. 
390 The prison authorities offered two "divergent" explanations as to the mattresses' absence. On the 
one hand, they claimed, the denial was necessary on account of the detainees' perceived suicidal 
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with technical characteristics such that a ligature cannot be made from them. 
Even if a mattress of this type is not available 
- 
nor a room deprived of all 
means (bars, handles, etc. ) capable of being exploited by a prisoner for the 
purpose of hanging himself 
- 
to deprive a suicidal person of a mattress for 
days is indefensible from a clinical standpoint; under such circumstances, 
alternative measures (e. g. a special observation scheme) should be introduced 
at the earliest opportunity". 391 
It continued: 
"[t]he denial of a mattress to a prisoner placed in a strip cell after having been 
assessed as suicidal but who is subsequently cleared for return to normal 
location is no less objectionable. There are good grounds for wishing such a 
prisoner to decide for himself to return to normal location rather than having 
to return him forcibly. The application of a restricted regime may well be a 
useful tool when managing such a situation. 392 However, the enjoyment of 
something so basic as the proper means to sleep should never be one of the 
bargaining chips. Similarly, the legitimacy of continuing to hold under strip 
conditions (even with a mattress) a prisoner who has been cleared for return to 
normal location is highly questionable". 393 
The placement procedure in the Isle of Man Prison was also the subject of CPT 
comment in the report. In this regard, it was at pains to stress that: 
tendencies. On the other, they suggested, it represented a deliberate attempt to persuade the detainees 
to return to normal location: idem, para 135. 
391 Idem, para 136. 
392 This is an interesting assertion. It suggests that the CPT is prepared to accept that restrictions may 
be used as an incentive to alter behaviour (in this case, to encourage a return to a normal regime). As 
we have seen, however, it has been less forthcoming on the use of restrictions to encourage good 
behaviour among detainees, which use, of course, has strong disciplinary connotations (see above, p 
431 et seq). 
393 See LTK N, para 137. 
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"... the placement of a suicidal person in an unfurnished cell should be decided 
by a doctor or be brought immediately to the attention of a doctor for his 
approval. Further, for so long as the person concerned is kept in the 
unfurnished cell as a clinical intervention, the management of his situation 
must be the exclusive responsibility of a doctor, and health care staff should 
follow closely the evolution of the prisoner's condition". 394 
This formulation, extensive and detailed, supplements very usefully the CPT's body 
of precepts in this area. 
- 
Juveniles 
The CPT is, understandably, particularly anxious about the possible damage 
occasioned to young persons by segregation regimes. To the Slovakian authorities, 
for example, regarding allegations heard at the Youth Re-education Home in 
Hlohovec in 1995 that inmates might spend up to five days in isolation without 
leaving their isolation rooms 
- 
except when using toilet or washing facilities 
- 
and 
might be denied reading material, the CPT averred that: 
"... such a deprivation of physical exercise and intellectual stimulation for a 
period of days is not acceptable for any detained person, and can be 
particularly harmful for young people". 395 
Writing recently about the disciplining of misbehaving juvenile detainees, the CPT 
stated that it is: 
"... particularly concerned about the placement of juveniles in conditions 
resembling solitary confinement, a measure which can compromise their 
394 Idem, para 138. 
395 See Slovakia I, para 159 (emphasis added). See, similarly, Turkey I, pars 123 (regarding findings in 
the disciplinary unit of Izmir Reformatory for Juveniles in October 1997 
- 
though cf para 124). 
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physical and/or mental integrity. The Committee considers that resort to such 
a measure must be regarded as highly exceptional" 
. 
396 
It might be said, however, that this constitutes, in essence, the view of the Committee 
on the application of measures of isolation generally; it is not particular to the 
detention of young persons. Indeed, in indicating the kind of safeguards which it 
considers ought to attend the segregation of juveniles, it is clear that there is little, if 
any, difference between these and those which, it believes, should attend the 
segregation of other categories of detainee. For present purposes, therefore, unless 
otherwise indicated in this text, 397 it is proposed to regard all identifiable CPT 
precepts on the isolation of juvenile detainees as applying to the isolation of all other 
detainees, regardless of type, notwithstanding the Committee's understandable and 
particular concern about the segregation of the former. 
Conclusion 
Like its approach to the use of force and instruments of restraint in places of 
detention, the CPT's approach to the application of measures of solitary confinement 
(and other, related restrictions) is thorough and far-reaching. Necessarily, therefore, 
this chapter has followed suit. It opened by setting out a number of the grounds on 
which Parties may seek to impose, inter alia, measures of seclusion, before looking in 
detail at one such ground, namely, the use of seclusion/restrictions by the police in the 
advancement of a criminal investigation (in respect of which Norwegian police 
practice has been found to be both striking and discomforting). There followed an 
396 See 9th GR, para 35. See, similarly, Czech Republic 1, pars 96 (following claims made in February 
1997 that inmates at the Moravsky Krumlov Educational Institute might be subject to isolation 
"last[ing] several days" as a punishment (Para 95)); and Luxembourg II, para 30. 397 See, e. g., above, p 455 (regarding the Committee's recommendation that national authorities 
formally lay down the maximum possible duration of measures of isolation applied to juveniles) and pp 
459-60 (regarding the proposed two-stage appeal process in juvenile detention centres). 
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extensive section on the possible effects of isolation, which, it is clear, may be 
profound and disturbing for the individual affected 
- 
as, indeed, it may be for the 
establishment in which he is detained, particularly if a large proportion of its inmates 
are isolated (findings in Iceland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, notably in the 
context of remand detention, are particularly noteworthy in this regard). 
Subsequently, identifiable CPT precepts on the practice of segregation were 
examined, the most fundamental of which is the need for custodial authorities to 
respect the human dignity of every isolated detainee, notwithstanding their 
dangerousness, disruptiveness or high security classification (a point made with 
particular emphasis, inter alia, to the Dutch, Spanish and Swiss authorities). Flowing 
from this fundamental precept are, it has been argued, others, such as the need for the 
authorities to base their decision to segregate on an assessment of each individual case 
(and not to isolate persons systematically, as appeared to be the case in a Maltese 
psychiatric hospital visited in 1995); the need to avoid accommodating different 
categories of isolated detainee together, as far as possible (a precept prompted by 
findings in Germany and the Netherlands); and the 
- 
admittedly somewhat less easily 
apprehended 
- 
efforts on the part of the Committee to circumscribe the extent to 
which the authorities may discriminate between different categories of isolated 
detainee (principally, its view that no distinction should be drawn between isolated 
detainees in terms of their entitlement to basic safeguards (Finland; Italy), but that 
some distinction between detainees segregated for punishment purposes and those 
segregated for other reasons may be acceptable insofar as their material conditions 
and, arguably 
- 
though less certainly 
- 
regime are concerned: a precept which emerged 
from the CPT's detailed consideration of the "prisoner grading system" operating in 
Spanish prisons in 1991 and 1994). 
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The Chapter then went on to consider CPT precepts on the physical 
environment in which secluded detainees may be accommodated, both in a general 
sense (concerning, inter alia, the effect of duration of placement on the 
appropriateness of material conditions, the need to avoid material hazards to health 
(following findings in Iceland, Greece and the UK), the importance of call systems in 
segregation cells (Belgium; Finland), the ease with which custodial staff can gain 
access to and monitor the occupants of such cells (Cyprus), the requirement of an 
appropriate means of rest (Slovenia; Hungary; Poland) and the need to safeguard the 
dignity of secluded detainees (Finland; Luxembourg)); and, specifically, regarding 
perceptible differences in the requirements of persons separated on non-disciplinary 
grounds (whose cells should, the CPT holds, resemble those on ordinary location 
(Finland)) and persons separated as a punishment (in respect of whom, it concedes, 
more austere conditions may be provided (Spain)). 
On the segregation regime, we examined briefly the content and 
appropriateness of regimes designed to encourage detainees to improve their 
behaviour (the "generalised incentive scheme" operating in HM Young Offender 
Institution, Feltham, England, when visited in 1994, being a particularly interesting 
example); the possible consequences, both for the detainees affected and the custodial 
environment, of exposure to segregation regimes (with findings in Denmark, the 
Netherlands Antilles, Germany and Sweden being worthy of note); and concluded by 
identifying precepts on the provision of purposeful activities for secluded persons 
(including access to outdoor exercise, suitable reading material and work activities) 
and the imperative to maintain appropriate human contact. 
Like recourse to force and/or instruments of restraint in places of detention, 
the application of measures of solitary confinement (and other restrictions), the CPT 
considers, should be attended by a range of safeguards. These safeguards include the 
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need to formulate a detailed policy on seclusion (contrast Norwegian prison practice 
in 1997 with that of the UK authorities in respect of psychiatric patients in 1994), the 
requirement of proportionality in the application of segregation measures, the need to 
apply such measures for as short a period of time as possible, the circumscription of 
the procedure which precedes their application (comprising the provision of written 
information to persons in respect of whom a measure is proposed (cf Irish practice in 
1998), their entitlement to a hearing (where, again, Irish practice has been found 
wanting) and their right of appeal), the need for regular reviews of placements (cf 
practice in a number of Swiss cantons in 1996), the appropriateness and content of 
medical examinations and recording procedures. 
Finally, we considered precepts on the segregation of particular categories of 
detainee, namely, remand prisoners (in respect of whom practice in a number of 
northern European countries has been the object of particular CPT attention), HIV- 
positive detainees, mentally disturbed prisoners (regarding whose isolation a very 
positive trend is beginning to emerge throughout Europe, it appears), detainees 
perceived to be at risk of suicide (on whose segregation the CPT very recently had 
cause to comment to the UK authorities) and juveniles. 
The CPT's approach to the formulation of standards in this area has been 
methodical and comprehensive. As with its standards on the use of force/restraint, it 
is significant, it may be stated, that a number of its precepts on seclusion have 
emerged from its analysis of particular situations encountered in the course of visits or 
in preparing for such visits. This approach, it is submitted, lends to the standards set a 
patina of credibility, underscoring them by reference to real events and domestic 
practices. They cannot be perceived, therefore, as being proposed blanket-fashion and 
didactically. More generally, this sensitive and thorough approach can only 
encourage greater trust in and respect for the CPT among its State party interlocutors. 
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PART IV 
Conclusion 
Conclusion 
In the foregoing analysis of CPT standards, a number of themes were examined. A 
number of others, however, remain unexplored. They have been omitted not because 
they are any less deserving of analysis (some, indeed, like material conditions and regime 
activities in places of detention, warrant very detailed consideration, so important are 
they to the welfare of persons detained therein), but because the disciplines of a Doctoral 
thesis do not permit their inclusion. 
It is now ten years since the CPT commenced its regime of visits and, 
concomitantly, the compilation of its corpus of standards. It may be appropriate therefore 
to attempt an evaluation of its standard-setting initiative, to ask whether it has formulated 
a realistic corpus of standards and whether it is reasonable to anticipate adherence to its 
precepts across Convention territory, as the Committee would clearly wish. It is worth 
considering further whether those standards, as expressed today, convey a sense of 
evolution: has their formulation remained static and inflexible or has the Committee 
sought to adapt its precepts as circumstances have changed, to reflect, for example, shifts 
in attitude in respect of the relationship between custodial and non-custodial sentencing 
practices or national immigration policy or 
- 
and of particularly compelling concern to 
the CPT, this 
- 
the accession to the ECPT of a number of central and eastern European 
States, possessed of a quite different set of political, economic and cultural priorities to 
their western European counterparts? 
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The extent of the CPI's task: the variable nature of Party practice 
Although this work has not attempted an exhaustive analysis of CPT standards or their 
impact on Party practice, it has examined sufficient areas of CPT concern, it is submitted, 
to gain a sense of the extent to which that practice accords with the standards set and the 
amount of work required in order to achieve wider conformity. This examination has 
yielded interesting results; indeed, in some respects, certain patterns in State practice may 
be discerned. Regarding safeguards in police custody, it is clear, for example, that 
Maltese law and practice possess a number of significant lacunae. In Malta (visited in 
both 1990 and 1995), none of the three "fundamental" safeguards, it appears, are 
expressly guaranteed, and police practice in respect of other safeguards 
- 
including the 
duty expressly to inform detainees of their rights at the outset of detention, the 
implementation of a code of conduct on interrogations, ' the maintenance of 
comprehensive custody records and the operation of effective complaints and inspection 
procedures2 
- 
is deficient in a number of important respects. Other States parties which, 
to varying degrees, appear consistently to have failed to meet CPT prescriptions in this 
area, include Austria, 3 Spain and, surprisingly, the Netherlands and a number of 
Scandinavian States, notably Sweden and Finland 
- 
although, contrarily, such States 
have, in other respects, developed practices which offer greater circumscription than that 
sought by the CPT. 4 It should be emphasised, however, that apparent deficiencies in the 
law and practice of these latter States has more often concerned a failure to make express 
' When visited in 1995, a "most satisfactory" draft code had been drawn up, but had not been brought into 
effect: see Malta II, para 37. 
'Neither of which procedures, it would appear, have been introduced in Malta: see Malta II, paras 42-3. 
3 However, cf Austrian law and practice on the enhanced protection afforded juveniles in police custody: 
above, p 72. 
` The attendance of "witnesses" at police interviews in Sweden, Finland and Iceland (see above, pp 156-8) 
is a case in point. 
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legislative provision, rather than a failure effectively to offer a right or safeguard in 
practice. 
By contrast with the number of instances of poor or unsatisfactory Party practice 
on detention in police custody, instances of entirely acceptable practice are rare. The 
development of Codes of Practice on a range of aspects of police custody in the various 
jurisdictions of the UK are as close as the CPT has yet come to a finding of good 
provision. That is not to say that notable examples of good practice cannot be found 
elsewhere. In France, for example, guidance on the conduct of interviews has long been 
provided; in the Netherlands, custody records are now held on computer and far-reaching, 
independent inspection mechanisms have been established in a number of cities; and in 
Switzerland, Portugal and France (again), corps of medical staff, independent of the 
police and permanently on call, authorised to carry out examinations of apprehended 
persons, have either been created or proposed. Nevertheless, it is clear that if the CPT is 
to see improvements made in the range of protections afforded persons detained by the 
police in all States parties, much work remains to be done. 
It is also clear, in the penal sphere, that efforts to tackle prison overcrowding will 
have to be redoubled if the phenomenon is to be satisfactorily addressed across 
Convention territory. Overcrowding remains one of the CPT's most compelling 
concerns. It is, indeed, arguably more compelling now than it was at its inception, 
particularly in light of the accession to the ECPT of a number of central and eastern 
European States, which, in some instances, have brought with them profound and long- 
established prison overcrowding problems. Generally, efforts on the part of Parties to 
reduce and/or eliminate prison overcrowding may be considered to have been far from 
urgent and resolute; indeed, on occasion, they have been desultory, little more than 
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rhetoric. Nevertheless, the policies adopted by the Swedish authorities in this area ought 
to be commended, while other notable efforts have been made, inter alia, by the 
Governments of Iceland and, to a lesser extent, Belgium. 
The analysis of the use of force and/or measures of restraint against detaineess has 
shown that a variety of methods are deployed by police officers and custodial staff to 
subdue agitated or violent detainees, many of which the CPT considers unsatisfactory per 
se. Further, the application of those whose use it finds acceptable (e. g. handcuffs) it has 
had occasion to criticise on account of the manner in which they have been applied. The 
use of force by police officers when apprehending an individual and the physical restraint 
of mentally disturbed persons are areas of particular concern and few Parties have been 
subject to no CPT comment or recommendation in these 
- 
and, indeed, a number of other 
- 
areas. It would, perhaps, be inappropriate, therefore, to single out particular Parties as 
offering instances of especially poor or inadequate practices. However, it cannot be 
doubted that CPT visits to central and eastern European Parties are likely to yield 
interesting results in this connection. 
Similarly, the use of seclusion by States parties 
- 
whether in the course of a 
criminal investigation or in prisons as a disciplinary sanction or for reasons of good order 
and security or in psychiatric establishments in the event of agitation or violence - has 
prompted very detailed CPT analysis. The inappropriate use of solitary confinement (and 
other restrictions) by the police in order to apply psychological pressure on criminal 
suspects has invited CPT censure, notably in reports to the Norwegian and Italian 
I Which analysis did not examine in any depth the notion of the deliberate ill-treatment, including torture, 
of detainees, allegations and findings of which do feature, often quite strongly, in the CPT's published 
work, particularly in the context of detention by the police (which, it is clear, occasions greater risk of ill- 
treatment than detention in prison 
- 
and indeed other 
- 
establishments): see, e. g., both public statements on 
Turkey, reports on the numerous visits to Spain between 1991 and 1998 and the first Cypriot visit report. 
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authorities, while the separation of "dangerous" prisoners from the general penal 
population has been the subject of extensive comment in reports, inter alia, to the Dutch, 
Spanish and Polish Governments. Further, individual segregation regimes have been 
examined in detail in the course of visits to England and Wales (in the particular context 
of a young offenders' institution) and Spain. 
What this analysis of a range of CPT standards and accompanying Party practice 
illustrates is just how varied such practice is in every area of CPT concern. While this 
makes academic analysis of the nature, evolution and impact of its precepts an 
interesting, though inexact, exercise, it renders the work of the Committee in the 
promotion of its standards, as well as the operation of its delegations in the field 
particularly difficult. In this regard, it will be intriguing to see how both its modus 
operandi and the manner in which it gives expression to its precepts alter, if at all, in this, 
its second, decade of operation, particularly if its efforts to effect change appear to it to be 
being frustrated. 
CPT standards: a general sense of stasis 
It is clear from a perusal of the CPT's published work that many of its standards have 
changed little since first being expressed in early visit and general reports. Its second and 
third annual reports, for instance, laid down a range of precepts on detention in police and 
prison establishments, and it is probably fair to say that in the intervening years, subject 
to a number of modest amendments, reflecting inter alia the variety of custodial 
situations encountered by visiting delegations, those precepts have altered little. 
This may be to do the CPT and its Secretariat a disservice. It may be that in some 
instances, few changes have been necessary, so fundamental and universal and so 
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exhaustively formulated are the principles in issue. The putative duty not to return 
foreign national detainees to countries where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that they would run a real risk of being tortured or ill-treated6 is not a precept that the 
CPT would ever wish to qualify in any way. 7 Further, it may be that the formulation of 
detailed precepts on certain custodial matters would take the Committee into areas that lie 
outside its mandate (which, it will be recalled, is to examine the treatment of detainees 
with a view to strengthening, if necessary, their protection against ill-treatment) and, 
therefore, which it may justifiably leave unexplored. Is there, for example, any need for 
it to consider in any depth the social rehabilitation of prisoners, as it has, on occasion, 
been minded to do? 8 
It may also be the case that the Committee has in fact made alterations to 
established precepts in the course of its life but that these are easily missed by the 
disinterested observer 
- 
though not by the CPT's State party interlocutors. The apparent 
downgrading of the importance which it attaches to the electronic recording of police 
interviews, as noted above, 9 is a case in point. Such subtle amendments do create 
difficulties for the analyst, who may be unable to determine what practical impact, if any, 
a slight alteration in the Committee's position on a particular issue has had or who, 
conversely, aware that modest changes in tenor may be found in its work, is driven to 
distraction in his efforts to discern in the texts of published reports gentle shifts in 
emphasis and nuance, with the result that he accords an unwarranted and misleading 
significance to mere changes in expression from one report to another. 
6 See, e. g., 7"' GR, para 32. 
Although States parties themselves may very well interpret the terms "substantial" and "real", as used in 
the formula, in different ways. $ See Portugal I, paras 95-6. 
Seep 179. 
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In sum, notwithstanding their comprehensive scope, there remains a sense of 
incompleteness about CPT precepts as currently formulated. This is disappointing given 
the perceived inadequacy of the European Prison Rules in contemporary Europe. 10 Does 
this apparent stasis signify that the Committee's standards have already attained the point 
of highest development, that they represent fully mature principles? Or does it, rather, 
indicate the attainment of a natural plateau, beyond which it would be fruitless to climb 
until respect among States parties for the principles already developed is universal or at 
least extensive? Only analysis of future reports will tell. 
Impact of CPT standards 
Impact on State party law and practice 
In the field, CPT delegations (comprising Committee members, experts and members of 
the Secretariat) have been extremely well received, by politicians, civil servants and 
NGOs alike. Visits are regarded as being carried out efficiently, with a sense of purpose, 
by a small group of appropriately specialist individuals. The reports which follow are 
perceived to be professionally prepared, on the whole accurately to represent domestic 
law, practice and observations made during the visit and to offer balanced and 
appropriate prescriptions. Anecdotally, the Committee is said to be performing a 
"valuable job", using methods that represent "a model for other monitoring bodies, 
domestic and international, to folloW'. 11 
It would be naive, however, to suggest that positive developments in criminal 
justice and penal policy among States parties to the ECPT subsequent to a visit are the 
10 See Evans and Morgan (1998), p 349. 
11 Idem, pp 353-4 and 355. 
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direct result of CPT intervention. Many other factors 
- 
not least pressure for change from 
within States 
- 
are clearly involved. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to 
detect any CPT influence on domestic policy. For instance, Mr. Andrew Coyle, former 
Governor of Brixton Prison, intimated at a seminar on the work of the Committee 
organised by the Association for the Prevention of Torture in Strasbourg in 1994 that 
criticisms in the CPT's first UK visit report helped bring about the closure of the prison's 
notorious F Wing. Evidence of more thoroughgoing influence, however, is difficult to 
discern. 12 
The principal problems confronting the CPT in seeking to influence domestic 
policy are essentially of its own making 
- 
or at least the result of the way in which the 
Convention is drafted. The Committee serves no judicial or quasi-judicial function. 
There is no guarantee that its findings will ever enter the public domain and therefore 
public and political discourse. 13 When they are made public 
- 
which event may take 
place a long time after the events to which they relate14 
- 
they are expressed in and terms 
and, for the overwhelming majority of Parties, a foreign language. 15 Further, there 
remains always, of course, the stigma of being an external organ of inspection, with a 
truly unprecedented interventionist mandate. 16 Is it any wonder, therefore, that CPT 
12 Although Evans and Morgan, for their part, offer a very striking illustration of CPT effectiveness. On the 
evidence of successive visit reports and their own observations, they contend, CPT intervention played a 
not insignificant part in precipitating an effective response on the part of the Cypriot authorities to findings 
of serious ill-treatment of suspects in police custody in 1992: see Evans and Morgan (1998), pp 206 and 
344. 
13 It is fortunate that the publication of the majority of visit reports has been authorised by Parties. 
14 Authorisation for the publication of the first Spanish and Cypriot visit reports, for example, was only 
obtained some five years after the visits concerned. 
15 CPT reports are written in French or English, the two working languages of the Council of Europe 
(although a number of its general reports have now been translated into a range of eastern European 
languages). 
16 For instance, on the day that the CPT's report on its 1997 visit to the UK was published (13th January 
2000), Ms. Molly Meacher, Chair of the Police Complaints Authority of England and Wales, asserted that 
the Committee was perceived as a group of outsiders with a limited knowledge of domestic police and 
penal systems. She illustrated her point by claiming that statistics used by the Committee, notably in its 
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0 
influence on domestic criminal justice and penal policy, at least on the evidence of its 
body of visit reports, is only peripheral? 
Accordingly, while the CPT may find it possible to secure modest changes to the 
custodial environment (the removal from service of a number of very small cubicles in 
Stockholm Central Police Station very shortly after the Committee's visit in 199117 is an 
example of a measure whose adoption was arguably precipitated by CPT observations), 
large-scale structural change, affecting large numbers of establishments or the general 
purport of criminal justice and penal policy is unlikely to flow directly from CPT 
intervention. 
It is also the case that in order fully to appreciate the true nature and extent of 
CPT standards, one must be prepared to read every published report, or at least a 
sufficient number to ensure that all aspects of deprivation of liberty that fall within the 
purview of the Committee's mandate have been dealt with. It is highly unlikely, 
however, that civil servants, politicians and even NGOs in any one Party systematically 
read each document published in Strasbourg; they are likely to read only those which are 
of immediate relevance to their own Party, perhaps even only those parts of documents 
which impinge on their particular area of interest or expertise (home affairs, immigration, 
health, etc. ). 18 This makes it very difficult to perceive CPT recommendations, comments 
and requests for information as part of a discrete and identifiable body of precepts. They 
are likely to be seen, rather, as an inchoate and unconsolidated mass of observation, 
complaint and injunction, relating to a very particular set of circumstances. 
first draft of the visit report 
- 
which the Authority had seen 
- 
were inaccurate (The World Tonight, BBC 
Radio 4,13`s January 2000). The report, it should be noted, devotes much space (paras 9-58) to the 
effectiveness of legal remedies for police misconduct in England and Wales. 17 See Sweden Response I, CPT/Inf (92) 6, p5 (regarding CPT criticism expressed in Sweden I, para 18). 18 See further in this connection 10th GR, pars 2. 
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Consequently, if the Committee is to see its corpus of standards promulgated qua corpus, 
it seems very likely that it will be obliged to undertake the task of consolidation itself 
(and be prepared, of course, regularly to update any elaborated code). 
Impact on ECHR jurisprudence ' 
As was seen in Chapter 3 above, the preventive work of the CPT has grown out of Article 
3, ECHR and the jurisprudence developed thereunder and is designed to enhance the 
protection of detainees afforded thereby. Unlike the European Commission and Court of 
Human Rights, 20 which are reactive, intervening only upon receiving complaints of 
breaches, inter alia, of Article 3, ECHR from individuals or States, the CPT intervenes ex 
officio, in a non judicial capacity, in order to assist States parties to strengthen detainees' 
protection against ill-treatment. Further, the CPT has much more latitude in its use of 
terminology. In describing situations encountered in the course of visits, it is not bound 
to use only the terms or the interpretations of terms developed by the Strasbourg organs; 
such terms and interpretations are considered by the Committee merely as points of 
reference or departure. Consequently, the relationship between the two systems is a 
potential source of conflict and confusion, particularly in light of the fact that contact 
between the two is practically unavoidable, so great is the overlap between their spheres 
of interest. This overlap will inevitably grow as the frequency with which published CPT 
" This is in no way intended to be a full account of the actual or potential impact of CPT standards on the 
work of the Strasbourg organs. Much more comprehensive analyses may be found, inter alia, in Peukert, 
Wolfgang, The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, in Morgan and Evans (1999), pp 85-102; and Murdoch, Jim, CPT Standards within the 
Context of the Council of Europe, also in Morgan and Evans (1999), pp 103-136. 
20 It should be noted that the dual Commission and Court procedure has now been replaced by a single 
Court following the entry into force of the Eleventh Protocol to the ECHR However, for the purposes of 
the present work, reference shall be made to the Commission as a recipient of applications alleging 
violations of the ECHR since it has, historically, had occasion to refer to CPT visit reports in its decisions. 
484 
reports are invoked before the new Court increases, an incipient trend prefigured, as we 
shall see, by developments in recent years. 
In some respects, it should be noted, the CPT appears quite content to rely on 
ECHR jurisprudence. The Explanatory Report to the ECPT, for instance, establishes the 
principle that the term "`deprivation of liberty' is to be understood within the meaning of 
Article 5 [ECHR] as elucidated by the case law of the European Court and Commission 
of Human Rights" 
. 
21 Consistent with this view, in its 7th General Report the Committee 
cited the judgment of the Court in Amuur v France22 as "vindicating" its assertion that a 
stay in a transit or "international" zone in an airport "can, depending on the 
circumstances, amount to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5(1)(f) of 
the [ECHR], and that consequently such zones fall within the Committee's mandate", 
notwithstanding the fact that, as the CPT's interlocutors have had occasion to point out, 
persons placed in such zones 
- 
principally persons refused entry to a country 
- 
are free to 
leave them at any moment by taking any international flight of their choice. 23 
Insofar as the reciprocal side of the relationship is concerned, it seems that CPT 
findings and observations may become used by the new Court for evidential purposes. It 
is, of course, not duty-bound to take cognisance of them. In Delazarus v UK, 24 the 
Applicant sought to rely, inter alia, on the contents of the CPT's first UK visit report in 
complaining that his treatment and conditions of detention in Wandsworth Prison 
21 See Explanatory Report, para 24. 
22 Amuur v France, Judgment of 25th June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights 1996-III-827. 
23 See 7`h GR, para 25. The Committee has also referred to the provisions of Article 8, ECHR (as well as 
Article 9 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) in respect of the treatment of administratively 
detained foreign national detainees, emphasising that "it is important to avoid any splitting up of the family 
unit, except where absolutely necessary 
... 
families of asylum seekers [should] remain together as far as 
ossible": see, e. g., Denmark 1, para 56. ý4 
Delazarus v UK, App No 17525/90, Comm Dec, 16's February 1993 (unpublished). 
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constituted inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3, ECHR. The visit 
report, it will be recalled, determined that conditions of detention in the gaol when visited 
in 1990 
- 
which visit took place during the Applicant's stay 
- 
were "very poor". It 
referred to a "pernicious combination of overcrowding, inadequate regime activities, lack 
of integral sanitation and poor hygiene" and concluded that "the overall 
environment... amounted... to inhuman and degrading treatment". 25 The Application was 
declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded, but is nevertheless significant because 
the Commission did not discountenance the relevance of the visit report in the context of 
the complaint. It merely sought to distinguish the CPT's concerns, namely the general 
conditions of detention obtaining in the establishment at the time of the visit, from its 
own, which was to consider the particular situation of the applicant before it. 26 In this 
regard, the Commission stated, the Applicant was unable to avail himself of CPT 
criticisms regarding the unsatisfactory levels of overcrowding obtaining in the prison, 
since, for the duration of his stay, he had been accommodated in a single cell - which fact 
had undoubtedly also alleviated the difficulties occasioned by the absence of integral 
sanitation. 27 
It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the different competences of the CPT and 
the Strasbourg organs, it is of course possible for an individual to be both the object of a 
CPT visit and to bring an application under the ECHR, since the intervention of the 
25 See above, p 270, quoted at p4 of the Commission's Decision on Admissibility, op cit, n 24, above. 
26 This distinction potentially limits the value of CPT visit reports to both Applicants and the Strasbourg 
institutions, since the CPT, as we have seen, is constrained from publishing data from which individual 
detainees' identities may be ascertained, without the latter's consent, while the Commission and Court are 
only competent to consider the circumstances particular to Applicant(s) before them. 
27 See p 11 of the Commission's Decision on Admissibility, op cit, n 24, above. The Commission also 
appeared to accept the probative relevance of CPT findings in Raphaie v UK, App No 20035/92, Comm 
Dec, 2od December 1993 (unpublished) (Application declared inadmissible as time-barred). 
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former does not preclude the latter. 28 Indeed, there is nothing to prevent the CPT from 
furnishing the new Court with allegations of the ill-treatment of particular individuals 
received in the course of its work. In its 7th General Report, for instance, it observed that: 
"[a]ny communications addressed to the CPT in Strasbourg by persons alleging 
that they are to be sent to a country where they run a risk of being subjected to 
torture or ill-treatment are immediately brought to the attention of the European 
Commission of Human Rights. The Commission is better placed than the CPT to 
examine such allegations and, if appropriate, take preventive action". 29 
Subsequent o Delazarus, the Commission more conspicuously took cognisance of CPT 
observations in reaching decisions as to admissibility, even though such observations 
necessarily concerned general conditions of detention. 30 Further, the Court made passing 
reference to CPT published work in adjudging that one particular Applicant had been the 
victim of torture. 31 References like these, it seems, are of use in a contextual sense, as 
28 Article 17(2), ECPT provides that "Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or 
derogating from the competence of the organs of the European Convention on Human Rights... " 
29 See 7" GR, para 33. 
30 See, e. g., LJ v Finland, App No 21221/93, Comm Dec, 28`h June 1995 (unpublished) (in which the 
Commission determined that there had been no breach of Article 3, though in so doing it took account of 
observations made in the CPT's first Finnish visit report and the Finnish Government's interim and follow- 
up reports); Tosunoglu v Greece, App No 21892/93, Comm Dec, 12th April 1996 (unpublished) (Application declared inadmissible since the conditions on which the Applicant sought to rely fell short of 
the Article 3 threshold. Observations made in the CPT's first Greek visit report regarding prevailing 
conditions at Larissa Prison in 1993 were noted by the Commission in reaching its Decision); and Peers v 
Greece, App No 28524/95, Comm Dec, 21" May 1998 (unpublished) (Application declared admissible and 
express reference made in the Commission's decision to CPT findings in respect of Korydallos Prison). 
See, now, A. D. D. B. v Netherlands, App No 37328/97, Court Decision of 5`h September 2000 (unpublished), 
wherein the new Court, in declaring admissible an application for breaches inter alia of Articles 3 and 8, 
ECHR, referred under the heading "Relevant international material" to findings in the three published 
Netherlands Antilles visit reports, as well as to the authorities' most recent response. 
31 See Aydin v Turkey, Judgment of 27th September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights 1997-VI-1866 (referring to the two Public Statements issued in respect of 
Turkey in 1992 and 1996, the contents of which were relied on by the Applicant in support of her 
complaint, which reliance, it is worth noting, was mentioned by the Commission in its report on the matter: 
see Aydin v Turkey, App No 23178/94, Comm Rep, 7's March 1996). See, more recently, Akkoc v Turkey, 
Judgment of 1& October 2000 (unpublished) (wherein the Court referred, in addition, to CPT precepts on 
the independent medical examination of detainees in finding a violation of Article 3, ECHR: at para 118). 
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objective and impartial indicia of the circumstances obtaining in an establishment at the 
time of incidents giving rise to an application or as means of illustrating that the 
conditions of detention or the conduct of custodial staff about which an applicant 
complains were not confined to him/her. However, they are not determinative; they 
comprise just one of a number of considerations taken into account by the Strasbourg 
organs, the extent of whose influence will vary from case to case. 
To date, the case of Aerts v Belgium represents the most developed use of CPT 
visit reports. Therein, the Applicant alleged that his treatment in the psychiatric wing of 
Lantin Prison had been inhuman and degrading on account of the detrimental effects to 
his psyche occasioned by exposure to the prevailing conditions and irregular medical 
care. Following its visit to the prison in 1993,32 the CPT had criticised the standard of 
care afforded patients on the wing concerned, remarking that it "fell, in every respect, 
below the minimum level acceptable from an ethical and humanitarian point of view". 33 
Its remarks were useful since they afforded objective evidence of the situation of the 
Applicant, who, due to mental disorder, was unable to provide clear evidence himself. 
The Commission narrowly found that there had been a breach of Article 3.34 The Court, 
however, did not follow suit, averring that the Applicant had failed to demonstrate that he 
himself had suffered adversely from the conditions of which he complained, or at least, 
32 The visit took place very shortly after the Applicant had been transferred to a more suitable 
establishment. 
33 See Belgium I, para 191. 
34 Aerts v Belgium, App No 25357/94, Comm Rep, 20`h May 1997, at 81-2. The minority suggested that the 
CPT's failure to describe the situation on the wing concerned in terms which brought it within the ambit of 
Article 3- namely, "inhuman or degrading" 
- 
helped to demonstrate that the Article 3 threshold had not 
been crossed. It has been seen, however, that the CPT does not consider that it is constrained to use Article 
3 terminology in describing its findings. In the light of this view, the contention of the minority is a little 
misleading, it is submitted. 
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had not suffered sufficiently adversely to justify an application for breach of Article 3.35 
Nevertheless, the CPT's description of the conditions on the affected wing was 
significant, it appears, since it indicated that continued detention therein might 
conceivably have taken detainees' treatment across the Article 3 threshold. It was simply 
that in his particular circumstances, the Applicant had not been able to prove that the 
threshold had been crossed. 
In Aerts, we again see the fundamental difference between the concerns of the 
CPT and those of the Court (the Commission, it may be argued, exceeded its competence 
in fording as it did). The Court focused, correctly, on the circumstances of the individual 
applicant; the CPT, for its part, on the general conditions obtaining in the wing 
concerned. While important in a probative sense, therefore, the value of CPT reports in 
substantiating applications under the ECHR and in assisting the new Court in reaching its 
determinations may be limited; the nature of their respective competences does not 
readily permit reference in individual applications to general circumstances - unless, of 
course, the applicant can prove that he himself was adversely affected by such 
circumstances. 36 
As far as the CPT is concerned, however, this distinction of competences has 
significant advantages. If the Court is unable readily to avail itself of evidence of 
general, systemic failures on the part of States when censuring them, then the CPT 
33 Aerts v Belgium, Judgment of 30'h July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights 1998-V-1939. The Court did, however, appear to accept the CPT's conclusion that the 
care afforded the Applicant had fallen below the "minimum level acceptable from the ethical and 
humanitarian point of view". 
36 In this regard, see, now, Magee v UK, Judgment of 6`b June 2000 (unpublished), wherein the new Court 
remarked that it had "examined" the findings and recommendations of the CPT on detention conditions 
obtaining in the Castlereagh Holding Centre in 1993 (see UK II) and had concluded that the Applicant 
should have been granted access to a lawyer in the initial stages of his custody as a "counterweight to the 
intimidating atmosphere specifically devised to sap his will and make him confide in his interrogators". 
The denial of such access amounted to a breach of Article 6 ECHR, it averred (at pars 43 of the judgment). 
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remains the only Council of Europe-inspired mechanism whose findings in respect of 
particular establishments (or parts of establishments) or particular categories of detainee 
or even entire national systems may be regarded as authoritative - and, it is to be hoped, 
influential 
- 
in highlighting areas of concern. The question must be asked, therefore: in 
the light of its unique position, should the CPT feel constrained to interpret Article 3, 
ECHR consistently with the old Commission and the Court? If it does, then it may be 
expected that its findings will be invoked more and more in applications under the 
Human Rights Convention. If it does not 
- 
and given the language used by it on 
occasion, this seems the most likely possibility37 
- 
then, while its reports may be 
perceived to be, rightly or wrongly, of limited value in actions before the Court, the CPT 
may be able to forge for itself a distinct and influential role in safeguarding the welfare of 
detainees in Council of Europe member States, all the while, perhaps, helping to alter in 
some incremental way understandings and interpretations of concepts like "torture", 38 
"inhuman" and "degrading". The ECPT may be in this respect a creative mechanism, 
supplementing the protective machinery of the ECHR in potentially interesting ways. 39 
Application of CPT standards 
Analysis of its published work indicates that the CPT has sought to promulgate its 
fundamental precepts consistently throughout its working life. In visit reports, few, if 
" It will be recalled that the Committee seeks to establish "a degree of protection which is greater than that 
upheld by the European Commission and European Court of Human Rights": see 1a GR, para 5. 
3 Although contemporary understandings of torture are quite fixed and clear and unlikely to alter much. 
39 In this connection, see Murdoch's very interesting disquisition on the way in which it may be possible for 
the CPT to fill the gaps in the standards developed under Article 5, ECHR jurisprudence in order to 
establish a range of precepts on pre-trial procedure in police custody, without in any way coming into 
conflict with the norms developed by the Commission and Court, in CPT Standards within the Context of 
the Council of Europe, in Morgan and Evans (1999), pp 103-136, at 130-134. Murdoch envisages a 
"dovetailing" of the two systems in order to create a "more complete" European code of criminal 
procedure. 
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any, differences in language are to be found regarding the manner in and emphasis with 
which such precepts are expressed. Moreover, in interview, Committee members 
themselves have expressly disavowed any variable or relative application of standards 
based, inter alia, on financial, cultural and/or political differences between Parties. 40 
The texts of visit reports, however, suggest that this refusal to countenance 
differences in the application of standards is a little misplaced. In practice, there appears 
to have emerged what has been characterised as a doctrine of "variable geometry", 
relating to the CPT's expectations of the achievement of its standards: "a doctrine, in 
effect, of same standards, different pace... "41 As might be expected, this doctrine has 
emerged in particular, albeit rather tentatively it may be argued, following the accession 
of a number of central and eastern European States to the Convention. To the Bulgarian 
authorities, for example, in the light of protestations in 1995 that "certain budgetary 
problems" would leave psychiatric hospitals "in an unfavourable financial position for a 
long period of time", 42 the CPT remarked that: 
"... [it] fully accepts that in times of economic difficulty, sacrifices have to be 
made... However, there are certain basic necessities of life the provision of which 
must be considered as a priority in institutions where the State has persons under 
its care and/or custody... "43 
44 See Evans and Morgan (1998), p 349 (referring to the authors' very revealing interview with the Bureau 
of the CPT). 
41 Ibid. As Evans and Morgan point out, the existence of a doctrine of variable geometry has been 
acknowledged by the first President of the CPT, who has remarked that, after much debate in its early 
years, the Committee ultimately settled on a policy whereby standards would be judged in the light of the 
"specific history and degree of economic development of each state". Consequently, although certain 
fundamental issues (such as what constitutes "inhuman" treatment) would remain constant, local 
circumstances - and their effect on the "prevailing mentality" in a Party - would be taken into account in 
the formulation of recommendations: see Cassese (1996), pp 27-8. 
42 See Bulgaria I, para 194. 
43 Idem, para 195. The basic necessities referred to include adequate food and heating and appropriate 
medication. 
491 
"A failure to meet this requirement", it continued, "can lead rapidly to situations falling 
within the scope of the term `inhuman and degrading treatment"'. Accordingly, 
sufficient budgetary resources should be made available, it suggested, to "ensure" the 
provision of those basic necessities. Significantly however, the Committee added that 
"[o]bviously, as soon as economic circumstances permit, additional steps should be 
taken" with a view to effecting further, less compelling improvements. 44 
Undeniably, therefore, a policy has emerged by virtue of which the CPT, while 
making it clear that the implementation of its standards by all Parties, regardless of 
circumstance, is its desired objective, is prepared to distinguish the way in and timetable 
according to which those standards should be given practical effect, which distinction is 
based on prevailing local conditions. 45 The terms used to express such a distinction are 
interesting: some improvements 
- 
notably efforts to reduce overcrowding 
- 
it considers, 
should be taken "immediately"; others, it believes, require of authorities "serious 
efforts... as soon as possible"; others "vigorous steps"; others still should be "accorded a 
high priority"; while some merely require the giving of "more attention". 46 
Setting standards for a diverse and diversifying continent 
In the light of the unanticipated speed with which large numbers of central and eastern 
European States have acceded to the ECPT and the likelihood of further such accessions 
- 
as well as the possible incorporation of certain, non-European States once the First 
44 Ibid (emphasis added). See in the same connection idem, para 203 and para 62 (regarding provision in 
Bulgarian police establishments); and Romania I, paras 71 (also regarding provision in police 
establishments), 124 (regarding provision in prisons) and 179 (psychiatric hospitals). 
as Evans and Morgan, for their part, consider the CPT's acceptance of a "'two speed' or culturally relative 
Europe" as "to some extent inevitable": see Evans and Morgan (1998), p 351. 
'6 See Bulgaria I, para 125. 
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Protocol to the ECPT enters into force 
- 
the level at which CPT standards are pitched has 
taken on a particular significance. It is clear from the analysis in Chapter 3 that the CPT 
considers itself free, in practice, to draw on the provisions of any number of international 
instruments relevant to its mandate and the jurisprudence developed thereunder as 
sources for its standard-setting work. It has stated, recently, for example, that, in certain 
respects, its own standards may be regarded as "complementary" to those which have 
emerged under the aegis of other international instruments, 47 and that, accordingly, in 
formulating precepts on women in places of detention, it has been led and influenced by 
standards developed under the ECHR, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and 
the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment. 48 
It is clear, too, that ECHR jurisprudence, notably that developed under Article 3, 
is an important point of reference, while good State party law and practice, offers a most 
immediate and compelling source on which to draw. In fact, it would appear from a close 
scrutiny of published reports that reference to State practice is an especially potent 
expedient for the Committee, useful in order to illustrate a particular precept or to 
reinforce a particular point of view. The CPT's rather spare general formulation on 
policies to reduce and, ultimately, eliminate, prison overcrowding, considered above, in 
Chapter 15, for example, may be considered to have been augmented by principles drawn 
from various national laws and practices which accord with its basic premise and which 
are cited by it in visit reports. Similarly, approbatory references to the comprehensive 
47 See 1 Oth GR, Para 22. 
49 Ibid. 
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provisions of Codes of Practice developed, inter alfa, in England and Wales in order 
better to protect persons detained by the police may be said to illumine a number of CPT 
precepts and to demonstrate just how readily such precepts may be realised in practice. 
Lastly in the present connection, reference might usefully be made to a very particular 
instance in which, it is plain, the CPT was influenced by State practice across Convention 
territory in the formulation of the precept concerned. Regarding the treatment of 
imprisoned expectant mothers, "[i]t is axiomatic", it proclaimed recently, "that babies 
should not be born in prison and the usual practice in Council of Europe member States 
seems to be, at the moment, to transfer pregnant women prisoners to outside hospitals". 49 
Clearly, the CPT's preference, it may be inferred, is for such transfers to be authorised in 
the event that a pregnant woman is imprisoned, and the determining factor, it seems, is 
contemporary Party practice. 
If the CPT is to become truly effective, therefore, and bring about fundamental 
and lasting change on a wide range of custodial matters in States across Europe (indeed, 
with the accession to the ECPT of the Russian Federation, across the Eurasian landmass), 
it must develop ways of drawing together all these disparate influences, allowing them to 
diffuse and coalesce, until, ultimately, its desired objective, viz., the creation of common 
standards of protection for persons deprived of their liberty in all PartiesSO - including, 
conceivably, States beyond Europe 
- 
crystallises. Its standards, therefore, are not 
international or European in the sense of their deriving directly from standards extant in 
international or European human rights law. They are truly international and truly 
European in that they emerge from a fertile mixture of precepts contained in and 
49 See 10th GR, para 27 (emphasis added). 
30 See above, p 47. 
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developed under a range of international instruments, binding and otherwise, as well as, 
significantly, the provision made by the States whose practices it monitors. 
In this regard, it is possible, clearly, to agree the content of certain common 
standards in the prevention of ill-treatment (the duty not to return persons to countries 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that they run a real risk of torture or ill- 
treatment, referred to above, is a case in point), notwithstanding differences, sometimes 
profound, between States' cultural and political traditions and, most significantly, 
economic development. Much less easy, it is submitted, is to secure consensus on many 
other matters which fall within the CPT's sphere of interest or which it has interpreted as 
falling within that sphere. As we have seen, even determining the content of its 
"fundamental" safeguards against ill-treatment in police custody can prove contentious 
and provoke strong reaction. 
Perhaps the Committee would be advised, therefore, to formulate bespoke 
standards, to tailor its recommendations to specific circumstances, even to specific cases. 
To a certain extent, as we have seen, it has achieved this 
- 
though how consciously is a 
moot point 
- 
in the context of its elaboration of standards on the use of force/restraint and 
the application of measures of solitary confinement in places of detention. In respect of 
both these areas of concern, a number of precepts may be considered to have emerged 
from the Committee's analysis of particular situations encountered in the course of visits 
(for instance, in the context of solitary confinement, the use made of the country's 
Prosecution Instructions by Norwegian police officers in order to exert psychological 
pressure on criminal suspects; or, in respect of the use of force, the systematic 
deployment of outside security forces in the event of prison disturbances, inter alia, in 
Portugal). Some commentators favour this approach very strongly, asserting that: 
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"... CPT reports would command greater attention, both domestically and 
internationally, if [they] established more precisely and on a case by case basis 
precisely how the adoption of its recommendations would make it less likely that 
particular forms of ill-treatment would occur in specific, identified contexts. 
Moreover, given the pressures of time and cost, the CPT should be prepared to 
prioritise its recommendations in order to assist the state to prepare a useful and 
realistic plan of action, the response and development of which could be 
monitored in detail. In short, the CPT should furnish each state party with 
something akin to a custom-made programme tailored to its particular 
circumstances and needs rather than the off-the-peg set of recommendations 
which are currently made". sl 
There would be much merit in such an approach, it is submitted. It would undoubtedly 
enhance and focus the dialogue between the Committee and States parties and render the 
CPT's standard-setting work potentially more efficacious. At the same time, it would not 
preclude the formulation of general, though not immutable, principles as guidelines of 
potentially universal appeal. There is nothing inconsistent, it is submitted, in developing, 
concurrently, tailored recommendations and general guidance. The one complements the 
other: tailored recommendations may be considered a most appropriate means of 
preventing ill-treatment (which, after all, is what the CPT is mandated to do) in particular 
circumstances; while the formulation of general guidance marks a not insignificant step 
towards the development of uniform standards. 
51 See Morgan and Evans (1999), p 27. 
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If the CPT is ever to achieve this last objective, it is important that it 
conscientiously seeks to develop flexible principles. Its mandate is to prevent ill- 
treatment, not to secure rigid conformity with an exhaustive body of precepts. If the 
former can be achieved without the latter, then the CPT will have served its purpose; 
there will be no need for it to seek the adoption of the same principles everywhere. 
Accordingly, its standards "should not be allowed to become ends in themselves: they are 
at best means to an end". 52 
This view does not, it is hoped, invalidate the purport of this thesis, the object of 
which is to identify and, if possible, expound the Committee's evolving corpus of 
standards. It merely places the CPT's standard-setting work in some kind of context and 
indicates how it might be exploited in the fulfilment of its preventive mandate. That 
work remains crucial to the effective functioning of the CPT. Accordingly, though its 
"measuring rods" are arguably inchoate and occasionally ill-defined, their promulgation 
through the medium inter alia of its visit and general reports represents, it is submitted, a 
most significant and commendable advance in the protection of detainees against ill- 
treatment. At the same time, however, the Committee should be encouraged to exploit 
the undoubted trust in its work and good will shown towards it by States parties in order 
to formulate a distinct and authoritative code of standards, recourse to which 
- 
by visiting 
delegations and local authorities alike 
- 
should be vigorously promoted, notwithstanding 
the inherent prescriptive limitations of the CPT's mandate. 
52 Ibid. 
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APPENDIX 
CPT Documents 
TABLE A 
CPT VISIT REPORTS 
COUNTRY CITATION IN DOCUMENT DATE CPT DATE OF 
THE TEXT OF REFERENCE PUBLICATION 
VISIT 
Andorra Andorra I First Report to the Andorran 27.05.98- CPT/Inf (2000) 11 20.07.00 
Government 29.05.98 
Austria Austria I First Report to the Austrian 20.05.90- CPT/! nf (91) 10 03.10.91 
Government 27.05.90 
Austria II Second Report to the Austrian 26.09.94- CPT/Inf (96) 28 31.10.96 
Government 07.10.94 
Belgium Belgium I First Report to the Belgian 14.11.93- CPT/Inf (94) 15 14.10.94 
Government 23.11.93 
Belgium II Second Report to the Belgian 31.08.97- CPT/Inf (98) 11 1&06.98 
Government 12.09.97 
Bulgaria Bulgaria I First Report to the Bulgarian 26.03.95- CPT/Inf (97) 1 06.03.97 
Government 07.04.95 
Cyprus Cyprus l First Report to the Cypriot 02.11.92- CPT/Inf (97) 5 22.05.97 
Government 09.11.92 
Cyprus H Second Report to the Cypriot 12.05.96- CPT/Inf (97)5 22.05.97 
Government 21.05.96 
Czech Czech Republic First Report to the 16.02.97- CPT/Inf (99) 7 15.04.99 
Republic I Government of the Czech 26.02.97 
Republic 
Denmark Denmark I First Report to the Danish 02.12.90- CPT/Inf (91) 12 03.10.91 
Government 08.12.90 
Denmark II Second Report to the Danish 29.09.96- CPT/Inf (97) 4 24.04.97 
Government 09.10.96 
Finland Finland I First Report to the Finnish 10.05.92- CPT/Inf (93) 8 01.04.93 
Government 20.05.92 
Finland H Second Report to the Finnish 07.06.98- CPT/Inf (99) 9 11.05.99 
Government 17.06.98 
France France I First Report to the French 27.10.91- CPT/Inf (93) 2 19.01.93 
Government 0& 11.91 
France II Second Report to the French 20.07.94- CPT/Inf (96) 2 23.01.96 
Government 22.07.94 
France III Third Report to the French 06.10.96- CPT/Inf (98) 7 14.015.98 
Government 1&10.96 
France France First Report to the French 03.07.94- CPT/Inf (96) 24 24.09.96 
(Martinique) (Martinique) I Government (Martinique) 07.07.9 4 
Germany Germany I First Report to the German 08.12.91- CPT/Inf (93) 13 19.07.93 
Government 20.12.91 
Germany II Second Report to the German 14.04.96- CPT/Inf (97) 9 17.07.97 
Government 26.04.96 
Germany III Third Report to the German 25.05.98- CPT/Inf (99)10 27.05.99 
Government 27.05.98 
Greece Greece I First Report to the Greek 14.03.93- CPT/Inf (94) 20 29.11.94 
Government 26.03.93 
Hungary Hungary I First Report to the Hungarian 01.11.94- CPT/Int (96) 5 01.02.96 
Government 14.11.94 
Iceland Iceland I First Report to the Icelandic 06.07.93- CPT/Inf (94) 8 28.06.94 
Government 12.07.93 
Iceland II Second Report to the Icelandic 29.03.98- CPT/Inf (99) 1 16.02.99 
Government 06.04.98 
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COUNTRY CITATION IN DOCUMENT DATE CPT DATE OF 
THE TEXT OF REFERENCE PUBLICATION 
VISIT 
Ireland Ireland I First Report to the Irish 26.09.93- CPTIInf (95) 14 13.12.95 
Government 05.10.93 
Ireland I Second Report to the Irish 31.08.98- CPT/Inf (99) 15 17.12.99 
Government 09.09.98 
Italy Italy I First Report to the Italian 15.03.92- CPT/Inf (95) 1 31.01.95 
Government 27.03.92 
Italy II Second Report to the Italian 22.10.95- CPT/Inf (97) 12 04.12.97 
Government 06.11.95 
Liechtenstein Liechtenstein I First Report to the 14.04.93- CPTIInf (95) 7 23.05.95 
Government of Liechtenstein 16.04.93 
Luxembourg Luxembourg I First Report to the 17.01.93- CPT/In( (93) 19 1111.93 
Government of Luxembourg 25.01.93 
Luxembourg II Second Report to the 20.04.97- CPT/Inf (98) 16 03.12.98 
Government of Luxembourg 25.04.97 
Malta Malta I First Report to the Maltese 01.07.90- CPTIInf (92) 5 01.10.92 
Government 09.07.90 
Malta II Second Report to the Maltese 16.07.95- CPT/Inf (96) 25 26.09.96 
Government 21.07.95 
Netherlands Netherlands I First Report to the Dutch 30.08.92- CPT/Inf (93) 15 15.07.93 
Government 08.09.92 
Netherlands II Second Report to the Dutch 17.11.97- CPTIInf (98) 15 29.09.98 
Government 27.11.97 
Netherlands Netherlands First Report to the Dutch 30.06.94- CPT/Inf (96) 27 03.10.96 
(Aruba) (Aruba) I Government (Aruba) 02.07.94 
Netherlands Netherlands First Report to the Dutch 26.06.94- CPT/Inf (96)1 18.01.96 
(Netherlands (NA) I Government (Netherlands 30.06.94 
Antilles) Antilles) 
Netherlands Second Report to the Dutch 07.12.97- CPT/Inf (98) 17 10.12.98 
(NA) II Government (Netherlands 11.12.97 
Antilles) 
Netherlands Third Report to the Dutch 25.01.99- CPT/Inf (2000) 9 25.05.00 
(NA) III Government (Netherlands 29.01.99 
Antilles) 
Norway Norway l First Report to the Norwegian 27.06.93- CPT/Int (94) 11 21.09.94 
Government 06.07.93 
Norway II Second Report to the 17.03.97- CPTIInf (97) 11 05.09.97 
Norwegian Government 21.03.97 
Poland Poland I First Report to the Polish 30.06.96- CPT/Inf (98) 13 24.09.98 
Government 12.07.96 
Portugal Portugal I First Report to the Portuguese 19.01.92- CPT/Inf (94) 9 22.07.94 
Government 28.01.92 
Portugal II Second Report to the 14.05.95- CPT/Inf (96) 31 21.11.96 
Portuguese Government 26.05.95 
Portugal III Third Report to the 20.10.96- CPT/Inf (98) 1 13.01.98 
Portuguese Government 24.10.96 
Romania Romania I First Report to the Romanian 24.09.95- CPT/Inf (98) 5 19.02.98 
Government 06.10.95 
San Marino San Marino I First Report to the 25.03.92- CPT/Inf (94) 13 12.10.94 
Government of San Marino 27.03.92 
Slovakia Slovakia I First Report to the Slovakian 25.06.95- CPT/Inf (97) 2 03.04.97 
Government 07.07.95 
Slovenia Slovenia I First Report to the Slovenian 19.02.95- CPT/Inf (96) 18 27.06.96 
Government 28.02.95 
Spain Spain I First Report to the Spanish 01.04.91- CPT/Inf (96) 9 05.03.96 
Government 12.04.91 
Spain II Second Report to the Spanish 10.04.94- CPT/Inf (96) 9 05.03.96 
Government 22.04.94 
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COUNTRY CITATION IN DOCUMENT DATE CPT DATE OF 
THE TEXT OF REFERENCE PUBLICATION 
VISIT 
Spain III Third Report to the Spanish 10.06.94- CPTIInf (96) 9 03.03.96 
Government 14.06.94 
Spain IV Fourth Report to the Spanish 21.04.97- CPT/Inf (98) 9 19.05.98 
Government 28.04.97 
Spain V Fifth Report to the Spanish 17.01.97- CPT/Inf (2000) 3 13.04.00 
Government 18.01.97 
Spain VI Sixth Report to the Spanish 22.11.98- CPT/Inf (2000) 5 13.04.00 
Government 04.12.98 
Sweden Sweden I First Report to the Swedish 03.05.91- CPTIInf (92) 4 12.03.92 
Government 14.05.91 
Sweden II Second Report to the Swedish 23.08.94- CPTIInf (95) S 03.04.95 
Government 26.08.94 
Sweden III Third Report to the Swedish 15.02.98- CPT/Inf (99) 25.02.99 
Government 25.02.98 
Switzerland Switzerland I First Report to the Swiss 21.07.91- CPTIInf (93) 3 27.01.93 
Government 29.07.91 
Switzerland II Second Report to the Swiss 11.02.96- CPT/Inf (97) 7 26.06.97 
Government 23.02.96 
Turkey Turkey I Report to the Turkish 05.10.97- CPT/Inf (99) 2 23.02.99 
Government* 17.10.97 
Turkey PS I First Public Statement CPT/Inf (93) 12 Issued 15.12.92 
Appendix 4 
Turkey PS II Second Public Statement CPTIIot (96) 34 Issued 06.12.96 
United UK I First Report to the United 29.07.90- CPT/Inf (91) 15 26,11.91 
Kingdom Kingdom Government 10.08.90 
UK II Second Report to the United 20.07.93- CPT/Inf (94) 17 17.11.94 
Kin dom Government 29.07.93 
UK III Third Report to the United 15.05.94- CPT/Inf (96) 11 05.03.96 
Kingdom Government 31.05.9 4 
UK IV 1 Fourth Report to the United 08.09.97- CPT/Inf (2000) 1 13.01.00 
Kingdom Government 17.09.97 
As at 18th August 2000, Turkey had been visited by the CPT on nine occasions. 
However, only one visit report (relating to the most recent of those visits) has 
been published. It is cited in the text as "Turkey I" for ease of reference. 
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TABLE B 
CPT GENERAL REPORTS 
CITATION IN REPORT CPT DATE OF 
THE TEXT REFERENCE PUBLICATION 
1'` GR 1`` General Report on the CPT (91) 3 20.02.91 
CPT's Activities covering the 
period November 1989 to 
December 1990 
2° GR 2° General Report on the CPT/Inf (92) 3 13.04.92 
CPT's Activities covering the 
period 1 January to 31 
December 1991 
3 GR 3" General Report on the CPT/Inf (93) 12 04.06.93 
CPT's Activities covering the 
period 1 January to 31 
December 1992 
4` GR 4 General Report on the CPT/Inf (94) 10 10.08.94 
CPT's Activities covering the 
period 1 January to 31 
December 1993 
5` GR 5` General Report on the CPT/Inf (95) 10 03.07.95 
CPT's Activities covering the 
period 1 January to 31 
December 1994 
6 GR 6 General Report on the CPT/Inf (96) 21 05.08.96 
CPT's Activities covering the 
period 1 January to 31 
December 1995' 
7` GR 7` General Report on the CPT/Inf (97) 10 22.08.97 
CPT's Activities covering the 
period 1 January to 31 
December 1996 
8` GR 8 General Report on the CPT/Inf (98) 12 31.08.98 
CPT's Activities covering the 
period 1 January to 31 
December 1997 
9 GR 9 General Report on the CPT/Inf (99) 12 30.08.99 
CPT's Activities covering the 
period 1 January to 31 
December 1998 
10` GR 10` General Report on the CPT/Inf 19.08.00 
CPT's Activities covering the (2000)13 
Period 1 January to 31 
December 1999 
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TABLE C 
OTHER CPT DOCUMENTS 
DOCUMENT CPT DATE OF 
REFERENCE PUBLICATION/ 
ADOPTION 
Text of the Convention and Explanatory H (87) 4 and 07.07.87 
Report CPT/Inf (91) 9 
European Committee for the Prevention of 16.11.89. Amended 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 08.03.90,11.05.90, 
Treatment or Punishment: Rules of 09.11.90,31.01.91 and 
Procedure 20.09.91 
Some Issues concerning the interpretation CPT/Inf (93) 10 03.05.93 
of the ECPT 
Historical background and main features CPT/Inf (89) 2 
- 
of the Convention 
Text of Protocols No.! and 2 to the ECPT CPT/Inf (93) 17 06.10.93 
Information on the ECPT: 
(A) Signatures and Ratifications of the CPT/Inf (93) 18 26.11.93 
Convention 
(B) Declarations and Notifications 
Information on the European Committee CPT/Inf (94) 2 01.06.94 
for the Prevention of Ill-treatment 
Information on the ECPT: 
(A) Signatures and Ratifications of the 
Convention 
(B) Signatures and Ratifications of Protocol CPT/Inf (94) 14 12.09.94 
No. 1 
(C) Signatures and Ratifications of Protocol 
No. 2 
(D) Declarations and Notifications 
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